70b3290a77521d8650b9a9ad879ba4d514361774
5
Commits
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70b3290a77 |
Bind an SSH key to a host instead of picking one per connection
A host now names the key it authenticates with, or none, as a field in its encrypted payload — so the choice follows the host to every machine rather than being made again each time somebody connects. The per-connection "Use key" switch it replaces was a stopgap for not having this, and keeping both would have left two mechanisms answering one question. This is the first payload schema version bump, and it does not work the obvious way. A host is written at the *lowest* schema version that can represent it: one that binds a key is written at 2, one that does not is still written at 1, byte for byte as it was before the field existed. The version is what makes an older client refuse to edit an item, so stamping 2 unconditionally would mean upgrading a single machine and renaming a single host made that host uneditable on every machine that had not upgraded yet. Confining the cost to the hosts that actually use the field is the difference between a team noticing a bump and a team being blocked by one. HostSecretCodec states the rule so the next field added follows it, and a test pins the version-1 bytes against a literal rather than against the codec, because the claim is about history: every host already in every vault has to re-encode to what it encoded before, or the first sync after an upgrade would push the whole vault as changed. A binding is an item id, not a copy of the key — a second copy of a private key is one that goes stale — which means the reference can dangle when the key is deleted on another machine. Both places that meets are handled the same way, by refusing rather than falling back: - Connecting to a host whose key is gone is refused outright. A host somebody deliberately set up for key-only access must not quietly start offering a password. - Opening such a host in the editor keeps the binding, selected, labelled as missing. The quieter version of the same failure is someone editing the port and saving, silently converting the host to password authentication with nothing ever having said so. Two things this found by being falsified: - The merge was untested for the new field, and "just take the server's value" passed the entire suite — a local binding change would have been discarded with no conflict recorded. HostSecretMergeTests already had a test written for exactly this class of omission; it simply had not been extended. - Adding a nullable field exposed a defect in HostSecretMerge.Field: it short-circuited when the discarded value was null, so the formatter never ran for the one case where null is a value rather than an absence, and a field whose absence has a name could not report it. Now the formatter always runs, and "no key" appears in the conflict log where an empty string used to. Also fixes eight nullable warnings in SyncEndpointTests left by the server-side SSH key commit, which had omitted the null-forgiving operator the rest of that file uses. They were invisible until an unrelated change forced the project to recompile. The end-to-end slice now binds its host to its key, so a schema-version-2 payload goes through the real API, the real PostgreSQL and back out on a second machine. 745 tests green. Zero warnings, dotnet format clean. |
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e3fd3e1728 |
Sync and authenticate with SSH keys on the client
Completes the client half of SSH keys: they sync alongside hosts, appear in their own list, and can be selected to authenticate a connection instead of typing a password. The reconciler and the repository were Host-typed throughout, so the choice was to generalise them or to keep a second copy per item type. Generalised, because ItemReconciler's whole premise is that the pull and the push paths must answer the same collision the same way — two copies would drift the first time one of them was fixed. What is genuinely per-type now arrives through IItemKind<TSecret>: the cipher, the merge, the plaintext columns, and the noun to use when telling a person what happened to their item. Generic where the server's IItemKind is not, and for the reason that reverses there — the client needs the concrete type, because it merges field by field. The pull filter is derived from the same registry that builds the reconcilers. That is the specific failure being designed out: an item type that encrypts, merges and lists perfectly and is never once requested from the server, so it works on the machine that made it and exists nowhere else. No client cache migration. The item table's primary key and the outbox's unique index already carry the entity type, and AadResourceTypes already mapped SshKey — so a host and a key may share an id and never see each other's rows, which SshKeySyncTests now arranges deliberately. A key hands the server nothing in plaintext. There is a public_key_fingerprint