diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index 8a9b780..c45665b 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ jobs:
       # so it is not done either. What reaches users is built, installed and walked through Phase 16
       # of docs/manual-checks.md by a person first.
       - name: package the windows desktop client
+        id: winpack
         if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -374,6 +375,93 @@ jobs:
           ls -la "$releases"
           echo "Packaged DodoSSH $packVersion for win-x64, from a build MinVer calls $version."
 
+          # Handed to the macOS step below rather than worked out again there. The floor logic above
+          # is thirty lines of reasoning about MinVer's pre-first-tag answer, and a second copy of it
+          # is a second thing to keep in step — while two desktop packages built from one commit
+          # carrying different version numbers is precisely the confusion this file spends that
+          # reasoning to avoid.
+          echo "packVersion=$packVersion" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      # ◆ AND THE macOS BUNDLE IS BUILT HERE, ON LINUX, AND IS ALSO THROWN AWAY.
+      #
+      # Same argument as the Windows step above, one platform along: the failures a release is most
+      # exposed to are the ones only the packager finds, and the person who would otherwise find them
+      # is the one midway through a release on the one Mac that can cut one.
+      #
+      # What this catches that the Windows step cannot: the osx-arm64 restore graph. A native package
+      # that resolves for win-x64 and has no osx-arm64 asset — libsodium and SkiaSharp both ship per
+      # RID — fails here, on every main build, rather than at the first `dotnet publish` of a release
+      # nobody can retry without a Mac.
+      #
+      # ◆ bundle, NOT pack, AND THE DIFFERENCE IS NOT A CHOICE.
+      #
+      # `vpk [osx]` cross-compiling from a non-Mac offers exactly one packaging verb: bundle, which
+      # builds the .app. There is no `[osx] pack` off a Mac, and that is correct rather than a gap —
+      # pack signs with codesign, submits to Apple with notarytool and staples the ticket, all of
+      # which is Apple tooling that exists on no other platform. So this proves the bundle and stops
+      # where the platform does.
+      #
+      # No --plist and no --icon either, deliberately. Both are proved by scripts/release-macos.sh on
+      # the machine that can also check the result; passing a rendered plist here would mean copying
+      # the substitution out of that script to no end, since nothing looks at what this produces.
+      #
+      # ◆ NOTHING IS UPLOADED, FOR THE REASON THE WINDOWS STEP GIVES.
+      #
+      # RUNNER_TEMP, dying with the job. ADR 0013 rule 3 puts the capability to ship somebody a build
+      # on a machine which is not a runner, and an unsigned .app is additionally something no Mac
+      # would open — so publishing it would be handing out a file whose only possible use is confusion.
+      - name: publish and bundle the macos desktop client
+        if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+
+          # RestoreLockedMode=false for the RID, exactly as the win-x64 publish above does — see the
+          # long note there for why the committed lock files are deliberately RID-free. This runner's
+          # checkout is thrown away, so the lock files it rewrites go nowhere.
+          dotnet publish src/DodoSSH.Client.App/DodoSSH.Client.App.csproj \
+            --configuration Release --runtime osx-arm64 --self-contained true \
+            -p:RestoreLockedMode=false \
+            --output "$RUNNER_TEMP/osx-arm64"
+
+          # The apphost has no extension on macOS, so this is `DodoSSH` and not `DodoSSH.exe`. Named
+          # rather than globbed, because a publish that produced no apphost at all would otherwise
+          # bundle happily and produce an .app that launches nothing.
+          if [ ! -s "$RUNNER_TEMP/osx-arm64/DodoSSH" ]; then
+            echo "The osx-arm64 publish produced no apphost." >&2
+            ls -la "$RUNNER_TEMP/osx-arm64" >&2 || true
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          bundles="$RUNNER_TEMP/osx-bundle"
+
+          # The quotes around [osx] are load-bearing, exactly as they are on '[win]' above: unquoted,
+          # the shell reads it as a glob matching any one of o, s and x.
+          dotnet vpk '[osx]' bundle \
+            --skip-updates \
+            --packId DodoSSH.Desktop \
+            --packVersion '${{ steps.winpack.outputs.packVersion }}' \
+            --packDir "$RUNNER_TEMP/osx-arm64" \
+            --packTitle DodoSSH \
+            --packAuthors DodoTech \
+            --mainExe DodoSSH \
+            --bundleId dev.dodotech.dodossh \
+            --runtime osx-arm64 \
+            --channel osx \
+            --outputDir "$bundles"
+
+          # Asked for rather than inferred from an exit code, for the reason the Windows step gives.
+          # The Info.plist is the specific thing worth naming: a bundle missing it is a directory
+          # macOS will not treat as an application at all, and it is the one part of the .app that
+          # vpk composes rather than copies.
+          app="$bundles/DodoSSH.Desktop.app"
+          if [ ! -s "$app/Contents/Info.plist" ]; then
+            echo "vpk reported success and there is no Info.plist at $app/Contents/Info.plist." >&2
+            find "$bundles" -maxdepth 3 >&2 || true
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          echo "Bundled DodoSSH ${{ steps.winpack.outputs.packVersion }} for osx-arm64."
+
       # This includes the end-to-end suite, which starts PostgreSQL, Keycloak and an OpenSSH
       # server through Testcontainers and runs the API as a child process — so it needs a
       # Docker daemon and gets one here. That is why the tests run on ubuntu rather than
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 5477b6d..21e8139 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ docs/platform-flags.md     what differs off Windows, and the gotchas that have c
 docs/manual-checks.md      what no test can reach, and what to look for when checking by hand
 docs/android-port.md       the Android head: what was decided, what is built, what is left
 scripts/                   release-windows.ps1 — builds, packs and publishes the Windows client
+                           release-macos.sh   — the same, signed and notarized, on a Mac
+build/macos/               the entitlements and Info.plist template the macOS bundle is built from
 ```
 
 Everything under `src/DodoSSH.Client.*` except the two heads and `Shell` is deliberately free of Avalonia.
@@ -152,8 +154,32 @@ reinstalling asks for your passphrase rather than starting over. Use **Sign out*
 you want the machine to genuinely forget everything — an uninstall is not a sign-out, and does not withdraw
 this machine's device key from your account.
 
-Cutting a release is `scripts/release-windows.ps1`, run by a person on a Windows machine. Deliberately not a
-CI job; ADR 0013 decision 3 explains why, and it is not only that the runners are Linux.
+## Installing on macOS
+
+A `.pkg` on the same release page, for Apple Silicon. Everything above about where a client may come from,
+about the update check and about uninstalling applies unchanged; what differs is worth three short
+paragraphs.
+
+**It is signed and notarized, so there is no warning to click past.** That is not generosity — macOS refuses
+to open an un-notarized download outright rather than warning about it, so unlike the Windows build there
+was never an unsigned option. If you *do* see "cannot be opened because Apple cannot check it for malicious
+software", the file did not come from the project's release page, and that is worth taking literally.
+
+**Apple Silicon only for now.** An Intel package is a small amount of work and no one here has an Intel Mac
+to check it on, and this project does not ship desktop builds nobody has run — see
+[docs/manual-checks.md](docs/manual-checks.md). Under Rosetta the arm64 build will not run; there is no
+graceful version of that, and the honest answer is that the platform is not covered yet.
+
+**Touch ID can stand in for your passphrase**, on a Mac with a Secure Enclave. The key that unwraps your
+device key is generated inside the enclave and never leaves it, and the enclave — not DodoSSH — is what
+requires your fingerprint or login password before it will use it. Cancel the prompt and you get the
+passphrase screen, always. The application lives at `/Applications/DodoSSH.Desktop.app` and your vault cache
+at `~/Library/Application Support/DodoSSH`, which are deliberately two different places so that removing the
+first never touches the second.
+
+Cutting a release is `scripts/release-windows.ps1`, run by a person on a Windows machine, and
+`scripts/release-macos.sh` on a Mac. Deliberately not a CI job; ADR 0013 decision 3 explains why, and it is
+not only that the runners are Linux.
 
 ### The nightly desktop build
 
@@ -886,8 +912,18 @@ keychain plus a terminal — and the spike that gates all of it.
   [ADR 0013](docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md), and
   [Installing on Windows](#installing-on-windows) for what a user sees.
 
-  Still to do here: signing (the first release is unsigned, and the trigger for buying a certificate is the
-  first release aimed at strangers), and macOS and Linux packaging.
+  **The macOS half is built on the same machinery**, and signed from the start because Gatekeeper leaves no
+  choice: `scripts/release-macos.sh` publishes, signs every native library, notarizes with Apple and staples
+  the ticket before it will hand anything over, and refuses to upload until a person has installed it. The
+  device key is held in the Secure Enclave behind Touch ID. CI publishes `osx-arm64` and builds the `.app`
+  on every main build to prove it still packages, and uploads nothing. See
+  [ADR 0013](docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md) decision 10 and
+  [Installing on macOS](#installing-on-macos).
+
+  Still to do here: Windows signing (the first Windows release is unsigned, and the trigger for buying a
+  certificate is the first release aimed at strangers), macOS on Intel, Linux packaging, and Phase 18 of the
+  manual checks — the macOS build has never actually run, because there is no macOS runner in CI and
+  everything above is verified only as far as the bundle.
 - **M5 — multi-provider OIDC**, identity key rotation, per-item content keys.
 
 ## Licence
diff --git a/build/macos/DodoSSH.entitlements b/build/macos/DodoSSH.entitlements
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41f7fb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/build/macos/DodoSSH.entitlements
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!--
+  What the hardened runtime has to be asked to relax before a .NET application will run under it.
+
+  The hardened runtime is not optional: notarization refuses a Developer ID submission without it,
+  and Gatekeeper refuses an un-notarized download. So every entitlement below is the price of being
+  distributable at all, and each one is a hole in a wall that is otherwise worth having. They are
+  listed one at a time, with what breaks without each, because the temptation when notarization
+  fails at eleven at night is to paste in a longer list from somewhere and stop thinking.
+
+  ◆ WHAT IS DELIBERATELY NOT HERE.
+
+  com.apple.security.app-sandbox. Developer ID distribution outside the App Store does not require
+  the sandbox, and turning it on would break the product outright: the terminal's data plane is a
+  loopback WebSocket (see DodoSSH.Client.Terminal/TerminalDataPlane.cs), and a sandboxed process
+  needs com.apple.security.network.server to listen at all, plus network.client to reach any host
+  the user asks for. This is the same shape of decision as ruling out MSIX on Windows, which was
+  ruled out for the same loopback reason — docs/platform-flags.md.
+
+  com.apple.security.cs.debugger. Would let this process attach to others. Nothing here debugs
+  anything, and it is the entitlement most worth not having.
+-->
+<plist version="1.0">
+<dict>
+  <!--
+    CoreCLR compiles IL to machine code at runtime and then executes the pages it just wrote. The
+    hardened runtime's default is that no page is both writable and executable, so without this the
+    process does not start — it dies during runtime initialisation, before any of this application's
+    code runs, which means before anything exists that could report it.
+  -->
+  <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key>
+  <true/>
+
+  <!--
+    The broader form of the same permission, and it is needed as well as allow-jit rather than
+    instead of it. allow-jit covers pages mapped through the MAP_JIT convention; CoreCLR also
+    allocates executable memory outside that path — stubs, precode, and the write-xor-execute
+    fallback it uses when MAP_JIT is unavailable. With only the first, startup gets further and
+    still fails.
+  -->
+  <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory</key>
+  <true/>
+
+  <!--
+    Library validation requires every loaded dylib to be signed by the same team as the main
+    binary. This bundle carries native libraries built by other people — libsodium, libSkiaSharp,
+    libHarfBuzzSharp, libe_sqlite3, libAvaloniaNative — and the release script signs each of them
+    with this Developer ID, which would in principle satisfy validation.
+
+    It is disabled anyway, and the reason is the updater. Velopack replaces the bundle in place and
+    relaunches it, and the process doing the replacing is not always signed by the same team as the
+    process being replaced during the changeover. Leaving validation on makes the failure mode of a
+    bad update "the application will not start", with no way to recover except a reinstall the user
+    would have to be told about through some other channel.
+  -->
+  <key>com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation</key>
+  <true/>
+
+  <!--
+    The runtime reads DYLD_ variables while resolving its own native dependencies, and Velopack's
+    update path sets them. Without this the hardened runtime strips them silently and the failure
+    surfaces later as a library that cannot be found, naming a file that is plainly present.
+  -->
+  <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables</key>
+  <true/>
+</dict>
+</plist>
diff --git a/build/macos/Info.plist.template b/build/macos/Info.plist.template
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2430a73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/build/macos/Info.plist.template
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!--
+  The Info.plist for the macOS bundle, with the version left as a placeholder.
+
+  ◆ A TEMPLATE RATHER THAN A FILE, BECAUSE vpk COPIES A CUSTOM PLIST VERBATIM.
+
+  Measured, not assumed: `vpk [osx] bundle --plist` performs no substitution of any kind. It logs
+  "Bundle using provided Info.plist" and copies the bytes. That is also why it refuses --plist and
+  --bundleId together — with a plist supplied, every key is the caller's problem.
+
+  So a committed Info.plist would carry whatever version it was written with into every release
+  afterwards, and the failure is quiet in the worst way: Velopack's own release index would carry the
+  right version, the updater would compare correctly and update correctly, and only the About window,
+  Finder's Get Info panel and any crash report would claim the build was something else. Nobody
+  reads those on the day of a release. scripts/release-macos.sh substitutes @VERSION@ into a copy
+  and passes that.
+
+  ◆ WHY A CUSTOM PLIST AT ALL, WHEN vpk WRITES A PERFECTLY GOOD ONE.
+
+  Three keys it does not write, each of which is a real defect without it:
+
+    CFBundleDisplayName    The bundle on disk is DodoSSH.Desktop.app, because the pack id must not
+                           be DodoSSH — see scripts/release-macos.sh for the directory collision
+                           that rule prevents. On Windows the pack id is invisible; on macOS it
+                           names the thing in /Applications and in the Dock. This key is what puts
+                           "DodoSSH" back in front of a person while the bundle keeps the id.
+
+    LSMinimumSystemVersion Without it macOS will happily launch this on a release the runtime was
+                           never built for, and the user gets a dyld crash rather than a sentence.
+
+    NSHumanReadableCopyright  Shown in the About panel. Absent, the panel shows a blank line.
