The Android head from docs/android-port.md, taken as far as its step 6.
Step 3, the spike, is answered and its throwaway screen is gone: libsodium.so and
libe_sqlite3.so are both in the arm64 APK, so NSec resolves its native half on Android
despite shipping no Android build, and the local cache opens. Two findings the audit
could not have had: Avalonia.Controls.WebView only ships net10.0-android36.0, which
settles the open "which Android versions" question at targetSdk 36; and Android has
blocked cleartext HTTP since API 28, so the terminal renderer needs a network security
config scoped to 127.0.0.1 or the WebView loads nothing.
DodoSSH.Client.Shell is new and is why the phone can exist: the view models, the terminal
renderer files and the palette moved there so both heads drive one state machine and draw
from one set of tokens. The desktop head is otherwise untouched and its 144 tests still
pass.
The platform pieces behind interfaces that already existed: the profile directory from
filesDir, a device key wrapped by a StrongBox-backed key that a fingerprint releases, and
a foreground service so a shell outliving a vault lock stays true on a platform that
stops backgrounded processes.
Sign-in is deliberately absent rather than approximated. It needs an app link, because
reusing the desktop loopback listener is the attack RFC 8252 section 8.3 names.
Three things a machine that has been set up could not do. Unlock now takes
Enter, which is the gesture everybody makes after typing a password and which
did nothing until they found the button.
Signing in survives a relaunch. The refresh token is kept in the local cache,
sealed under the vault's own cache key, so a later launch resumes the session
through the refresh grant with no browser and nobody present โ and because it
is sealed under that key, only an unlocked vault can resume it. A locked
client therefore cannot reach the server at all, which is a consequence worth
stating rather than working around; docs/crypto.md ยง3.2 records it. Every sync
pass asks the shell for a connection rather than reading one captured at
unlock, so a laptop that unlocked on a train is online within a minute of
finding a network, with nothing pressed. Unlocking itself still never waits on
a socket.
Signing out empties this machine: the profile, the cached items, the outbox
and this machine's device key, with the account's row withdrawn when the
server can be reached. It asks first and says what it costs โ the outbox count
when the vault is open, an admission that it cannot be counted when it is not,
and the shells that keep running either way. The vault is on the server and is
untouched, which is what makes the same button the only honest answer to a
forgotten passphrase, so it is on the unlock screen as well as in preferences.
It cannot end the session at the identity provider, and says so.
Two defects surfaced on the way. The synchronisation pass that runs when the
vault opens never ran at all: the loop is started from inside the unlock
command, so the busy flag it yields to was raised by that command โ the first
sync was a minute late on every launch. And signing in from preferences while
unlocked threw an unlock screen over an open vault whose keys were still in
memory.
The unlock card and the new confirmation live in their own controls because
MainWindow cannot be laid out headless, so markup left inside it is markup no
test can measure; both are now measured at the window's minimum size in the
shapes that grow. What is still unverified is the composed window itself.
jaap-jan