Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jaap-jan 4b706bc3c3 Say when a vault has moved, so nobody waits out the minute
The delta pull was cheap enough to run on a timer and the client did, once a
minute. That is fine for a machine and wrong for two people: an edit a colleague
makes is up to a minute stale, which is long enough for both of them to make it
and produce a conflict neither needed to have. Shortening the interval is the
obvious answer and the wrong one — it costs a request per client per interval
whether or not anything happened, and it converges on a busier server that is
still late.

So the server now says so. A client holds a WebSocket open at GET /api/v1/events,
subprotocol dodossh.events.v1, and gets a line down it when something it can read
has changed. ADR 0012 has the reasoning; three parts of it are worth repeating
here, because they are what everything else rests on.

**What crosses the socket is a notice, never data.** A frame names a vault and
how far its change log has got. No item, no ciphertext, not even which item it
was. The client's answer is the delta pull it would have run anyway, so there is
still exactly one code path that applies a change to a keychain, and it is not
this one. Pushing the items themselves would save a round trip and fork that path
in two, with the cursor, the merge and the tombstone rules duplicated across both
— ADR 0003 put every mutation through one write path for that reason, and this
keeps every read on one for the same one. It also makes a dropped notice
harmless, which is what lets the fan-out below be as simple as it is.

**Polling stays, and is what guarantees a pass.** The minute timer is unchanged.
A network that eats WebSockets, a server with Events:Enabled off, an older
server, a proxy that will not upgrade, a notice dropped under backpressure —
every one of those leaves a client behaving exactly as it did before this commit.
Nothing is reachable only over the socket and nothing is meant to become so;
VaultViewModel's AutoSyncInterval remark now says that where somebody changing it
will read it.

**The bearer token authorises the upgrade, unlike the relay's ticket.** Not an
inconsistency with ADR 0004: the relay's socket is a byte pipe whose whole
authorization decision — which host, which IPs, which port — is made before it
opens and never revisited, and it is the extraction seam for a process that must
hold no ACL code. This one is a view of the caller's own vault list and has to
keep answering "what may this account read" for as long as it is held. A ticket
would carry that answer in a token and be wrong the moment the account's access
changed. The two bounds that arrangement needs are met rather than waved at: the
socket is closed at the token's exp with close code 4401 and the client comes
straight back with a fresh one, and the vault set is re-resolved every few
minutes as well as on the changes known to affect it. Both bound *metadata*,
because a notice contains nothing else and reading a vault still needs a key this
server has never held.

**The fan-out.** VaultEventHub is a singleton holding the sockets this node
accepted; publishing walks them and asks each whether it cares, rather than
keeping a vault-to-subscriber index that every re-subscription would have to move
entries between under a lock publishing also takes. At a few hundred sockets per
node and an event rate bounded by how often people edit keychains, the walk is
not measurable and its races are obvious. Per-connection queues are bounded and
drop the *oldest*: a notice means "pull vault X, which is at least at sequence
N", so the newest subsumes what it displaces and the client's answer is identical
either way — which is what lets the publish path be void, never block, and never
fail.

Announced from the endpoint rather than from SyncService, and that placement is
the point: by then the push has committed and released the per-vault advisory
lock. From inside it would name a sequence no reader can see yet and would hold
the lock that serialises writers across a socket write. Only the highest
*applied* sequence, so a batch of pure conflicts announces nothing, and a
duplicate — already announced when it first landed — announces nothing either.

Grants and membership publish too, and those take the *recipient* rather than the
actor. This is what AdmitNewVaultsAsync has been apologising for since sharing
shipped — "the recipient is handed nothing, there is no push channel" — and the
README with it. A vault shared with somebody now turns up as it is shared. The
comment and the README paragraph both say what is true now, and both keep saying
that the pass is what *discovers* the vault, because a client with no socket has
to arrive at the same place.

