dc1ebf6afadac77e7aa88e60a0fd5ad94fd02beb
67
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jaap-jan
|
04faef6597 |
Move files to and from a host over SFTP
M2's file transfer, built bottom-up: an SFTP session on the SSH layer, a transfer queue in a project of its own, and the two-pane browser the design asked for replacing the screen that said it did not exist. Remote listings carry names, sizes, modification times and a real drwxr-xr-x — nothing in this repository could render a POSIX mode before — and the queue moves one file at a time with progress, throughput and resume. The design import assumed this would be an SFTP subsystem channel on ISshConnection, beside the shell on a transport that is already up. SSH.NET does not offer that: SftpClient derives from BaseClient and owns its own transport, and there is no supported way to hand it an SshClient's session. So file transfer opens a second authenticated connection, and it is named for that rather than dressed up as a channel — OpenSftpAsync is on ISftpSessionFactory, not on a connection. The difference is visible to a user: the host records a second login, and a host whose password is typed each time asks for it again on this screen. It goes through the same host key gate, the same pin and the same two refusals a shell does, so a fingerprint approved for a terminal is approved here and one approved here reaches the other machines with the next sync. docs/design-import-gaps.md is corrected, and marked as the one row where what shipped differs from what it predicted. Nothing is written at its final name until it is complete. Every transfer goes to a .dodossh-part file beside its destination and is renamed into place at the end, so an interrupted transfer can never be mistaken for a finished one — which matters most for what this screen is actually for, which is copying a build artefact onto a server and then running it. A destination that already exists is refused outright rather than overwritten: the queue has no way to ask, and silently replacing a file somebody's process is serving is the worse of the two failures. The remote pane has DELETE and MKDIR so that refusal is not a dead end. A test against the container pins the assumption underneath all of this — that SFTP's rename does not clobber. Resume works within a run of the application and not across a restart, and the limit is deliberate rather than unfinished. Nothing records which source wrote a part file, and resuming one on the strength of its name matching is how a corrupt artefact gets delivered with nothing reporting a failure; a part file found at startup is started over. Making it survive a restart needs the preferences store this client still has not got. The offset a resume starts at is the part file's own length rather than the transfer's recorded progress: a cancellation can land between a write completing and the counter moving, and only one of those two is a fact about the bytes that are there. The queue and its connection outlive a lock, as shells do. LockAsync already argues that locking must not destroy work in flight — it is what somebody does when they walk away from the machine, which is exactly when a long transfer is most likely to be running — so TransfersViewModel is created once and the vault is attached on unlock and detached on lock. What locking takes is the host list, and it has to: those rows carry decrypted secrets. DodoSSH.Client.Transfer is a new project rather than more of Client.Ssh. The two answer different questions — one is about reaching a host, the other about moving bytes and what to do when moving them stops halfway — and this is the only client project that deliberately touches the local filesystem. Three defects the tests found, none of which review would have. SftpPath.Name answered an empty string for the root. NavigateRemoteAsync wrapped itself in the busy guard, so navigating from inside another command did nothing at all and the remote pane simply stayed empty after connecting, with no failure anywhere to explain it. And opening an SFTP session per test made two handshakes per test — this client learns a host key by being refused — which pushed the SSH assembly past sshd's MaxStartups and failed a different few unrelated tests each run; the session is shared through the fixture now, with the reason written where the next person will hit it. 1004 tests green across 18 projects, 24 of them new: the SFTP subsystem against the OpenSSH container, the queue against a real temporary directory and a fake host, and three more layout measurements because a screen this window has never laid out is a screen never checked. Not verified: the screen has not been looked at running. The layout harness measures it at the window's minimum in three shapes, which is the class of defect that has shipped here before, but reaching it in the application needs the compose stack, the migrations, the API and a browser sign-in. What is still absent — the status bar's transfer count, dragging between the panes, transferring a directory, and sftp over a bastion — is in docs/design-import-gaps.md. |
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jaap-jan
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9a76eced14 |
Give hosts and terminals their own screen, and the rest of the vault another
Rebuilds the client's shell from an imported design: a titlebar and nav rail it draws itself, real multi-session tabs over the one WebView, a Ctrl+K host search, and a vault screen that merges keys, passwords and pinned host keys into one table. Hosts left the vault column for their own screen beside the terminal, which is what the design asks for and turned out to be the better split anyway. Two screens the design shows have nothing behind them yet — file transfer and teams — and say so plainly rather than rendering invented data; every other gap between the design and this build is recorded in docs/design-import-gaps.md. |
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jaap-jan
|
211eba0666 |
Keep host key trust in the vault, and make it withdrawable
A fingerprint approved once is now approved on every machine and survives a
restart, because host key trust is a vault item type rather than a dictionary
that dies with the process. InMemoryKnownHostStore was what shipped, so the user
was asked to verify a fingerprint on every single connection — which is the gap
most likely to train somebody to click through the one warning that actually
matters. A warning that appears when nothing is wrong teaches that nothing is
ever wrong.
