Public Access
b08f2c58e3e30274baa696454b276c402ca257e6
4
Commits
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b08f2c58e3 |
Fill in the Spelunk API key on the Security page, as a synced Spelunk key that goes only to its own address
Settings → Security gains a SPELUNK section: an API address and a key, saved as a new keychain item, a Spelunk key (SyncEntityType 14, AadResourceType 17, server table spelunk_key via the AddSpelunkKeyItem migration). It is ciphertext only on the server, lives in the personal vault, syncs like every secret, and holds the key together with the one address it may be sent to. The key box empties once saved; the list shows name, address and how many hosts use each key, never the key. Saving a key for an address that already has one replaces it, and deleting goes through the shared confirmation card with the hosts that would stop connecting. A host's route names a saved key where it named a credential, in the same apiKeyCredentialId field, so no host schema changes and an older build reads such a host as one whose key credential has gone. At connect a saved key is sent only to its own address; a host naming it with another Spelunk address is refused in words. Keys kept as a credential's password still work. The editor offers saved keys first and picks the one saved for an address as it is typed. A link from a Spelunk with a saved key now connects straight away, including the first one: saving the key is the user's say-so that the first-link editor used to ask for. The address and key merge as one pair, so two concurrent edits can never pair one device's key with another's address, and the key never reaches the conflict log. |
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6ae1912c34 |
Give the two logs and the buckets a resource type, so a conflict can be written
AadResourceTypes.For maps a syncable type onto the AAD resource type its cache records bind to, and it had no arm for ConnectionLogEntry, ActivityLogEntry or ObjectStore. All three are on both enums, in the reconciler registry and in the cipher pinning; only this switch was missed, and it throws rather than falling back — so a merge conflict on a connection log, an activity log or a bucket raised ArgumentOutOfRangeException on the path that records what the merge discarded. The conflict log is the whole reason the merge is allowed to pick a winner, so the one item kind whose conflicts could not be recorded was a bucket: an editable item two machines can genuinely disagree about. Worth writing down why it lasted two phases. Of the three callers, ItemStore and OutboxStore reach the mapping only when an item carries plaintext fields, and none of these three kinds does — so they never touched the gap. ConflictStore calls it unconditionally, but a test only reaches that by causing a real merge conflict, and every existing one raised its conflict against a Host. Three arms missing, and no path in the suite crossed any of them. So the tests are the point of this commit as much as the arms are. The guard is AadResourceTypeTests.EverySyncableType_HasAnArmInTheStorageMapping: it walks the whole wire enum, and for each type asserts both that there is an arm and that the arm returns the same-named resource type, which is the mistake the file's cipher half already guards against on the server side. Written over the full enum rather than over ItemKinds.SyncedTypes, because that is the stronger claim and the one the switch really makes — the two reserved association types have arms too. Beside it, CacheStoreTests.AConflict_CanBeRecordedForEveryKindOfItem records a conflict per kind and reads the detail back, since an arm returning the wrong resource type seals under one AAD and opens under another, which surfaces as an empty detail rather than as a throw. Both were confirmed to fail with the arms removed: the theory fails on exactly ConnectionLogEntry, ActivityLogEntry and ObjectStore and passes on the other three, and the guard names those three and no others. The note in docs/adding-hosts-on-the-phone.md that recorded this as out of scope is marked fixed, with what let it survive, since that is the part worth knowing next time an item kind is added. 1529 tests pass, seven of them new. |
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7016ce36f1 |
Key the local cache to the identity, not to the door it was opened through
Groundwork for a device key, and a spec change rather than a feature. ADR 0007 records the decision it clears the way for: a Windows Hello gesture guarding a protected blob, with the passphrase kept as a permanent fallback. The reason that decision needed this first is that a device key cannot open a session on its own. SessionOpener derived two things from the passphrase master key — the bundle, and the local cache key — and a device wrap is SealTo(device_x25519_pk), which yields the bundle and never computes a master key at all. A device unlock could therefore have opened the identity and still not read the cache it had itself written. So LocalCacheKey now derives from the bundle: dsh1/localcache/v1 → v2, specified in crypto.md §3.2. Every wrap that opens a vault ends up holding the bundle, so every door reaches the same cache. Extract-and-expand, not expand alone. Everything derived from the master key uses HKDF-Expand directly, which is sound because an Argon2id output is uniformly random over its whole length. The bundle's encoding is not — it opens with a fixed 14-byte label and carries a version, a generation and a timestamp before reaching any key material — so it needs the extract step to become a pseudorandom key first. Two consequences fell out, both improvements and neither the point: - A passphrase change no longer discards the local cache. The bundle is unchanged by a re-wrap, so the cache key is too. Under v1 changing a passphrase silently orphaned every cached row and the next launch re-pulled the whole vault. - Recovery-code unlock is fixed before it ships. It derives a different master key from a different secret and a different salt, so under v1 it would have had the same defect as the device path, and nobody would have noticed until it landed. The cache becomes unreadable exactly when the identity is rotated, which is the correct moment to discard it. Existing caches are discarded and re-pulled on upgrade — already the specified