Add /me and enrollment with the identity-provider key binding (M1)

The last backend piece of M1. A client can now log in, discover it must
enroll, publish its identity key, and get a usable personal vault.

Enrollment is one indivisible act. One transaction writes the key, its
wraps, the device, the key log entry, the vault and the vault key grant,
because none of them is useful alone: a key with no vault leaves a user
unable to store anything, and a vault with no grant is a container nobody
can ever open -- including its owner, since only the client can wrap the
key and it has already moved on.

Two independent checks run, and neither substitutes for the other. The
Ed25519 self-signature proves possession of the private key. The
identity-provider binding proves whose key it is: the client hashed its
statement, used the hash as an OIDC nonce, and the resulting ID token is
the provider's signature over exactly those public keys. This server
cannot mint that signature, so it cannot invent a key for a user who never
enrolled -- which is the attack that would otherwise let an operator read
every vault by publishing its own key as yours.

The binding token is stored verbatim, not just summarised. Clients must
repeat the check against the provider's JWKS fetched directly, and storing
only our conclusion would ask them to trust the server about the one
question the design exists to avoid trusting it about.

Key log appends take a deployment-wide advisory lock. The falsification
matters more than the passing test: with the lock removed,
Enroll_ConcurrentEnrollmentsByDifferentUsers_LeaveAnUnbrokenChain fails
with entry 11 linked to the wrong predecessor. Different users trip no
unique index, so without serialising they all read the same head and the
chain forks -- indistinguishable from the key substitution the log exists
to make detectable, and permanent, because the log is append-only.

Enrollment is idempotent. Vault ids and keys are client-chosen, so a
client whose response was lost re-sends the identical body and gets the
identical result. Without that, a lost response leaves a user enrolled
against a vault they never learned the id of.

Contract change, breaking the v0.1 freeze deliberately. EnrollmentRequest
had DevicePublicKey but no wrap to go with it, which is unsatisfiable:
only the holder of the secret bundle can seal it, so the server could
never fill the gap. Added DeviceWrappedPrivateKey, and PersonalVault so
enrollment can be atomic rather than leaving an unopenable vault behind
two endpoints that do not exist yet. No client exists and no package is
published, which is exactly when PublicAPI.Unshipped.txt expects this.

Sync now requires the Enrolled policy, which until now was a stub whose
name promised a check it never made. The sync denial tests use enrolled
intruders instead of unenrolled ones -- an unenrolled caller is stopped
before the vault check runs, which would have left those tests passing
without exercising the thing they exist to prove.

Also fixed: omitting kdfParameters from the JSON body was a 500. A
record's non-nullable parameters are a compile-time promise, not a runtime
one.