The fourth item type, and like the third it cost no sync logic: a row, an EF
configuration, a migration, a server kind; a secret, a codec, a merge, a cipher,
a repository facade and a session property. One row in the client registry. The
reconciler, the mirror, the repository, the outbox and the pull filter were not
touched. SyncEntityType.KnownHostKey and AadResourceType.KnownHostKey were
already reserved, so neither the contract nor docs/crypto.md changed.
One item per (host, port, algorithm), because a server legitimately offers
several host keys and which one gets negotiated is not ours to predict. Pinning
per endpoint would make an algorithm change indistinguishable from an attack.
The label is derived rather than stored, which is the one place this type
departs from the other three. A user never names a pin — there is nothing to
name it after but the three fields it already has — and a stored label is a
second copy of data that can disagree with the first after a merge. Relabel
returns the secret unchanged, and says why.
The store answers the handshake without touching the disk. SshNetConnectionFactory
calls FindAsync from inside SSH.NET's synchronous HostKeyReceived event, over
.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), which cannot be avoided; doing SQLite I/O plus an AEAD
open per lookup there would put the handshake behind the cache. So decryption
happens in OpenAsync and RefreshAsync — on unlock and after each sync pass,
exactly where the host and key lists already reload — and FindAsync is a
dictionary read under a lock with no await inside it.
That snapshot is where the one real bug in this change lived. Install originally
merged the live pins over the freshly loaded snapshot, to protect a TrustAsync
that had landed while the read was in flight. It would also have resurrected
every pin the user had just forgotten, and stopped a withdrawal made on another
machine from ever taking effect — the store would have healed the deletion back
into existence on every refresh. Replacing wholesale and discarding the read
instead is correct because writes are the rare case: every write bumps a
generation counter, and a refresh whose stamp is stale throws itself away rather
than winning. Nothing found this but reading the method again; it is the kind of
mistake that passes every test written before it, because the test that catches
it is the one the bug tells you to write.
Forgetting is new, and persistence is what made it mandatory rather than
convenient. A mismatch is a hard refusal with no way to continue — deliberately,
and that stays — so pinning a key permanently is also a way to make a
legitimately rebuilt server permanently unreachable. Before this change the pin
died at exit and the problem solved itself; now it does not.
ForgetAsync drops every algorithm for an endpoint, and it is reachable from the
host editor rather than from the warning. Putting it on the mismatch banner would
have made it two clicks from "this may be an attack" to "connect anyway", which
is the affordance the hard refusal exists to deny. The banner already promised
the key could be removed in the host's settings; that promise is now true and
points at the button.
Trust recorded on another machine becomes visible at the next sync pass, not
immediately, and that is a decision rather than an oversight. The failure it
produces is a first-contact prompt for a host a colleague approved a minute ago:
answerable, and self-correcting on the next pass. The opposite trade — polling
the vault on the handshake thread to close a one-minute window — buys nothing
and costs the property above. The dangerous direction is not reachable at all: a
pin recorded here enters the snapshot as part of recording it, so a refresh can
never discard a local trust decision.
The server learns nothing, and this is the item type where the temptation was
real. A plaintext host column would let a known-hosts screen sort and page
without decrypting anything, and it would hand the operator the map of every
user's estate — assembled, as these things are, out of facts that are each
individually harmless. A host row concedes an address only when relay is
switched on and the database refuses to store one otherwise (ADR 0004); there is
no equivalent excuse here. The table has no column to put one in, and the EF
configuration says so where somebody adding it would be standing.
Two things about the migration in this commit are worth knowing, because both
came out of getting it wrong.
It was hand-written first, including its .Designer.cs, and that version is not
what is here. Verifying it turned up something that had been quietly assumed:
Migration_AppliedCleanly_WithNoPendingModelChanges does not check the model
snapshot. It asserts that migrations applied and that none are pending, which a
wrong snapshot satisfies perfectly — the snapshot only matters as the diff base
for the *next* migrations add, so an incorrect one passes the whole suite and
corrupts the following migration instead. The real check is to generate a
throwaway migration and confirm its Up and Down come out empty. They did, and
the generated designer was byte-identical to the transcribed one across all 1255
lines, so the hand-written work was in fact correct.
Then dotnet ef migrations remove --no-build deleted the wrong migration. With
--no-build the tool reads the previously compiled assembly rather than the files
on disk, and the probe had just changed which migration was last, so it removed
AddKnownHostKeyItem and reverted the snapshot. That turned out to leave exactly
the right diff base, so the migration here is EF's own output rather than a
transcription — a better outcome than the one that was interrupted, arrived at
by accident. Never pass --no-build to migrations remove.
