Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jaap-jan e3fd3e1728 Sync and authenticate with SSH keys on the client
Completes the client half of SSH keys: they sync alongside hosts, appear in
their own list, and can be selected to authenticate a connection instead of
typing a password.

The reconciler and the repository were Host-typed throughout, so the choice was
to generalise them or to keep a second copy per item type. Generalised, because
ItemReconciler's whole premise is that the pull and the push paths must answer
the same collision the same way — two copies would drift the first time one of
them was fixed. What is genuinely per-type now arrives through
IItemKind<TSecret>: the cipher, the merge, the plaintext columns, and the noun
to use when telling a person what happened to their item. Generic where the
server's IItemKind is not, and for the reason that reverses there — the client
needs the concrete type, because it merges field by field.

The pull filter is derived from the same registry that builds the reconcilers.
That is the specific failure being designed out: an item type that encrypts,
merges and lists perfectly and is never once requested from the server, so it
works on the machine that made it and exists nowhere else.

No client cache migration. The item table's primary key and the outbox's unique
index already carry the entity type, and AadResourceTypes already mapped SshKey
— so a host and a key may share an id and never see each other's rows, which
SshKeySyncTests now arranges deliberately.

A key hands the server nothing in plaintext. There is a public_key_fingerprint
column and it would be accepted; leaving it null is deliberate. A fingerprint is
not secret but it is a stable identifier for a key pair, so filling it would let
an operator tell which of their users hold the same key and correlate one across
vaults, for a column nothing reads. The design allows itself one plaintext
concession — the relay address, which the relay cannot work without — and this
is not that.

A key is chosen per connection rather than bound to a host, which works the way
ssh -i does. Binding one needs a field on HostSecret and therefore a payload
schema bump, which makes every host written afterwards read-only on an older
build; worth doing deliberately rather than as a side effect of adding keys.

Three things this found, all of them by being falsified rather than by review:

- Making the reconciler generic silently turned a record comparison into
  reference equality, because == on a type parameter is not value equality. The
  effect would have been a conflict recorded on every pass for an unacknowledged
  create that had in fact landed. Sabotaging the fix left all 73 tests passing —
  nothing covered that branch — so ConflictMatrixTests now has
  AnUnacknowledgedCreateThatDidLand_IsDroppedQuietly, which fails without it.

- A test asserting that a blank passphrase reaches SSH.NET as null was vacuous:
  it exercised the editor, not the credential path, and passed with the guard
  deleted. Resolved by making SshKeySecret.Passphrase normalise an empty string
  to null, so there is one spelling of one state — which also keeps two clients
  from producing different payload bytes for an identical key. That exposed a
  wider gap: SshKeySecret, its codec and its merge had no direct unit tests at
  all. They have 25 now.

- The reason first given for that normalisation was false. It claimed SSH.NET
  rejects a passphrase supplied for an unprotected key; measured against a real
  sshd it ignores it and authenticates anyway. Corrected everywhere it was
  stated and recorded in docs/platform-flags.md. The same test file also closes
  a real hole: SshPrivateKeyCredential had never been exercised against a
  server, because the existing key test builds SSH.NET's auth method directly
  and bypasses the path a vault-held key actually takes.

Only one editor may be open at a time. Both sit in the same 340-pixel column as
Auto rows and their heights together exceed it at the window's minimum size, so
two open editors put the lower one's Save and Cancel past the bottom edge — the
same failure this window already shipped once with the setup screens. Expressed
as a state rule because that is the only form of it this repository can check:
nothing here loads a .axaml. The refusal keeps what was typed, since in the key
editor that is a pasted private key the user may have nowhere else.

The end-to-end slice now carries a key as well as a host, so both item types go
through the real API, the real PostgreSQL and the real crypto in one pass — the
three hand-kept mappings between enums that do not line up are the reason that
is worth doing rather than trusting the unit suites.

735 tests green, including the container-backed SSH and end-to-end suites. Zero
warnings, dotnet format clean.
2026-07-29 20:27:23 +02:00
jaap-jan c6fc19bbbd Sync the vault automatically instead of only on a button press
Three triggers: once when the vault opens, straight after any local change,
and every minute while it stays open. The Sync button stays, because someone
just handed a credential wants to know now rather than within the minute, but
nothing depends on it being pressed any more.

