nightly
6
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jaap-jan
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766fe6aebe |
Stop the test sshd penalising the suite for its own host-key refusals
The SSH suite has failed intermittently for months with SshConnectionException "The connection was closed by the remote host", within milliseconds, on whichever class happened to be running. Two previous attempts guessed at the cause and said so honestly; this one has a mechanism and a before/after. ◆ THE CAUSE IS PerSourcePenalties, WHICH THIS SUITE PROVOKES BY DESIGN. OpenSSH 9.8 added per-source penalties and 10.x enables them by default; the image runs 10.3 and its config never mentions the keyword, so the compiled-in default was what ran. A source address that repeatedly disconnects without attempting authentication gets penalised, and while the penalty holds every connection from it is answered with the clear-text line "Not allowed at this time" and then closed. That is exactly the traffic this suite generates. This client's first contact with an unknown host is a connection deliberately refused at the host key — a disconnect with no authentication attempt — so every helper that learns a host key by being turned away first, plus RefusingTheHostKey_AbortsTheConnection and AnUntrustedHost_IsRefusedExactlyAsAShellWouldBe, feeds the penalty counter. Enough of them close together and sshd stops talking to the test host for a while, then starts again. Measured on a fresh container, probing 200 times with connections of that shape: with the image default, the first refusal came back at probe 18 and 183 of the 200 were refused. With PerSourcePenalties no, none of 200 were. That is the before/after the earlier attempts could not produce. It also explains the shape of the failure, which never fitted a throttle. The class that failed lost EVERY connection it made rather than a random few — including the one test that expects a refusal, which passed throughout for the wrong reason — while the classes around it were untouched. That is a window in which the server refuses one source, not a probabilistic drop. Both earlier diagnoses are recorded in the fixture so they are not tried again. MaxStartups was blamed on the reasoning that xUnit runs test classes in parallel, so ten unauthenticated connections would be in flight at once; but every class touching this server shares one collection and xUnit parallelises collections, not classes, so they run one after another and never have more than a connection or two open. The reload window was blamed next, and a wait for the banner was written and removed as unproven — it was unproven because the banner answers perfectly right up until the penalty lands, so a check that stopped at the first "SSH-" ran entirely inside the good part. MaxStartups is kept, on the narrower argument that it is right regardless: a connection throttle is hardening a test server has no business reproducing. Removing it would be a second change riding along with this one. The readiness gate that replaces the reconfigure's silence is a guard rather than a wait. It requires 25 connections answered back to back, which is the specific provocation rather than a soak test: 25 is above the measured threshold of 18 on purpose, and it costs under a second when the setting is off. Ten was tried first and was worse than useless — it sits below the threshold, so it passed against a server that was still penalising. With the fix removed the gate now fails in a minute naming PerSourcePenalties and quoting the server's own "Not allowed at this time", instead of the suite failing later somewhere unrelated. The gate also closes a hole the container's own readiness cannot: a log line and netstat showing :2222 both pass on a container whose sshd has gone, because Docker publishes the port with a host-side proxy that accepts before it has anything to forward to. It is probed from the host rather than with docker exec for the same reason it matters — that is the path the tests take, and penalties are counted per source address. Rejected: patching sshd_config from /custom-cont-init.d to avoid the reload entirely. It looks like the right hook and is not — the container's log puts "sshd is listening on port 2222" before "[custom-init] Files found, executing", so a script there edits a file the running server has already read. It leaves a config that greps correctly and a server behaving as though it were never touched, which is the same trap as patching the wrong one of the image's two config files. Twenty-eight tests failed before that was noticed; the finding is in the fixture. Four consecutive full-solution runs clean, and the SSH suite green on every run since. 1,861 tests, none failing. |
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jaap-jan
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e41eca01a8 |
Stop the SSH suite's server refusing connections at random