268 tests pass, zero warnings on a clean rebuild, format clean.
This commit is contained in:
jaap-jan committed 2026-07-28 16:06:35 +02:00
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using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text.Json;
using DodoSSH.Contracts;
using DodoSSH.Crypto;
using DodoSSH.Domain;
using DodoSSH.Infrastructure;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
using Npgsql;
namespace DodoSSH.Api.Features.Identity;
/// <summary>
/// Publishes a user's first identity key and creates their personal vault.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// One transaction produces the key, its wraps, the device, the key log entry, the vault and the
/// vault key grant. Nothing here is separable: a key with no vault leaves a user unable to store
/// anything, and a vault with no grant is a container nobody can ever open — including its owner,
/// since only the client can wrap the key and it has already moved on.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Enrollment is idempotent on retry. A client whose request timed out after the server committed
/// re-sends the identical body and receives the identical response, because the vault id and the
/// keys are all client-chosen. Without that, a lost response would leave the user permanently
/// enrolled against a vault they never learned the id of.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
internal sealed class EnrollmentService(
DodoDbContext database,
IIdentityBindingVerifier bindingVerifier,
TimeProvider clock,
ILogger<EnrollmentService> logger)
{
/// <summary>
/// Lock key serialising key log appends across the deployment.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// A constant string rather than a per-user key, because the chain is global: two concurrent
/// enrollments reading the same head would produce two entries claiming the same predecessor,
/// which is indistinguishable from the fork the chain exists to detect. Enrollment happens once
/// per user, so serialising it costs nothing.
/// </remarks>
private const string KeyLogLockName = "dodossh:key_log";
/// <summary>Enrolls the caller's first identity key.</summary>
/// <exception cref="EnrollmentInvalidException">The request is structurally unacceptable.</exception>
/// <exception cref="IdentityBindingInvalidException">The provider token did not bind the keys.</exception>
/// <exception cref="AlreadyEnrolledException">A different current key already exists.</exception>
internal async Task<EnrollmentResponse> EnrollAsync(
UserAccount user,
EnrollmentRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
EnrollmentValidation.Validate(request, user);
var statement = request.Statement;
var canonical = KeyStatementCodec.Encode(ToFields(statement));
// Order matters only for cost: the self-signature is local and cheap, the binding check may
// hit the provider's JWKS endpoint. Both are mandatory and neither substitutes for the
// other — the self-signature proves possession of the private key, the binding proves whose
// key it is.
if (!DshSignatures.VerifyKeyStatement(
statement.SigningPublicKey, canonical, request.StatementSignature))
{
IdentityLog.StatementSignatureRejected(logger, user.Id);
throw new EnrollmentInvalidException(
"The key statement self-signature did not verify against the statement's own signing key.");
}
var verification = await bindingVerifier.VerifyAsync(
request.IdentityProviderToken,
statement.Issuer,
statement.Subject,
KeyStatementCodec.ToNonce(KeyStatementCodec.ComputeBinding(canonical)),
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
if (!verification.Verified)
{
IdentityLog.BindingRejected(logger, user.Id);
throw new IdentityBindingInvalidException(verification.Failure!);
}
var fingerprint = DshCrypto.ComputeFingerprint(
statement.EncryptionPublicKey,
statement.SigningPublicKey);
// Cheap path for the common retry. The authoritative check runs inside the transaction.
var current = await FindCurrentKeyAsync(user.Id, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (current is not null)
{
return await ResolveExistingAsync(user, request, current, fingerprint, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
return await CommitAsync(user, request, verification, fingerprint, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
private async Task<EnrollmentResponse> CommitAsync(
UserAccount user,
EnrollmentRequest request,
BindingVerification verification,
byte[] fingerprint,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var strategy = database.Database.CreateExecutionStrategy();
return await strategy.ExecuteAsync(async () =>
{
var transaction = await database.Database
.BeginTransactionAsync(cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
await using var _ = transaction.ConfigureAwait(false);
// First statement in the transaction, as with a sync push. The key log's sequence is an
// identity column, so it is assigned before commit: without serialising appends, two
// transactions can interleave their sequences and the hash chain no longer matches the
// order a reader sees. See ADR 0003 for the same hazard in the vault change log.
await AcquireKeyLogLockAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
var current = await FindCurrentKeyAsync(user.Id, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (current is not null)
{
// Two concurrent first enrollments. Fall back to the same resolution the fast path
// uses, so a duplicate submission still ends in an idempotent success.
return await ResolveExistingAsync(user, request, current, fingerprint, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
await RequireVaultIdIsFreeAsync(request.PersonalVault.VaultId, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
