Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jaap-jan 70b3290a77 Bind an SSH key to a host instead of picking one per connection
A host now names the key it authenticates with, or none, as a field in its
encrypted payload — so the choice follows the host to every machine rather than
being made again each time somebody connects. The per-connection "Use key"
switch it replaces was a stopgap for not having this, and keeping both would
have left two mechanisms answering one question.

This is the first payload schema version bump, and it does not work the obvious
way. A host is written at the *lowest* schema version that can represent it: one
that binds a key is written at 2, one that does not is still written at 1, byte
for byte as it was before the field existed. The version is what makes an older
client refuse to edit an item, so stamping 2 unconditionally would mean
upgrading a single machine and renaming a single host made that host uneditable
on every machine that had not upgraded yet. Confining the cost to the hosts that
actually use the field is the difference between a team noticing a bump and a
team being blocked by one. HostSecretCodec states the rule so the next field
added follows it, and a test pins the version-1 bytes against a literal rather
than against the codec, because the claim is about history: every host already in
every vault has to re-encode to what it encoded before, or the first sync after
an upgrade would push the whole vault as changed.

A binding is an item id, not a copy of the key — a second copy of a private key
is one that goes stale — which means the reference can dangle when the key is
deleted on another machine. Both places that meets are handled the same way, by
refusing rather than falling back:

- Connecting to a host whose key is gone is refused outright. A host somebody
  deliberately set up for key-only access must not quietly start offering a
  password.
- Opening such a host in the editor keeps the binding, selected, labelled as
  missing. The quieter version of the same failure is someone editing the port
  and saving, silently converting the host to password authentication with
  nothing ever having said so.

Two things this found by being falsified:

- The merge was untested for the new field, and "just take the server's value"
  passed the entire suite — a local binding change would have been discarded with
  no conflict recorded. HostSecretMergeTests already had a test written for
  exactly this class of omission; it simply had not been extended.

- Adding a nullable field exposed a defect in HostSecretMerge.Field: it
  short-circuited when the discarded value was null, so the formatter never ran
  for the one case where null is a value rather than an absence, and a field
  whose absence has a name could not report it. Now the formatter always runs,
  and "no key" appears in the conflict log where an empty string used to.

Also fixes eight nullable warnings in SyncEndpointTests left by the server-side
SSH key commit, which had omitted the null-forgiving operator the rest of that
file uses. They were invisible until an unrelated change forced the project to
recompile.

The end-to-end slice now binds its host to its key, so a schema-version-2
payload goes through the real API, the real PostgreSQL and back out on a second
machine.

745 tests green. Zero warnings, dotnet format clean.
2026-07-29 20:42:51 +02:00
jaap-jan 8d2416a602 Add the encrypted local cache and the sync client
Three new client projects, and the wire-contract fix they needed.

DodoSSH.Client.Domain holds the decrypted item model and the three-way
merge, with no I/O at all — so the suite that decides whether a
credential can be lost runs in milliseconds with nothing to mock.
Scalars defer to the server on a genuine clash so every replica resolves
the same triple identically and two clients cannot ping-pong; directives
merge per name so two people each adding one both keep theirs; the jump
chain merges as a whole value because its order is the route. Whatever
loses is returned rather than dropped.

DodoSSH.Client.Storage is EF Core on SQLite, no SQLCipher: the rows are
already ciphertext, so an encrypted file would protect protected bytes
at the cost of a native dependency. It keeps the server's state and the
outbox in separate tables, which is what preserves the common ancestor a
merge needs. One pending operation per item, enforced by a unique index.

DodoSSH.Client.Sync is the pull/apply/push loop. Pulling never decrypts
— a change with no local work pending is plumbed as ciphertext — so a
first sync of thousands of items does not run twice as many AEAD
operations for nothing.

Contracts: EncryptedPayload gains WrappedDataKey and DataKeyId. The
specification has required a per-item data key since crypto.md §3, the
columns have existed since the first migration and DshAad.ItemPayload
binds the id, but this record had nowhere to put either — so a
spec-compliant item could not be transmitted at all. Found by writing
the client that has to produce one. Also closes a hole in
AadResourceType, which had no value for the HostTag and HostCredential
that SyncEntityType has always listed.

Four bugs the tests found, not review:

- SQLite refuses to order or compare its own DateTimeOffset mapping, and
  throws at execution rather than model build. Collecting tombstones and
  listing conflicts are both that shape, so this was a crash waiting for
  the first user with a deleted host. Timestamps are integers now, by
  convention so a later field cannot be the one left unconverted.
- SQLitePCLRaw 2.1.11, which EF resolves, is covered by
  GHSA-2m69-gcr7-jv3q. Pinned forward as a family.
- Resurrecting content from a remote deletion cleared the original
  before queueing the copy. Two transactions, so a crash between them
  lost the work; reversed, and the rescued id is derived from the
  tombstone so a replay coalesces instead of duplicating.
- Several equality assertions went through Shouldly's ShouldBe, which
  compares IEnumerable element-wise and so tested nothing about the
  Equals these types exist to provide. Corrected; the falsification that
  caught it went from 2 failures to 6.

The push response's cursor is deliberately ignored. It sits after this
client's own writes, so adopting it skips anything another client
committed at a lower sequence in the window between a pull and a push —
permanently. Re-reading one's own writes is idempotent and costs a page.
The Contracts doc that invited the shortcut now says so.

593 tests, up from 448. The delete-versus-edit rules, the ancestor
retention, the fresh operation id on coalesce and the cursor safeguard
were each verified by breaking them and watching the right test fail.
2026-07-29 10:27:37 +02:00