column and it would be accepted; leaving it null is deliberate. A fingerprint is not secret but it is a stable identifier for a key pair, so filling it would let an operator tell which of their users hold the same key and correlate one across vaults, for a column nothing reads. The design allows itself one plaintext concession — the relay address, which the relay cannot work without — and this is not that. A key is chosen per connection rather than bound to a host, which works the way ssh -i does. Binding one needs a field on HostSecret and therefore a payload schema bump, which makes every host written afterwards read-only on an older build; worth doing deliberately rather than as a side effect of adding keys. Three things this found, all of them by being falsified rather than by review: - Making the reconciler generic silently turned a record comparison into reference equality, because == on a type parameter is not value equality. The effect would have been a conflict recorded on every pass for an unacknowledged create that had in fact landed. Sabotaging the fix left all 73 tests passing — nothing covered that branch — so ConflictMatrixTests now has AnUnacknowledgedCreateThatDidLand_IsDroppedQuietly, which fails without it. - A test asserting that a blank passphrase reaches SSH.NET as null was vacuous: it exercised the editor, not the credential path, and passed with the guard deleted. Resolved by making SshKeySecret.Passphrase normalise an empty string to null, so there is one spelling of one state — which also keeps two clients from producing different payload bytes for an identical key. That exposed a wider gap: SshKeySecret, its codec and its merge had no direct unit tests at all. They have 25 now. - The reason first given for that normalisation was false. It claimed SSH.NET rejects a passphrase supplied for an unprotected key; measured against a real sshd it ignores it and authenticates anyway. Corrected everywhere it was stated and recorded in docs/platform-flags.md. The same test file also closes a real hole: SshPrivateKeyCredential had never been exercised against a server, because the existing key test builds SSH.NET's auth method directly and bypasses the path a vault-held key actually takes. Only one editor may be open at a time. Both sit in the same 340-pixel column as Auto rows and their heights together exceed it at the window's minimum size, so two open editors put the lower one's Save and Cancel past the bottom edge — the same failure this window already shipped once with the setup screens. Expressed as a state rule because that is the only form of it this repository can check: nothing here loads a .axaml. The refusal keeps what was typed, since in the key editor that is a pasted private key the user may have nowhere else. The end-to-end slice now carries a key as well as a host, so both item types go through the real API, the real PostgreSQL and the real crypto in one pass — the three hand-kept mappings between enums that do not line up are the reason that is worth doing rather than trusting the unit suites. 735 tests green, including the container-backed SSH and end-to-end suites. Zero warnings, dotnet format clean. |
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ea271d980a |
Give the realm's users their roles, and sign in as one in the E2E suite
Signing in failed at the token exchange with `400 Offline tokens not allowed
for the user or client`. A user declared in a realm import gets no role
mappings at all unless realmRoles lists them — not even the realm's own
default-roles composite, which Keycloak grants automatically to a user created
through the admin API or the registration form. alice and bob had none, and
offline_access lives inside that composite, which the desktop client requests.
Verified against the running Keycloak: alice's role-mappings were {} before and
resolve to default-roles-dodossh, offline_access, uma_authorization after.
The authorization request succeeds and the failure lands one step later, at the
code redemption, which makes it read like a client bug. It is not.
The E2E suite could not catch this because it created its own account through
the admin API — exercising a provisioning path no real user takes, and passing
while the account the README tells you to use could not sign in at all. It now
signs in as the realm's own alice, which is sound because the Keycloak and
PostgreSQL containers are per-run so the account is pristine, and this assembly
holds one test. Removing the roles again fails it with exactly the reported
message; that is what makes the coverage real rather than nominal.
Two traps recorded in docs/platform-flags.md, the second found by shipping it
for a moment: Keycloak's RealmRepresentation deserialises with
FAIL_ON_UNKNOWN_PROPERTIES enabled, so the "_comment" key I first used to
explain the roles inside the JSON did not get ignored — the import threw and
the container refused to start. Explanations go in the docs, not in the realm
file.
