Public Access
Add configuration, OIDC auth wiring and discovery endpoints (M1)
Options, JWT bearer validation, the /meta and .well-known endpoints, and a dev compose stack with Keycloak. Verified end to end: compose up, migrate, run, both discovery endpoints return correct payloads, and readiness reports the schema current. Configuration: - Strongly-typed options for Server, Oidc, Relay and Sync, all ValidateOnStart. A self-hosted server that boots half-configured and fails later per-request is far harder to diagnose than one that refuses to start and names the bad setting. - Cross-field validation the annotations cannot express: relay needs a WebSocketUrl when enabled, idle timeout must be under max session duration, item payload cap under batch cap. - Startup warnings for combinations that are individually valid but dangerous together: RequireHttpsMetadata false outside Development, and AllowEmailLinking (which turns any token bearing a victim's email into account takeover, hence default false). Auth: - JwtBearer with ClockSkew cut to 30s from the 5-minute default; five minutes of slack on a credential granting vault ciphertext access is more than any clock needs. - IncludeErrorDetails off, and a FallbackPolicy so an endpoint without an explicit policy still requires a caller rather than silently being public. Discovery, per ADR 0002: - /api/v1/meta reports versions, features and push caps. - /.well-known/dodossh-configuration is the onboarding story: the user types one server URL and the client discovers OIDC authority, client id, scopes and relay endpoint. Two environment problems found by actually running the stack: - PostgreSQL 18 changed its data mount point. Mounting /var/lib/postgresql/data — correct through 17 — makes the image refuse to start; 18+ wants a single mount at /var/lib/postgresql with the cluster in a subdirectory. - Keycloak moved to host port 18080. An unrelated Apache Tomcat on this machine holds 127.0.0.1:8080, and a loopback-specific bind beats Docker's 0.0.0.0 publish for "localhost". It presents as Keycloak 404ing every realm while its own log says the import succeeded, which is a genuinely misleading failure. Also: CA1848 is enforced, not advisory — warnings are errors, so the .editorconfig comment claiming otherwise was wrong. Startup and health logging now uses [LoggerMessage]. And a clean rebuild is back to zero warnings; the incremental build had been hiding 40 in test projects (banned Guid.NewGuid, an obsolete Testcontainers constructor, and two analyzer families that are genuinely noise under a test host). Verified: 0 warnings on a clean rebuild, 122 tests pass, format clean.
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using System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations;
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namespace DodoSSH.Api.Setup;
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/// <summary>Identity provider settings.</summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// Provider-agnostic by design. Claim names differ between providers — Keycloak nests roles at
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/// <c>realm_access.roles</c>, Entra uses <c>roles</c> and <c>groups</c>, Auth0 namespaces them,
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/// Authentik uses <c>groups</c> — so the mapping is configuration rather than code.
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/// </remarks>
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public sealed class OidcOptions
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{
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/// <summary>Configuration section name.</summary>
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public const string SectionName = "Oidc";
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/// <summary>Issuer URL. Discovery and JWKS are fetched from here.</summary>
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[Required]
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[Url]
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public string Authority { get; set; } = string.Empty;
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/// <summary>Expected audience of access tokens.</summary>
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[Required]
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public string Audience { get; set; } = string.Empty;
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/// <summary>Public client identifier the desktop app uses.</summary>
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[Required]
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public string ClientId { get; set; } = string.Empty;
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/// <summary>Scopes the client should request.</summary>
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public IList<string> Scopes { get; } = ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"];
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/// <summary>
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/// Registered loopback redirect pattern. RFC 8252: a native client uses a loopback redirect on
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/// an ephemeral port with the system browser, never a custom scheme and never an embedded
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/// browser, so the user can see the real address bar.
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/// </summary>
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public string LoopbackRedirectPattern { get; set; } = "http://127.0.0.1:*/callback";
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/// <summary>Whether HTTPS metadata is required. Only ever false for local development.</summary>
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public bool RequireHttpsMetadata { get; set; } = true;
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/// <summary>
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/// Whether a new identity-provider subject may be linked to an existing account by matching
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/// email.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// Defaults to false, and must stay that way. If an attacker can obtain a token from any
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/// configured provider carrying a victim's email address, email linking hands them the
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/// victim's account.