A background pass is deliberately not the button's code path. Routing it
through RunAsync would raise the busy flag every minute — disabling Connect
and Save for the duration — and repaint the status line over whatever the user
was reading. So it is quiet: the status changes only when a pass actually
moved an item or produced something needing attention, and a pass is skipped
outright while a command is running rather than queueing behind it. Both
guards are covered; removing either fails a test.

A shared semaphore serialises every pass, taken with a zero timeout rather
than awaited — a pass arriving while another runs has nothing to add by
waiting, and queueing them would turn a slow server into a backlog of
identical work.

Failures are swallowed, which is right in exactly this one place: a laptop
closed all afternoon would otherwise replace the status line with a socket
error once a minute. It is quiet rather than hidden — the account bar already
shows when there is no connection, and pressing Sync reports the real reason.
What earns that is the outbox: a test proves a change left queued by a failed
pass is still sent by the next sync, so quiet never means lost.

Two existing tests asserted the opposite behaviour — that a save queued and
pushed nothing until Sync was pressed — and were rewritten rather than
deleted; the local-first guarantee they were really protecting is that the
list updates with no server, which the offline test still covers.

Two things the tests caught in my own work. ReloadAsync had to be split out
of LoadAsync because rebuilding the list repainted the status line
unconditionally, which made "the background pass is quiet" false on the one
path that mattered. And the yields-to-a-command test was vacuous as first
written: saving pushes, so there was no pending change left and the assertion
held with the guard deleted. It now fails the automatic push first to arrange
a real queue.
2026-07-29 14:53:19 +02:00
jaap-jan 49f617b450 Wire the Avalonia shell to the vault
The host list now comes from the vault instead of from a form. A fresh
machine takes a server URL, signs in through the browser, enrolls, and
from then on opens with the passphrase alone.

DodoSSH.Client.Session is the composition layer: where a profile lives,
how it unlocks, and how a machine gets one. ClientPaths picks a
non-roaming per-OS directory — %LOCALAPPDATA% and never %APPDATA%,
because a SQLite cache that roams between two machines is a corrupt one,
and each machine's outbox is its own. SessionOpener needs no transport at
all and could not reach one if it wanted to; that is the offline unlock,
asserted rather than asserted about. A wrong passphrase, a stale KDF and a
grant revoked by a rekey are three different answers, because the remedies
are three different things and telling someone to retype a passphrase that
was never the problem is worse than saying nothing.

The shell's states are the onboarding story. The recovery code gets its
own state that cannot be clicked past: it exists for one moment, losing it
with the passphrase loses the vault, and there is no server-side reset by
design. It is dropped from memory on confirmation rather than merely
hidden.

Sign-in is a delegate over IVaultServer, so the whole state machine runs
in a test against an in-memory server — no browser, no identity provider,
no toolkit. The view models are plain observable objects, which is what
makes that possible. What it does not cover is whether the XAML binds to
the right names; that needs a rendered tree and Avalonia.Headless, and is
its own piece of work.

Three things found by doing it rather than by reading it:

- Pooled SQLite connections keep the database file open after the last
  context is disposed. On Windows that means locked, so the application
  could never replace its own cache — and a test could not clean up after
  itself, which is how it surfaced. Dispose now clears the pool.
- EF's SQLite provider puts the database in WAL mode, so the cache is
  three files. A comment in ClientCacheFactory claimed the opposite;
  reading PRAGMA journal_mode off a real launch settled it. WAL is the
  right mode here — a sync pass writes while the interface reads — so the
  comment was wrong on the merits as well as on the fact.
- Enrolling a device key with nowhere to keep the private half would put a
  wrap on the server nobody can open and make the device list claim this
  machine can unlock without a passphrase. Device binding is now optional
  and the shell declines it until the OS keystore is wired.

Verified on Windows: the client created %LOCALAPPDATA%\DodoSSH\cache.db
and migrated it on first launch, and msedgewebview2 held an established
connection to the data plane while the unlock overlay covered it — which
is the point of covering the WebView rather than collapsing it, since a
NativeWebView that is never laid out is never realised.

630 tests, up from 593. The recovery-code gate and the offline unlock were
each verified by breaking them and watching the right test fail.

Still to do for M1's actual definition of done: the manual run against the
real API and a real Keycloak. Credentials are not a synced entity type
yet, so a connection still asks for a password, and the interface says so
rather than implying otherwise.
2026-07-29 11:02:19 +02:00