Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jaap-jan e9cea2ccbc Let a shared vault arrive, a bucket be found, and a vault be deleted
Three things a user reported, one of which was a real bug and one of which was
not the bug it looked like.

**A vault shared with somebody never reached their machine.** The grant was
correct at both ends: the sharing client verified the recipient's key against the
key log and wrapped every generation to it, the server stored it, and /me would
have returned it. Nothing asked. VaultSession.RefreshVaultsAsync — the method
whose own summary says it is "called after a share and on a periodic pass" — had
no caller anywhere in the application, so the vault list was whatever the last
browser sign-in cached. A restart did not help: an offline unlock reads that same
cache. The vault appeared only if the recipient happened to sign in through the
browser again, which is why this looked like sharing being broken rather than
like a list that was never re-read.

So every synchronisation pass now re-reads it, before it syncs. SyncOnceAsync
takes the whole server rather than its sync half for that reason, and the order
matters: a vault admitted by the refresh is one that same pass then pulls, where
the other order would show a newly shared vault as an empty one until the minute
after. The shell is told only when the set actually changed — it rebuilds the tab
strip's vault menu from the session's list, and doing that on every quiet pass
would rebuild a menu once a minute for nothing.

The test needed the fake server to be able to do something no test here had
needed before: hand this account a vault it did not make. ShareVaultWithMe wraps
a real key to the encryption key this account enrolled, so the keyring opens it
exactly as it opens a real colleague's — a helper that filled the field with
bytes would let a vault appear in the list and never prove it could be read.

**Adding an S3 bucket on the desktop works, and could not be found.** The report
was that it is not possible; driving the real XAML headlessly says otherwise —
Keychain, + BUCKET, and the editor saves. What is true is that S3 is where
somebody goes looking, and from there SELECT BUCKET opened a combo box with
nothing in it and no sentence anywhere saying that a bucket is a keychain item.
From where the user was standing that is indistinguishable from an application
with no way to add one.

The empty state now says what a bucket is and offers a button that lands on the
keychain with the editor already open — navigating to the screen and leaving
+ BUCKET to be found among five buttons would be most of the same problem. The
phone gets the sentence and no button: its keychain screen reads and deletes and
edits nothing, so there is no editor to send anybody to, and naming the machine
that has one beats an empty control that reads as a screen still loading.

The keychain screen's layout test grew the two categories it never covered.
Tags and buckets arrived after it was written, and the header strip it measures
is one that has overflowed twice before.

**A vault can now be deleted.** DELETE /api/v1/vaults/{id}, gated on Admin —
the line the rename already drew, for a stronger version of its reason, since
this takes the vault from everybody in it at once. The row is soft-deleted and
every grant to it withdrawn in one write; VaultAccessService filters on the stamp
at both ends, so from that moment the vault is absent from every member's /me and
every call naming it answers 404. Their clients notice on the pass described
above.

The team behind it is archived when it owned nothing else, which is the mirror of
renaming it: a vault made from the vaults screen gets a team named after it that
nobody was ever shown, and leaving that behind would leave a membership list no
screen has a row for. That is a second call rather than one transaction —
archiving is TeamService's, it refuses while a team owns vaults, and it can only
tell that this one no longer does once the deletion is committed. A crash between
the two leaves an empty team: invisible, archivable afterwards, harmless, and a
better failure than a vault that could not be deleted because tidying up after it
did not work.

Two refusals worth stating. The personal vault cannot be deleted at either end:
it is created by enrollment, everything filed nowhere else lives in it, and no
call would make another. And the items are kept — ciphertext behind a vault
nothing will resolve, so deleting them buys no confidentiality while destroying
what an operator undoing a mistake would need.

The client drops the key from the keyring and the row from the cache rather than
waiting for a refresh, so the list is right immediately; the items stay, as they
stay for a vault whose grant was withdrawn, because a copy is on every other
member's machine too and removing these rows would be the client pretending to a
reach it does not have. The confirmation says that out loud before it is
answered. It is the one sentence this screen must not leave implied: deletion is
no more retroactive than revocation is. See ADR 0001.

Desktop only, deliberately. The Android vaults screen offers no rename and no
hand-over either, so adding delete alone there would be the one destructive vault
operation on a screen with no other.

Three places asserted that a vault can never be deleted — TeamService's refusal
message, the TeamNotEmpty problem code, and ADR 0009 — and each now names the
route instead.
2026-08-04 15:34:40 +02:00
jaap-jan ebb88c8ae4 Give the phone both pickers, and settle who signs the APK
The files screen could browse a remote and delete on it, and that was all: there
is no browsable local filesystem on Android for a second pane to show, so the
gesture the desktop is built around — choose on the left, press the arrow — has
nothing to stand on. What replaces it is the platform's own two pickers. ADD
FILES is ACTION_OPEN_DOCUMENT, so a document is pointed at wherever it lives and
goes to the directory showing; SAVE FILE is ACTION_CREATE_DOCUMENT for the
selected row.