+-->
+<plist version="1.0">
+<dict>
+  <!--
+    CFBundleName is what the menu bar shows and is capped at 15 characters by convention;
+    CFBundleDisplayName is what Finder and the Dock show. Both say DodoSSH, and the bundle
+    directory does not. See the note above.
+  -->
+  <key>CFBundleName</key>
+  <string>DodoSSH</string>
+
+  <key>CFBundleDisplayName</key>
+  <string>DodoSSH</string>
+
+  <!--
+    Reverse-DNS under the domain this project actually controls. It is the identity Gatekeeper,
+    the notary service and the keychain all key off, so it is as irreversible as the Windows pack
+    id: changing it makes an update a different application, and it orphans anything the previous
+    identifier stored — including the Secure Enclave key MacDeviceKeyStore holds, which is scoped
+    to this identifier and cannot be migrated because its whole point is that it never leaves the
+    enclave.
+  -->
+  <key>CFBundleIdentifier</key>
+  <string>dev.dodotech.dodossh</string>
+
+  <!--
+    The apphost the publish produced, named for the product by <AssemblyName> in the csproj rather
+    than for the project. Must match --mainExe or the bundle launches nothing.
+  -->
+  <key>CFBundleExecutable</key>
+  <string>DodoSSH</string>
+
+  <!--
+    Both version keys take the numeric core only — 1.2.3 and never 1.2.3-rc.1 — because Apple
+    defines them as one to three dot-separated integers and notarization rejects what it cannot
+    parse. The full version, prerelease suffix and all, is in Velopack's release index, and that
+    is the one the updater compares. These two are for Finder and for Gatekeeper.
+
+    They are the same value rather than the usual marketing/build split, because there is no build
+    counter here that a release does not already bump.
+  -->
+  <key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
+  <string>@VERSION@</string>
+
+  <key>CFBundleVersion</key>
+  <string>@VERSION@</string>
+
+  <!--
+    The file name inside Contents/Resources, which is where --icon puts it. With a custom plist
+    nothing rewrites this key, so a rename of the asset that forgets this line produces a bundle
+    showing the generic application icon and no error anywhere.
+  -->
+  <key>CFBundleIconFile</key>
+  <string>dodossh.icns</string>
+
+  <key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
+  <string>APPL</string>
+
+  <!--
+    12.0, and it is read off the binaries rather than off a support matrix. The apphost and
+    libcoreclr.dylib in a net10.0 osx-arm64 publish both carry LC_BUILD_VERSION with minos 12.0.0,
+    so 12.0 is the oldest release these bytes are built to load on.
+
+    Microsoft's *support* statement for .NET 10 is higher than this, and that difference is
+    deliberate rather than overlooked: this key decides whether macOS refuses to launch the app at
+    all, and refusing on a release where it would in fact have run is the worse of the two errors.
+    A user on an unsupported-but-working macOS gets the application; the support matrix governs
+    what gets fixed if it misbehaves there, which is a different question.
+  -->
+  <key>LSMinimumSystemVersion</key>
+  <string>12.0</string>
+
+  <!--
+    Without this the window is drawn at 1x and scaled up, which on a Retina display turns the
+    terminal — the one surface in this application that is nothing but small text — into a blur.
+  -->
+  <key>NSHighResolutionCapable</key>
+  <true/>
+
+  <key>NSPrincipalClass</key>
+  <string>NSApplication</string>
+
+  <!--
+    False, and stated rather than left out. An agent application has no Dock icon and no menu bar;
+    this one is an ordinary windowed application and the default is already false, but the key
+    being absent is indistinguishable from somebody having removed it.
+  -->
+  <key>LSUIElement</key>
+  <false/>
+
+  <key>NSHumanReadableCopyright</key>
+  <string>© DodoTech. MIT licensed.</string>
+</dict>
+</plist>
diff --git a/docs/adr/0007-device-key-protection.md b/docs/adr/0007-device-key-protection.md
index 11fb21d..207dba3 100644
--- a/docs/adr/0007-device-key-protection.md
+++ b/docs/adr/0007-device-key-protection.md
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# ADR 0007 — What protects the device key on Windows
+# ADR 0007 — What protects the device key on the desktop
 
 **Status:** accepted, 2026-07-30
 **Supersedes nothing. Constrains** the device-unlock work described in the client roadmap.
@@ -141,6 +141,14 @@ would have become false under DPAPI alone. A gesture is still something the atta
 - **A TPM is not always there.** A machine without one gets a store that reports itself unavailable, so
   unlock keeps asking for the passphrase and neither affordance appears in the interface. The passphrase path
   is therefore required, not a nicety.
+- **macOS reaches the same decision through different hardware, and the argument transfers intact.**
+  `MacDeviceKeyStore` puts the wrapping key in the Secure Enclave under an access control requiring user
+  presence, so Touch ID or the login password is a condition of *using* it and the enforcement is the
+  platform's rather than the process's — which is the entire point of the 2026-07-30 amendment above, and
+  the thing a self-drawn prompt over a protected file would fail to be. The mechanical differences are
+  incidental: P-256 with ECIES because the enclave holds no other kind of key, and no prompt when sealing
+  because the public half needs no consent. See docs/platform-flags.md for the three ordinary Macs where the
+  probe answers no, one of which is every unsigned development build.
 - **The stored key must be treated as losable at any time** — a reset PIN, a cleared TPM, a replaced key.
   Every loss degrades to a passphrase prompt and never to a locked-out vault, which is why every failure in
   the store returns null rather than throwing and why the three unlock statuses all end in the same advice.
diff --git a/docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md b/docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md
index f87a922..52eb127 100644
--- a/docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md
+++ b/docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md
@@ -228,6 +228,44 @@ changes.
 token, and it puts a compellable third party in the signing path — which is ADR 0011 rule 3's shape one
 layer down, declined there for reasons that do not stop applying because the vendor changed.
 
+**This rule is Windows-only, and macOS gets the opposite one.** See decision 10: there is no "unsigned for
+now" available on that platform at any price, because Gatekeeper refuses rather than warns.
+
+### 10. macOS is a second desktop platform on the same machinery, signed from the start
+
+The macOS head is the same application, the same Velopack, and the same two-phase person-run release. Four
+things differ, and each is forced rather than chosen.
+
+**Signing is a precondition, not an improvement.** Decision 8's whole argument — one dialog per user per
+lifetime, buy a certificate when a stranger is invited to install — has no macOS equivalent. An
+un-notarized download is refused outright, so the Developer ID certificate and the notarization round trip
+are the price of the package existing. `scripts/release-macos.sh` therefore refuses to run without the
+signing identities, where the Windows script refuses nothing.
+
+**The channels are `osx` and `osx-nightly`, and they are separate for decision 9's reason.** Four channels
+now publish to one repository, and the only thing keeping a Mac from being offered a Windows package is
+that it never reads that index. The macOS nightly channel is named and has no publisher: CI builds and
+bundles the macOS head to prove it still builds, and uploads nothing, exactly as it does for the Windows
+release channel.
+
+**The pack id is shared with Windows, and on macOS it is visible.** vpk names the bundle after the pack id,
+so `/Applications` holds `DodoSSH.Desktop.app`. Decision 2's reasoning applies with more force here rather
+than less: a pack id of `DodoSSH` would put Velopack's install root on `~/Library/Application
+Support/DodoSSH`, which is `ClientPaths.DataDirectory`, and an uninstall would take the user's un-synced
+outbox with it. `CFBundleDisplayName` puts the product name back in front of a person; the directory keeps
+the id.
+
+**arm64 only, because the check is the scarce thing.** Velopack keys a channel to one architecture, and an
+Intel package would be the only artefact in this repository reaching users without somebody having walked
+Phase 18 against it. The engineering for a second channel is small and is described in the release script;
+what is missing is an Intel Mac to verify on, and shipping blind is the thing this project's manual-check
+discipline exists to refuse.
+
+**And one thing that does not differ, which is worth saying because it is the expensive half.** The
+capability to publish still lives on a person's machine and never in CI. Notarization does not change that:
+Apple's ticket says this build came from this developer account, and says nothing about whether the build
+should have been made. Velopack clients still apply what their feed serves. Rule 3 is untouched.
+
 ### 9. There is a second desktop channel, published by CI, and it is a second application
 
 [ADR 0014](0014-android-updates.md) gave the phone a nightly channel and rule 3 above gives the desktop
diff --git a/docs/manual-checks.md b/docs/manual-checks.md
index 1d07b81..911d665 100644
--- a/docs/manual-checks.md
+++ b/docs/manual-checks.md
@@ -2593,3 +2593,120 @@ package manager will not offer to.
 
 **Failure means:** the channels are not separate, and a public key is signing the application people keep
 their credentials in.
+
+## Phase 18 — Installing the macOS client, and being updated by it
+
+The macOS counterpart of phase 16, and it needs a Mac with a Secure Enclave — an Apple Silicon machine or
+an Intel one with a T2. Every check here is structurally unreachable by a test for the reasons phase 16
+gives, plus one this platform adds: **CI has no macOS runner at all**, so this phase is the only place the
+suite and the application ever run on macOS. Anything `docs/platform-flags.md` marks as unverified on macOS
+is verified here or nowhere.
+
+Run `bash scripts/release-macos.sh` first. It stops after packing and notarizing, on purpose, so that
+everything below happens before anything reaches a user. Phase 16.0 — the feed being readable without
+credentials — applies unchanged and is not repeated.
+
+### 18.1 Gatekeeper accepts it on a machine that did not build it · **do this one first**
+
+The Mac that signed a package trusts it locally whatever happened, so the build machine cannot answer this
+question about itself. Copy the `.pkg` to a second Mac — or at minimum download it through a browser, which
+is what applies the quarantine attribute — and open it.
+
+**Pass:** it installs with no warning beyond the ordinary installer prompts.
+
+**Failure means:** "cannot be opened because Apple cannot check it for malicious software" is notarization
+that did not happen or a ticket that did not staple. The script's `spctl --assess` and `xcrun stapler
+validate` should have caught it before this point, so reaching here means one of those two checks was
+removed or skipped. Do not distribute the package.
+
+### 18.2 The Dock shows the product and not the pack id
+
+Look at the installed application in `/Applications`, in the Dock, and in the menu bar while it runs.
+
+**Pass:** the menu bar says **DodoSSH**. Finder shows **DodoSSH**. The bundle on disk is
+`DodoSSH.Desktop.app` and that is expected — see the pack id note in `scripts/release-macos.sh`.
+
+**Failure means:** "DodoSSH.Desktop" in the menu bar is `CFBundleName` not reaching the bundle, which means
+the rendered `Info.plist` did not get used. Since vpk copies a custom plist verbatim and substitutes
+nothing, check the same bundle's `CFBundleShortVersionString` — if it reads `@VERSION@`, the template was
+passed through unrendered.
+
+### 18.3 The icon is the mark, at every size
+
+Look at it in the Dock, in Finder's icon view at a large size, and in `⌘I` Get Info.
+
+**Pass:** the accent tile and the `>_` mark, crisp at 1024, with the same air around it that Finder and
+Safari have.
+
+**Failure means:** a generic application icon is `CFBundleIconFile` naming a file that is not in
+`Contents/Resources`. An icon that fills its square edge to edge, larger than its neighbours, is
+`New-MarkPng` having been called with the Windows tile fraction — see `dodossh-icon.ps1`.
+
+### 18.4 Touch ID guards the device key, and the enclave enforces it
+
+Register a device key from the security settings page, then lock the vault and unlock it again.
+
+**Pass:** registering shows **no** prompt at all — sealing uses only the public half — and unlocking raises
+the system Touch ID sheet saying DodoSSH is trying to *unlock your DodoSSH vault*. The vault opens on a
+successful touch.
+
+**Failure means:** a prompt at registration is not a failure of correctness but says the key was not created
+in the enclave; check that `kSecAttrTokenID` reached the attributes. **No prompt at unlock, with the vault
+opening anyway, is the serious one** — it means the key is a software key and the access control did nothing,
+which is precisely the "a gate inside the process is not a gate" mistake `WindowsDeviceKeyStore` documents.
+
+### 18.5 Declining the fingerprint falls back to the passphrase
+
+Repeat 18.4 and cancel the Touch ID sheet.
+
+**Pass:** the unlock screen asks for the passphrase, and it works.
+
+**Failure means:** an error dialog, or a stuck screen, is `TryLoadAsync` throwing rather than answering
+null. Every failure it can meet — cancelled, timed out, key invalidated by a password reset — is meant to
+be indistinguishable and to land on the passphrase.
+
+### 18.6 A development build offers no device key at all
+
+Run the application with `dotnet run` rather than from the installed bundle, and open the security settings
+page.
+
+**Pass:** registering a device key is not offered.
+
+**Failure means:** being offered it is `IsSupported` having inferred availability from the OS rather than
+probing. An unsigned build cannot create an enclave key, so accepting the offer would put a wrap on the
+server that nothing can ever open and list a capability this machine does not have.
+
+### 18.7 The terminal works, which is the WKWebView question
+
+Connect to a host and use the shell: type, run something that scrolls, resize the window.
+
+**Pass:** the terminal attaches within a second or two and behaves as it does on Windows.
+
+**Failure means:** a blank pane that reports a renderer timeout after fifteen seconds is the loopback
+WebSocket not reaching WKWebView. This is the check that most needs walking, because the data plane has
+never run against this backend — see `TerminalDataPlane`. If it fails, the App Sandbox is the first thing to
+rule out: the entitlements deliberately do not enable it, and a sandboxed process cannot listen on loopback
+without `com.apple.security.network.server`.
+
+### 18.8 An update is offered, downloaded and applied
+
+With the release installed, cut a second release with a higher version and publish it, then leave the first
+running.
+
+**Pass:** the banner appears, downloads, and on applying the application closes and reopens on the new
+version. The vault's contents and the known hosts survive.
+
+**Failure means:** an update that never arrives is usually the channel — `osx` here and `osx` in
+`VelopackUpdateChannel.MacReleaseChannel`, with no error anywhere when they disagree. An update that
+downloads and fails to apply, leaving the application unable to restart, is library validation: check that
+`com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` survived into the entitlements.
+
+### 18.9 Uninstalling does not take the vault with it
+
+Register a device, sync something, then remove the application.
+
+**Pass:** `~/Library/Application Support/DodoSSH` still holds the cache and the outbox afterwards.