Mutation tested, all three sabotages detected: dropping the algorithm from
KnownHostIdentity.For, merging instead of replacing in Install, and pointing
KnownHostKeyCipher at PortForward — which is what a cast from the wire enum's 10
would silently produce. Each is caught both by an assertion about the mechanism
and by a behavioural test that never mentions it; the resource-type sabotage is
caught by the table from
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jaap-jan
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70b3290a77 |
Bind an SSH key to a host instead of picking one per connection
A host now names the key it authenticates with, or none, as a field in its encrypted payload — so the choice follows the host to every machine rather than being made again each time somebody connects. The per-connection "Use key" switch it replaces was a stopgap for not having this, and keeping both would have left two mechanisms answering one question. This is the first payload schema version bump, and it does not work the obvious way. A host is written at the *lowest* schema version that can represent it: one that binds a key is written at 2, one that does not is still written at 1, byte for byte as it was before the field existed. The version is what makes an older client refuse to edit an item, so stamping 2 unconditionally would mean upgrading a single machine and renaming a single host made that host uneditable on every machine that had not upgraded yet. Confining the cost to the hosts that actually use the field is the difference between a team noticing a bump and a team being blocked by one. HostSecretCodec states the rule so the next field added follows it, and a test pins the version-1 bytes against a literal rather than against the codec, because the claim is about history: every host already in every vault has to re-encode to what it encoded before, or the first sync after an upgrade would push the whole vault as changed. A binding is an item id, not a copy of the key — a second copy of a private key is one that goes stale — which means the reference can dangle when the key is deleted on another machine. Both places that meets are handled the same way, by refusing rather than falling back: - Connecting to a host whose key is gone is refused outright. A host somebody deliberately set up for key-only access must not quietly start offering a password. - Opening such a host in the editor keeps the binding, selected, labelled as missing. The quieter version of the same failure is someone editing the port and saving, silently converting the host to password authentication with nothing ever having said so. Two things this found by being falsified: - The merge was untested for the new field, and "just take the server's value" passed the entire suite — a local binding change would have been discarded with no conflict recorded. HostSecretMergeTests already had a test written for exactly this class of omission; it simply had not been extended. - Adding a nullable field exposed a defect in HostSecretMerge.Field: it short-circuited when the discarded value was null, so the formatter never ran for the one case where null is a value rather than an absence, and a field whose absence has a name could not report it. Now the formatter always runs, and "no key" appears in the conflict log where an empty string used to. Also fixes eight nullable warnings in SyncEndpointTests left by the server-side SSH key commit, which had omitted the null-forgiving operator the rest of that file uses. They were invisible until an unrelated change forced the project to recompile. The end-to-end slice now binds its host to its key, so a schema-version-2 payload goes through the real API, the real PostgreSQL and back out on a second machine. 745 tests green. Zero warnings, dotnet format clean. |
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jaap-jan
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e3fd3e1728 |
Sync and authenticate with SSH keys on the client
Completes the client half of SSH keys: they sync alongside hosts, appear in their own list, and can be selected to authenticate a connection instead of typing a password. The reconciler and the repository were Host-typed throughout, so the choice was to generalise them or to keep a second copy per item type. Generalised, because ItemReconciler's whole premise is that the pull and the push paths must answer the same collision the same way — two copies would drift the first time one of them was fixed. What is genuinely per-type now arrives through IItemKind<TSecret>: the cipher, the merge, the plaintext columns, and the noun to use when telling a person what happened to their item. Generic where the server's IItemKind is not, and for the reason that reverses there — the client needs the concrete type, because it merges field by field. The pull filter is derived from the same registry that builds the reconcilers. That is the specific failure being designed out: an item type that encrypts, merges and lists perfectly and is never once requested from the server, so it works on the machine that made it and exists nowhere else. No client cache migration. The item table's primary key and the outbox's unique index already carry the entity type, and AadResourceTypes already mapped SshKey — so a host and a key may share an id and never see each other's rows, which SshKeySyncTests now arranges deliberately. A key hands the server nothing in plaintext. There is a public_key_fingerprint column and it would be accepted; leaving it null is deliberate. A fingerprint is not secret but it is a stable identifier for a key pair, so filling it would let an operator tell which of their users hold the same key and correlate one across vaults, for a column nothing reads. The design allows itself one plaintext concession — the relay address, which the relay cannot work without — and this is not that. A key is chosen per connection rather than bound to a host, which works the way ssh -i does. Binding one needs a field on HostSecret and therefore a payload schema bump, which makes every host written afterwards