Section 7 always required "a canonical, length-prefixed encoding" for
signatures without ever specifying one. That gap had to be closed before
enrollment could exist: the client hashes the key statement and uses the
result as an OIDC nonce, so the provider signs over those exact bytes. Two
implementations disagreeing by one byte produce two nonces and an
enrollment nobody can verify -- and it only shows up against a real
provider, never in a local test.
JSON cannot be the hashed form. Property order, number formatting, Unicode
escaping and whitespace all vary between serialisers. So the statement is
transmitted as JSON and hashed as a fixed binary encoding, and the two are
independent by construction.
Three details are load-bearing rather than stylistic:
- The presence byte before each string is what makes the encoding
injective. Without it an absent email and an empty one encode
identically, and two different statements share a binding.
- Timestamps truncate to milliseconds. PostgreSQL stores microseconds, so
a statement that has been through the database must still hash to what
the client hashed. The same applies to the key log, where an entry that
cannot reproduce its own hash after being read back makes the chain
unverifiable.
- The key log entry hash deliberately excludes the database sequence. It
is unknown until the insert runs, and order already follows the hash
links -- so a renumbered or gapped sequence column cannot silently
reorder history.
KeyStatementFields is separate from Contracts.KeyStatement on purpose: one
may gain JSON fields freely, the other cannot change without invalidating
every stored binding, and Crypto must not depend on the contract assembly.
KeyStatementDriftTests makes a field added to one and not the other a
build failure, because a wire field outside the binding is unauthenticated
data the server can change undetected.
54 new tests and two new golden vector sections. The vectors pin the
absent-versus-empty email case and confirm that an offset-bearing
sub-millisecond timestamp encodes identically to its truncated UTC form.
Only additions to vectors.json; nothing existing moved.
Moves the scaffold to src/DodoSSH.Api and establishes the repo conventions the rest
of the milestones build on.
Structure:
- src/{Contracts,Crypto,Domain,Infrastructure,Api}, tests/{Contracts,Crypto,Domain}.Tests
- DodoSSH.slnx rewritten with src/ and tests/ solution folders
Build:
- Directory.Build.props centralises TFM, nullable, deterministic builds and
TreatWarningsAsErrors; Directory.Packages.props pins every version centrally
- packages.lock.json committed so CI restores in locked mode
- NuGet.config clears machine-level sources, which both fixes NU1507 under central
package management and makes restore reproducible off this machine
- Microsoft.OpenApi pinned to 2.11.0: ASP.NET Core 10.0.10 resolves 2.0.0, which is
covered by GHSA-v5pm-xwqc-g5wc (high, patched in 2.7.5)
Analyzers:
- AnalysisLevel is Recommended, not All. With warnings-as-errors, All turns opinionated
naming rules into build breaks and trains people to blanket-suppress.
- BannedSymbols.txt bans DateTime.UtcNow (TimeProvider), Guid.NewGuid (CreateVersion7),
sync-over-async, MD5/SHA1, PBKDF2 and SecureString
- CA1711/CA1724 disabled: both are .NET Framework CAS-era naming rules
- PublicApiAnalyzers on Contracts only, since that assembly is the client's real contract
API:
- weather-forecast template removed
- UseHttpsRedirection removed; TLS terminates at the reverse proxy and redirecting
behind one causes loops
- /healthz/{live,ready,startup}. Liveness deliberately checks no dependencies so a
transient database outage cannot restart the container and kill live SSH sessions.
Notes:
- No coverage collector yet. Microsoft.Testing.Extensions.CodeCoverage pulls an MTP 1.x
MSBuild extension that throws TypeLoadException against the MTP 2.3.x xunit.v3 brings.
Coverage gates are an M3 concern; revisit with an MTP 2.x-aligned version then.
Verified: dotnet build (0 warnings), 17 tests pass, format check clean, API serves
health and OpenAPI endpoints.