var written = await WriteAsync(user, request, verification, fingerprint, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
await transaction.CommitAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
IdentityLog.Enrolled(logger, user.Id, written.Generation, written.KeyLogSequence);
return new EnrollmentResponse(
UserId: user.Id,
KeyGeneration: written.Generation,
Fingerprint: fingerprint,
PersonalVaultId: request.PersonalVault.VaultId,
DeviceId: written.DeviceId,
KeyLogSequence: written.KeyLogSequence);
}).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>What the write produced, for the response.</summary>
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.StructLayout(System.Runtime.InteropServices.LayoutKind.Auto)]
private readonly record struct WrittenEnrollment(int Generation, Guid? DeviceId, long KeyLogSequence);
/// <summary>Writes every row enrollment produces, inside the caller's transaction.</summary>
private async Task<WrittenEnrollment> WriteAsync(
UserAccount user,
EnrollmentRequest request,
BindingVerification verification,
byte[] fingerprint,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
// Truncated to the precision the key log hashes, so the stored row can reproduce its own
// hash after a round trip through PostgreSQL's microsecond timestamps.
var now = KeyLogChain.TruncateTimestamp(clock.GetUtcNow());
var key = BuildKey(user, request, verification, fingerprint, now);
database.UserKeys.Add(key);
AddWraps(user, request, now);
var deviceId = AddDevice(user, request, now);
var entry = await AppendKeyLogAsync(user, request, now, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
AddPersonalVault(user, request, fingerprint, now);
user.EnrolledAtUtc = now;
user.UpdatedAtUtc = now;
user.LastSeenAtUtc = now;
try
{
await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (DbUpdateException exception) when (IsUniqueViolation(exception))
{
// The advisory lock covers the key log, and the pre-checks cover the expected races.
// Anything left is a genuine collision — most plausibly the global unique index on key
// fingerprints — and must not be reported as success.
throw new AlreadyEnrolledException(
"Enrollment collided with existing identity data. Retry with freshly generated keys.");
}
return new WrittenEnrollment(key.Generation, deviceId, entry.Sequence);
}
/// <summary>
/// Decides whether an enrollment against an already-enrolled user is a retry or a conflict.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Compared by fingerprint, which covers both public keys, rather than by any single field. The
/// vault id must match too: the same keys with a different vault id is a client that has lost
/// track of its own state, and creating a second vault for it would strand the first.
/// </remarks>
private async Task<EnrollmentResponse> ResolveExistingAsync(
UserAccount user,
EnrollmentRequest request,
UserKey current,
byte[] fingerprint,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (!CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals(current.FingerprintSha256, fingerprint))
{
throw new AlreadyEnrolledException(
"This account already holds a different identity key. Rotate the existing key "
+ "rather than enrolling a second one.");
}
var vaultExists = await database.Vaults
.AnyAsync(
v => v.Id == request.PersonalVault.VaultId
&& v.OwnerUserId == user.Id
&& v.DeletedAtUtc == null,
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
if (!vaultExists)
{
throw new AlreadyEnrolledException(
"This account is already enrolled with these keys, but not against the supplied "
+ "vault id. Read /api/v1/me to recover the current state.");
}
var sequence = await database.KeyLog
.Where(e => e.UserId == user.Id && e.Generation == current.Generation)
.Select(e => e.Sequence)
.FirstOrDefaultAsync(cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
var deviceId = request.DevicePublicKey is null
? (Guid?)null
: await database.Devices
.Where(d => d.UserId == user.Id && d.PublicKey == request.DevicePublicKey)
.Select(d => (Guid?)d.Id)
.FirstOrDefaultAsync(cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
IdentityLog.EnrollmentReplayed(logger, user.Id);
return new EnrollmentResponse(
UserId: user.Id,
KeyGeneration: current.Generation,
Fingerprint: current.FingerprintSha256,
PersonalVaultId: request.PersonalVault.VaultId,
DeviceId: deviceId,
KeyLogSequence: sequence);
}
private static UserKey BuildKey(
UserAccount user,
EnrollmentRequest request,
BindingVerification verification,
byte[] fingerprint,
DateTimeOffset now) =>
new()
{
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
UserId = user.Id,
Generation = request.Statement.KeyGeneration,
EncryptionPublicKey = request.Statement.EncryptionPublicKey,
SigningPublicKey = request.Statement.SigningPublicKey,
FingerprintSha256 = fingerprint,
// Stored verbatim so a client can recompute the canonical encoding and check the
// binding for itself. The hash is over the canonical encoding, not over this JSON, so
// the serialiser's formatting choices cannot invalidate anything.
Statement = JsonSerializer.Serialize(
request.Statement,
DodoSshJsonContext.ResponseOptions),
StatementSignature = request.StatementSignature,
IdentityProviderBinding = verification.Evidence,
IsCurrent = true,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
};
private void AddWraps(UserAccount user, EnrollmentRequest request, DateTimeOffset now)
{
database.UserKeyWraps.Add(BuildKdfWrap(
user.Id,
UserKeyWrapKind.Passphrase,
request.WrappedPrivateKey,
request.KdfParameters,
now));
if (request.RecoveryWrappedPrivateKey is not null && request.RecoveryKdfParameters is not null)
{
database.UserKeyWraps.Add(BuildKdfWrap(