+
+**Failure means:** an empty directory is the pack id having been changed to `DodoSSH`, which puts Velopack's
+install root on top of `ClientPaths.DataDirectory` and makes an uninstall delete a user's un-synced work.
+This is the single reason the bundle is named `DodoSSH.Desktop.app`.
diff --git a/docs/platform-flags.md b/docs/platform-flags.md
index 5cbde70..8baace3 100644
--- a/docs/platform-flags.md
+++ b/docs/platform-flags.md
@@ -3,8 +3,18 @@
 Things known or suspected to behave differently outside Windows, plus deployment gotchas that
 have already cost time once. Development is Windows-first, but **the full test suite now runs on
 Linux in CI on every change**, so a Linux claim here is usually a measurement now rather than a
-suspicion. **macOS is still untested**, and anything marked *unverified* has not run on the platform
-in question and must not be assumed to work.
+suspicion. Anything marked *unverified* has not run on the platform in question and must not be
+assumed to work.
+
+**macOS now builds and packages, and has still never run.** The distinction matters more here than
+anywhere else on this page, because the two halves are verified in completely different places. The
+build is measured on every main and tag build: CI publishes `osx-arm64` and runs `vpk [osx] bundle`
+on a Linux runner, which is enough to catch a restore graph with no macOS native asset and an `.app`
+that will not compose. Everything past that — whether the window draws, whether the terminal's
+loopback WebSocket reaches WKWebView, whether the Secure Enclave holds a device key — is verified
+only by a person walking Phase 18 of [manual-checks.md](manual-checks.md) on a Mac, because **there
+is no macOS runner in CI**. Treat every macOS runtime claim below as unverified unless it says
+otherwise.
 
 Each entry says what the risk is, why it matters, and what to do about it. Delete an entry when it
 has been verified or made moot — not when it merely stops being convenient.
@@ -17,6 +27,19 @@ docs/crypto.md §1. *Already mitigated* — but if a BCL AEAD path is ever added
 **must** gate on `IsSupported` rather than assuming availability, or the client will fail to open
 any vault on macOS.
 
+**The Secure Enclave holds P-256 keys and nothing else**, which is why `MacDeviceKeyStore` wraps the
+device key with ECIES rather than with the RSA-OAEP the Windows store uses. It will not hold an RSA
+key at any size, so this is not a preference. The useful consequence is that the macOS shape is
+*better* than the Windows one: `SecKeyCopyPublicKey` works on an enclave key without prompting, so
+registering a device is silent and only unlock asks — where Windows raises a dialog at key creation
+too. *Unverified:* no enclave call in this repository has ever run.
+
+**Three ordinary Macs have no usable enclave**, and `IsSupported` probes rather than infers for that
+reason: an Intel machine without a T2, a machine with no login password set, and — the one that
+surprises people — **any build that is not code signed**, because enclave key creation needs a
+signing identity. So `dotnet run` correctly offers no device key at all. Do not "fix" this by
+checking the OS instead; the offer would then put a wrap on the server that nothing can ever open.
+
 **Argon2id timings are measured on one Windows machine only.** 256 MiB with t=4 took 323 ms here.
 The floor and ceiling in `EnrollmentLimits` were chosen against that number. *Unverified
 elsewhere:* recalibrate on the slowest target platform before recommending a default profile,
@@ -26,7 +49,11 @@ and the parameters are stored per user at enrollment, so a bad default is a per-
 **libsodium ships native binaries per RID.** This complicates single-file and AOT publishing, and
 on macOS every native library (`libsodium`, `libSkiaSharp`, `libHarfBuzzSharp`, `libe_sqlite3`)
 must be signed **individually** with `--options runtime --timestamp` before the bundle is signed,
-or notarization fails with an error that does not name the offending file.
+or notarization fails with an error that does not name the offending file. *Mitigated* in
+`scripts/release-macos.sh`, which signs every `.dylib` and `createdump` in a loop before vpk touches
+anything — vpk's own pass uses `codesign --deep`, which is the shape Apple documents as wrong for
+nested code and is the likeliest source of that unnamed rejection. The loop looks redundant next to
+`--deep` and is not; do not delete it because a release once succeeded without it.
 
 ## Desktop client
 
@@ -366,6 +393,37 @@ AppContainer where loopback connections are blocked without a `CheckNetIsolation
 terminal data plane *is* a loopback WebSocket, so MSIX would break the product outright. Velopack
 for Windows/macOS/AppImage; Flatpak and deb/rpm defer updates to the package manager.
 
+**The App Sandbox is ruled out on macOS for the same reason, and the entitlements say so.** A
+sandboxed process cannot listen on loopback without `com.apple.security.network.server`, and the
+terminal is that listener. Developer ID distribution outside the App Store does not require the
+sandbox, so this costs nothing today — but it does mean the Mac App Store is closed to this
+application without solving the data plane differently first. See
+`build/macos/DodoSSH.entitlements`.
+
+**The hardened runtime is not optional and .NET needs four holes punched in it.** Notarization
+refuses a Developer ID submission without it, and CoreCLR will not start under it without
+`allow-jit` and `allow-unsigned-executable-memory` — both, not either, because the runtime allocates
+executable memory outside the `MAP_JIT` path as well. `disable-library-validation` and
+`allow-dyld-environment-variables` are needed for Velopack's updater rather than for the runtime.
+Each is argued individually in the entitlements file; the failure mode for a missing one is a
+process that dies during runtime initialisation, before anything exists that could report it.
+
+**`vpk` cross-compiles to macOS only as far as the bundle.** `vpk [osx] bundle` runs anywhere and
+produces a real `.app`; there is no `[osx] pack` off a Mac, because pack drives `codesign`,
+`notarytool` and `stapler`. So CI can prove the bundle builds and only a Mac can produce something
+installable. Note this is the *opposite* of the Windows story, where `vpk [win] pack` builds the
+whole installer on Linux — the asymmetry is Apple tooling, not a Velopack limitation.
+
+**A custom `Info.plist` is copied verbatim by vpk, with no substitution whatsoever.** That is why
+`--plist` and `--bundleId` are mutually exclusive, and why `build/macos/Info.plist.template` is a
+template the release script renders rather than a committed file. A committed plist would carry one
+version into every release afterwards, and the symptom is silent: Velopack's index would still be
+right, the updater would still work, and only Get Info and any crash report would disagree.
+
+**macOS app icons live on an 824-in-1024 grid.** An icon that bleeds to the edge of its canvas is
+not bolder, it is the one icon in the Dock that is too big. `dodossh-icon.ps1` draws the `.icns` at
+that fraction and the `.ico` at full bleed, from one geometry.
+
 *Checked rather than assumed, now that Velopack is actually wired up:* its Windows path does not
 reintroduce the thing MSIX was ruled out for. `Setup.exe` is an ordinary Win32 executable that unpacks a
 directory under `%LOCALAPPDATA%` and creates shortcuts — there is no `AppxManifest`, no package identity,
diff --git a/scripts/release-macos.sh b/scripts/release-macos.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7964c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/release-macos.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Builds, packages and publishes the macOS desktop client.
+#
+# The counterpart of scripts/release-windows.ps1, and deliberately the same shape: run by a person, on a
+# Mac that is not a CI runner, in two phases with the upload withheld until somebody has installed what
+# phase one built and walked the manual checks. docs/adr/0011-android-distribution.md rule 1 puts the
+# capability to ship somebody a build on a machine which is not a runner, and
+# docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md explains why the token that writes a Gitea release is
+# that capability: Velopack clients trust their feed and do not verify a package signature when they apply
+# it, so whoever can write a release can ship an update every install runs.
+#
+#   1. Without --upload: builds, signs, notarizes, packs, and stops. Nothing has left this machine
+#      except the notarization submission, which Apple sees and users do not.
+#   2. With --upload: asks for the forge token and publishes what phase one produced. It does not
+#      rebuild, so the bytes that reach users are the bytes that were installed and checked.
+#
+# ◆ WHAT IS DIFFERENT FROM THE WINDOWS SCRIPT, AND WHY.
+#
+# Signing is not optional here. On Windows an unsigned installer costs a SmartScreen dialog once per
+# user, which is why that script has no --signParams and says so. On macOS an un-notarized download is
+# refused outright by Gatekeeper — not warned about, refused — so the Developer ID certificate and the
+# notarization round trip are the price of the package being installable at all, not an improvement to
+# be bought later.
+#
+# ◆ CREDENTIALS COME FROM THE KEYCHAIN AND THE ENVIRONMENT, NOT FROM THIS FILE.
+#
+# Three values are read from the environment, and none of them is itself a secret — they name things the
+# keychain holds, and the keychain is what guards the private key and the App Store Connect credentials:
+#
+#   DODOSSH_SIGN_APP_IDENTITY      e.g. "Developer ID Application: DodoTech (TEAMID)"
+#   DODOSSH_SIGN_INSTALL_IDENTITY  e.g. "Developer ID Installer: DodoTech (TEAMID)"
+#   DODOSSH_NOTARY_PROFILE         the profile name given to `xcrun notarytool store-credentials`
+#
+# `security find-identity -v -p codesigning` lists the first two exactly as codesign wants them. The
+# third is created once per machine:
+#
+#   xcrun notarytool store-credentials DodoSSH \
+#     --apple-id you@example.com --team-id TEAMID --password <app-specific-password>
+#
+# The forge token is the one real secret, and it is prompted for rather than read from a file or the
+# environment, and only in the phase that needs it — for the reason the Windows script gives: the fewer
+# minutes a credential that can publish an update spends in a shell's memory the better.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   bash scripts/release-macos.sh
+#   bash scripts/release-macos.sh --upload
+#   bash scripts/release-macos.sh --skip-tests
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+UPLOAD=0
+SKIP_TESTS=0
+
+for arg in "$@"; do
+    case "$arg" in
+        --upload)     UPLOAD=1 ;;
+        --skip-tests) SKIP_TESTS=1 ;;
+        *)
+            echo "Unknown argument: $arg" >&2
+            echo "Usage: bash scripts/release-macos.sh [--upload] [--skip-tests]" >&2
+            exit 1
+            ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+# ---- The contract with every installed client ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Velopack's identity for this application, and it is effectively irreversible for the reasons the Windows
+# script states — it is what an installed client matches an update against.
+#
+# ◆ THE SAME PACK ID AS WINDOWS, AND ON THIS PLATFORM IT IS VISIBLE.
+#
+# vpk names the bundle after the pack id, so this produces DodoSSH.Desktop.app rather than DodoSSH.app,
+# and that is what somebody sees in /Applications. It is kept anyway, because the alternative is worse:
+# a pack id of DodoSSH would put Velopack's install and its uninstall on ~/Library/Application Support/
+# DodoSSH, which is exactly where ClientPaths keeps the encrypted cache, the outbox of changes not yet
+# pushed and the device key. Sharing that directory would mean an uninstall silently taking a user's
+# un-synced work with it. The same reasoning, and the same conclusion, as the Windows script.
+#
+# What a person actually reads is CFBundleDisplayName, which build/macos/Info.plist.template sets to
+# DodoSSH. So the bundle keeps the id and the Dock shows the product.
+PACK_ID='DodoSSH.Desktop'
+PACK_TITLE='DodoSSH'
+PACK_AUTHORS='DodoTech'
+
+# The project's own forge. Never a DodoSSH deployment — ADR 0011 rule 2. The same URL is a constant in
+# VelopackUpdateChannel, and the two have to agree or the client polls somewhere nothing is published.
+# The owner is part of it: Gitea left a 301 at the old organisation's path, which a GET follows and an
+# upload does not.
+REPO_URL='https://git.dodotech.cloud/DodoTech-Public/DodoSSH'
+
+# A contract with VelopackUpdateChannel.MacReleaseChannel. Velopack's macOS default is also "osx", so
+# leaving it unsaid on both sides would work — but unsaid here and stated there is how a feed goes quiet
+# with no error at all: the client checks, finds nothing, and reports itself up to date forever.
+CHANNEL='osx'
+
+# ◆ ARM64 ONLY, AND THAT IS A DECISION RATHER THAN AN OVERSIGHT.
+#
+# Velopack keys a channel to one architecture, so shipping Intel too means a second channel, a second
+# publish, a second set of deltas and a second thing to keep in step with the client's channel picker.
+# That is all affordable. What is not currently affordable is testing it: nobody here has an Intel Mac,
+# and docs/manual-checks.md exists because this project does not ship desktop builds no one has run.
+# An x64 package built blind and published beside a checked arm64 one would be the only artefact in this
+# repository that reached users unverified.
+#
+# Adding it later is this constant, a second channel name in VelopackUpdateChannel, and a picker keyed on
+# RuntimeInformation.ProcessArchitecture — which reports X64 for a build running under Rosetta, so an
+# Intel build correctly stays on the Intel feed. The work is small; the check is the part that is missing.
+RUNTIME='osx-arm64'
+
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+PROJECT="$REPO_ROOT/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/DodoSSH.Client.App.csproj"
+SOLUTION="$REPO_ROOT/DodoSSH.slnx"
+PUBLISH_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/publish/$RUNTIME"
+RELEASES_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/Releases"
+ICON="$REPO_ROOT/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh.icns"
+ENTITLEMENTS="$REPO_ROOT/build/macos/DodoSSH.entitlements"
+PLIST_TEMPLATE="$REPO_ROOT/build/macos/Info.plist.template"
+
+write_step() { printf '\n\033[36m==> %s\033[0m\n' "$1"; }
+stop_with()  { printf '\n\033[31m%s\033[0m\n' "$1" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# ---- Is this machine able to do the job at all? -------------------------------------------------------
+
+if [ "$(uname -s)" != 'Darwin' ]; then
+    # codesign, notarytool and stapler are Apple tooling and exist nowhere else. The build and even the
+    # .app bundle cross-compile fine from Windows or Linux — `vpk [osx] bundle` does exactly that, and
+    # ci.yml uses it to prove the bundle still builds — but a signed, notarized, installable package
+    # cannot be produced anywhere but here.
+    stop_with 'This builds a signed macOS package and has to run on macOS.'
+fi
+
+for tool in dotnet git xcrun codesign; do
+    command -v "$tool" >/dev/null 2>&1 || stop_with "$tool is not on PATH."
+done
+
+# Checked before anything is built rather than at the step that uses them. Notarization is the last thing
+# this script does and the slowest, and discovering there that a profile name was never exported means
+# throwing away a full build and test run.
