2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jaap-jan	d459dac600	Stop a dead WebView2 hanging Connect with the busy flag stuck ... VaultViewModel.ConnectAsync awaited TerminalWorkspace.WaitForRendererAsync with no timeout and no token, and RunAsync clears IsBusy only after the work returns. Whether the renderer attaches at all depends on a runtime this application does not install: with a missing or policy-blocked Evergreen runtime, or an AppContainer that cannot reach loopback, the socket never arrives — so Connect never returned, the window stayed disabled on "Connecting…" for the rest of the session, and nothing on screen said why. Left out of 0500e43 to keep that change focused, and recorded in docs/platform-flags.md as worth fixing on its own merits. The gate itself is unchanged and has to stay: TerminalDataPlane.SendAsync drops frames when no renderer is attached rather than queueing them, so a session opened before the renderer arrives loses its SessionOpened frame and then streams output at a terminal that was never created. Only the wait changed — RendererAttached.WaitAsync(timeout, cancellationToken), with the command's own token threaded through. Fifteen seconds, on TerminalWorkspaceOptions.RendererTimeout. Attaching is normally near-instant, since WebView2 starts with the window and the page has usually attached while the passphrase was still being typed, but a first run on a cold profile creates a user-data directory and starts a process tree of some thirty-five processes first, which on a loaded machine is seconds rather than milliseconds. A renderer that will never attach will not attach however long the wait is, so being generous costs only how long a broken runtime takes to say so, while being tight costs telling someone their runtime is broken when it was merely slow. Injectable because both new tests would otherwise sit out that budget. The timeout is caught in VaultViewModel rather than left to RunAsync's generic handler, because TimeoutException.Message is "The operation has timed out" — which sends someone looking at their network or their host. The status now names the WebView2 runtime and says to install it. TerminalWorkspaceTests covers the half that was missing: the wait gives up (329 ms against a 250 ms budget) and obeys its token (2 ms against a five-minute one). Before the bound, the first of those would have hung rather than failed. ShellFlowTests never starts its workspace, which from the view model's side is indistinguishable from a WebView2 that failed to initialise, so it asserts that the status names WebView2 and that IsBusy is cleared; changing the catch to another exception type makes it fail with "The operation has timed out.", so neither assertion is vacuous. The success path is untouched and still covered end to end by TerminalEndToEndTests against a real sshd container, which now passes the test's cancellation token. One byproduct: the doc comment on WaitForRendererAsync carried two double-encoded em dashes, fixed now that the block is rewritten.	2026-07-29 15:26:53 +02:00
jaap-jan	eb354bcdd9	Add the SSH session layer and the terminal data plane ... The throughput harness the plan requires before any UI, plus the SSH plumbing under it. 94 new tests, no WebView involved. Credit-based flow control is what makes `yes` survivable. A terminal renders at 60 Hz at best while a remote produces output as fast as the network allows, and the difference has to accumulate somewhere or be refused. Credit is reserved *before* reading, never after: because the pump cannot read more than the renderer has room for, the coalescing buffer is bounded by the window rather than by how fast the remote can talk. When credit runs out the pump stops reading, SSH's own receive window closes, and the remote sshd blocks -- backpressure to the source with no custom protocol. Verified by falsification, not just by passing: with the credit gate removed three tests fail, including the throughput harness's bounded-memory assertion. Acknowledgements are clamped because they cross into JavaScript, where a buggy or hostile page could otherwise claim to have rendered a gigabyte and talk the host into an unbounded read. Host key trust is enforced by *failing* the connection rather than prompting inside the handshake. SSH.NET raises verification synchronously, so consulting the user there would block the handshake on a UI round trip and deadlock the first time the prompt needed the UI thread. Unknown host and changed key become distinct exceptions the caller resolves asynchronously. A mismatch has no retry path at all: a dialog offering to continue is how users are trained to click through the one warning that actually indicates interception. A legitimately rebuilt server is handled by removing the pin in settings, away from the moment of connecting. The data plane serves the renderer page from the same loopback listener as the socket, which makes Origin predictable -- always http://127.0.0.1:{port} -- where a WebView virtual-host mapping would give a different origin per backend and nothing to validate. The token is substituted at serve time, so it never touches disk and never appears in a URL. Being clear about what that buys: not protection from a process running as this user, which can read our memory anyway, but from a page in the user's browser attempting WebSocket connections to loopback ports, which is a real and routine thing. Two bugs the tests caught. The accept loop handled connections serially, so an upgraded WebSocket parked it inside the receive loop and every later request went unanswered -- the page's own script among them. The suite hung rather than failed, which is how I found it. And SHA-1 is unavoidable here: RFC 6455 mandates it for Sec-WebSocket-Accept, where it authenticates nothing. Suppressed narrowly with that reasoning; the alternative, HttpListener.AcceptWebSocketAsync, throws PlatformNotSupportedException off Windows.	2026-07-28 21:58:55 +02:00