DodoSSH

155 Commits 3 Branches 2 Tags

3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jaap-jan	d5b1a73182	Move the keys when a membership changes, not just the flag Adding somebody to a team granted them nothing readable and removing them rotated nothing. Both were honest — the interface said so in as many words — and both left the actual work to a button somebody had to remember to press, on a machine that happened to hold the key. Adding now wraps every team vault this machine can open to the new member, and removing revokes their grants and moves each of those vaults to a fresh key that goes to whoever is left. The rotation is where the design had to be decided rather than written. A vault key is per generation and an item carries the generation it was sealed under, so advancing the vault and withdrawing the old grants would make everything already stored unreadable to everybody, including whoever pressed the button. So earlier grants are kept: a member holds one per generation, /me serves them as PriorKeyWraps, and VaultKeyring holds a key per generation — the newest for writing, the item's own for reading, chosen per item on every read path. Sharing issues one grant per generation held, because a recipient handed only the current key would open the vault to find most of it undecryptable; revocation takes every generation, because leaving the history behind leaves them able to read everything written before the rotation. The bump itself is one server transaction. POST /vaults/{id}/rekey must name exactly current + 1 and the vault's xmin token makes that binding, so two admins rotating at once do not both walk away believing they succeeded — the second is refused and told to read the vault again. The server contributes the moment and no cryptography: it cannot generate the key, cannot tell that the one it is handed differs from the old one, and checks that the caller held the old one the only way it can, by requiring a live grant at the current generation. What this does not do is re-encrypt what is already stored, and the product says so rather than the reassuring version: everything written from the rotation onwards is unreadable to the person who left, and nothing about the past changes. That half is deferred and is safe to add incrementally precisely because a vault at mixed generations stays readable. ADR 0010 records the alternatives — revoking the old grants, chaining each key under its successor, re-sealing every item in one request against a server that caps a push at 500 operations — and why each was rejected. Two things fell out of the change rather than being asked for. The grant listing would have shown a member once per generation, so it now returns one row per holder carrying the best key they hold, which is what makes a row below the vault's generation mean "still owed the new key". And MarkUnreadable gives up the write target as well as reporting: a client whose vault was rotated elsewhere would otherwise have gone on sealing items under its superseded key — readable to its author, unreadable to everybody else, with nothing to show for it.	2026-08-03 23:05:40 +02:00
jaap-jan	0b261c4d39	Stay signed in, come back online by itself, and let a machine be given up Three things a machine that has been set up could not do. Unlock now takes Enter, which is the gesture everybody makes after typing a password and which did nothing until they found the button. Signing in survives a relaunch. The refresh token is kept in the local cache, sealed under the vault's own cache key, so a later launch resumes the session through the refresh grant with no browser and nobody present — and because it is sealed under that key, only an unlocked vault can resume it. A locked client therefore cannot reach the server at all, which is a consequence worth stating rather than working around; docs/crypto.md §3.2 records it. Every sync pass asks the shell for a connection rather than reading one captured at unlock, so a laptop that unlocked on a train is online within a minute of finding a network, with nothing pressed. Unlocking itself still never waits on a socket. Signing out empties this machine: the profile, the cached items, the outbox and this machine's device key, with the account's row withdrawn when the server can be reached. It asks first and says what it costs — the outbox count when the vault is open, an admission that it cannot be counted when it is not, and the shells that keep running either way. The vault is on the server and is untouched, which is what makes the same button the only honest answer to a forgotten passphrase, so it is on the unlock screen as well as in preferences. It cannot end the session at the identity provider, and says so. Two defects surfaced on the way. The synchronisation pass that runs when the vault opens never ran at all: the loop is started from inside the unlock command, so the busy flag it yields to was raised by that command — the first sync was a minute late on every launch. And signing in from preferences while unlocked threw an unlock screen over an open vault whose keys were still in memory. The unlock card and the new confirmation live in their own controls because MainWindow cannot be laid out headless, so markup left inside it is markup no test can measure; both are now measured at the window's minimum size in the shapes that grow. What is still unverified is the composed window itself.	2026-07-31 11:07:36 +02:00
jaap-jan	8d2416a602	Add the encrypted local cache and the sync client Three new client projects, and the wire-contract fix they needed. DodoSSH.Client.Domain holds the decrypted item model and the three-way merge, with no I/O at all — so the suite that decides whether a credential can be lost runs in milliseconds with nothing to mock. Scalars defer to the server on a genuine clash so every replica resolves the same triple identically and two clients cannot ping-pong; directives merge per name so two people each adding one both keep theirs; the jump chain merges as a whole value because its order is the route. Whatever loses is returned rather than dropped. DodoSSH.Client.Storage is EF Core on SQLite, no SQLCipher: the rows are already ciphertext, so an encrypted file would protect protected bytes at the cost of a native dependency. It keeps the server's state and the outbox in separate tables, which is what preserves the common ancestor a merge needs. One pending operation per item, enforced by a unique index. DodoSSH.Client.Sync is the pull/apply/push loop. Pulling never decrypts — a change with no local work pending is plumbed as ciphertext — so a first sync of thousands of items does not run twice as many AEAD operations for nothing. Contracts: EncryptedPayload gains WrappedDataKey and DataKeyId. The specification has required a per-item data key since crypto.md §3, the columns have existed since the first migration and DshAad.ItemPayload binds the id, but this record had nowhere to put either — so a spec-compliant item could not be transmitted at all. Found by writing the client that has to produce one. Also closes a hole in AadResourceType, which had no value for the HostTag and HostCredential that SyncEntityType has always listed. Four bugs the tests found, not review: - SQLite refuses to order or compare its own DateTimeOffset mapping, and throws at execution rather than model build. Collecting tombstones and listing conflicts are both that shape, so this was a crash waiting for the first user with a deleted host. Timestamps are integers now, by convention so a later field cannot be the one left unconverted. - SQLitePCLRaw 2.1.11, which EF resolves, is covered by GHSA-2m69-gcr7-jv3q. Pinned forward as a family. - Resurrecting content from a remote deletion cleared the original before queueing the copy. Two transactions, so a crash between them lost the work; reversed, and the rescued id is derived from the tombstone so a replay coalesces instead of duplicating. - Several equality assertions went through Shouldly's ShouldBe, which compares IEnumerable element-wise and so tested nothing about the Equals these types exist to provide. Corrected; the falsification that caught it went from 2 failures to 6. The push response's cursor is deliberately ignored. It sits after this client's own writes, so adopting it skips anything another client committed at a lower sequence in the window between a pull and a push — permanently. Re-reading one's own writes is idempotent and costs a page. The Contracts doc that invited the shortcut now says so. 593 tests, up from 448. The delete-versus-edit rules, the ancestor retention, the fresh operation id on coalesce and the cursor safeguard were each verified by breaking them and watching the right test fail.	2026-07-29 10:27:37 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

