f1d6499bb507129a4abc0c424ea9ee90a833b298
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jaap-jan
|
185790fb14 |
Let a key move to another vault, and ask whether it goes with the host
Keys sync and keys are shared: SshKey is in the sync registry on both sides, the material rides in the sealed payload, and every generation of the vault key is wrapped to a new member. What was missing was the way in. Hosts and groups could move between vaults and keychain items could not, so a key typed into a personal vault before the team existed stayed there for good — and moving a host into the team's vault left it authenticating with something nobody else in that vault can read. The code said so and could do nothing about it: "the answer is usually to put a copy of that key in the destination vault", which meant pasting the private half into a second item and deleting the first. A private key on a clipboard, and two items nobody can tell apart afterwards. MoveAsync already existed on the generic repository and is now exposed for keys and passwords as it is for hosts and groups. What had to be built around it is the re-aim. An item re-sealed under another vault's key lands with an id of that vault's making, so every host bound to the old one and every group lending it as a default is left naming a tombstone — and a host bound to something its vault no longer holds refuses to connect rather than falling back to a typed password. A move without the re-aim would look like a success and break every machine on that key. It runs over every vault this session can write to, because a binding resolves across all of them, and it counts what it could not rewrite: an item from a newer client, or one in a vault this account may only read. Those are said in the sentence afterwards rather than swallowed. The host's move asks the question rather than deciding it. A binding resolves across vaults, so the moved host goes on working for the person who moved it whichever way this is answered; it is the colleagues they have just joined who hold one vault's key and cannot connect with a host whose key stayed behind. Unticked, and it stays that way on purpose: moving a key into a team's vault hands it to everybody holding that key, and this design does not default anybody into a disclosure. Under the box is the count of everything else that authenticates with that key, because a key twenty machines use is a different decision from one nothing else touches, and neither number is visible from the panel otherwise. The question is answered against the vault in the picker, so choosing a different destination re-asks it and a key already in the destination offers nothing. One thing fixed on the way. A host that inherited its key from its group arrived in the destination naming nothing at all — the group belongs to the vault it left — so a machine that connected before the move refused after it, with no sentence anywhere saying why. The resolved binding is now written onto the host as it crosses, and the stranded-binding warning reads the resolved binding too, which is the case where somebody is least likely to know a key is involved. MOVE is on both heads, for keys and passwords only: a tag, a bucket and a pin are read from the active vault alone, so "another vault" is not a question any of them has. Four tests cover the move and its re-aim, the host's move with the key brought and without it, and the inherited binding. |
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|
jaap-jan
|
8707629a6c |
Make the vault the thing you share, and ask a host which one it lives in
The teams screen listed teams that owned vaults, so sharing four servers with two
colleagues meant creating a team, then a vault inside it, then wrapping a key.
Two of those three steps are about a concept nobody arrives wanting. The screen
now lists vaults: naming one creates the membership list that carries it, named
after the vault and owned by you, and members, invitations, roles, hand-over and
key holders all hang off the vault they apply to.
Nothing on the server moved. VaultAccessService still resolves a shared vault
through team_membership and every membership call still names a team id — what
went is the requirement that anybody make one. The split the whole design rests
on is untouched and is still what the screen is built around: adding somebody
authorises the server to serve them, and only a machine holding the key can make
the vault readable. ADR 0009 keeps its decision and gains an addendum recording
which half of it a person is now asked about.
The one place the team resurfaces is a membership list carrying several vaults,
which this screen cannot produce and does not hide: the members section says so,
because "adding somebody here adds them there" is precisely the fact a
vault-shaped screen is in a position to conceal.
Two things left the interface and one arrived. Creating a team is gone, and so is
archiving one — it was only ever possible for a team owning no vaults, and a
screen whose rows are vaults has no row for one, so the button would have been
unreachable or always refused. The endpoint is unchanged and the screen states
the limit instead, since a vault cannot be deleted at all. The exception is a
create whose second call failed: cancelling that form archives the membership
list it left behind, which is a deliberate departure from this client's rule
against tidying up on the user's behalf, made because nothing else can reach it.
What arrived is PUT /api/v1/vaults/{id}. Without it the screen loses its only
editing action, since renaming the team behind a vault is invisible to everybody
who was never shown the team. It is gated on PermissionFlags.Admin — the line
UpdateTeamEndpoint already draws, because a name is what everybody in the vault
sees it called rather than part of its contents — and it renames the owning team
with it when that team carries nothing else, so the row an operator reads and the
name a user says cannot drift apart. The slug never moves, for the reason it does
not move on a team rename. The session edits its cached vault row rather than
replacing it with the response, which deliberately carries no wrapped key.
The host editor now asks which vault a host goes into, beside the name, while
adding and only where there is more than one vault to write to. It is a second
picker rather than the keychain screen's reused, and the two selections are
separate on purpose: that one is a standing preference about where new items go,
this is a field of the host in front of you, and binding both to one selection
would mean a click on the other screen could move a half-typed host. An existing
host is not offered it at all rather than offered it disabled — the two vaults
are encrypted under different keys, so moving an item is a delete and a retype.
That forced a fix worth naming. The group picker was built from the active
vault's groups whatever vault the host was being filed into, so a host put in a
shared vault could be filed under a group only its author can resolve — a
colleague would see it filed under nothing, which is the quietest kind of wrong.
Groups are now kept per vault and the picker follows the vault choice.
Two renames, because the pair they would otherwise have made is a bug farm:
ShellScreen.Vault became Keychain and VaultScreen became KeychainScreen, which is
what the rail has always labelled that screen, leaving Vault for one vault's
contents and Vaults for the vaults themselves. The enum values are unchanged;
NavRail.axaml writes them as x:Static literals.
1536 tests pass, seven more than before. Five are new on the server — the rename
endpoint's success, the team it does and does not take with it, the two refusals
and the empty name — and the client suite gains six and folds four together,
having lost the two about archiving a team.
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