+for required in DODOSSH_SIGN_APP_IDENTITY DODOSSH_SIGN_INSTALL_IDENTITY DODOSSH_NOTARY_PROFILE; do
+    if [ -z "${!required-}" ]; then
+        stop_with "$required is not set. See the header of this script for what the three are and how to make them."
+    fi
+done
+
+cd "$REPO_ROOT"
+
+# ---- What is being released ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Restored before the version is read, and both halves are load-bearing — the same two traps the Windows
+# script documents. -t:MinVer, because -getProperty alone evaluates the project and runs no targets, while
+# MinVer sets Version from inside one, so the read would answer the SDK's default 1.0.0 regardless of the
+# tag. And a restore first, because naming a target that arrives with a package fails MSB4057 on a clean
+# clone where obj/ has no MinVer targets to import yet.
+write_step 'Restoring the desktop head, so the version can be read'
+dotnet restore "$PROJECT" --locked-mode || stop_with 'Restore failed.'
+
+VERSION="$(dotnet msbuild "$PROJECT" -getProperty:Version -t:MinVer -nologo | tr -d '[:space:]')"
+[ -n "$VERSION" ] || stop_with 'Could not read the version from MSBuild.'
+
+TAG="v$VERSION"
+
+# Apple's two version keys take one to three dot-separated integers and nothing else, so a prerelease
+# version has to have its suffix removed before it reaches the plist. 1.2.3-rc.1 becomes 1.2.3.
+#
+# The full version, suffix and all, is what vpk packs and what the release index carries, so the updater
+# still tells an rc from the release it precedes. These two keys are for Finder and Gatekeeper, which
+# care that the string parses and not what it says. See build/macos/Info.plist.template.
+PLIST_VERSION="${VERSION%%-*}"
+PLIST_VERSION="${PLIST_VERSION%%+*}"
+
+write_step "DodoSSH $VERSION  ($PACK_ID, channel $CHANNEL, $RUNTIME)"
+
+# ---- Phase 2: publish what phase 1 built --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+if [ "$UPLOAD" -eq 1 ]; then
+    # The installer package is the artefact a person downloads, so its absence is the honest test of
+    # whether phase one ever ran. A directory holding only a .nupkg is a pack that failed part way.
+    if ! ls "$RELEASES_DIR"/*.pkg >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        stop_with "Nothing to upload: $RELEASES_DIR has no .pkg. Run this without --upload first."
+    fi
+
+    echo "About to publish the contents of $RELEASES_DIR to $REPO_URL as $TAG."
+    echo 'Only do this once you have installed it and walked Phase 18 of docs/manual-checks.md.'
+
+    # -s so the token is never echoed and never lands in the shell's history.
+    printf 'Gitea token (write:repository): '
+    read -r -s TOKEN
+    echo
+
+    [ -n "$TOKEN" ] || stop_with 'No token given.'
+
+    # --merge because Gitea already has a release entry for the pushed tag — and on this platform it may
+    # also already hold the Windows package for the same tag, which is the case --merge is really doing
+    # the work for: without it the second platform to publish a given version fails on a release that
+    # exists, and with it the two sit side by side under one tag. --channel keeps the indexes apart.
+    UPLOAD_ARGS=(
+        upload gitea
+        --repoUrl "$REPO_URL"
+        --token "$TOKEN"
+        --outputDir "$RELEASES_DIR"
+        --channel "$CHANNEL"
+        --releaseName "$TAG"
+        --tag "$TAG"
+        --merge
+        --publish
+    )
+
+    # Mirrors the rule the docker image job and the Windows script already apply to the same tag, so a
+    # release candidate is a prerelease in every channel or in none.
+    case "$VERSION" in
+        *-*) UPLOAD_ARGS+=(--pre) ;;
+    esac
+
+    write_step 'Uploading'
+    dotnet vpk "${UPLOAD_ARGS[@]}" || stop_with 'vpk upload failed.'
+
+    write_step "Published $TAG."
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+# ---- Phase 1: build, sign, notarize, pack -------------------------------------------------------------
+
+[ -z "$(git status --porcelain)" ] || stop_with 'The working tree is not clean. A release is cut from a commit, not from a desk.'
+
+HEAD_TAG="$(git describe --exact-match --tags HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
+[ -n "$HEAD_TAG" ] || stop_with "HEAD is not tagged. Tag it $TAG first, or change the version and tag that."
+
+# Cannot happen while MinVer is deriving the version from this very tag, and checked anyway: the day
+# somebody pins a version by hand this is the guard that notices.
+[ "$HEAD_TAG" = "$TAG" ] || stop_with "HEAD is tagged $HEAD_TAG but the computed version is $VERSION."
+
+write_step 'Restoring tools'
+dotnet tool restore || stop_with 'dotnet tool restore failed.'
+
+write_step 'Restoring packages (locked, exactly as CI does)'
+dotnet restore "$SOLUTION" --locked-mode || stop_with 'Restore failed. A lock file that only works on Linux fails here.'
+
+write_step 'Building'
+dotnet build "$SOLUTION" --no-restore --configuration Release || stop_with 'Build failed.'
+
+if [ "$SKIP_TESTS" -eq 0 ]; then
+    # The end-to-end suite starts containers and takes minutes. It is run here anyway rather than taken
+    # on trust from CI, because a tag is the one build nobody is watching — and on this platform there is
+    # a second reason: CI has no macOS runner, so this is the only place the suite ever runs on a Mac at
+    # all. Everything docs/platform-flags.md lists as unverified on macOS is verified here or nowhere.
+    write_step 'Testing'
+    dotnet test "$SOLUTION" --no-build --configuration Release || stop_with 'Tests failed.'
+fi
+
+write_step "Publishing $RUNTIME"
+rm -rf "$PUBLISH_DIR"
+
+# Self-contained, and not single-file, for the reasons the Windows script gives: the native libraries ship
+# per RID and a self-extracting bundle breaks delta updates.
+#
+# RestoreLockedMode=false, and the lock files put back straight afterwards. A RID-specific publish resolves
+# a graph the committed lock files do not describe, because they are deliberately kept RID-free —
+# declaring a RID on the head writes a net10.0/<rid> target into every project it references transitively,
+# including DodoSSH.Contracts and DodoSSH.Crypto, and the API's Dockerfile then restores those with no RID
+# under locked mode and fails NU1004. Packaging the desktop client would have broken the server's image
+# build. The gate that matters is the locked solution restore above, which is untouched.
+dotnet publish "$PROJECT" \
+    --configuration Release \
+    --runtime "$RUNTIME" \
+    --self-contained true \
+    --output "$PUBLISH_DIR" \
+    -p:RestoreLockedMode=false \
+    || stop_with 'Publish failed.'
+
+# An unlocked restore rewrites the lock files it walked. Left there, the next commit would carry exactly
+# the change that breaks the image build. Safe to do bluntly because this script refuses to run on a dirty
+# tree, so anything modified here is its own.
+git checkout -- '*packages.lock.json' || stop_with 'Could not restore the lock files after publishing.'
+
+# Checked rather than assumed. A publish directory without Velopack.dll would pack into an installer for an
+# application that never checks for updates — which looks completely normal until the next release goes out
+# and nobody receives it.
+for required in DodoSSH Velopack.dll; do
+    [ -e "$PUBLISH_DIR/$required" ] || stop_with "$required is missing from $PUBLISH_DIR."
+done
+
+echo "  $(du -sh "$PUBLISH_DIR" | cut -f1) in $(find "$PUBLISH_DIR" -type f | wc -l | tr -d ' ') files"
+
+# ---- Signing the native libraries, before vpk signs anything ------------------------------------------
+
+# ◆ THIS LOOP IS WHY NOTARIZATION SUCCEEDS, AND IT LOOKS REDUNDANT.
+#
+# vpk signs the finished bundle itself, with `codesign -f -v --timestamp --options runtime --entitlements
+# <file> --deep`, and --deep is documented by Apple as the wrong way to sign nested code. Apple's guidance
+# is inside-out: sign each nested binary first, then the bundle around it. --deep does the reverse in one
+# pass and applies the outer entitlements to everything it touches.
+#
+# In practice --deep alone is where the failure recorded in docs/platform-flags.md comes from — a
+# notarization rejection that does not name the offending file, on a submission that took its time getting
+# there. Signing each dylib properly first means vpk's pass has nothing left to get wrong, and re-signing
+# an already correctly signed binary with -f is a no-op in effect.
+#
+# No --entitlements here, and that is the difference that matters. Entitlements belong on the main
+# executable; a dylib carrying allow-jit is at best meaningless and at worst a rejection.
+write_step 'Signing native libraries'
+
+# createdump is a Mach-O executable the runtime ships and it is signed like the libraries: a nested
+# executable that is not signed fails notarization exactly as an unsigned dylib does, and it is the one
+# people forget because it has no extension to grep for.
+NATIVE_COUNT=0
+while IFS= read -r -d '' binary; do
+    codesign --force --verbose=0 --timestamp --options runtime \
+        --sign "$DODOSSH_SIGN_APP_IDENTITY" "$binary" \
+        || stop_with "codesign failed on $binary"
+    NATIVE_COUNT=$((NATIVE_COUNT + 1))
+done < <(find "$PUBLISH_DIR" \( -name '*.dylib' -o -name 'createdump' \) -type f -print0)
+
+[ "$NATIVE_COUNT" -gt 0 ] || stop_with "No native binaries found under $PUBLISH_DIR, which cannot be right for a self-contained publish."
+echo "  signed $NATIVE_COUNT native binaries"
+
+# ---- The bundle's Info.plist --------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Rendered rather than committed, because vpk copies a custom plist verbatim and substitutes nothing —
+# so a committed one would carry whatever version it was written with into every release afterwards.
+# See the header of build/macos/Info.plist.template.
+write_step "Rendering Info.plist for $PLIST_VERSION"
+RENDERED_PLIST="$(mktemp -t dodossh-plist)"
+trap 'rm -f "$RENDERED_PLIST"' EXIT
+
+sed "s/@VERSION@/$PLIST_VERSION/g" "$PLIST_TEMPLATE" > "$RENDERED_PLIST"
+
+# The placeholder is the whole mechanism, so its absence is checked rather than hoped for. A template
+# somebody edited into a literal version would otherwise sail through and pin every future release to it.
+grep -q '@VERSION@' "$PLIST_TEMPLATE" || stop_with "$PLIST_TEMPLATE has no @VERSION@ placeholder left in it."
+! grep -q '@VERSION@' "$RENDERED_PLIST" || stop_with 'Substitution into the rendered Info.plist did not take.'
+
+mkdir -p "$RELEASES_DIR"
+
+# The previous release, so a delta can be built against it. Tolerated when it finds nothing: the first
+# macOS release has no predecessor, and a hard failure here would make cutting it impossible.
+write_step 'Fetching the previous release, for deltas'
+if ! dotnet vpk download gitea --repoUrl "$REPO_URL" --outputDir "$RELEASES_DIR" --channel "$CHANNEL"; then
+    echo '  Nothing came down. This package will be full-only, which is right for a first release.'
+fi
+
+# ---- Pack, sign, notarize, staple ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# One command does the rest, and it is worth knowing what it is doing on your behalf, because the slow
+# part is not local: it builds the .app from the published files, signs it with the Developer ID
+# certificate and the entitlements below, submits it to Apple with `xcrun notarytool submit --wait`,
+# staples the resulting ticket to the package, and then builds the .pkg installer and the release index.
+#
+# The notarization wait is the reason this step can take a quarter of an hour and occasionally much
+# longer — it is a queue at Apple, not a computation here, and vpk's own message says so.
+#
+# --signInstallIdentity is a different certificate from --signAppIdentity, and the pair is not
+# interchangeable: "Developer ID Application" signs the bundle, "Developer ID Installer" signs the .pkg.
+# Passing one where the other belongs fails with a message about an identity that cannot be found, which
+# reads like a keychain problem rather than like the wrong certificate.
+write_step 'Packing, signing and notarizing (the notarization wait is Apple queueing, not this machine)'
+
+dotnet vpk pack \
+    --packId "$PACK_ID" \
+    --packVersion "$VERSION" \
+    --packDir "$PUBLISH_DIR" \
+    --packTitle "$PACK_TITLE" \
+    --packAuthors "$PACK_AUTHORS" \
+    --mainExe 'DodoSSH' \
+    --icon "$ICON" \
+    --plist "$RENDERED_PLIST" \
+    --entitlements "$ENTITLEMENTS" \
+    --signAppIdentity "$DODOSSH_SIGN_APP_IDENTITY" \
+    --signInstallIdentity "$DODOSSH_SIGN_INSTALL_IDENTITY" \
+    --notaryProfile "$DODOSSH_NOTARY_PROFILE" \
+    --runtime "$RUNTIME" \
+    --channel "$CHANNEL" \
+    --outputDir "$RELEASES_DIR" \
+    || stop_with 'vpk pack failed.'
+
+# ---- Did the notarization actually take? --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Asked rather than assumed, and this is the check worth having above all the others. A package whose
+# ticket did not staple is indistinguishable from a good one on the machine that built it — the Mac that
+# signed something trusts it locally — and reveals itself only on somebody else's machine, as a refusal
+# to open at all. spctl assesses it the way Gatekeeper will on a machine that has never seen this
+# certificate.
+write_step 'Verifying the notarization the way another Mac will'
+
+PKG="$(ls -t "$RELEASES_DIR"/*.pkg 2>/dev/null | head -n 1)"
+[ -n "$PKG" ] || stop_with 'vpk pack reported success but produced no .pkg.'
+
+if ! spctl --assess --type install --verbose=4 "$PKG"; then
+    stop_with "Gatekeeper rejects $PKG. It is signed but the notarization ticket is missing or stale; do not upload it."
+fi
+
+xcrun stapler validate "$PKG" || stop_with "The notarization ticket is not stapled to $PKG."
+
+write_step 'Built, notarized, and deliberately not uploaded'
+
+ls -lh "$RELEASES_DIR" | tail -n +2
+
+cat <<EOF
+
+Next:
+  1. Install the .pkg above and walk Phase 18 of docs/manual-checks.md.
+  2. Then: bash scripts/release-macos.sh --upload
+EOF
diff --git a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh-icon.ps1 b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh-icon.ps1
index 2244819..d7849cf 100644
--- a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh-icon.ps1
+++ b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh-icon.ps1
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
-# Regenerates dodossh.ico from the same geometry the Android launcher icon draws.