read-only on an older build; worth doing deliberately rather than as a side effect of adding keys. Three things this found, all of them by being falsified rather than by review: - Making the reconciler generic silently turned a record comparison into reference equality, because == on a type parameter is not value equality. The effect would have been a conflict recorded on every pass for an unacknowledged create that had in fact landed. Sabotaging the fix left all 73 tests passing — nothing covered that branch — so ConflictMatrixTests now has AnUnacknowledgedCreateThatDidLand_IsDroppedQuietly, which fails without it. - A test asserting that a blank passphrase reaches SSH.NET as null was vacuous: it exercised the editor, not the credential path, and passed with the guard deleted. Resolved by making SshKeySecret.Passphrase normalise an empty string to null, so there is one spelling of one state — which also keeps two clients from producing different payload bytes for an identical key. That exposed a wider gap: SshKeySecret, its codec and its merge had no direct unit tests at all. They have 25 now. - The reason first given for that normalisation was false. It claimed SSH.NET rejects a passphrase supplied for an unprotected key; measured against a real sshd it ignores it and authenticates anyway. Corrected everywhere it was stated and recorded in docs/platform-flags.md. The same test file also closes a real hole: SshPrivateKeyCredential had never been exercised against a server, because the existing key test builds SSH.NET's auth method directly and bypasses the path a vault-held key actually takes. Only one editor may be open at a time. Both sit in the same 340-pixel column as Auto rows and their heights together exceed it at the window's minimum size, so two open editors put the lower one's Save and Cancel past the bottom edge — the same failure this window already shipped once with the setup screens. Expressed as a state rule because that is the only form of it this repository can check: nothing here loads a .axaml. The refusal keeps what was typed, since in the key editor that is a pasted private key the user may have nowhere else. The end-to-end slice now carries a key as well as a host, so both item types go through the real API, the real PostgreSQL and the real crypto in one pass — the three hand-kept mappings between enums that do not line up are the reason that is worth doing rather than trusting the unit suites. 735 tests green, including the container-backed SSH and end-to-end suites. Zero warnings, dotnet format clean. |
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jaap-jan
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5a899afd78 |
Decide what Lock does to a running shell, and say it
Pressing Lock nulled and disposed the vault view model and touched nothing else. TerminalWorkspace is injected from App.axaml.cs and outlives every lock, so the SSH connection, the pty and the pump all kept running while the window said "Unlock your vault" — and since |
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jaap-jan
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0500e43e02 |
Stop the terminal's WebView painting over the setup screens
The shell layered its setup and unlock screens over the terminal, which does not work: NativeWebView attaches a real Win32 child HWND through NativeControlHost, and a child window composites above everything its parent paints regardless of visual-tree z-order. The cards rendered sliced at the terminal column's left edge; at the window's default width every one of their buttons fell inside the WebView's rectangle, so the flow could only be completed by keyboard, and a click in that region handed Win32 focus to WebView2 so the text boxes silently stopped accepting keystrokes. The WebView is now collapsed while the vault is not unlocked. The comment that previously forbade this — hiding it means never realising it — was wrong: NativeControlHost creates the native attachment on attach to the visual tree, never consulting layout or visibility, and NativeWebView replays a Source assigned before its adapter exists. A collapsed WebView still starts WebView2, loads the page and lets the renderer attach. Confirmed: 35 msedgewebview2 processes with the control collapsed. What the first connection after unlocking actually depends on is the existing await on WaitForRendererAsync, since the data plane drops frames when no renderer is attached. Also fixes the second visible defect: the default server URL was https://localhost:7217, the API's *second* launch profile, while the README, its appsettings and a plain `dotnet run` all use http://localhost:5233 — so nothing was listening, and an HTTPS client against a plaintext port reports "The SSL connection could not be established", which reads as a certificate problem. The default now matches, a missing scheme is rejected by name instead of parsing as scheme "localhost", and that specific TLS failure now suggests http://. Both new tests fail when the fixes are reverted. Corrections to claims I made earlier and should not have: - docs/platform-flags.md asserted the opposite of the mechanism above and cited an established msedgewebview2 connection as verification. That observation was taken while the overlay was showing but, because of this very bug, the WebView was uncovered and in plain view — so it confirmed only that a visible WebView is realised. A process-level check cannot verify a rendering claim. The entry was also filed under "Local cache". - ITerminalHost was documented as the live seam the app plugs into, with a stub standing in for headless tests. It has no implementation anywhere and no test uses it; the view navigates the control directly. It also counted Avalonia.Controls.WebView and NativeWebView as two interchangeable backends when they are one component, with the Linux backend backwards. - The README claimed the shell's whole path was covered by tests. Its state machine is; its layout is covered by nothing, and a headless test could not have caught this — headless has no native window, so it would have rendered correctly and confirmed the wrong belief. Verified by screenshotting the running app: the card renders complete and centred at the default size, with the button clickable. |