jaap-jan

d5b1a73182

Move the keys when a membership changes, not just the flag

Adding somebody to a team granted them nothing readable and removing them
rotated nothing. Both were honest — the interface said so in as many words — and
both left the actual work to a button somebody had to remember to press, on a
machine that happened to hold the key. Adding now wraps every team vault this
machine can open to the new member, and removing revokes their grants and moves
each of those vaults to a fresh key that goes to whoever is left.

The rotation is where the design had to be decided rather than written. A vault
key is per generation and an item carries the generation it was sealed under, so
advancing the vault and withdrawing the old grants would make everything already
stored unreadable to everybody, including whoever pressed the button. So earlier
grants are kept: a member holds one per generation, /me serves them as
PriorKeyWraps, and VaultKeyring holds a key per generation — the newest for
writing, the item's own for reading, chosen per item on every read path. Sharing
issues one grant per generation held, because a recipient handed only the current
key would open the vault to find most of it undecryptable; revocation takes every
generation, because leaving the history behind leaves them able to read
everything written before the rotation.

The bump itself is one server transaction. POST /vaults/{id}/rekey must name
exactly current + 1 and the vault's xmin token makes that binding, so two admins
rotating at once do not both walk away believing they succeeded — the second is
refused and told to read the vault again. The server contributes the moment and
no cryptography: it cannot generate the key, cannot tell that the one it is
handed differs from the old one, and checks that the caller held the old one the
only way it can, by requiring a live grant at the current generation.

What this does not do is re-encrypt what is already stored, and the product says
so rather than the reassuring version: everything written from the rotation
onwards is unreadable to the person who left, and nothing about the past changes.
That half is deferred and is safe to add incrementally precisely because a vault
at mixed generations stays readable. ADR 0010 records the alternatives — revoking
the old grants, chaining each key under its successor, re-sealing every item in
one request against a server that caps a push at 500 operations — and why each
was rejected.

Two things fell out of the change rather than being asked for. The grant listing
would have shown a member once per generation, so it now returns one row per
holder carrying the best key they hold, which is what makes a row below the
vault's generation mean "still owed the new key". And MarkUnreadable gives up the
write target as well as reporting: a client whose vault was rotated elsewhere
would otherwise have gone on sealing items under its superseded key — readable to
its author, unreadable to everybody else, with nothing to show for it.

2026-08-03 23:05:40 +02:00

jaap-jan

0b261c4d39

Stay signed in, come back online by itself, and let a machine be given up

Three things a machine that has been set up could not do. Unlock now takes
Enter, which is the gesture everybody makes after typing a password and which
did nothing until they found the button.