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34304b989b |
Make the end-to-end suite self-contained with Testcontainers
It needed a hand-started stack and an opt-in flag, so it ran on one machine and never in CI. It now brings up PostgreSQL, Keycloak and an OpenSSH server itself, applies the committed migrations and starts the API as a child process, which makes it part of the ordinary test run at ~25s. The API runs as a process rather than through WebApplicationFactory. The client builds its own HttpClient for a URL the user typed, so there is no seam to hand a test handler through without inventing one that exists only for tests — and a test host would replace the entry point, Kestrel and the content root, so it would never prove that Program.cs composes or that the committed appsettings is found and layered in the documented order. Running out of the API's own output directory is what makes its configuration real. The suite still consumes what ships: the realm file from deploy/keycloak, the EF migrations, the API's own appsettings. Only Oidc:Authority is overridden, because the container's port is assigned at start. Falsified by reintroducing the wildcard-port redirect URI the realm once had — Keycloak rejects the authorization request and the suite fails at sign-in, which is what proves the committed file is the one imported. Skipping the migration step likewise fails, and the failure names the pending migration. A fresh Keycloak per run also sidesteps the --import-realm trap: editing the realm file and rerunning now always tests the edit. DodoDbContextFactory gains a Create(connectionString) so the fixture and dotnet ef place the migrations history table in exactly one place. If they disagreed the API would report every migration pending, which is how the readiness gate catches it. |
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1d262b7ccc |
Run M1's end-to-end slice, and fix the two bugs it found
The whole vertical slice now runs against a real Keycloak, a real API, a real PostgreSQL and a real sshd: sign in through the browser flow, enroll with the identity-provider key binding, unlock, create a host, sync it, read it back on a second machine, unlock again with no network, accept an unseen host key, and open an interactive shell. Opt-in, because it needs the development stack; skipped with a message naming the commands. It found two bugs on its first run, and both are the same class: two sides of a stub agreeing with each other about something the specification never said. **The API never applied DodoSshJsonContext to its HTTP JSON options.** Minimal APIs therefore used the framework's web defaults, which write an enum as a number. Every request DTO carrying one failed to bind against a client writing the specified string form — which is the entire sync surface, unreachable from the real client, with a 400 naming only the parameter. The documented guarantee that request bodies reject unmapped members was likewise not in effect anywhere. Nothing caught it because the API tests posted with PostAsJsonAsync's defaults, so they and the server had independently settled on integers. Those tests now serialise through the contract, which is the deeper fix: removing the new configuration fails 13 of them. Copying settings into options a host owns is itself the hazard the context warns about, so ApplyTo lives beside the settings it mirrors and ApplyToTests pins the transformation, including that inserting the resolver leaves the caller's own in place. **The realm registered a loopback redirect URI Keycloak rejects.** `http://127.0.0.1:*/callback` looks more explicit than the RFC 8252 form and is broken: Keycloak's wildcards are trailing-only, so the `*` parses as a literal port and every authorization request came back "Invalid parameter: redirect_uri". Providers ignore the port for loopback hosts, which is the whole mechanism, so the correct registration is `http://127.0.0.1/callback` — path pinned, port free. The value the server advertises through the discovery document said the same wrong thing and now says the right one. Two smaller things, both documented in docs/platform-flags.md: - --import-realm skips a realm that already exists, so editing the realm file and restarting Keycloak changes nothing and serves stale configuration. The container has to be recreated. The compose comment claimed the opposite. - Keycloak marks its session cookies Secure even over plain HTTP, because SameSite=None requires it. A spec-conformant client drops them and the login POST answers 400 with no message; browsers complete the flow only because they exempt loopback. Harmless for the product, fatal for automation, so ScriptedBrowser carries the cookies by hand and says why. Also: the server enforces a 64 MiB floor on the passphrase KDF, so this suite cannot use the 8 MiB profile the other client suites take for speed. Those only get away with it because their in-memory servers have no policy — worth knowing rather than rediscovering. 638 tests. The solution-wide run stays green with the stack down: exit code 8 means "no tests ran", which the platform reports as failure, so the opt-in project ignores exactly that code. |