Let the recovery code be copied, and give the phone a clipboard to copy to

Both screens had made the code selectable and both said why: a person who cannot
get it out of the box photographs the screen, and a screenshot is a worse home
for it than a clipboard. This finishes that argument. Selecting 64 characters of
letter-spaced monospace with a thumb is the version of "possible" people give up
on halfway — and on the phone the screen blocks screenshots, so the honest
remaining options were retyping it or losing it.

It is the one secret this application deliberately offers to a clipboard, and the
contrast with the keychain's copy is the whole argument rather than an
inconsistency. There, copying the private half is refused outright, because
installing a key means pasting the public one and the private one has no business
leaving the vault. Here there is no better route: the code exists for one screen,
is stored nowhere, and has to reach a password manager. The clipboard is the
intended destination rather than a way round the design.

The sentence afterwards matters as much as the copy, and is asserted: a clipboard
is a staging post, this screen is the only place the code exists, and the next
thing copied replaces it. Somebody who copies and does nothing has not saved it.

The phone had no clipboard delegate at all — the desktop passed one and this head
passed null — so COPY PUBLIC KEY on the keychain answered "this machine has no
clipboard" on a device that plainly has one. Nothing about that was platform
shaped: Android has a clipboard and Avalonia surfaces it through the same
TopLevel. Wiring it fixes that copy too.

The test fixture built its shell without a clipboard, which modelled the bug
rather than the product, so it has one now and the public-key test asserts what
lands there instead of the refusal. The refusal keeps its own test, on a shell
built without one, because the view model reads the delegate's absence rather
than an empty result — and because a button that silently does nothing on this
screen is worse than one that refuses.

README.md

@@ -195,7 +195,10 @@ dotnet run --project src/DodoSSH.Client.App
 
 In the app, enter `http://localhost:5233` as the server. Your browser opens for sign-in — the realm ships
 `alice` / `alice` — then choose a vault passphrase and **write down the recovery code**, which cannot be
-skipped and cannot be recovered from the server. You can then add a host and open a shell on it — double-click
+skipped and cannot be recovered from the server. **COPY CODE** puts it on the clipboard so it can go
+straight into a password manager: it is the one secret this application deliberately offers to a clipboard,
+because there is nowhere better for it to go and the alternative people actually reach for is a photograph
+of the screen. You can then add a host and open a shell on it — double-click
 its card, or select it and press **CONNECT** in the drawer that opens beside the grid, which is the same
 command with the password box above it. Keycloak's admin console is at `http://localhost:18080`
 (`admin` / `admin`).