**On the client**, VaultEventStream is really a reconnection policy wrapped round
a ClientWebSocket: a dropped socket is the ordinary case here — laptops sleep,
proxies time out, tokens expire, servers are redeployed — so nothing in it treats
a failure as exceptional, and every path ends in "wait, then dial again". A
connection that lived long enough to say hello resets the backoff, so a laptop
that woke, worked, and lost its network an hour later does not inherit a
minute-long wait it has already proved it need not take. A 4401 close skips the
backoff entirely and asks the token provider again, which is the whole reason
that close code is distinct. A server that does not advertise the events feature
gets IdleVaultEventStream, which never delivers — so IVaultServer.Events is never
null and every caller stays on one shape, because the correct behaviour without a
socket is the behaviour with a silent one.

The shell's background loop now selects between the timer and a notice, and both
waits are held across iterations. That is load-bearing rather than tidy:
PeriodicTimer permits one outstanding WaitForNextTickAsync and throws on a
second, and an abandoned channel read stays registered and consumes the next
notice written. Either defect leaves the first notice working and every one after
it silently lost, which is why NoticesKeepWakingTheLoop_NotJustTheFirst pushes
three and not one. Notices are coalesced over a quarter of a second, so one
person's save — a host and its log entry are two items — and a colleague clearing
a folder each cost one pass rather than a dozen.

**The kind is a string, not an enum**, and that is a compatibility decision.
UseStringEnumConverter throws on a value it does not know, so a newer server
sending a kind an older client had never heard of would not add an unreadable
frame — it would break that client's socket outright. A string is ignored
instead. ProblemCodes is the same shape for the same reason.

**Tested on both sides, through the real pipeline.** The endpoint suite opens a
genuine socket against TestServer and proves a push produces a notice, that
another account's push does not reach it, that a ping is answered, and that a
frame this server cannot parse does not end the connection. Two of those assert
on *ordering* rather than on absence within a timeout — the stranger's write goes
first, so a socket that leaked would have announced it before the one the test
waits for — because "nothing arrived in two seconds" is a test that passes on a
slow machine for the wrong reason. And ANoticeCarriesNoCiphertext asserts on the
bytes that crossed the wire rather than on the record's fields, since the latter
would only prove that this type has no payload member, which is a tautology; the
former is what catches a field added later without anybody thinking about
disclosure.

The client suite drives VaultEventStream through an injected connector, because
the one thing a test cannot do to a real network is make it fail on cue — and
failure is the entire subject. The shell suite proves a notice produces a pull
inside ten seconds against a sixty-second timer, so the timer cannot be what
caused it.

**Two limits, stated rather than left to be discovered.** Fan-out is in-process,
so a deployment running more than one API replica only pushes for writes its own
replica handled and the rest arrive on the timer. IVaultEventPublisher is the
seam a PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY backplane implements and it is deliberately not
implemented: an untested backplane is worse than a documented gap, and multiple
replicas degrade to the behaviour before this commit rather than breaking. And a
client is notified of its own writes; it pushed, so it already pulled, and the
extra pass finds nothing. Suppressing that echo correctly needs a per-device
identity on the socket, and the same user's other machines must still be told.

Manual checks phase 15 covers what no test here can reach, which is the network
in between: a proxy that will not upgrade, one that drops an idle socket without
telling either end, a laptop lid, a token expiring. Every one of those is
invisible inside a test host, and every check there passes only if the change
arrives quickly *and* still arrives with the socket taken away.

ADR 0012 also fixes one thing about the shared terminal session this is the
transport for, so it need not be renegotiated later: session data will be binary
frames on this same socket, because base64 in a JSON envelope is the wrong shape
for the one payload here that is continuous rather than occasional. Two questions
it explicitly does not answer by implication — whether those bytes go through the
API at all, and what end-to-end encryption means when the second party watches a
stream rather than holding a key — are ADR 0001 questions and get their own
decision.