user.Id,
UserKeyWrapKind.Recovery,
request.RecoveryWrappedPrivateKey,
request.RecoveryKdfParameters,
now));
}
}
private static UserKeyWrap BuildKdfWrap(
Guid userId,
UserKeyWrapKind kind,
byte[] wrap,
KdfParameters parameters,
DateTimeOffset now) =>
new()
{
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
UserId = userId,
Kind = kind,
Wrap = wrap,
WrapVersion = 1,
KdfAlgorithm = parameters.Algorithm,
KdfSalt = parameters.Salt,
KdfMemoryKibibytes = parameters.MemoryKibibytes,
KdfPasses = parameters.Passes,
KdfParallelism = parameters.Parallelism,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
};
/// <remarks>
/// The platform is left unreported: the request carries a device name but no platform, and
/// guessing one from a user agent would be a display-only field populated with a lie. The
/// devices endpoint sets it properly when it lands.
/// </remarks>
private Guid? AddDevice(UserAccount user, EnrollmentRequest request, DateTimeOffset now)
{
if (request.DevicePublicKey is null || request.DeviceWrappedPrivateKey is null)
{
return null;
}
var device = new Device
{
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
UserId = user.Id,
Name = request.Statement.DeviceName,
Platform = DevicePlatform.Unspecified,
PublicKey = request.DevicePublicKey,
EnrolledAtUtc = now,
LastSeenAtUtc = now,
};
database.Devices.Add(device);
database.UserKeyWraps.Add(new UserKeyWrap
{
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
UserId = user.Id,
Kind = UserKeyWrapKind.Device,
DeviceId = device.Id,
Wrap = request.DeviceWrappedPrivateKey,
WrapVersion = 1,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
});
return device.Id;
}
private async Task<KeyLogEntry> AppendKeyLogAsync(
UserAccount user,
EnrollmentRequest request,
DateTimeOffset now,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
// Ordered by sequence rather than by timestamp: the sequence is what the chain follows, and
// two entries can share a millisecond.
var previousHash = await database.KeyLog
.OrderByDescending(e => e.Sequence)
.Select(e => e.Hash)
.FirstOrDefaultAsync(cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false)
?? KeyLogChain.CreateGenesisPreviousHash();
var entry = new KeyLogEntry
{
UserId = user.Id,
Generation = request.Statement.KeyGeneration,
EncryptionPublicKey = request.Statement.EncryptionPublicKey,
SigningPublicKey = request.Statement.SigningPublicKey,
StatementSignature = request.StatementSignature,
PreviousHash = previousHash,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
};
entry.Hash = KeyLogChain.ComputeEntryHash(
previousHash,
entry.UserId,
entry.Generation,
entry.EncryptionPublicKey,
entry.SigningPublicKey,
entry.StatementSignature,
entry.CreatedAtUtc);
database.KeyLog.Add(entry);
return entry;
}
/// <remarks>
/// The grant carries no key log head. A self-grant has no third party whose key could have been
/// substituted, and the entry that would supply the head is being written in this very
/// transaction — so the client could not have signed over it. Recording the server's own
/// observation instead would produce a row whose signature verifies against nothing.
/// </remarks>
private void AddPersonalVault(
UserAccount user,
EnrollmentRequest request,
byte[] fingerprint,
DateTimeOffset now)
{
var personal = request.PersonalVault;
database.Vaults.Add(new Vault
{
Id = personal.VaultId,
Name = personal.Name,
OwnerKind = VaultOwnerKind.Personal,
OwnerUserId = user.Id,
KeyGeneration = 1,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
UpdatedAtUtc = now,
});
database.VaultKeyGrants.Add(new VaultKeyGrant
{
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
VaultId = personal.VaultId,
KeyGeneration = 1,
Kind = GrantKind.Member,
RecipientUserId = user.Id,
RecipientKeyFingerprint = fingerprint,
WrappedKey = personal.WrappedVaultKey,
GranterUserId = user.Id,
GranterKeyFingerprint = fingerprint,
KeyLogHead = null,
Signature = personal.GrantSignature,
State = GrantState.Active,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
});
}
/// <remarks>
/// Checked rather than left to the primary key, so the failure is a clear 400 about the
/// caller's own request instead of a constraint violation surfacing as a 500. The residual
/// disclosure — that some vault with this id exists — is accepted: vault ids are unguessable
/// random values, so confirming one exists tells a caller nothing they did not already supply.
/// </remarks>
private async Task RequireVaultIdIsFreeAsync(Guid vaultId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var taken = await database.Vaults
.AnyAsync(v => v.Id == vaultId, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
if (taken)
{
throw new EnrollmentInvalidException(
"The supplied personal vault id is already in use. Generate a new UUIDv7 and retry.");
}
}
private Task<UserKey?> FindCurrentKeyAsync(Guid userId, CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
database.UserKeys.SingleOrDefaultAsync(
k => k.UserId == userId && k.IsCurrent,
cancellationToken);
private Task<int> AcquireKeyLogLockAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
database.Database.ExecuteSqlAsync(
$"SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended({KeyLogLockName}, 0))",
cancellationToken);
private static KeyStatementFields ToFields(KeyStatement statement) =>
new(
statement.Version,
statement.Issuer,
statement.Subject,
statement.Email,
statement.EncryptionPublicKey,
statement.SigningPublicKey,
statement.KeyGeneration,
statement.CreatedAt,
statement.DeviceName);
private static bool IsUniqueViolation(DbUpdateException exception) =>
string.Equals(
(exception.InnerException as PostgresException)?.SqlState,
PostgresErrorCodes.UniqueViolation,
StringComparison.Ordinal);
}