Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jaap-jan b20f7cae04 Let a host marked for the relay actually be reached through it
ci / build and test (pull_request) Successful in 6m27s
ci / desktop nightly (pull_request) Skipped
ci / android head (pull_request) Successful in 15m47s
ci / api image (pull_request) Failing after 28s
The relay checkbox said it was not wired up, and the plan said the server
half was built and shipped. It was not: there was ADR 0004, the contract
records, RelayOptions and a CHECK constraint, and RelayOptions said in its
own remarks that there was no endpoint and no dialler. So both halves are
built here, as step 3 of docs/reaching-a-host-you-cannot-dial.md.

Server, in Features/Relay:

- POST /api/v1/relay/tickets makes every decision: the host, Connect on
  its vault, the relay switched on, and the stored name resolved once and
  judged by RelayAddressPolicy. Loopback, link-local, 0.0.0.0/8,
  multicast and the metadata endpoints are refused with no configuration
  escape, with IPv4-mapped and NAT64 spellings unwrapped first; then the
  operator's denials, allow-list and private-network switch. What passes
  goes into a Data Protection ticket, and nothing resolves the name again.
  Every target refusal is the same 403, so the endpoint cannot be used to
  map the operator's DNS; the real reason is logged.
- GET /api/v1/relay/connect takes the ticket as a second subprotocol,
  checks its expiry against TimeProvider and spends it with a unique
  insert into relay_ticket_use before accepting the upgrade. After the
  upgrade a refusal is a close code: 4502 for a host the server could not
  reach, 4429 for a limit, 4408 idle, 4409 lifetime, 1001 after a drain.
- relay_session is the audit row, written from short-lived scopes.

Client:

- RelayBridge is a loopback SOCKS5 listener that accepts once and pipes
  to the relay socket. It rides on the new SshLoopbackProxy.Lifetime, so
  the connection disposes it on every way a session ends and a failed
  connect disposes it before throwing.
- ServerRelay, exposed as IVaultServer.Relay from /api/v1/meta, asks for
  the ticket, opens the socket, starts the bridge and turns every refusal
  into a sentence.
- VaultViewModel and TransfersViewModel reach a relayed host through it,
  never fall back to dialling it directly, and replace SSH.NET's transport
  error with the relay's own reason when it gave one.

Neither side ever cancels a WebSocket operation. Cancelling one aborts
the socket, and an aborted socket sends no close frame, which is the only
way the client learns the server could not reach the host.
AnIdleSession_IsClosedWithTheIdleCode asserts that the code arrives.

Three departures from ADR 0004, recorded in it: awaited copy loops rather
than Pipelines (same backpressure, two 32 KiB buffers), no ?ticket=
fallback, and no device id in the ticket.

Tests: API 245, shell 582 (5 skipped), layout 170, SSH 110 including a
real login through the bridge, API client 30, contracts 25. Not run: the
Android build (its change is copy only) and the Alpine layout oracle.
2026-09-28 14:37:20 +02:00
jaap-jan 06d04b490b Freeze DodoSSH.Contracts v0.1 (M1)
The second M1 gate. This assembly, not the OpenAPI document, is the client's contract,
so PublicApiAnalyzers now tracks all 540 public members: a renamed DTO property becomes
a build error rather than a runtime deserialisation failure on someone's laptop.

Contract surface:
- EncryptedPayload carries the envelope plus the KeyGeneration and AadVersion columns
  needed to recompute AAD, since AAD is derived from the row rather than transmitted.
- Sync: push with per-operation status (Applied/Conflict/Forbidden/Invalid/Duplicate) so
  one stale item cannot block a whole offline queue; a Conflict returns the server's row
  for client-side three-way merge, because the server cannot merge ciphertext.
- Enrollment: KeyStatement whose hash becomes the OIDC nonce, so the identity provider
  signs over the public keys and this server cannot fabricate a key for a user who never
  enrolled.
- Meta and .well-known configuration: capability negotiation instead of URL versioning,
  which is what a self-hosted product needs when client and server upgrade independently.
- SyncPlaintextFields deliberately has no label or name field. ACL admin runs client-side
  where names can be decrypted, so the server never needs a searchable title.

Two design problems found by writing the tests rather than assuming:
- Hand-constructing JsonSerializerOptions and merely pointing its resolver at the context
  silently discards every source-generated setting. JsonSerializerDefaults.Web replaces
  NumberHandling.Strict with AllowReadingFromString, so "1" would be accepted where 1 is
  meant — invisible until two implementations disagree. Callers now use ResponseOptions or
  StrictRequestOptions; StrictRequestOptions is derived by copying so it cannot drift.
- StrictRequestOptions had a static-initialisation cycle: it read the generated Default
  property from the same type's initialiser and got null. Now lazy.

Requests reject unmapped members so a client typo is a 400; responses tolerate them so an
older client can read a newer server. Enums cross the wire as strings, so reordering one
cannot silently reinterpret stored data.

Also: excluded source-generator output from PublicApiAnalyzers. The JSON generator emits a
public member per serialisable type, which would have added hundreds of mechanical entries
and drowned the ones describing the actual wire contract. And disabled MA0048's
one-type-per-file rule: splitting SyncPullRequest from SyncPullResponse makes a reviewer
open two files to understand one endpoint.

Verified: 0 warnings, 95 tests pass, format clean.
2026-07-28 13:28:02 +02:00