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jaap-jan
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b9e7c258ae |
Point the design-time factory at the stack the repo ships
`dotnet ef database update --project src/DodoSSH.Infrastructure` — the command the README documents — failed on a clean machine. The design-time default named `dodossh_design` as user `postgres` with no password, which is a database this repository never creates, while the development compose stack creates `dodossh`/`dodossh`. The failure arrives as a SCRAM authentication error, so it reads like a broken container rather than a stale default. The default is now the compose stack, since that is the only local database the repo defines. DODOSSH_DESIGN_CONNECTION still overrides it, and a real deployment migrates through that or the migrator job. Also documents running the thing end to end, which the README never covered: the four commands in order, that migrations are a separate step because the API deliberately fails readiness rather than migrating, and the three M1 gaps visible in the first five minutes — so they are expected rather than diagnosed. |
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jaap-jan
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34304b989b |
Make the end-to-end suite self-contained with Testcontainers
It needed a hand-started stack and an opt-in flag, so it ran on one machine and never in CI. It now brings up PostgreSQL, Keycloak and an OpenSSH server itself, applies the committed migrations and starts the API as a child process, which makes it part of the ordinary test run at ~25s. The API runs as a process rather than through WebApplicationFactory. The client builds its own HttpClient for a URL the user typed, so there is no seam to hand a test handler through without inventing one that exists only for tests — and a test host would replace the entry point, Kestrel and the content root, so it would never prove that Program.cs composes or that the committed appsettings is found and layered in the documented order. Running out of the API's own output directory is what makes its configuration real. The suite still consumes what ships: the realm file from deploy/keycloak, the EF migrations, the API's own appsettings. Only Oidc:Authority is overridden, because the container's port is assigned at start. Falsified by reintroducing the wildcard-port redirect URI the realm once had — Keycloak rejects the authorization request and the suite fails at sign-in, which is what proves the committed file is the one imported. Skipping the migration step likewise fails, and the failure names the pending migration. A fresh Keycloak per run also sidesteps the --import-realm trap: editing the realm file and rerunning now always tests the edit. DodoDbContextFactory gains a Create(connectionString) so the fixture and dotnet ef place the migrations history table in exactly one place. If they disagreed the API would report every migration pending, which is how the readiness gate catches it. |
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jaap-jan
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1d262b7ccc |
Run M1's end-to-end slice, and fix the two bugs it found
The whole vertical slice now runs against a real Keycloak, a real API, a real PostgreSQL and a real sshd: sign in through the browser flow, enroll with the identity-provider key binding, unlock, create a host, sync it, read it back on a second machine, unlock again with no network, accept an unseen host key, and open an interactive shell. Opt-in, because it needs the development stack; skipped with a message naming the commands. It found two bugs on its first run, and both are the same class: two sides of a stub agreeing with each other about something the specification never said. **The API never applied DodoSshJsonContext to its HTTP JSON options.** Minimal APIs therefore used the framework's web defaults, which write an enum as a number. Every request DTO carrying one failed to bind against a client writing the specified string form — which is the entire sync surface, unreachable from the real client, with a 400 naming only the parameter. The documented guarantee that request bodies reject unmapped members was likewise not in effect anywhere. Nothing caught it because the API tests posted with PostAsJsonAsync's defaults, so they and the server had independently settled on integers. Those tests now serialise through the contract, which is the deeper fix: removing the new configuration fails 13 of them. Copying settings into options a host owns is itself the hazard the context warns about, so ApplyTo lives beside the settings it mirrors and ApplyToTests pins the transformation, including that inserting the resolver leaves the caller's own in place. **The realm registered a loopback redirect URI Keycloak rejects.** `http://127.0.0.1:*/callback` looks more explicit than the RFC 8252 form and is broken: Keycloak's wildcards are trailing-only, so the `*` parses as a literal port and every authorization request came back "Invalid parameter: redirect_uri". Providers ignore the port for loopback hosts, which is the whole mechanism, so the correct registration is `http://127.0.0.1/callback` — path pinned, port free. The value the server advertises through the discovery document said the same wrong thing and now says the right one. Two smaller things, both documented in docs/platform-flags.md: - --import-realm skips a realm that already exists, so editing the realm file and restarting Keycloak changes nothing and serves stale configuration. The container has to be recreated. The compose comment claimed the opposite. - Keycloak marks its session cookies Secure even over plain HTTP, because SameSite=None requires it. A spec-conformant client drops them and the login POST answers 400 with no message; browsers complete the flow only because they exempt loopback. Harmless for the product, fatal for automation, so ScriptedBrowser carries the cookies by hand and says why. Also: the server enforces a 64 MiB floor on the passphrase KDF, so this suite cannot use the 8 MiB profile the other client suites take for speed. Those only get away with it because their in-memory servers have no policy — worth knowing rather than rediscovering. 638 tests. The solution-wide run stays green with the stack down: exit code 8 means "no tests ran", which the platform reports as failure, so the opt-in project ignores exactly that code. |
