Give DodoSSH a phone, and a shared shell for both heads to drive

The Android head from docs/android-port.md, taken as far as its step 6.

Step 3, the spike, is answered and its throwaway screen is gone: libsodium.so and
libe_sqlite3.so are both in the arm64 APK, so NSec resolves its native half on Android
despite shipping no Android build, and the local cache opens. Two findings the audit
could not have had: Avalonia.Controls.WebView only ships net10.0-android36.0, which
settles the open "which Android versions" question at targetSdk 36; and Android has
blocked cleartext HTTP since API 28, so the terminal renderer needs a network security
config scoped to 127.0.0.1 or the WebView loads nothing.

DodoSSH.Client.Shell is new and is why the phone can exist: the view models, the terminal
renderer files and the palette moved there so both heads drive one state machine and draw
from one set of tokens. The desktop head is otherwise untouched and its 144 tests still
pass.

The platform pieces behind interfaces that already existed: the profile directory from
filesDir, a device key wrapped by a StrongBox-backed key that a fingerprint releases, and
a foreground service so a shell outliving a vault lock stays true on a platform that
stops backgrounded processes.

Sign-in is deliberately absent rather than approximated. It needs an app link, because
reusing the desktop loopback listener is the attack RFC 8252 section 8.3 names.

src/DodoSSH.Client.Android/Properties/AndroidManifest.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
+
+  <!-- SSH itself, the sync client, and the loopback socket the terminal renderer attaches to. -->
+  <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
+
+  <!--
+    The foreground service that keeps shells and transfers alive across backgrounding — the decision
+    recorded in docs/android-port.md. dataSync is the type that matches what it actually does; Android 14
+    (API 34) rejects a service that starts without one declared here and on the <service> element.
+  -->
+  <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE" />
+  <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC" />
+
+  <!-- The service's persistent notification. Runtime-requested on API 33+, and refusal is survivable. -->
+  <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS" />
+
+  <!-- Releases the device key. See AndroidDeviceKeyStore. -->
+  <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC" />
+
+  <!--
+    allowBackup and fullBackupContent are both off deliberately, and both are vault properties rather
+    than defaults worth inheriting. The local cache is a SQLite file holding the ciphertext mirror, the
+    outbox and the offline unlock material; letting Android back it up would copy vault material into a
+    Google-held backup that this product's threat model says nothing about. It would also restore one
+    phone's outbox onto another, which is the same corruption ClientPaths already refuses by insisting on
+    a local, non-roaming directory.
+  -->
+  <application android:label="DodoSSH"
+               android:theme="@style/DodoTheme"
+               android:networkSecurityConfig="@xml/network_security_config"
+               android:allowBackup="false"
+               android:fullBackupContent="false" />
+
+</manifest>