1512 tests pass. DodoSSH.SystemTests was not run — it needs the whole compose
stack — so the end-to-end path is unverified for this change beyond what the
manual checks describe.
2026-08-04 16:37:41 +02:00
jaap-janandClaude Opus 5 093f3904c1 Apply pending migrations at startup instead of asking for a second command
ci / build and test (push) Failing after 1m48s
ci / api image (push) Skipped
ci / android head (push) Failing after 5s
The API deliberately never migrated: it failed readiness while a migration was pending and
named it, and a separate step applied them. That is the right split for a deployment with a
release pipeline and the wrong one for a self-hosted server, where it means an image that
boots, refuses traffic, and waits for somebody to know that dotnet ef exists. The schema and
the code that expects it ship in the same image, so the image is where the two are
reconciled now.

Before RunAsync rather than in the background. A migration racing the first requests would
let them through against a half-applied schema, and the first authenticated request is the
one that provisions accounts. Failing to migrate therefore fails to start, which is the
loudest signal available and the one an orchestrator already acts on.

Concurrent starts take a Postgres advisory lock first. Without it two replicas rolled out
together read the same empty history table, both apply the same migration, and the second
dies on an object that already exists — a crash loop on the day of a schema change, which
is the worst day to have one. The lock is held on a connection of its own because EF opens
and closes one per command, and a session lock belongs to the connection that took it.

The exception is a database that does not exist yet: there is nothing to hold a lock in, so
that path migrates without one and says so. Two instances creating it at once still
converges — one wins, the other restarts into the ordinary locked path — and refusing to
start would leave a fresh deployment stuck on the step this removes.

Database:AutoMigrate turns it off for the deployments that own their schema: a migrator job,
a rollout where new code must run against the old schema first, or a database user denied
DDL. With it off the behaviour is exactly what it was, and the health check now explains
which of the two situations a pending migration means.

Verified against a throwaway PostgreSQL container: an empty database gets all seven
migrations applied before the port opens, the tables land in the dodo schema, and a second
start logs the schema up to date and serves. The API suite passes, which exercises the
startup path once per assembly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 21:12:22 +02:00
jaap-jan 1d262b7ccc Run M1's end-to-end slice, and fix the two bugs it found
The whole vertical slice now runs against a real Keycloak, a real API, a
real PostgreSQL and a real sshd: sign in through the browser flow, enroll
with the identity-provider key binding, unlock, create a host, sync it,
read it back on a second machine, unlock again with no network, accept an
unseen host key, and open an interactive shell. Opt-in, because it needs
the development stack; skipped with a message naming the commands.

It found two bugs on its first run, and both are the same class: two
sides of a stub agreeing with each other about something the
specification never said.

**The API never applied DodoSshJsonContext to its HTTP JSON options.**
Minimal APIs therefore used the framework's web defaults, which write an
enum as a number. Every request DTO carrying one failed to bind against a
client writing the specified string form — which is the entire sync
surface, unreachable from the real client, with a 400 naming only the
parameter. The documented guarantee that request bodies reject unmapped
members was likewise not in effect anywhere.

Nothing caught it because the API tests posted with PostAsJsonAsync's
defaults, so they and the server had independently settled on integers.
Those tests now serialise through the contract, which is the deeper fix:
removing the new configuration fails 13 of them. Copying settings into
options a host owns is itself the hazard the context warns about, so
ApplyTo lives beside the settings it mirrors and ApplyToTests pins the
transformation, including that inserting the resolver leaves the caller's
own in place.

**The realm registered a loopback redirect URI Keycloak rejects.**
`http://127.0.0.1:*/callback` looks more explicit than the RFC 8252 form
and is broken: Keycloak's wildcards are trailing-only, so the `*` parses
as a literal port and every authorization request came back "Invalid
parameter: redirect_uri". Providers ignore the port for loopback hosts,
which is the whole mechanism, so the correct registration is
`http://127.0.0.1/callback` — path pinned, port free. The value the
server advertises through the discovery document said the same wrong
thing and now says the right one.