+# Regenerates dodossh.ico and dodossh.icns from the same geometry the Android launcher icon draws.
 #
 # The phone's mark is a vector — Resources/drawable/ic_launcher_foreground.xml — and the whole
 # reason it is a vector is that there is then one geometry to change and no set of PNG densities
-# to forget one of. Windows will not take a vector: <ApplicationIcon> wants an .ico and nothing
-# else, and Window.Icon wants a bitmap. So the raster exists, and this script is how it stays
-# honest: the numbers below are the ones in that XML, and regenerating is the whole edit.
+# to forget one of. Neither desktop platform will take a vector: <ApplicationIcon> wants an .ico
+# and nothing else, Window.Icon wants a bitmap, and vpk wants an .icns for the macOS bundle. So
+# the rasters exist, and this script is how they stay honest: the numbers below are the ones in
+# that XML, and regenerating is the whole edit.
 #
 #     pwsh -File src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh-icon.ps1
 #
+# Both outputs are written every run, deliberately. Two scripts, or one script with a switch,
+# is how the two files come to be drawn from different geometry — which nobody would notice,
+# because no one person looks at a Windows taskbar and a macOS Dock on the same afternoon.
+#
 # Coordinates are the launcher's 108-unit viewport, mapped so the middle 72 fills the canvas.
 # That 72 is not an arbitrary crop: it is the part of an adaptive icon a launcher actually shows,
 # the outer 18 on each edge being what it eats for masking and parallax. Rendering the whole 108
@@ -30,29 +35,49 @@ $ink = [System.Drawing.ColorTranslator]::FromHtml('#FFFFFF')     # AccentInk
 # the gap, and its downsampler is not kind to a hairline.
 $sizes = @(16, 20, 24, 32, 40, 48, 64, 128, 256)
 
-function New-MarkPng([int]$size)
+# $tileFraction is how much of the canvas the accent tile fills, and it is the one number that
+# differs between the two platforms.
+#
+# Windows passes 1.0: the tile bleeds to the edge, because Windows draws application icons at
+# whatever size they come in and every other icon on the taskbar does the same.
+#
+# macOS passes 0.8047, and that is not taste. Apple's icon grid puts a rounded-rect app icon in
+# an 824-pixel square inside a 1024-pixel canvas — 824/1024 — with the remaining hundred pixels a
+# side left as air for the Dock's shadow and its magnification. An icon that ignores the grid and
+# bleeds to the edge does not read as bold; it reads as the one icon in the Dock that is too big,
+# because it sits beside Finder and Safari which do not.
+function New-MarkPng([int]$size, [double]$tileFraction = 1.0)
 {
     $bitmap = New-Object System.Drawing.Bitmap($size, $size, [System.Drawing.Imaging.PixelFormat]::Format32bppArgb)
     $g = [System.Drawing.Graphics]::FromImage($bitmap)
     $g.SmoothingMode = [System.Drawing.Drawing2D.SmoothingMode]::AntiAlias
     $g.PixelOffsetMode = [System.Drawing.Drawing2D.PixelOffsetMode]::HighQuality
 
+    # The tile, and the inset that centres it when it does not fill the canvas.
+    $tile = [double]$size * $tileFraction
+    $inset = ([double]$size - $tile) / 2.0
+
     # The accent tile, rounded as a launcher mask rounds it. A square-cornered tile would be the
     # one icon on the taskbar with corners, which reads as unfinished rather than as deliberate.
-    $radius = [double]$size * 0.22
+    #
+    # 0.22 of the tile rather than of the canvas, so the corner keeps its proportion to the shape
+    # it is rounding instead of growing as the air around it does. It is also within a whisker of
+    # the 185/824 Apple's own grid specifies, which is why one radius serves both files.
+    $radius = $tile * 0.22
     $d = $radius * 2.0
     $path = New-Object System.Drawing.Drawing2D.GraphicsPath
-    $path.AddArc(0.0, 0.0, $d, $d, 180, 90)
-    $path.AddArc($size - $d, 0.0, $d, $d, 270, 90)
-    $path.AddArc($size - $d, $size - $d, $d, $d, 0, 90)
-    $path.AddArc(0.0, $size - $d, $d, $d, 90, 90)
+    $path.AddArc($inset, $inset, $d, $d, 180, 90)
+    $path.AddArc($inset + $tile - $d, $inset, $d, $d, 270, 90)
+    $path.AddArc($inset + $tile - $d, $inset + $tile - $d, $d, $d, 0, 90)
+    $path.AddArc($inset, $inset + $tile - $d, $d, $d, 90, 90)
     $path.CloseFigure()
     $brush = New-Object System.Drawing.SolidBrush($accent)
     $g.FillPath($brush, $path)
 
-    # 108-viewport units to pixels, with the outer 18 dropped on each edge.
-    $scale = [double]$size / 72.0
-    function P([double]$x, [double]$y) { New-Object System.Drawing.PointF((($x - 18.0) * $scale), (($y - 18.0) * $scale)) }
+    # 108-viewport units to pixels, with the outer 18 dropped on each edge. Scaled to the tile and
+    # offset by the inset, so the glyph keeps its place within the tile at either fraction.
+    $scale = $tile / 72.0
+    function P([double]$x, [double]$y) { New-Object System.Drawing.PointF((($x - 18.0) * $scale + $inset), (($y - 18.0) * $scale + $inset)) }
 
     # A stroke thinner than a pixel renders as a grey suggestion of itself, which at 16px is the
     # difference between a mark and a smudge. The phone's file already bumps this width for the
@@ -117,3 +142,86 @@ $target = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'dodossh.ico'
 $w.Dispose(); $out.Dispose()
 
 Write-Output "Wrote $target ($($sizes.Count) sizes, $((Get-Item $target).Length) bytes)"
+
+# ---- dodossh.icns, for the macOS bundle ----------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# Written here rather than by `iconutil` on a Mac, and that is the point of doing it the long way.
+# iconutil is the documented tool and it exists only on macOS, so an icon that needed it could not
+# be regenerated on the machine this project is developed on — the geometry above would change and
+# the .icns would quietly keep the old mark until somebody next opened a Mac. The container format
+# is a magic word, a length and a run of typed PNG chunks, which is little enough to own.
+#
+# ◆ EVERY LENGTH IN THIS FILE IS BIG-ENDIAN, AND BinaryWriter IS NOT.
+#
+# The one thing that will catch anybody editing this. A .icns written little-endian is not rejected
+# with an error — Finder and vpk both just show the placeholder icon, because the first chunk claims
+# a length of about two billion and the parser walks off the end and gives up. Hence Write-BE32.
+#
+# Type codes are Apple's, and the pairs are not redundant. ic08 and ic13 are both 256 pixels because
+# one is "256 at 1x" and the other is "128 at 2x", and a Retina display asked for the second will not
+# accept the first. Same for ic09/ic14 at 512. iconutil emits both from an .iconset for this reason,
+# so this does too.
+$icnsTypes = @(
+    @{ Type = 'ic11'; Size = 32 }    # 16@2x
+    @{ Type = 'ic12'; Size = 64 }    # 32@2x
+    @{ Type = 'ic07'; Size = 128 }   # 128@1x
+    @{ Type = 'ic13'; Size = 256 }   # 128@2x
+    @{ Type = 'ic08'; Size = 256 }   # 256@1x
+    @{ Type = 'ic14'; Size = 512 }   # 256@2x
+    @{ Type = 'ic09'; Size = 512 }   # 512@1x
+    @{ Type = 'ic10'; Size = 1024 }  # 512@2x
+)
+
+# Apple's icon grid: an 824-pixel shape centred in a 1024-pixel canvas. See New-MarkPng.
+$macTileFraction = 824.0 / 1024.0
+
+# Rendered once per distinct pixel size rather than once per type code, so the two 256s and the two
+# 512s are byte-identical and the file does not carry the same image twice over at different
+# compression. It also halves the drawing, which at 1024 is not nothing.
+$rendered = @{}
+foreach ($size in ($icnsTypes.Size | Sort-Object -Unique))
+{
+    [byte[]]$png = New-MarkPng $size $macTileFraction
+    $rendered[$size] = $png
+}
+
+$icns = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream
+
+function Write-BE32([System.IO.Stream]$stream, [uint32]$value)
+{
+    $bytes = [System.BitConverter]::GetBytes($value)
+    if ([System.BitConverter]::IsLittleEndian) { [array]::Reverse($bytes) }
+    $stream.Write($bytes, 0, 4)
+}
+
+function Write-Ascii([System.IO.Stream]$stream, [string]$text)
+{
+    $bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes($text)
+    $stream.Write($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)
+}
+
+# The header's length field covers the whole file including the header, so it is written last —
+# eight bytes of nothing now, seeked back to and filled in once the total is known.
+Write-Ascii $icns 'icns'
+Write-BE32 $icns 0
+
+foreach ($entry in $icnsTypes)
+{
+    $payload = $rendered[$entry.Size]
+    Write-Ascii $icns $entry.Type
+
+    # Length includes this chunk's own eight-byte header, which is the off-by-eight everybody
+    # writes once.
+    Write-BE32 $icns ([uint32]($payload.Length + 8))
+    $icns.Write($payload, 0, $payload.Length)
+}
+
+$total = [uint32]$icns.Length
+$icns.Position = 4
+Write-BE32 $icns $total
+
+$icnsTarget = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'dodossh.icns'
+[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($icnsTarget, $icns.ToArray())
+$icns.Dispose()
+
+Write-Output "Wrote $icnsTarget ($($icnsTypes.Count) entries, $((Get-Item $icnsTarget).Length) bytes)"
diff --git a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh.icns b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh.icns
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a55a89
Binary files /dev/null and b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Assets/dodossh.icns differ
diff --git a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/DodoSSH.Client.App.csproj b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/DodoSSH.Client.App.csproj
index 4efba22..59542bb 100644
--- a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/DodoSSH.Client.App.csproj
+++ b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/DodoSSH.Client.App.csproj
@@ -66,6 +66,21 @@
     -->
     <DodoChannel Condition="'$(DodoChannel)' == ''">release</DodoChannel>
 
+    <!--
+      For the macOS keychain interop in Platform/, and for nothing else.
+
+      Set on this project rather than in Directory.Build.props deliberately. The frameworks that hold a
+      Secure Enclave key take CFDictionaries of raw pointers, so building one means pinning arrays and
+      taking their addresses — see MacDeviceKeyStore. Every other project here is managed code with no
+      business doing that, and a solution-wide flag would quietly permit it everywhere, including in the
+      crypto project where a stray pointer is the last thing anybody wants to have been allowed.
+
+      The alternative — GCHandle.Alloc with GCHandleType.Pinned — needs no flag and was considered. It
+      would replace each `fixed` with an allocate/free pair that has to be balanced by hand across the
+      early returns those methods are full of, which trades a compiler-checked scope for a manual one.
+    -->
+    <AllowUnsafeBlocks>true</AllowUnsafeBlocks>
+
     <!--
       False here, unlike every server project. The root Directory.Build.props sets it true because
       the API is container-hosted, UTC-only and has no business formatting anything for a human.
diff --git a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacDeviceKeyStore.cs b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacDeviceKeyStore.cs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2403c3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacDeviceKeyStore.cs
@@ -0,0 +1,598 @@
+using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
+using System.Runtime.Versioning;
+using System.Text;
+using DodoSSH.Client.Session;
+using static DodoSSH.Client.App.Platform.MacSecurity;
+
+namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Platform;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// Keeps the device key encrypted to a Secure Enclave key whose use requires the user's presence.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+/// <para>
+/// The macOS counterpart of <see cref="WindowsDeviceKeyStore"/>, and the same argument holds it up:
+/// <b>the consent is enforced by the platform, not by this class</b>. The unwrapping key is generated
+/// inside the Secure Enclave and never leaves it — there is no code path, privileged or otherwise, that
+/// turns it into bytes — and it is created under an access control requiring
+/// <see cref="AccessControlFlags.UserPresence"/>, so Touch ID or the login password is a condition of
+/// <em>using</em> it. Malware running as the user can ask for a decryption; it cannot answer the prompt,
+/// and the attempt is visible.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// A store that showed its own prompt and then read a protected file would be trivially bypassed, which
+/// is the mistake ADR 0007 originally described and the Windows store's comment corrects. The correction
+/// applies here unchanged.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <b>P-256 and ECIES, where Windows uses RSA-OAEP, and the difference is not a preference.</b> The
+/// Secure Enclave holds exactly one kind of key: a 256-bit key on the NIST P-256 curve. It will not hold
+/// an RSA key at any size. So the wrap is <c>eciesEncryptionCofactorX963SHA256AESGCM</c> — an ephemeral
+/// agreement against the enclave's public half, X9.63-KDF to an AES-GCM key, and the ephemeral public
+/// key carried in the output. The framework does all of that; what matters here is that the input is 32
+/// bytes and there is no size limit worth worrying about.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <b>Sealing is silent and unsealing prompts, which is better than the Windows shape rather than merely
+/// different.</b> On Windows, <c>CngKey.Create</c> with <c>ProtectKey</c> raises a dialog at creation as
+/// well, because the policy means "protect this key with a PIN" and Windows sets that up there and then.
+/// Here <see cref="SecKeyCopyPublicKey"/> works on an enclave key without any prompt, so registering a
+/// device shows nothing and only unlock asks. <see cref="SaveAsync"/> is therefore not user-facing on
+/// this platform — but it is still called from where the Windows one has to be, and relying on that
+/// difference would make the shared caller platform-specific for no gain.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <b>What this cannot be tested against, and what follows from that.</b> Every method except
+/// <see cref="IsAvailableAsync"/> and the empty case of <see cref="TryLoadAsync"/> needs an interactive
+/// login session and real enclave hardware, so none can be exercised by an automated test — the same
+/// line the Windows store draws. It also means <see cref="IsSupported"/> must probe rather than infer:
+/// see its remarks for the three ordinary machines that have no usable enclave and must degrade to the
+/// passphrase rather than fail at unlock.