Signing in survives a relaunch. The refresh token is kept in the local cache,
sealed under the vault's own cache key, so a later launch resumes the session
through the refresh grant with no browser and nobody present — and because it
is sealed under that key, only an unlocked vault can resume it. A locked
client therefore cannot reach the server at all, which is a consequence worth
stating rather than working around; docs/crypto.md §3.2 records it. Every sync
pass asks the shell for a connection rather than reading one captured at
unlock, so a laptop that unlocked on a train is online within a minute of
finding a network, with nothing pressed. Unlocking itself still never waits on
a socket.

Signing out empties this machine: the profile, the cached items, the outbox
and this machine's device key, with the account's row withdrawn when the
server can be reached. It asks first and says what it costs — the outbox count
when the vault is open, an admission that it cannot be counted when it is not,
and the shells that keep running either way. The vault is on the server and is
untouched, which is what makes the same button the only honest answer to a
forgotten passphrase, so it is on the unlock screen as well as in preferences.
It cannot end the session at the identity provider, and says so.

Two defects surfaced on the way. The synchronisation pass that runs when the
vault opens never ran at all: the loop is started from inside the unlock
command, so the busy flag it yields to was raised by that command — the first
sync was a minute late on every launch. And signing in from preferences while
unlocked threw an unlock screen over an open vault whose keys were still in
memory.

The unlock card and the new confirmation live in their own controls because
MainWindow cannot be laid out headless, so markup left inside it is markup no
test can measure; both are now measured at the window's minimum size in the
shapes that grow. What is still unverified is the composed window itself.

2026-07-31 11:07:36 +02:00

jaap-jan

8d2416a602

Add the encrypted local cache and the sync client

Three new client projects, and the wire-contract fix they needed.

DodoSSH.Client.Domain holds the decrypted item model and the three-way
merge, with no I/O at all — so the suite that decides whether a
credential can be lost runs in milliseconds with nothing to mock.
Scalars defer to the server on a genuine clash so every replica resolves
the same triple identically and two clients cannot ping-pong; directives
merge per name so two people each adding one both keep theirs; the jump
chain merges as a whole value because its order is the route. Whatever
loses is returned rather than dropped.

DodoSSH.Client.Storage is EF Core on SQLite, no SQLCipher: the rows are
already ciphertext, so an encrypted file would protect protected bytes
at the cost of a native dependency. It keeps the server's state and the
outbox in separate tables, which is what preserves the common ancestor a
merge needs. One pending operation per item, enforced by a unique index.

DodoSSH.Client.Sync is the pull/apply/push loop. Pulling never decrypts
— a change with no local work pending is plumbed as ciphertext — so a
first sync of thousands of items does not run twice as many AEAD
operations for nothing.

Contracts: EncryptedPayload gains WrappedDataKey and DataKeyId. The
specification has required a per-item data key since crypto.md §3, the
columns have existed since the first migration and DshAad.ItemPayload
binds the id, but this record had nowhere to put either — so a
spec-compliant item could not be transmitted at all. Found by writing
the client that has to produce one. Also closes a hole in
AadResourceType, which had no value for the HostTag and HostCredential
that SyncEntityType has always listed.

Four bugs the tests found, not review:

- SQLite refuses to order or compare its own DateTimeOffset mapping, and
  throws at execution rather than model build. Collecting tombstones and
  listing conflicts are both that shape, so this was a crash waiting for
  the first user with a deleted host. Timestamps are integers now, by
  convention so a later field cannot be the one left unconverted.
- SQLitePCLRaw 2.1.11, which EF resolves, is covered by
  GHSA-2m69-gcr7-jv3q. Pinned forward as a family.
- Resurrecting content from a remote deletion cleared the original
  before queueing the copy. Two transactions, so a crash between them
  lost the work; reversed, and the rescued id is derived from the
  tombstone so a replay coalesces instead of duplicating.
- Several equality assertions went through Shouldly's ShouldBe, which
  compares IEnumerable element-wise and so tested nothing about the
  Equals these types exist to provide. Corrected; the falsification that
  caught it went from 2 failures to 6.

The push response's cursor is deliberately ignored. It sits after this
client's own writes, so adopting it skips anything another client
committed at a lower sequence in the window between a pull and a push —
permanently. Re-reading one's own writes is idempotent and costs a page.
The Contracts doc that invited the shortcut now says so.

593 tests, up from 448. The delete-versus-edit rules, the ancestor
retention, the fresh operation id on coalesce and the cursor safeguard
were each verified by breaking them and watching the right test fail.

2026-07-29 10:27:37 +02:00