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jaap-jan
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49f617b450 |
Wire the Avalonia shell to the vault
The host list now comes from the vault instead of from a form. A fresh machine takes a server URL, signs in through the browser, enrolls, and from then on opens with the passphrase alone. DodoSSH.Client.Session is the composition layer: where a profile lives, how it unlocks, and how a machine gets one. ClientPaths picks a non-roaming per-OS directory — %LOCALAPPDATA% and never %APPDATA%, because a SQLite cache that roams between two machines is a corrupt one, and each machine's outbox is its own. SessionOpener needs no transport at all and could not reach one if it wanted to; that is the offline unlock, asserted rather than asserted about. A wrong passphrase, a stale KDF and a grant revoked by a rekey are three different answers, because the remedies are three different things and telling someone to retype a passphrase that was never the problem is worse than saying nothing. The shell's states are the onboarding story. The recovery code gets its own state that cannot be clicked past: it exists for one moment, losing it with the passphrase loses the vault, and there is no server-side reset by design. It is dropped from memory on confirmation rather than merely hidden. Sign-in is a delegate over IVaultServer, so the whole state machine runs in a test against an in-memory server — no browser, no identity provider, no toolkit. The view models are plain observable objects, which is what makes that possible. What it does not cover is whether the XAML binds to the right names; that needs a rendered tree and Avalonia.Headless, and is its own piece of work. Three things found by doing it rather than by reading it: - Pooled SQLite connections keep the database file open after the last context is disposed. On Windows that means locked, so the application could never replace its own cache — and a test could not clean up after itself, which is how it surfaced. Dispose now clears the pool. - EF's SQLite provider puts the database in WAL mode, so the cache is three files. A comment in ClientCacheFactory claimed the opposite; reading PRAGMA journal_mode off a real launch settled it. WAL is the right mode here — a sync pass writes while the interface reads — so the comment was wrong on the merits as well as on the fact. - Enrolling a device key with nowhere to keep the private half would put a wrap on the server nobody can open and make the device list claim this machine can unlock without a passphrase. Device binding is now optional and the shell declines it until the OS keystore is wired. Verified on Windows: the client created %LOCALAPPDATA%\DodoSSH\cache.db and migrated it on first launch, and msedgewebview2 held an established connection to the data plane while the unlock overlay covered it — which is the point of covering the WebView rather than collapsing it, since a NativeWebView that is never laid out is never realised. 630 tests, up from 593. The recovery-code gate and the offline unlock were each verified by breaking them and watching the right test fail. Still to do for M1's actual definition of done: the manual run against the real API and a real Keycloak. Credentials are not a synced entity type yet, so a connection still asks for a password, and the interface says so rather than implying otherwise. |
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jaap-jan
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8d2416a602 |
Add the encrypted local cache and the sync client
Three new client projects, and the wire-contract fix they needed. DodoSSH.Client.Domain holds the decrypted item model and the three-way merge, with no I/O at all — so the suite that decides whether a credential can be lost runs in milliseconds with nothing to mock. Scalars defer to the server on a genuine clash so every replica resolves the same triple identically and two clients cannot ping-pong; directives merge per name so two people each adding one both keep theirs; the jump chain merges as a whole value because its order is the route. Whatever loses is returned rather than dropped. DodoSSH.Client.Storage is EF Core on SQLite, no SQLCipher: the rows are already ciphertext, so an encrypted file would protect protected bytes at the cost of a native dependency. It keeps the server's state and the outbox in separate tables, which is what preserves the common ancestor a merge needs. One pending operation per item, enforced by a unique index. DodoSSH.Client.Sync is the pull/apply/push loop. Pulling never decrypts — a change with no local work pending is plumbed as ciphertext — so a first sync of thousands of items does not run twice as many AEAD operations for nothing. Contracts: EncryptedPayload gains WrappedDataKey and DataKeyId. The specification has required a per-item data key since crypto.md §3, the columns have existed since the first migration and DshAad.ItemPayload binds the id, but this record had nowhere to put either — so a spec-compliant item could not be transmitted at all. Found by writing the client that has to produce one. Also closes a hole in AadResourceType, which had no value for the HostTag and HostCredential that SyncEntityType has always listed. Four bugs the tests found, not review: - SQLite refuses to order or compare its own DateTimeOffset mapping, and throws at execution rather than model build. Collecting tombstones and listing conflicts are both that shape, so this was a crash waiting for the first user with a deleted host. Timestamps are integers now, by convention so a