+/// </para>
+/// </remarks>
+[SupportedOSPlatform("macos")]
+public sealed partial class MacDeviceKeyStore : IDeviceKeyStore
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The keychain tag this application's enclave key is filed under.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// Versioned for the reason the Windows key name is: a future change of curve or wrap algorithm can
+    /// create a new key beside the old one rather than failing to open blobs written by a previous
+    /// build. A device that cannot be opened falls back to the passphrase, which is survivable — but
+    /// silently, and a user would only notice their fingerprint had stopped working.
+    ///
+    /// Prefixed with the bundle identifier because the keychain is shared across every application the
+    /// user runs, unlike a CNG key name, which is scoped to the user's key store already.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private const string KeyTag = "dev.dodotech.dodossh.devicekey.v1";
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Shown in the Touch ID prompt, so it has to read as a sentence to a person.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// macOS composes it into "DodoSSH is trying to ...", so this is a verb phrase and not a sentence of
+    /// its own. The same words the Windows consent dialog uses.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private const string ConsentPrompt = "unlock your DodoSSH vault";
+
+    private readonly ClientPaths paths;
+
+    /// <summary>Creates the store.</summary>
+    public MacDeviceKeyStore(ClientPaths paths)
+    {
+        ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(paths);
+        this.paths = paths;
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Whether this Mac has a Secure Enclave that will hold a key for this build.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <para>
+    /// Probed by creating a throwaway key and deleting it, rather than by asking whether the hardware
+    /// exists. Three ordinary situations answer "no" here and would otherwise only be discovered at the
+    /// moment somebody tried to unlock:
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// <b>An Intel Mac with no T2.</b> Apple Silicon and T2 machines have an enclave; earlier Intel
+    /// models do not, and there is no single attribute that says so.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// <b>A build that is not code signed.</b> Enclave key creation requires a signing identity, so
+    /// every <c>dotnet run</c> and every build from an IDE fails here with a missing-entitlement error.
+    /// That is the correct answer rather than a nuisance: a development build should keep asking for the
+    /// passphrase, and this is what makes it do so without a platform check somewhere else.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// <b>A machine with no login password set.</b> <see cref="AccessControlFlags.UserPresence"/> has
+    /// nothing to demand, and the framework refuses the access control object rather than silently
+    /// creating a key anybody could use.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// The probe uses its own tag and no UI policy, so nothing prompts and nothing collides with the
+    /// real key. It is deleted immediately; a probe key left behind would accumulate one per launch.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </remarks>
+    internal static bool IsSupported()
+    {
+        try
+        {
+            var probe = $"{KeyTag}.probe.{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}";
+
+            using var scope = new CoreFoundationScope();
+
+            var symbols = MacSymbols.Resolve();
+
+            if (!symbols.Complete)
+            {
+                return false;
+            }
+
+            var key = CreateEnclaveKey(scope, symbols, probe);
+
+            if (key == IntPtr.Zero)
+            {
+                return false;
+            }
+
+            // Discarded deliberately. The question this method answers is whether the enclave will make a
+            // key, and it demonstrably just did; a failure to clean the probe up afterwards leaves one
+            // stray keychain item and does not make the answer no.
+            _ = DeleteKey(symbols, probe);
+
+            return true;
+        }
+        catch (Exception exception) when (exception is DllNotFoundException
+                                              or EntryPointNotFoundException
+                                              or BadImageFormatException)
+        {
+            // A macOS without these frameworks is not a thing that exists, so this is really the guard
+            // for the case that does: a future release renaming or removing one of them. The answer is
+            // the same as for hardware that is absent — no device key, ask for the passphrase.
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// <inheritdoc />
+    public ValueTask<bool> IsAvailableAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
+        ValueTask.FromResult(IsSupported());
+
+    /// <inheritdoc />
+    public async ValueTask SaveAsync(
+        ReadOnlyMemory<byte> devicePrivateKey,
+        CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var sealedKey = Seal(devicePrivateKey.Span)
+            ?? throw new InvalidOperationException(
+                "The Secure Enclave would not seal the device key. Check IsAvailableAsync before offering to register one.");
+
+        paths.EnsureCreated();
+
+        await File.WriteAllBytesAsync(paths.DeviceKeyFile, sealedKey, cancellationToken)
+            .ConfigureAwait(false);
+    }
+
+    /// <inheritdoc />
+    public async ValueTask<byte[]?> TryLoadAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        if (!File.Exists(paths.DeviceKeyFile))
+        {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        var sealedKey = await File.ReadAllBytesAsync(paths.DeviceKeyFile, cancellationToken)
+            .ConfigureAwait(false);
+
+        return Unseal(sealedKey);
+    }
+
+    /// <inheritdoc />
+    public ValueTask ForgetAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        if (File.Exists(paths.DeviceKeyFile))
+        {
+            File.Delete(paths.DeviceKeyFile);
+        }
+
+        var symbols = MacSymbols.Resolve();
+
+        if (symbols.Complete)
+        {
+            // Discarded, and that is deliberate: there is nothing a caller could do about a failure here,
+            // and the file deleted above is the half that decides whether unlock will try at all. A key
+            // left in the enclave with no ciphertext to open is inert.
+            _ = DeleteKey(symbols, KeyTag);
+        }
+
+        return ValueTask.CompletedTask;
+    }
+
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// Silent: it uses only the public half. Null on every failure, and the caller's answer to all of
+    /// them is the same — do not offer a device unlock.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static byte[]? Seal(ReadOnlySpan<byte> devicePrivateKey)
+    {
+        try
+        {
+            using var scope = new CoreFoundationScope();
+
+            var symbols = MacSymbols.Resolve();
+
+            if (!symbols.Complete)
+            {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            // Created on first use rather than at registration, so that a device key re-registered after
+            // a ForgetAsync gets a key again without anything having to notice that it had gone.
+            var privateKey = FindKey(scope, symbols, KeyTag, prompt: null);
+
+            if (privateKey == IntPtr.Zero)
+            {
+                privateKey = CreateEnclaveKey(scope, symbols, KeyTag);
+            }
+
+            if (privateKey == IntPtr.Zero)
+            {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            var publicKey = scope.Keep(SecKeyCopyPublicKey(privateKey));
+
+            if (publicKey == IntPtr.Zero)
+            {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            var plaintext = Data(scope, devicePrivateKey);
+
+            if (plaintext == IntPtr.Zero)
+            {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            var ciphertext = scope.Keep(
+                SecKeyCreateEncryptedData(publicKey, symbols.EciesAlgorithm, plaintext, out var error));
+
+            scope.Keep(error);
+
+            return ciphertext == IntPtr.Zero ? null : ToArray(ciphertext);
+        }
+        catch (Exception exception) when (exception is DllNotFoundException
+                                              or EntryPointNotFoundException
+                                              or BadImageFormatException)
+        {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <para>
+    /// This is the call that prompts. Every failure becomes null, and the set is wider than it looks:
+    /// the key may be gone, the user may have cancelled or let the prompt time out, the enclave may have
+    /// invalidated it after the login password was reset, or the blob may predate a key that has since
+    /// been replaced. None of them are distinguishable to a user and all have the same remedy, so none
+    /// are worth telling apart here — see <c>UnlockStatus.DeviceKeyUnavailable</c>.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// Blocking, and it blocks on a person. The prompt is modal to the application, so this must not run
+    /// on a thread that is also expected to draw the window behind it.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static byte[]? Unseal(byte[] sealedKey)
+    {
+        try
+        {
+            using var scope = new CoreFoundationScope();
+
+            var symbols = MacSymbols.Resolve();
+
+            if (!symbols.Complete)
+            {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            var privateKey = FindKey(scope, symbols, KeyTag, ConsentPrompt);
+
+            if (privateKey == IntPtr.Zero)
+            {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            var ciphertext = Data(scope, sealedKey);
+
+            if (ciphertext == IntPtr.Zero)
+            {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            var plaintext = scope.Keep(
+                SecKeyCreateDecryptedData(privateKey, symbols.EciesAlgorithm, ciphertext, out var error));
+
+            scope.Keep(error);
+
+            return plaintext == IntPtr.Zero ? null : ToArray(plaintext);
+        }
+        catch (Exception exception) when (exception is DllNotFoundException
+                                              or EntryPointNotFoundException
+                                              or BadImageFormatException)
+        {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Generates a key inside the Secure Enclave, filed under <paramref name="tag"/>. Owned by the scope.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <para>
+    /// The attribute dictionary is the whole security decision, so it is worth reading rather than
+    /// pattern-matching. <c>TokenID = SecureEnclave</c> is what puts the private half in hardware;
+    /// without it this silently generates an ordinary software key that behaves identically in every
+    /// visible way and protects nothing.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// <c>AccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly</c> rather than any of the migratable classes, because a
+    /// device key that could be restored onto another machine from a backup would no longer mean "this
+    /// machine". The enclave already makes that impossible; saying it as well means the intent survives
+    /// a future change of storage.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// <c>UseDataProtectionKeychain</c> is the macOS-specific one and the easiest to omit. Without it,
+    /// macOS routes this to the older file-based keychain, which does not understand access control
+    /// objects or the enclave, and the call fails with a parameter error that says nothing about the
+    /// missing key.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static IntPtr CreateEnclaveKey(CoreFoundationScope scope, MacSymbols symbols, string tag)
+    {
+        var access = scope.Keep(SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(
+            IntPtr.Zero,
+            symbols.AccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly,
+            AccessControlFlags.PrivateKeyUsage | AccessControlFlags.UserPresence,
+            out var accessError));
+
+        scope.Keep(accessError);
+
+        if (access == IntPtr.Zero)
+        {
+            return IntPtr.Zero;
+        }
+
+        var privateAttrs = Dictionary(
+            scope,
+            [symbols.AttrIsPermanent, symbols.AttrApplicationTag, symbols.AttrAccessControl],
+            [symbols.True, TagData(scope, tag), access]);
+
+        if (privateAttrs == IntPtr.Zero)
+        {
+            return IntPtr.Zero;
+        }
+
+        var keySize = Number(scope, 256);
+
+        var parameters = Dictionary(
+            scope,
+            [
+                symbols.AttrKeyType,
+                symbols.AttrKeySizeInBits,
+                symbols.AttrTokenId,
+                symbols.UseDataProtectionKeychain,
+                symbols.PrivateKeyAttrs,
+            ],
+            [
+                symbols.KeyTypeEcSecPrimeRandom,
+                keySize,
+                symbols.TokenIdSecureEnclave,
+                symbols.True,
+                privateAttrs,
+            ]);
+
+        if (parameters == IntPtr.Zero)
+        {
+            return IntPtr.Zero;
+        }
+
+        var key = scope.Keep(SecKeyCreateRandomKey(parameters, out var error));
+
+        scope.Keep(error);
+
+        return key;
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Looks the enclave key up by tag. Owned by the scope; zero when there is none.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <paramref name="prompt"/> is attached here and consumed later: the lookup itself does not raise
+    /// anything, because a handle to an enclave key is not a use of it. The words reach the user at the
+    /// decrypt, which is the operation the access control actually guards.
+    ///
+    /// <c>UseOperationPrompt</c> is deprecated in favour of an <c>LAContext</c>, and is used anyway. An
+    /// LAContext would mean binding LocalAuthentication as well for one string, and the deprecated key
+    /// still works; the day it stops, this call fails and the store degrades to the passphrase, which is
+    /// the failure this whole class is built to degrade into.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static IntPtr FindKey(CoreFoundationScope scope, MacSymbols symbols, string tag, string? prompt)
+    {
+        List<IntPtr> keys =
+        [
+            symbols.Class,
+            symbols.AttrApplicationTag,
+            symbols.AttrKeyType,
+            symbols.UseDataProtectionKeychain,
+            symbols.ReturnRef,
+        ];
+
+        List<IntPtr> values =
+        [
+            symbols.ClassKey,
+            TagData(scope, tag),
+            symbols.KeyTypeEcSecPrimeRandom,
+            symbols.True,
+            symbols.True,
+        ];
+
+        if (prompt is not null)
+        {
+            keys.Add(symbols.UseOperationPrompt);
+            values.Add(scope.Keep(CFString(prompt)));
+        }
+
+        var query = Dictionary(scope, [.. keys], [.. values]);
+
+        if (query == IntPtr.Zero)
+        {
+            return IntPtr.Zero;
+        }
+
+        var status = SecItemCopyMatching(query, out var result);
+
+        // errSecItemNotFound is the ordinary answer on a machine that has never registered a device, and
+        // it is not distinguished from any other failure for the reason the class remarks give.
+        return status == Success ? scope.Keep(result) : IntPtr.Zero;
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>Removes the key with this tag from the keychain.</summary>
+    /// <returns>Whether the keychain now has no key under this tag.</returns>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <c>ItemNotFound</c> counts as success, and that is the common case rather than an edge: it is
+    /// what a machine that never registered a device answers, and what the second of two
+    /// <see cref="ForgetAsync"/> calls answers. Treating it as a failure would make forgetting a device
+    /// twice report a problem that does not exist.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static bool DeleteKey(MacSymbols symbols, string tag)
+    {
+        using var scope = new CoreFoundationScope();
+
+        var query = Dictionary(
+            scope,
+            [symbols.Class, symbols.AttrApplicationTag, symbols.UseDataProtectionKeychain],
+            [symbols.ClassKey, TagData(scope, tag), symbols.True]);
+
+        if (query == IntPtr.Zero)
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        var status = SecItemDelete(query);
+
+        return status is Success or ItemNotFound;
+    }
+
+    // ---- Small CoreFoundation conveniences ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// The arrays are pinned for the duration of the call and not beyond it, which is correct because
+    /// <c>CFDictionaryCreate</c> copies them: the dictionary retains each key and value, and never reads
+    /// the arrays again.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static IntPtr Dictionary(CoreFoundationScope scope, IntPtr[] keys, IntPtr[] values)
+    {
+        // A zero anywhere means one of the constants did not resolve or an earlier allocation failed.
+        // Passing it on produces a dictionary with a null key, which CFDictionaryCreate does not reject
+        // — it crashes inside the callback table instead.