Both stage through the application's cache, and that copy is a requirement
rather than a shortcut. android-port.md predicted a picked document would be a
third IRemoteFileStore beside SFTP and S3; it cannot be. FileTransferQueue seeks,
because an upload resumes from the byte the last attempt reached, and a
content:// URI has no path behind it, no length worth trusting, no promised seek
and no grant that survives the document being edited underneath it. Copying
first costs one class in the head and nothing at all in the shared layers, where
the alternative was every resume rule rewritten around a stream that cannot
rewind. The copy is deleted when the transfer completes, kept while it is stopped
so RESUME still has something to read, and swept at the next launch — which is
the one moment emptying that directory is provably safe, since nothing has
queued anything yet.

Coming out had a decision going in did not: when to ask where it goes. The save
picker is raised before the transfer, so the download runs into the same staging
directory and hands its bytes to a callback the head supplied, held against the
transfer id so a RETRY still lands where the person pointed. Asking afterwards
would put the picker minutes from the button that caused it and, on a phone,
usually while the application is backgrounded and Android will not show one at
all. The cost is that the picker creates its file when it is dismissed, so a
download that then fails leaves an empty one there; that is said on the screen,
in the README and in the manual checks rather than left to be discovered. A
delivery that fails keeps the staged bytes for the sweep instead of throwing away
the one copy of something just fetched over somebody's network.

The foreground service counts transfers now, which is the half of it that
matters most here: a shell survives backgrounding because somebody is looking at
it, and an upload has to survive precisely when nobody is. Queued counts as
active, so putting five files in and locking the phone moves five files. The
seam was built for this and wired to () => 0 because nothing could fill the
queue.

Alongside it, ADR 0010 answers the second question android-port.md left open,
and it had to be answered before the first release rather than at upload time: a
new Play app must use App Bundles and therefore Play App Signing, and an
installed app can only be updated by a package signed with the same key, so the
first release picks an identity for good. The project holds the key, offline and
never in CI — the workflow's package step now says so where somebody would break
it — and a DodoSSH deployment never serves the client, because a download link on
your own server hands the binary that holds the plaintext to the party the whole
threat model is about.

The README's M1 gap note was stale in both halves and is replaced by what is
actually true: credentials have an editor and a REMEMBER tick, and the device key
registers into the TPM under a CNG policy that makes the consent dialog a
condition of using it. What is left is the floor rather than a gap — no TPM, or
no Windows, means the passphrase on every launch.
2026-08-04 10:07:16 +02:00
jaap-jan 35387b1c9d Tell the phone's keyboard these are secrets, and get it off the box
ci / api image (push) Successful in 21s
ci / build and test (push) Successful in 1m22s
ci / android head (push) Failing after 5s
Five boxes on this head take a secret and every one of them was drawing dots
and saying nothing. `PasswordChar` is a screen property: Windows has no opinion
about what is being typed into a text box, so the desktop head needs nothing
more. Android's software keyboard has an opinion, and left at its default it
read a vault passphrase as prose — completions offered in the suggestion strip
above the box, and the passphrase itself learned into the IME's dictionary.
Dots on screen with a word bar over them is the worst of both: hidden from the
person typing it and offered to the room. `TextInputOptions.ContentType` is the
property the Android backend maps onto `InputType`, and it is what turns both
off. Both attributes now live in one `TextBox.secret` class rather than being
repeated per box, because they are two halves of one fact and the next box
added would have got one of them.

The keyboard also went on covering whichever box had raised it. That is in
`PhoneShell` rather than on each screen: everything the phone draws is inside
its one root panel, so a bottom margin shortens all eleven screens at once, and
a screen added later cannot forget to handle something it never had to know
about.

Two mechanisms, and it matters that neither is a backstop for the other. Before
Android 15 the activity now declares `AdjustResize` and the platform shortens
the window itself; left unspecified Android chooses, and what it chooses for a
window whose entire content is one native view — which is what an Avalonia
surface is — is to pan, sliding the window by however much it thinks the
focused native view needs and leaving the box exactly where it was. That was
the bug. From Android 15 the attribute is ignored, edge-to-edge being enforced
and the window no longer resized for the keyboard at all, and the reported
inset is what there is. Each is dead where the other applies — where the window
resizes, the inset arrives already consumed and measures zero — which is why
the margin comes from the inset alone. Both added together would strand the
interface an entire keyboard above the keyboard.

Scrolling the box back into view keys off the size change rather than off
either mechanism. `ScrollViewer` already brings a newly focused child into
view; what it cannot know is that the visible region shrank after the focus,
and both ways of losing that region end in the same resize.