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/// </remarks>
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public bool AllowEmailLinking { get; set; }
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/// <summary>Claim type holding the user's email.</summary>
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public string EmailClaim { get; set; } = "email";
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/// <summary>Claim type holding the user's display name.</summary>
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public string NameClaim { get; set; } = "name";
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}
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/// <summary>Relay settings. See ADR 0004.</summary>
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public sealed class RelayOptions
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{
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/// <summary>Configuration section name.</summary>
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public const string SectionName = "Relay";
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/// <summary>Whether this deployment offers a relay at all.</summary>
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public bool Enabled { get; set; }
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/// <summary>Public WebSocket URL clients should dial. Required when enabled.</summary>
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public string? WebSocketUrl { get; set; }
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/// <summary>
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/// Whether RFC1918 and other private ranges may be dialled.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// Defaults to true, unlike a typical SSRF allow-list, because reaching private
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/// infrastructure is the entire purpose of a self-hosted SSH tool. The control that matters is
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/// the ACL: only hosts in a vault the caller holds Connect on can be dialled at all. Loopback,
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/// link-local and cloud metadata ranges are denied unconditionally and are not configurable.
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/// </remarks>
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public bool AllowPrivateNetworks { get; set; } = true;
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/// <summary>Maximum concurrent sessions per user.</summary>
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[Range(1, 1000)]
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public int MaxConcurrentSessionsPerUser { get; set; } = 10;
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/// <summary>Maximum concurrent sessions per node.</summary>
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[Range(1, 100_000)]
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public int MaxConcurrentSessionsTotal { get; set; } = 200;
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/// <summary>Maximum session lifetime.</summary>
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public TimeSpan MaxSessionDuration { get; set; } = TimeSpan.FromHours(12);
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/// <summary>Idle timeout.</summary>
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public TimeSpan IdleTimeout { get; set; } = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10);
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/// <summary>Timeout for the outbound TCP connect.</summary>
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public TimeSpan ConnectTimeout { get; set; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
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/// <summary>Ticket lifetime. Deliberately tiny: single-use and single-host.</summary>
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public TimeSpan TicketLifetime { get; set; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
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/// <summary>How long to keep draining live sessions during shutdown.</summary>
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public TimeSpan DrainTimeout { get; set; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
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}
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/// <summary>Sync protocol limits.</summary>
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public sealed class SyncOptions
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{
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/// <summary>Configuration section name.</summary>
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public const string SectionName = "Sync";
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/// <summary>Maximum operations in one push. Enforced before the transaction opens.</summary>
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[Range(1, 10_000)]
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public int MaxOperationsPerPush { get; set; } = 500;
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/// <summary>Maximum total ciphertext in one push.</summary>
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[Range(1024, 1024L * 1024 * 1024)]
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public long MaxPayloadBytes { get; set; } = 8L * 1024 * 1024;
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/// <summary>Maximum ciphertext for a single item.</summary>
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[Range(1024, 1024L * 1024 * 1024)]
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public long MaxItemPayloadBytes { get; set; } = 256L * 1024;
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/// <summary>Default page size for a pull.</summary>
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[Range(1, 10_000)]
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public int DefaultPullLimit { get; set; } = 200;
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/// <summary>Maximum page size for a pull.</summary>
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[Range(1, 10_000)]
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public int MaxPullLimit { get; set; } = 1000;
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/// <summary>How long tombstones are retained before collection.</summary>
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[Range(1, 3650)]
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public int TombstoneRetentionDays { get; set; } = 90;
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/// <summary>
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/// Key used to sign sync cursors, base64.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// Cursors are integrity-tagged so a tampered one is rejected rather than silently
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/// mis-serving. Generated per deployment; losing it only invalidates in-flight cursors, since
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/// clients simply resync from the beginning.
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/// </remarks>
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public string? CursorSigningKey { get; set; }
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}
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/// <summary>Server identity and client compatibility.</summary>
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public sealed class ServerOptions
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{
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/// <summary>Configuration section name.</summary>
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public const string SectionName = "Server";
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/// <summary>Public base URL clients should use for API calls.</summary>
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[Required]
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[Url]
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public string PublicBaseUrl { get; set; } = string.Empty;
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/// <summary>
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/// Oldest client version this server will serve.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// Self-hosted means version skew is normal, not exceptional. A client below this must be
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/// shown a clear remediation screen rather than failing obscurely mid-sync.
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/// </remarks>
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public string? MinClientVersion { get; set; }
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}
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