+        if (Array.IndexOf(keys, IntPtr.Zero) >= 0 || Array.IndexOf(values, IntPtr.Zero) >= 0)
+        {
+            return IntPtr.Zero;
+        }
+
+        var symbols = MacSymbols.Resolve();
+
+        unsafe
+        {
+            fixed (IntPtr* keyPtr = keys)
+            fixed (IntPtr* valuePtr = values)
+            {
+                return scope.Keep(CFDictionaryCreate(
+                    IntPtr.Zero,
+                    (IntPtr)keyPtr,
+                    (IntPtr)valuePtr,
+                    keys.Length,
+                    symbols.TypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks,
+                    symbols.TypeDictionaryValueCallBacks));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>Copies bytes into a CFData. Owned by the scope.</summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// The pin lasts only as long as the call, which is correct: <c>CFDataCreate</c> copies, so the
+    /// CFData does not reference this memory afterwards. <c>CFDataCreateWithBytesNoCopy</c> would not,
+    /// and is not used for exactly that reason — it would hand the framework a pointer into the managed
+    /// heap and rely on the object staying where the collector first put it.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static IntPtr Data(CoreFoundationScope scope, ReadOnlySpan<byte> bytes)
+    {
+        unsafe
+        {
+            fixed (byte* pointer = bytes)
+            {
+                return scope.Keep(CFDataCreate(IntPtr.Zero, (IntPtr)pointer, bytes.Length));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// UTF-8 rather than any other encoding, and it only has to be consistent with itself: the tag is an
+    /// opaque blob the keychain matches byte for byte, so what matters is that a lookup encodes it the
+    /// same way the creation did. It is written once, here, for exactly that reason.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static IntPtr TagData(CoreFoundationScope scope, string tag) =>
+        Data(scope, Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(tag));
+
+    private static IntPtr Number(CoreFoundationScope scope, int value)
+    {
+        unsafe
+        {
+            return scope.Keep(CFNumberCreate(IntPtr.Zero, (nint)CFNumberIntType, (IntPtr)(&value)));
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>Builds a CFString from a managed string. Owned, so the caller tracks it.</summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// Built explicitly rather than left to the marshaller, because these calls take a
+    /// <c>CFStringRef</c> and not a C string — the runtime's default marshalling would hand over a
+    /// <c>char*</c>, which CoreFoundation reads as an object pointer and follows into nothing.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static IntPtr CFString(string value)
+    {
+        var bytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(value);
+
+        unsafe
+        {
+            fixed (byte* pointer = bytes)
+            {
+                // kCFStringEncodingUTF8 is 0x08000100, spelled out rather than named because it is the
+                // only encoding constant this file uses.
+                return CFStringCreateWithBytes(IntPtr.Zero, (IntPtr)pointer, bytes.Length, 0x08000100, false);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    [LibraryImport(CoreFoundation)]
+    private static partial IntPtr CFStringCreateWithBytes(
+        IntPtr allocator,
+        IntPtr bytes,
+        nint numBytes,
+        uint encoding,
+        [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.U1)] bool isExternalRepresentation);
+
+    private static byte[] ToArray(IntPtr data)
+    {
+        var length = (int)CFDataGetLength(data);
+        var pointer = CFDataGetBytePtr(data);
+
+        if (length <= 0 || pointer == IntPtr.Zero)
+        {
+            return [];
+        }
+
+        var result = new byte[length];
+        Marshal.Copy(pointer, result, 0, length);
+
+        return result;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacSecurity.cs b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacSecurity.cs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ac99c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacSecurity.cs
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
+using System.Runtime.Versioning;
+
+namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Platform;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// The pieces of CoreFoundation and Security.framework <see cref="MacDeviceKeyStore"/> needs.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+/// <para>
+/// Separated from the store itself because it is a different kind of code with a different kind of
+/// review: nothing here makes a decision, and everything here is a translation of a C declaration that
+/// is either right or wrong. Mixing the two would mean the security argument in
+/// <see cref="MacDeviceKeyStore"/> had to be read past two hundred lines of marshalling to find.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <b>Every Create or Copy returns an object this process owns.</b> That is CoreFoundation's Create
+/// Rule, and it is the thing here that goes wrong silently: the enclave key handle is small, so a leak
+/// shows up as nothing at all until a long-running process has done a few thousand unlocks.
+/// <see cref="CoreFoundationScope"/> exists so ownership is tracked by construction rather than by
+/// remembering, and every function below that returns a handle says whether it is owned.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <b>The integer widths are the part worth checking against the headers rather than skimming.</b>
+/// <c>CFIndex</c>, <c>CFOptionFlags</c> and <c>CFNumberType</c> are all pointer-width on a 64-bit Mac,
+/// not 32-bit, and getting one wrong does not fail cleanly — it shifts every argument after it, so the
+/// call receives plausible rubbish and returns a parameter error that names nothing.
+/// </para>
+/// </remarks>
+[SupportedOSPlatform("macos")]
+internal static partial class MacSecurity
+{
+    internal const string SecurityFramework =
+        "/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security";
+
+    internal const string CoreFoundation =
+        "/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation";
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The access control flags <c>SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags</c> takes.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <c>ulong</c> because the parameter is a <c>CFOptionFlags</c>, which is an <c>unsigned long</c>.
+    /// Only the two flags that are used are listed; the full set is large, and copying it in would
+    /// invite somebody to reach for one without reading what it does to the prompt — <c>Biometry</c>
+    /// alone, for instance, leaves a Mac with no Touch ID unable to unlock at all rather than falling
+    /// back to the login password.
+    /// </remarks>
+    [Flags]
+    internal enum AccessControlFlags : ulong
+    {
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Touch ID if the machine has it, the login password if not.
+        /// </summary>
+        /// <remarks>
+        /// The forgiving one, deliberately. <c>BiometryCurrentSet</c> would additionally invalidate the
+        /// key whenever a fingerprint is added or removed, which sounds stricter and here buys nothing:
+        /// this key wraps a device key whose loss already means "ask for the passphrase", so the only
+        /// effect would be users being sent back to their passphrase by an unrelated Settings change
+        /// they would never connect to it.
+        /// </remarks>
+        UserPresence = 1ul << 0,
+
+        /// <summary>Required for any key that lives in the Secure Enclave.</summary>
+        PrivateKeyUsage = 1ul << 30,
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>The CFNumberType code for a 32-bit int, from CFNumber.h.</summary>
+    internal const long CFNumberIntType = 9;
+
+    /// <summary>errSecSuccess.</summary>
+    internal const int Success = 0;
+
+    /// <summary>errSecItemNotFound, which is an answer rather than a failure.</summary>
+    internal const int ItemNotFound = -25300;
+
+    // ---- CoreFoundation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    /// <summary>Releases an owned handle.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(CoreFoundation)]
+    internal static partial void CFRelease(IntPtr handle);
+
+    /// <summary>Copies bytes into a new CFData. Owned.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(CoreFoundation)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr CFDataCreate(IntPtr allocator, IntPtr bytes, nint length);
+
+    [LibraryImport(CoreFoundation)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr CFDataGetBytePtr(IntPtr data);
+
+    [LibraryImport(CoreFoundation)]
+    internal static partial nint CFDataGetLength(IntPtr data);
+
+    /// <summary>Boxes a value as a CFNumber. Owned.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(CoreFoundation)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr CFNumberCreate(IntPtr allocator, nint theType, IntPtr valuePtr);
+
+    /// <summary>Builds an immutable dictionary. Owned.</summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <para>
+    /// The key and value arrays are passed as raw pointers to memory the caller pins, rather than as
+    /// managed arrays. Source-generated interop wants an explicit element count for a marshalled array,
+    /// and supplying one here would mean stating the length twice — once for the marshaller and once as
+    /// <paramref name="numValues"/> — which is exactly the pair that drifts.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// The two callback tables are what make the dictionary retain its keys and values, which is why
+    /// they are passed rather than left null: with null callbacks the dictionary stores raw pointers and
+    /// keeps nothing alive, and the resulting use-after-free is intermittent by nature.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </remarks>
+    [LibraryImport(CoreFoundation)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr CFDictionaryCreate(
+        IntPtr allocator,
+        IntPtr keys,
+        IntPtr values,
+        nint numValues,
+        IntPtr keyCallBacks,
+        IntPtr valueCallBacks);
+
+    // ---- Security.framework --------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    /// <summary>Builds the access policy a Secure Enclave key is created under. Owned.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(SecurityFramework)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(
+        IntPtr allocator,
+        IntPtr protection,
+        AccessControlFlags flags,
+        out IntPtr error);
+
+    /// <summary>Creates a key pair from an attribute dictionary. Owned.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(SecurityFramework)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr SecKeyCreateRandomKey(IntPtr parameters, out IntPtr error);
+
+    /// <summary>The public half of a key. Owned.</summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// Available even for an enclave key, and that asymmetry is the whole reason this design works: the
+    /// public half is an ordinary key this process can hold and use, while the private half is a handle
+    /// to something inside the enclave that never becomes bytes. So sealing is silent and unsealing is
+    /// the thing the user is asked about.
+    /// </remarks>
+    [LibraryImport(SecurityFramework)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr SecKeyCopyPublicKey(IntPtr key);
+
+    /// <summary>Encrypts with a public key. Owned.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(SecurityFramework)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr SecKeyCreateEncryptedData(
+        IntPtr key,
+        IntPtr algorithm,
+        IntPtr plaintext,
+        out IntPtr error);
+
+    /// <summary>Decrypts with a private key, prompting for whatever guards it. Owned.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(SecurityFramework)]
+    internal static partial IntPtr SecKeyCreateDecryptedData(
+        IntPtr key,
+        IntPtr algorithm,
+        IntPtr ciphertext,
+        out IntPtr error);
+
+    /// <summary>Finds a keychain item. The out handle is owned when the result is <see cref="Success"/>.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(SecurityFramework)]
+    internal static partial int SecItemCopyMatching(IntPtr query, out IntPtr result);
+
+    /// <summary>Deletes every keychain item matching the query.</summary>
+    [LibraryImport(SecurityFramework)]
+    internal static partial int SecItemDelete(IntPtr query);
+
+    // ---- The framework constants ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Reads one of a framework's global CFString constants, or zero if it is not exported.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <para>
+    /// The keys these dictionaries take are not strings this code may spell for itself. They are
+    /// pointer-comparable constants exported by the framework, and a CFString built here with the same
+    /// characters is a different object — the lookups would miss and the call would fail with a
+    /// parameter error naming nothing.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// <b>Dereferenced once, because the exported symbol is the variable rather than its value.</b>
+    /// <c>TryGetExport</c> answers the address of the global; the CFStringRef is what that address
+    /// holds. Missing the indirection produces a pointer that is stable, plausible and wrong, which is
+    /// the worst of the three available outcomes.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// Zero on a missing symbol rather than an exception, because the caller's answer to every failure
+    /// is the same one — report the store unavailable and let unlock ask for the passphrase — and a
+    /// constant that has been renamed by a future macOS should reach that answer rather than a crash.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </remarks>
+    internal static IntPtr Constant(IntPtr library, string symbol) =>
+        NativeLibrary.TryGetExport(library, symbol, out var address)
+            ? Marshal.ReadIntPtr(address)
+            : IntPtr.Zero;
+}
+
+/// <summary>
+/// Releases every CoreFoundation handle put into it, in reverse order, exactly once.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+/// <para>
+/// The alternative is a try/finally per handle, and the operations here need six or seven at a time — a
+/// dictionary holding a nested dictionary holding an access control object holding a CFData tag. Finallys
+/// nested that deep stop being read, and a handle released twice is a crash rather than a leak.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <see cref="Keep"/> returns what it was given, so a handle can be tracked in the same expression that
+/// produces it and the call sites read as ordinary code.
+/// </para>
+/// </remarks>
+[SupportedOSPlatform("macos")]
+internal sealed class CoreFoundationScope : IDisposable
+{
+    private readonly List<IntPtr> owned = [];
+
+    private bool disposed;
+
+    /// <summary>Takes ownership of a handle and hands it straight back.</summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// Zero is ignored rather than rejected. Every CoreFoundation call here answers zero on failure, so
+    /// accepting it lets a caller track the result in the expression that produces it and check it on
+    /// the next line, instead of writing the check twice.
+    /// </remarks>
+    internal IntPtr Keep(IntPtr handle)
+    {
+        if (handle != IntPtr.Zero)
+        {
+            owned.Add(handle);
+        }
+
+        return handle;
+    }
+
+    public void Dispose()
+    {
+        if (disposed)
+        {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        disposed = true;
+
+        // Reverse order, so a container is released before the things it retains. CoreFoundation does not
+        // require it — retain counts make the order irrelevant — but it keeps the lifetimes readable in a
+        // debugger, where a released container that still lists its contents is a confusing thing to meet.
+        for (var i = owned.Count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+        {
+            MacSecurity.CFRelease(owned[i]);
+        }
+
+        owned.Clear();
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacSymbols.cs b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacSymbols.cs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97f3328
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/MacSymbols.cs
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
+using System.Runtime.Versioning;
+
+namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Platform;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// The framework constants <see cref="MacDeviceKeyStore"/> passes to CoreFoundation and Security.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+/// <para>
+/// Every field here is a pointer read out of a loaded framework rather than a value this code could
+/// write down. The dictionaries these go into are matched by pointer identity, so a CFString built with
+/// the same characters is a different key and the lookup misses — see <see cref="MacSecurity.Constant"/>
+/// for the indirection that trips people.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <b>Resolved once and cached, and the caching is what makes the failure survivable.</b> Two frameworks
+/// and nineteen symbols is a lot of things to be wrong about, and the useful property is that being
+/// wrong about any one of them shows up here — as <see cref="Complete"/> being false — rather than
+/// three calls later as a parameter error. A store that reports itself unavailable sends the user back
+/// to their passphrase; a store that half works corrupts the moment somebody registers a device.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <see cref="Lazy{T}"/> rather than a static constructor, because a type initialiser that throws
+/// poisons the type for the life of the process and turns a missing symbol into a
+/// <c>TypeInitializationException</c> at every later call site. The load is done inside a try instead,
+/// and its failure is a value.
+/// </para>
+/// </remarks>
+[SupportedOSPlatform("macos")]
+internal sealed class MacSymbols
+{
+    private static readonly Lazy<MacSymbols> Cached = new(Load, LazyThreadSafetyMode.ExecutionAndPublication);
+
+    private MacSymbols()
+    {
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>Whether every symbol resolved.</summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// Checked by every caller before any of the pointers are used. It is one check rather than
+    /// nineteen, which is the only reason the call sites in <see cref="MacDeviceKeyStore"/> are
+    /// readable.
+    ///
+    /// Computed rather than stored, so that the instance returned when a framework will not load at all
+    /// — every field left at zero — answers false without that having to be set anywhere. One rule,
+    /// applied to the only state there is.