behaviour for a stale cache, and the reason the label is versioned rather than reused: a v1 cache must fail to open rather than decrypt to nonsense. One stated guarantee got weaker and now says so. crypto.md §10 claimed locking meant "nothing on disk can be read again without the passphrase." Where a device wrap exists that is no longer true, and it would have been untrue under either candidate design — the alternative was storing a copy of the cache key in the device blob, which is the same door with an extra key lying next to it. The wording now points at ADR 0007, because what guards the device key is a platform decision and not a property of this specification. A golden vector was quietly lying, which is the part worth reading twice. The "local-cache" entry pinned HKDF-SHA512-Expand over a fixed PRK — a construction the cache key no longer uses. Regenerating it would have produced a green suite describing a derivation this code does not perform. It is replaced by a vector over a bundle whose every byte is pinned: the label, version 1, generation 1, a fixed timestamp and two recognisable key scalars, all visible in the fixture so a second implementation can check itself against it. UserSecretBundle.TryDecode is internal for this, because Create draws fresh randomness and so can never produce a reproducible input. Mutation tested, and this one earns its keep: dropping the extract step now fails CommittedVectors_MatchCurrentImplementation. The vector it replaced could not have caught that, because it never touched the bundle at all. One test became false and says so. ARecordSealedUnderAnotherPassphrase is now ARecordSealedByAnotherIdentity: a different passphrase deliberately no longer changes the cache key, and TheLocalCacheKey_SurvivesAPassphraseChange pins that. What must still be unreadable is another user's cache. CacheHarness therefore generates an identity rather than deriving from a passphrase, and has no passphrase parameter left — the cache key is not a question about passphrases any more. SyncHarness's two simulated machines now derive the same cache key, which is what keying on the bundle means: they are the same user holding the same identity. They still have separate cache databases, so nothing is shared between them but the key that would open either. Both harnesses lost a MasterKey field that existed only to make a protector. 858 tests green. Zero warnings, dotnet format clean. Not done: the device key itself. Three pieces remain, and the middle one was a discovery rather than a plan — EnrollmentService.AddDevice runs only during enrollment, so every already-enrolled account, which is all of them, needs an endpoint to add a device wrap while unlocked. The client proves possession by producing the wrap, so that shape falls out of the crypto. After that: the protector seam with the wrap cached locally for offline unlock, then the Hello implementation and the unlock-screen UI, which is where the Windows TFM lands and where automated testing stops. |
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8d2416a602 |
Add the encrypted local cache and the sync client
Three new client projects, and the wire-contract fix they needed. DodoSSH.Client.Domain holds the decrypted item model and the three-way merge, with no I/O at all — so the suite that decides whether a credential can be lost runs in milliseconds with nothing to mock. Scalars defer to the server on a genuine clash so every replica resolves the same triple identically and two clients cannot ping-pong; directives merge per name so two people each adding one both keep theirs; the jump chain merges as a whole value because its order is the route. Whatever loses is returned rather than dropped. DodoSSH.Client.Storage is EF Core on SQLite, no SQLCipher: the rows are already ciphertext, so an encrypted file would protect protected bytes at the cost of a native dependency. It keeps the server's state and the outbox in separate tables, which is what preserves the common ancestor a merge needs. One pending operation per item, enforced by a unique index. DodoSSH.Client.Sync is the pull/apply/push loop. Pulling never decrypts — a change with no local work pending is plumbed as ciphertext — so a first sync of thousands of items does not run twice as many AEAD operations for nothing. Contracts: EncryptedPayload gains WrappedDataKey and DataKeyId. The specification has required a per-item data key since crypto.md §3, the columns have existed since the first migration and DshAad.ItemPayload binds the id, but this record had nowhere to put either — so a spec-compliant item could not be transmitted at all. Found by writing the client that has to produce one. Also closes a hole in AadResourceType, which had no value for the HostTag and HostCredential that SyncEntityType has always listed. Four bugs the tests found, not review: - SQLite refuses to order or compare its own DateTimeOffset mapping, and throws at execution rather than model build. Collecting tombstones and listing conflicts are both that shape, so this was a crash waiting for the first user with a deleted host. Timestamps are integers now, by convention so a later field cannot be the one left unconverted. - SQLitePCLRaw 2.1.11, which EF resolves, is covered by GHSA-2m69-gcr7-jv3q. Pinned forward as a family. - Resurrecting content from a remote deletion cleared the original before queueing the copy. Two transactions, so a crash between them lost the work; reversed, and the rescued id is derived from the tombstone so a replay coalesces instead of duplicating. - Several equality assertions went through Shouldly's ShouldBe, which compares IEnumerable element-wise and so tested nothing about the Equals these types exist to provide. Corrected; the falsification that caught it went from 2 failures to 6. The push response's cursor is deliberately ignored. It sits after this client's own writes, so adopting it skips anything another client committed at a lower sequence in the window between a pull and a push — permanently. Re-reading one's own writes is idempotent and costs a page. The Contracts doc that invited the shortcut now says so. 593 tests, up from 448. The delete-versus-edit rules, the ancestor retention, the fresh operation id on coalesce and the cursor safeguard were each verified by breaking them and watching the right test fail. |