Two smaller things, both documented in docs/platform-flags.md:

- --import-realm skips a realm that already exists, so editing the realm
  file and restarting Keycloak changes nothing and serves stale
  configuration. The container has to be recreated. The compose comment
  claimed the opposite.
- Keycloak marks its session cookies Secure even over plain HTTP, because
  SameSite=None requires it. A spec-conformant client drops them and the
  login POST answers 400 with no message; browsers complete the flow only
  because they exempt loopback. Harmless for the product, fatal for
  automation, so ScriptedBrowser carries the cookies by hand and says why.

Also: the server enforces a 64 MiB floor on the passphrase KDF, so this
suite cannot use the 8 MiB profile the other client suites take for
speed. Those only get away with it because their in-memory servers have
no policy — worth knowing rather than rediscovering.

638 tests. The solution-wide run stays green with the stack down: exit
code 8 means "no tests ran", which the platform reports as failure, so
the opt-in project ignores exactly that code.
2026-07-29 11:37:49 +02:00
jaap-jan 98d29bff37 Add HTTP integration harness and the sync authorization matrix (M1)
ci / build and test (ubuntu) (push) Has been cancelled
ci / build (windows) (push) Has been cancelled
27 end-to-end tests over the real HTTP pipeline, against a PostgreSQL container and a
stubbed identity provider. This closes the gap the previous commit flagged.

Authentication is genuinely exercised, not bypassed. StubIdentityProvider serves real OIDC
discovery and JWKS via WireMock and signs tokens with a real RSA key, so the application's
own JwtBearer pipeline validates issuer, audience, signature, lifetime and claims. A
TestAuthHandler that short-circuits authentication would hide exactly the claim-mapping
mistakes that cause real authorization holes. Proven by rejecting: no token, a foreign
signing key, the wrong audience, the wrong issuer, and an expired token.

Authorization denials — the tests that matter most:
- Another user's vault is 404, not 403, for both pull and push. A distinct
  "exists but forbidden" answer is an existence oracle for other tenants' vault ids.
- A denied push writes nothing: no host row and no change-log entry. A denial that still
  mutated state would be worse than no check at all.
- A team vault is denied until M3 rather than falling through to a permissive default.

Behaviour covered: push/pull round trip, cursor advance (and that an empty pull does not
rewind the cursor, which would replay history), tampered cursor rejection, stale-version
conflict returning server state without overwriting, operation-id replay reported Duplicate
and applied once, a mixed batch applying the good and reporting the bad, relay field
enforcement both ways, delete clearing the relay address, tombstones carrying no payload,
and JIT provisioning happening exactly once.

Two configuration problems found by running it:
- appsettings.json carried empty-string placeholders for the connection string and OIDC
  authority. Under minimal hosting those beat anything a test registers via
  ConfigureAppConfiguration, because Program.cs adds its own sources after that callback
  runs. Removed them outright — an empty placeholder turns "not configured" into
  "configured as empty", which defeats failing fast. Tests now use DODOSSH_ environment
  variables, which Program.cs adds last.
- My first fix for minting an expired test token derived notBefore from the expiry, which
  put nbf fourteen minutes in the future for normal tokens and made every valid token 401.
  It needs the earlier of now-1min and exp-1min.

Verified: 0 warnings on a clean rebuild, 173 tests pass (up from 146), format clean.
2026-07-28 15:11:43 +02:00
jaap-jan d3b14e6bc0 Add configuration, OIDC auth wiring and discovery endpoints (M1)
Options, JWT bearer validation, the /meta and .well-known endpoints, and a dev compose
stack with Keycloak. Verified end to end: compose up, migrate, run, both discovery
endpoints return correct payloads, and readiness reports the schema current.

Configuration:
- Strongly-typed options for Server, Oidc, Relay and Sync, all ValidateOnStart. A
  self-hosted server that boots half-configured and fails later per-request is far harder
  to diagnose than one that refuses to start and names the bad setting.
- Cross-field validation the annotations cannot express: relay needs a WebSocketUrl when
  enabled, idle timeout must be under max session duration, item payload cap under batch cap.
- Startup warnings for combinations that are individually valid but dangerous together:
  RequireHttpsMetadata false outside Development, and AllowEmailLinking (which turns any
  token bearing a victim's email into account takeover, hence default false).

