The foreground service existed, and four defects in its wiring meant it
mostly did not run. A shell opening was never announced to it — only the
ending was — so the service never came up for a shell at all. An idle
connected Files session counted as nothing. Every refresh restarted the
service, which Android 12+ answers with a crash the moment the app is
backgrounded — a transfer finishing in the pocket took the remaining
connections with it. And POST_NOTIFICATIONS was declared but never
requested, so on Android 13+ the receipt was silently invisible.
Updates while backgrounded now go through the notification manager; a
foregrounded refresh still prefers a real start, so a stop still in
flight cannot leave an orphan receipt over an unprotected process.
The Android head from docs/android-port.md, taken as far as its step 6.
Step 3, the spike, is answered and its throwaway screen is gone: libsodium.so and
libe_sqlite3.so are both in the arm64 APK, so NSec resolves its native half on Android
despite shipping no Android build, and the local cache opens. Two findings the audit
could not have had: Avalonia.Controls.WebView only ships net10.0-android36.0, which
settles the open "which Android versions" question at targetSdk 36; and Android has
blocked cleartext HTTP since API 28, so the terminal renderer needs a network security
config scoped to 127.0.0.1 or the WebView loads nothing.
DodoSSH.Client.Shell is new and is why the phone can exist: the view models, the terminal
renderer files and the palette moved there so both heads drive one state machine and draw
from one set of tokens. The desktop head is otherwise untouched and its 144 tests still
pass.
The platform pieces behind interfaces that already existed: the profile directory from
filesDir, a device key wrapped by a StrongBox-backed key that a fingerprint releases, and
a foreground service so a shell outliving a vault lock stays true on a platform that
stops backgrounded processes.
Sign-in is deliberately absent rather than approximated. It needs an app link, because
reusing the desktop loopback listener is the attack RFC 8252 section 8.3 names.
jaap-jan