None of it is reachable by a test. The software keyboard is an inset the
platform reports and a headless top level reports none, so phase 10 of
`docs/manual-checks.md` is the whole of the verification — including the note
to run it on one device each side of Android 15, since a build exercised on
only one of the two will look correct and be half broken.
2026-08-03 13:55:08 +02:00
jaap-janandClaude Opus 5 5593f337b6 Give the phone the second design, and both heads the palette it arrives with
The Android v2 design is what this head draws now: four destinations in a bottom bar — Hosts,
Terminal, Keychain, More — with snippets, SFTP, S3, logs and preferences one tap deeper behind the
last. The first design's four had nothing behind them, which is what made a hub worth building.

The palette moved from green-black to blue-black, and it moved in the shared project because that is
where it lives and the desktop v2 specifies the same seventeen tokens. One colour changed meaning
rather than value, and it is the only semantic change in the file. Green used to *be* the accent, so
Ellipse.dot.live filled with Accent and "the thing to press" and "a shell is open on this host" were
the same colour by construction. v2 makes the accent blue and keeps a green for status alone, which
finally separates them: Live is that green and nothing merely interactive may use it. The accent is
also two colours now — Accent fills, AccentText writes — because a row of chips in the fill colour is
a row of things that all look like the primary action.

A palette is not one file, which is the part worth knowing before the next one. Nine hex literals
lived outside it: the nav bar's own label colours, the accessory keys and their Ctrl-latched state,
two scrims, the window background Android paints before Avalonia has a frame, and the launcher
vector. The two C# sites now resolve from the dictionary by name rather than restating it. The
renderer's page cannot — it is served to a WebView over a loopback socket — so terminal.css and
terminal.js keep hand-copied values and say so at both sites.

ShellScreen gained More and Buckets, appended rather than slotted in. SFTP and S3 are one screen over
one TransfersViewModel differing only in which picker they offer, and the kind is set by the button
that navigates rather than on arrival — doing it in OnScreenChanged made every arrival at Transfers
force the picker back to hosts, including the desktop's own rail arriving at a screen with a bucket
already open. It refuses to change kind while a session is live, because there is one session behind
both destinations and switching under it would title a screen S3 while it listed an SFTP host.

What the design draws and this does not, on the usual grounds. The FORWARDING screen: nothing here
forwards anything, so every toggle would be a control with no effect — it is a paragraph on the hub
naming the absence, for the reason the desktop keeps TEAMS in its rail. The terminal's `23 ms · fwd
5432`. An ED25519 badge and a SHA256 line on keychain cards, which need an algorithm field and a
fingerprint the item type does not have. An `agent` chip, for an agent that does not exist. Snippet
run history and exit codes. The Logs FOLLOW pill, which claims a live tail over records that are
written once at close and read when the screen opens, and the severity filter, which has nothing to
count — that chip row is spent on the real choice, which of the two logs. S3 bucket totals and
lifecycle. And the + on HOSTS, which would open a host editor this head has not got.

SFTP is browse, open and delete. Both transfer commands work, and what they work against is the local
pane: QueueDownloads writes to Path.Combine(LocalPath, name), and LocalPath starts at
SpecialFolder.UserProfile, which on Android is the application's own private directory. A download
would have reported success and left the file where the person who asked for it cannot open it, which
is worse than not offering it — a refusal is visible and a file in /data/user/0/ is not. The queue is
not drawn either, since nothing here can put anything in it. Both return with the document picker.
The foreground service still counts zero transfers, and the reason moved rather than went away.

Four defects worth naming, because three of them are the kind that compile. A Button as a ListBox
ItemTemplate swallows the pointer press before the list sees it, so the files listing selected
nothing and every command reading the selection did nothing — the row is a Border now and the
phone-only single-tap-to-open is a Tapped handler, which also keeps a desktop single click from
walking into directories. Avalonia type selectors are exact, so TextBlock.fingerprint never matched
SelectableTextBlock and every fingerprint on this head rendered proportional and unwrapped: that was
breaking the never-truncated rule on the host-key sheet already. The new two-level hierarchy had no
handler for the system back gesture, so back left the application from a log screen. And the tab's
close cross had shrunk to a 30x32 target flush against the select target, which is the one control
here that ends a shell with no confirmation and no undo.

Fingerprint unlock is raised on arriving at the lock screen rather than waiting for its button, which
is still there. Only at launch: a lock the user asked for is not answered with an immediate request
to unlock, which makes LOCK look inert and trains the reflex of authenticating at a prompt nobody
asked for. And once, because a declined gesture leaves the passphrase box exactly where it was and a
prompt that came back after being dismissed would be a modal you cannot get out of to type into it.

Two fixes fall on the desktop. Its file listing coloured directories with Info and executables with
Accent, which was blue against green and is now two steps of one blue; an executable is Live now.
And a bucket's folders were drawn with a 0001-01-01 timestamp, because a prefix has no modification
time — blank now, for the reason a directory's size is blank.

Verified by the whole suite: 1309 tests over nineteen projects, none failing, including the layout
suite that stands up real Avalonia and parses every desktop screen. Both heads build. Not verified on
a device — nothing in this head ever has been; see docs/android-port.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AZE3u99BNt6LzgTC5jhbz2
2026-08-02 18:23:53 +02:00