Auth:
- JwtBearer with ClockSkew cut to 30s from the 5-minute default; five minutes of slack on a
  credential granting vault ciphertext access is more than any clock needs.
- IncludeErrorDetails off, and a FallbackPolicy so an endpoint without an explicit policy
  still requires a caller rather than silently being public.

Discovery, per ADR 0002:
- /api/v1/meta reports versions, features and push caps.
- /.well-known/dodossh-configuration is the onboarding story: the user types one server URL
  and the client discovers OIDC authority, client id, scopes and relay endpoint.

Two environment problems found by actually running the stack:
- PostgreSQL 18 changed its data mount point. Mounting /var/lib/postgresql/data — correct
  through 17 — makes the image refuse to start; 18+ wants a single mount at
  /var/lib/postgresql with the cluster in a subdirectory.
- Keycloak moved to host port 18080. An unrelated Apache Tomcat on this machine holds
  127.0.0.1:8080, and a loopback-specific bind beats Docker's 0.0.0.0 publish for
  "localhost". It presents as Keycloak 404ing every realm while its own log says the import
  succeeded, which is a genuinely misleading failure.

Also: CA1848 is enforced, not advisory — warnings are errors, so the .editorconfig comment
claiming otherwise was wrong. Startup and health logging now uses [LoggerMessage]. And a
clean rebuild is back to zero warnings; the incremental build had been hiding 40 in test
projects (banned Guid.NewGuid, an obsolete Testcontainers constructor, and two analyzer
families that are genuinely noise under a test host).

Verified: 0 warnings on a clean rebuild, 122 tests pass, format clean.
2026-07-28 14:33:54 +02:00
jaap-jan 3a81f3c90b Restructure into src/tests and add build foundation (M0)
Moves the scaffold to src/DodoSSH.Api and establishes the repo conventions the rest
of the milestones build on.

Structure:
- src/{Contracts,Crypto,Domain,Infrastructure,Api}, tests/{Contracts,Crypto,Domain}.Tests
- DodoSSH.slnx rewritten with src/ and tests/ solution folders

Build:
- Directory.Build.props centralises TFM, nullable, deterministic builds and
  TreatWarningsAsErrors; Directory.Packages.props pins every version centrally
- packages.lock.json committed so CI restores in locked mode
- NuGet.config clears machine-level sources, which both fixes NU1507 under central
  package management and makes restore reproducible off this machine
- Microsoft.OpenApi pinned to 2.11.0: ASP.NET Core 10.0.10 resolves 2.0.0, which is
  covered by GHSA-v5pm-xwqc-g5wc (high, patched in 2.7.5)

Analyzers:
- AnalysisLevel is Recommended, not All. With warnings-as-errors, All turns opinionated
  naming rules into build breaks and trains people to blanket-suppress.
- BannedSymbols.txt bans DateTime.UtcNow (TimeProvider), Guid.NewGuid (CreateVersion7),
  sync-over-async, MD5/SHA1, PBKDF2 and SecureString
- CA1711/CA1724 disabled: both are .NET Framework CAS-era naming rules
- PublicApiAnalyzers on Contracts only, since that assembly is the client's real contract

API:
- weather-forecast template removed
- UseHttpsRedirection removed; TLS terminates at the reverse proxy and redirecting
  behind one causes loops
- /healthz/{live,ready,startup}. Liveness deliberately checks no dependencies so a
  transient database outage cannot restart the container and kill live SSH sessions.

Notes:
- No coverage collector yet. Microsoft.Testing.Extensions.CodeCoverage pulls an MTP 1.x
  MSBuild extension that throws TypeLoadException against the MTP 2.3.x xunit.v3 brings.
  Coverage gates are an M3 concern; revisit with an MTP 2.x-aligned version then.

Verified: dotnet build (0 warnings), 17 tests pass, format check clean, API serves
health and OpenAPI endpoints.
2026-07-28 12:25:34 +02:00