later field cannot be the one left unconverted. - SQLitePCLRaw 2.1.11, which EF resolves, is covered by GHSA-2m69-gcr7-jv3q. Pinned forward as a family. - Resurrecting content from a remote deletion cleared the original before queueing the copy. Two transactions, so a crash between them lost the work; reversed, and the rescued id is derived from the tombstone so a replay coalesces instead of duplicating. - Several equality assertions went through Shouldly's ShouldBe, which compares IEnumerable element-wise and so tested nothing about the Equals these types exist to provide. Corrected; the falsification that caught it went from 2 failures to 6. The push response's cursor is deliberately ignored. It sits after this client's own writes, so adopting it skips anything another client committed at a lower sequence in the window between a pull and a push — permanently. Re-reading one's own writes is idempotent and costs a page. The Contracts doc that invited the shortcut now says so. 593 tests, up from 448. The delete-versus-edit rules, the ancestor retention, the fresh operation id on coalesce and the cursor safeguard were each verified by breaking them and watching the right test fail. |
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jaap-jan
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5fccd53824 |
Add the Avalonia app and the xterm renderer, and fix two real bugs
The terminal works end to end. A new integration test drives a real sshd in a container through a real PTY, the real pump, the real loopback WebSocket with its token and origin checks, and a ClientWebSocket standing in for the page: the login banner arrives, typed input round-trips, and `stty size` reports the 100x30 the session asked for. The only untested link left is xterm drawing bytes it was handed. The WebView is de-risked on Windows, which was the plan's largest risk. Not by assertion: with the app running there is an established TCP connection from msedgewebview2 to the data plane port, so WebView2 launched, navigated to the loopback page, executed terminal.js, and completed the WebSocket handshake against the real token and origin checks. Linux remains unproven and the package's own release notes now corroborate the concern -- Linux uses a WPE backend, and it ships a NativeWebDialog described as useful where embedded WebViews may be unavailable. Two bugs found by building it, both of which would have shipped: - ShellStream.Write buffers and needs an explicit Flush. Without one a keystroke is accepted, reported as written, and never reaches the remote: the terminal displays output perfectly and simply stops responding to input. SSH.NET's own WriteLine flushes, which is why the earlier spike never hit it. Found by isolating the pump against real SSH and reading BytesRead=51 -- banner and prompt through, nothing after. - The Windows app manifest needs a supportedOS list, or Avalonia's native control host fails outright and the terminal never starts. Also fixed a genuinely flaky test I happened to catch: SyncCursorTests tampered with the *last* base64url character, whose low bits the decoder ignores when the input length is not a multiple of three -- so a tampered cursor sometimes decoded to identical bytes and verified. It failed roughly one run in thirty, depending on a random key. Now tampers the penultimate character, which is fully significant at every length; 40 consecutive runs are clean. xterm 6.0.0 plus the fit and webgl addons are vendored as UMD bundles rather than built with npm, so a clean clone needs only the .NET SDK. Provenance and licences are recorded next to them, along with the UMD global names terminal.js depends on -- a bundle that switched to ES modules would load without error and leave Terminal undefined. The renderer acknowledges output from term.write's completion callback, not on receipt. Acknowledging early would return flow-control credit for bytes the screen has not caught up with, which is the one thing the credit window exists to measure. TerminalWorkspace moved into DodoSSH.Client.Terminal: it has no Avalonia dependency, and having it there is what let the end-to-end test exist at all. 404 tests pass, zero warnings on a clean rebuild, format clean. |
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jaap-jan
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885fb17bdc |
Clear the SSH gate: window-change reaches the remote, and licence as MIT
Licence is MIT, set solution-wide rather than only on the packable project: DodoSSH.Contracts is published so clients can build against it, and a package with no licence expression is one a corporate policy scanner rejects outright. The SSH.NET spike is the M1 client gate and it passes. SSH.NET 2025.1.0 exposes ShellStream.ChangeWindowSize, but a method existing is not the remote observing it, so the tests read `stty size` back from a real sshd after resizing rather than asserting the call did not throw. Repeated resizes each take effect too, which matters because dragging a window edge produces a stream of them. The IChannelSession fallback is not needed. Also verified against a real sshd: password and public-key auth, that the host key arrives as a raw blob we can fingerprint ourselves rather than reading SSH.NET's MD5 property, and that refusing the key via CanTrust actually aborts the connection -- without which the TOFU dialog would be decoration. Kept as a permanent suite, not deleted after the spike. An upgrade that silently stopped sending the request would present as wrapped output only after a resize, which is easy to misattribute to the terminal emulator. Two bugs in the test itself, both worth naming because either would have been read as "resize does not work": - A PTY emits CRLF, and the anchored regex rejected the CR. The output visibly contained `24 80` while the match failed. - Each read can begin with output still buffered from the previous command, including its size line. Taking the first match would have reported the pre-resize size. platform-flags.md now records window-change as resolved rather than unverified -- a stale flag is worse than none -- plus the three real SSH.NET limits found on the way: ShellStream does not override ReadAsync so every idle session parks a pool thread, one connection cannot serve both SshClient and SftpClient, and agent forwarding needs an upstream change. |