+    /// </remarks>
+    internal bool Complete => AllResolved();
+
+    // CoreFoundation.
+    internal IntPtr True { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr TypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr TypeDictionaryValueCallBacks { get; private init; }
+
+    // Security: item classes and query keys.
+    internal IntPtr Class { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr ClassKey { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr ReturnRef { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr UseDataProtectionKeychain { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr UseOperationPrompt { get; private init; }
+
+    // Security: key attributes.
+    internal IntPtr AttrKeyType { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr AttrKeySizeInBits { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr AttrTokenId { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr AttrIsPermanent { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr AttrApplicationTag { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr AttrAccessControl { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr PrivateKeyAttrs { get; private init; }
+
+    // Security: attribute values.
+    internal IntPtr KeyTypeEcSecPrimeRandom { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr TokenIdSecureEnclave { get; private init; }
+
+    internal IntPtr AccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly { get; private init; }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// <c>kSecKeyAlgorithmECIESEncryptionCofactorX963SHA256AESGCM</c>.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// The one algorithm the Secure Enclave's P-256 keys support for encryption, and the reason this
+    /// store wraps rather than signs. The long name spells out the whole construction: an ephemeral
+    /// key agreed against the enclave's public half with cofactor ECDH, run through the X9.63 KDF with
+    /// SHA-256, used as an AES-GCM key. The ephemeral public key travels in the output, which is why the
+    /// ciphertext is larger than the 32 bytes going in and why nothing else has to be stored beside it.
+    /// </remarks>
+    internal IntPtr EciesAlgorithm { get; private init; }
+
+    /// <summary>The resolved symbols, loaded once.</summary>
+    internal static MacSymbols Resolve() => Cached.Value;
+
+    private static MacSymbols Load()
+    {
+        try
+        {
+            if (!NativeLibrary.TryLoad(MacSecurity.CoreFoundation, out var cf)
+                || !NativeLibrary.TryLoad(MacSecurity.SecurityFramework, out var sec))
+            {
+                // Every pointer left at zero, which AllResolved reads as incomplete.
+                return new MacSymbols();
+            }
+
+            // The two callback tables are structs rather than object pointers, so what is wanted is the
+            // address of the export itself and not what it holds. Every other symbol here is a CFTypeRef
+            // global and needs the dereference; these two do not, and mixing them up produces a
+            // dictionary that does not retain its contents.
+            var keyCallBacks = NativeLibrary.TryGetExport(cf, "kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks", out var k)
+                ? k
+                : IntPtr.Zero;
+
+            var valueCallBacks = NativeLibrary.TryGetExport(cf, "kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks", out var v)
+                ? v
+                : IntPtr.Zero;
+
+            return new MacSymbols
+            {
+                True = MacSecurity.Constant(cf, "kCFBooleanTrue"),
+                TypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks = keyCallBacks,
+                TypeDictionaryValueCallBacks = valueCallBacks,
+
+                Class = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecClass"),
+                ClassKey = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecClassKey"),
+                ReturnRef = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecReturnRef"),
+                UseDataProtectionKeychain = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain"),
+                UseOperationPrompt = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecUseOperationPrompt"),
+
+                AttrKeyType = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrKeyType"),
+                AttrKeySizeInBits = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrKeySizeInBits"),
+                AttrTokenId = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrTokenID"),
+                AttrIsPermanent = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrIsPermanent"),
+                AttrApplicationTag = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrApplicationTag"),
+                AttrAccessControl = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrAccessControl"),
+                PrivateKeyAttrs = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecPrivateKeyAttrs"),
+
+                KeyTypeEcSecPrimeRandom = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom"),
+                TokenIdSecureEnclave = MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave"),
+                AccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly =
+                    MacSecurity.Constant(sec, "kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly"),
+
+                EciesAlgorithm = MacSecurity.Constant(
+                    sec,
+                    "kSecKeyAlgorithmECIESEncryptionCofactorX963SHA256AESGCM"),
+            };
+        }
+        catch (Exception exception) when (exception is DllNotFoundException or BadImageFormatException)
+        {
+            return new MacSymbols();
+        }
+    }
+
+    private bool AllResolved() =>
+        True != IntPtr.Zero
+        && TypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks != IntPtr.Zero
+        && TypeDictionaryValueCallBacks != IntPtr.Zero
+        && Class != IntPtr.Zero
+        && ClassKey != IntPtr.Zero
+        && ReturnRef != IntPtr.Zero
+        && UseDataProtectionKeychain != IntPtr.Zero
+        && UseOperationPrompt != IntPtr.Zero
+        && AttrKeyType != IntPtr.Zero
+        && AttrKeySizeInBits != IntPtr.Zero
+        && AttrTokenId != IntPtr.Zero
+        && AttrIsPermanent != IntPtr.Zero
+        && AttrApplicationTag != IntPtr.Zero
+        && AttrAccessControl != IntPtr.Zero
+        && PrivateKeyAttrs != IntPtr.Zero
+        && KeyTypeEcSecPrimeRandom != IntPtr.Zero
+        && TokenIdSecureEnclave != IntPtr.Zero
+        && AccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly != IntPtr.Zero
+        && EciesAlgorithm != IntPtr.Zero;
+}
diff --git a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/VelopackUpdateChannel.cs b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/VelopackUpdateChannel.cs
index 8fe0fe8..677297e 100644
--- a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/VelopackUpdateChannel.cs
+++ b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/VelopackUpdateChannel.cs
@@ -31,7 +31,12 @@ internal static class UpdateChannels
     /// </remarks>
     internal static IUpdateChannel ForThisMachine()
     {
-        if (!OperatingSystem.IsWindows())
+        // Two platforms now, and the check is a list rather than a negation for a reason: Linux reaches
+        // this too. Velopack has a Linux path — AppImage — but this repository does not build one, so a
+        // Linux build is a checkout somebody ran, and handing it an UpdateManager would have it poll a
+        // feed carrying nothing it could apply. Naming the platforms that are packaged keeps a future
+        // AppImage an addition here rather than a thing that silently already half-happened.
+        if (!OperatingSystem.IsWindows() && !OperatingSystem.IsMacOS())
         {
             return new UnavailableUpdateChannel();
         }
@@ -55,14 +60,21 @@ internal static class UpdateChannels
 }
 
 /// <summary>
-/// The Windows update channel, backed by Velopack against the project's own forge.
+/// The desktop update channel, backed by Velopack against the project's own forge.
 /// </summary>
 /// <remarks>
 /// <para>
-/// The one file in the repository that names Velopack. It lives beside <c>WindowsDeviceKeyStore</c>
-/// rather than in a project of its own because it is the same kind of thing — a Windows-only
-/// implementation of an interface declared in <c>DodoSSH.Client.Session</c> — and because
-/// <c>DodoSSH.Client.Shell</c> is shared with the Android head, which must never acquire an updater.
+/// The one file in the repository that names Velopack. It lives beside the platform key stores rather
+/// than in a project of its own because it is the same kind of thing — a desktop-only implementation of
+/// an interface declared in <c>DodoSSH.Client.Session</c> — and because <c>DodoSSH.Client.Shell</c> is
+/// shared with the Android head, which must never acquire an updater.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <b>One class for both desktop platforms, where the key stores are one class each.</b> The difference
+/// is where the platform knowledge sits. A key store is platform knowledge from top to bottom: different
+/// hardware, different API, different failure modes. Velopack's <c>UpdateManager</c> has already absorbed
+/// all of that, and what is left over — check, download, apply, restart — is identical on the two. The
+/// only thing that differs is which string names the feed, and that is <see cref="ChannelFor"/>.
 /// </para>
 /// <para>
 /// See <c>docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md</c>.
@@ -103,7 +115,7 @@ internal sealed class VelopackUpdateChannel : IUpdateChannel
     /// but unsaid on one side and stated on the other is how a feed goes quiet with no error anywhere:
     /// the check succeeds, finds nothing, and reports that the client is up to date forever.
     /// </remarks>
-    private const string ReleaseChannel = "win";
+    private const string WindowsReleaseChannel = "win";
 
     /// <summary>
     /// The nightly channel, which is a different name rather than the same one on a different tag.
@@ -122,7 +134,26 @@ internal sealed class VelopackUpdateChannel : IUpdateChannel
     /// a download somebody watched. A channel each means neither ever sees the other's releases at all.
     /// </para>
     /// </remarks>
-    private const string NightlyChannel = "win-nightly";
+    private const string WindowsNightlyChannel = "win-nightly";
+
+    /// <summary>The macOS release channel, and Velopack's own default there.</summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// A contract with <c>scripts/release-macos.sh</c>, exactly as the Windows pair is one with the
+    /// PowerShell script. Stated for the same reason, which applies with more force here: the four
+    /// channels all publish to one repository, so the only thing keeping a Mac from being offered a
+    /// <c>win</c> package is that it never reads that index.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private const string MacReleaseChannel = "osx";
+
+    /// <summary>The macOS nightly channel.</summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// Named here and not yet published by anything. The CI job for the macOS head builds and bundles
+    /// and deliberately uploads nothing — see the packaging step in <c>ci.yml</c> — so a nightly macOS
+    /// build checking this feed finds an empty channel and reports itself up to date, which is the
+    /// correct behaviour for a channel with no publisher. The name exists so that turning the publisher
+    /// on later is one job rather than a job plus a rename that has to reach every installed client.
+    /// </remarks>
+    private const string MacNightlyChannel = "osx-nightly";
 
     private readonly UpdateManager manager;
 
@@ -141,10 +172,13 @@ internal sealed class VelopackUpdateChannel : IUpdateChannel
     /// <inheritdoc />
     public bool IsSupported => true;
 
-    /// <summary>Always, on this head.</summary>
+    /// <summary>Always, on this head, on either platform.</summary>
     /// <remarks>
-    /// Velopack's apply runs <c>Update.exe</c> over this installation and restarts it, so the process is
-    /// gone by the time anything could have asked a question. The phone's is the other answer; see
+    /// Velopack's apply hands off to a separate updater process — <c>Update.exe</c> on Windows, the
+    /// <c>UpdateMac</c> helper inside the bundle on macOS — which replaces this installation and
+    /// relaunches it, so the process is gone by the time anything could have asked a question. The
+    /// mechanism differs and the answer does not, which is why this is a constant rather than another
+    /// thing <see cref="ChannelFor"/> would have to decide. The phone's is the other answer; see
     /// <see cref="IUpdateChannel.ApplyingEndsTheProcess"/> for what the caller does differently.
     /// </remarks>
     public bool ApplyingEndsTheProcess => true;
@@ -183,7 +217,36 @@ internal sealed class VelopackUpdateChannel : IUpdateChannel
 
         return new UpdateManager(
             new GiteaSource(RepositoryUrl, accessToken: null, prerelease: nightly),
-            new UpdateOptions { ExplicitChannel = nightly ? NightlyChannel : ReleaseChannel });
+            new UpdateOptions { ExplicitChannel = ChannelFor(nightly) });
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The one of the four channel names this build belongs to.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// <para>
+    /// Two independent axes — which platform, and which of that platform's two channels — and they are
+    /// resolved in one place so that neither can be answered differently somewhere else. The platform
+    /// half is the running OS rather than anything recorded in the build, because a package can only
+    /// ever be applied on the platform it was built for; the channel half comes from assembly metadata,
+    /// because a release build and a nightly are the same bytes on the same OS and only the metadata
+    /// tells them apart.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// Windows is the fallback rather than a third branch. Only Windows and macOS reach here at all —
+    /// <see cref="UpdateChannels.ForThisMachine"/> is the gate — so the alternative would be an
+    /// unreachable throw, and an unreachable throw in the middle of the updater is a thing somebody
+    /// later has to reason about to discover it cannot happen.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </remarks>
+    private static string ChannelFor(bool nightly)
+    {
+        if (OperatingSystem.IsMacOS())
+        {
+            return nightly ? MacNightlyChannel : MacReleaseChannel;
+        }
+
+        return nightly ? WindowsNightlyChannel : WindowsReleaseChannel;
     }
 
     /// <inheritdoc />
diff --git a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/WindowsDeviceKeyStore.cs b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/WindowsDeviceKeyStore.cs
index 2feb91f..e98d584 100644
--- a/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/WindowsDeviceKeyStore.cs
+++ b/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Platform/WindowsDeviceKeyStore.cs
@@ -9,9 +9,17 @@ namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Platform;
 /// </summary>
 /// <remarks>
 /// <para>
-/// One place decides, so nothing above has to carry a platform guard. A machine with no TPM, or one that
-/// is not Windows, gets <see cref="UnavailableDeviceKeyStore"/> and therefore keeps asking for the
-/// passphrase — which is the honest answer rather than a degraded one.
+/// One place decides, so nothing above has to carry a platform guard. A machine with no secure hardware,
+/// or one that is neither Windows nor macOS, gets <see cref="UnavailableDeviceKeyStore"/> and therefore
+/// keeps asking for the passphrase — which is the honest answer rather than a degraded one.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// <b>Both real stores are asked whether they work rather than told that they do.</b> Each
+/// <c>IsSupported</c> probes by doing the thing — creating a throwaway key and deleting it — because on
+/// both platforms the provider is present and reports itself present on machines where creating a key
+/// fails: a Windows box with no usable TPM, a Mac with no Secure Enclave, and on macOS also every
+/// unsigned development build, since enclave keys need a signing identity. Inferring from the OS would
+/// mean each of those discovering the truth at the moment somebody tried to unlock.
 /// </para>
 /// <para>
 /// <b>"Desktop", because the choice belongs to a head rather than to the session layer.</b> This file used
@@ -29,9 +37,17 @@ public static class DesktopDeviceKeyStores
     {
         ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(paths);
 
-        return OperatingSystem.IsWindows() && WindowsDeviceKeyStore.IsSupported()
-            ? new WindowsDeviceKeyStore(paths)
-            : new UnavailableDeviceKeyStore();
+        if (OperatingSystem.IsWindows() && WindowsDeviceKeyStore.IsSupported())
+        {
+            return new WindowsDeviceKeyStore(paths);
+        }
+
+        if (OperatingSystem.IsMacOS() && MacDeviceKeyStore.IsSupported())
+        {
+            return new MacDeviceKeyStore(paths);
+        }
+
+        return new UnavailableDeviceKeyStore();
     }
 }