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jaap-jan
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b7325b78ca |
Record the platform flags that were only in conversation
Development and testing are Windows-only, so anything unverified elsewhere needs to be written down or it gets assumed to work. Several of these have already cost time once: PostgreSQL 18 moving its data directory silently gives a carried-over compose file an empty volume, and a loopback-bound Tomcat beat Docker's 0.0.0.0 publish for `localhost`, making every Keycloak realm 404 while the container looked healthy. The largest entry is the Avalonia WebView on Linux, which remains the biggest risk in the plan and is why the terminal sits behind ITerminalHost. Also records two things this milestone deliberately left undone -- no rate limiting on the enrollment and sync write paths until M2, and /me not touching last_seen_at_utc -- so neither reads later as an oversight. |
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jaap-jan
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a628762cd1 |
Add /me and enrollment with the identity-provider key binding (M1)
The last backend piece of M1. A client can now log in, discover it must enroll, publish its identity key, and get a usable personal vault. Enrollment is one indivisible act. One transaction writes the key, its wraps, the device, the key log entry, the vault and the vault key grant, because none of them is useful alone: a key with no vault leaves a user unable to store anything, and a vault with no grant is a container nobody can ever open -- including its owner, since only the client can wrap the key and it has already moved on. Two independent checks run, and neither substitutes for the other. The Ed25519 self-signature proves possession of the private key. The identity-provider binding proves whose key it is: the client hashed its statement, used the hash as an OIDC nonce, and the resulting ID token is the provider's signature over exactly those public keys. This server cannot mint that signature, so it cannot invent a key for a user who never enrolled -- which is the attack that would otherwise let an operator read every vault by publishing its own key as yours. The binding token is stored verbatim, not just summarised. Clients must repeat the check against the provider's JWKS fetched directly, and storing only our conclusion would ask them to trust the server about the one question the design exists to avoid trusting it about. Key log appends take a deployment-wide advisory lock. The falsification matters more than the passing test: with the lock removed, Enroll_ConcurrentEnrollmentsByDifferentUsers_LeaveAnUnbrokenChain fails with entry 11 linked to the wrong predecessor. Different users trip no unique index, so without serialising they all read the same head and the chain forks -- indistinguishable from the key substitution the log exists to make detectable, and permanent, because the log is append-only. Enrollment is idempotent. Vault ids and keys are client-chosen, so a client whose response was lost re-sends the identical body and gets the identical result. Without that, a lost response leaves a user enrolled against a vault they never learned the id of. Contract change, breaking the v0.1 freeze deliberately. EnrollmentRequest had DevicePublicKey but no wrap to go with it, which is unsatisfiable: only the holder of the secret bundle can seal it, so the server could never fill the gap. Added DeviceWrappedPrivateKey, and PersonalVault so enrollment can be atomic rather than leaving an unopenable vault behind two endpoints that do not exist yet. No client exists and no package is published, which is exactly when PublicAPI.Unshipped.txt expects this. Sync now requires the Enrolled policy, which until now was a stub whose name promised a check it never made. The sync denial tests use enrolled intruders instead of unenrolled ones -- an unenrolled caller is stopped before the vault check runs, which would have left those tests passing without exercising the thing they exist to prove. Also fixed: omitting kdfParameters from the JSON body was a 500. A record's non-nullable parameters are a compile-time promise, not a runtime one. 268 tests pass, zero warnings on a clean rebuild, format clean. |
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jaap-jan
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ce43f397a6 |
Add ADRs 0001-0006 and README (M0)
Records the decisions the milestone plan already made, with their costs stated rather than only their benefits: - 0001 e2ee-trust-model: key hierarchy, the AAD-to-row binding that stops the server moving ciphertext between rows, and the four-layer public-key trust story. States plainly that revocation is not retroactive, that Connect cannot be a security boundary, and that the IdP becomes a key-distribution trust root. - 0002 minimal-apis: feature modules with explicit registration; capability negotiation instead of Asp.Versioning, since client and server upgrade independently when self-hosted. - 0003 sync-protocol: single write path, revision cursors, and the bigserial pre-commit sequence gap that silently corrupts sync — plus the per-vault advisory lock that fixes it and the test that must prove it. - 0004 relay-authorization: relay forwards bytes rather than terminating SSH, so zero-knowledge survives; server-resolved target IPs in the ticket to defeat DNS rebinding; why host addresses must be plaintext when relay is enabled. - 0005 no-application-layer: why the usual Application/mediator layer earns nothing here, with the trigger that would make us revisit it. - 0006 observability-stack: OTel plus built-in ILogger; liveness excludes dependencies so a database blip cannot restart the container and kill live SSH sessions. Also adds a README covering layout, build, enforced conventions and milestones. |