The suite fails intermittently with SshConnectionException "The connection was closed by the remote host", within tens of milliseconds, on whichever test happens to connect first. It has been seen in CI and reproduces locally. This raises sshd's MaxStartups in the fixture, which is the most likely cause and is worth doing regardless. sshd's compiled-in default is 10:30:100: past ten unauthenticated connections in flight it refuses new ones at random, thirty percent of the time, rising to always at a hundred. The image ships the line commented out, so that default was what ran. xUnit runs test classes in parallel and most of the classes here open a connection, so ten in flight is reachable during the opening seconds — and a refusal presents to the client exactly as observed, because a dropped connection and a server that never answered are indistinguishable from that end. ◆ IT IS A MITIGATION AND NOT A DEMONSTRATED CURE, AND THE COMMENT SAYS SO. The flake rate could not be measured. On the Windows development machine the identical unmodified suite ran 85/85 clean and, an hour later, failed 13 runs out of 15; a Linux container gave 30/30 clean and then failed on the first run of the next batch. Docker throughput on that host swings far enough to swamp the effect, so every before/after comparison taken there was noise — including two that were briefly believed. It is committed on the narrower argument that it is right either way. A connection throttle is hardening this suite has no interest in reproducing: it exists to test an SSH client, not to survive a rate limit, and a test server that drops connections at random is a bad test server whether or not it is the cause of this particular flake. The other candidate was the reload window — pkill returns when SIGHUP is delivered, not when sshd has finished closing its listeners and re-execing, so a connection immediately afterwards can be refused the same way. A wait that required three consecutive banner reads before returning was written and then removed: it could not be shown to change anything either, and a fixture carrying two unproven fixes for one symptom is worse than one, because the next person has to disprove both. Both candidates, and how to tell them apart with sshd's own log, are recorded in the fixture and in docs/platform-flags.md. |
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jaap-jan
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82966af37b |
Let a connection be reached through a proxy on this machine's loopback
Step 1 of docs/reaching-a-host-you-cannot-dial.md, and it is not the step that document said it was. SshConnectionRequest carries an optional SshLoopbackProxy and BuildConnectionInfo hands SSH.NET its proxy ConnectionInfo when there is one. Nothing passes one yet: the callers are jump hosts and the relay, which are steps 2 and 3. ◆ THE BRIDGE WAS THE WRONG FIRST STEP, AND BUILDING IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE MISTAKE THIS DOCUMENT IS ABOUT. ADR 0004 says the relay's loopback bridge "also provides ProxyJump via a SOCKS5 dynamic forward — one mechanism, two features", and the plan took that to mean the bridge was the shared foundation. It is not: ForwardedPortDynamic *is* the listener for a jump host — SSH.NET accepts on it, speaks SOCKS5 on it and tunnels through the bastion — so nothing is left for a bridge of ours to do on that path. The relay is the case with no SshClient to hang a forward off, so it is the bridge's only consumer, and the bridge belongs in the commit that uses it. What the two actually share is one level down and a tenth of the size: being told to reach a target through a loopback proxy while staying about the target. That is what this is. Three properties, one test each. A port and nothing else, so a proxy anywhere but loopback cannot be expressed. The failure that shape rules out is an open SOCKS proxy on the user's network for the life of a shell, which nothing would report — so it is made unrepresentable rather than validated, on the same grounds AuthenticationChoice carries a kind. SOCKS5 rather than a dumb pipe, which is what keeps host key pinning honest. The target's own name and port stay in the request, travel to the proxy in the CONNECT, and are what the gate pins — so a machine reached through a bastion is pinned under its own name instead of under 127.0.0.1 on whatever ephemeral port that day's forward got, which is not an identity at all. A pipe would have meant handing SSH.NET a stand-in and remembering everywhere else that it was one. And a proxy that is not listening fails as a connection error rather than as an unknown host key. The gate turns "no host key seen" into a fingerprint prompt, and a connection that never reached a server has seen none either; the prompt would offer to fix the wrong thing, with no fingerprint to show. TWO THINGS THE TESTS MEASURED RATHER THAN ASSUMED, both found by the first run failing. The target is resolved at the *bastion*, not here — a SOCKS CONNECT names it and the far end looks it up. So the test asks for localhost:2222, the address inside the container, and the published port this host would use means nothing there. That is not a quirk of the fixture; it is what ProxyJump means, and it is why an ssh_config writes the target's internal address beside its jump host. Getting it wrong is a SOCKS "general failure" that names neither end. And the test server refuses forwarding. linuxserver/openssh-server ships AllowTcpForwarding no, which a dynamic forward does not notice — opening one asks the server nothing — so every connection through it is refused at channel-open and reported as the same general failure. The fixture patches it and HUPs sshd. There are two sshd_config files in that image and the running server uses /config/sshd/sshd_config; the first attempt patched /etc/ssh/sshd_config, which is the one a search finds first, changed the text and nothing else, and left the failure exactly where it was. VERIFIED. Build clean with no new warnings, 85 tests in Client.Ssh.Tests against the real sshd, and the solution builds. The proxy test was seen to fail — proxy.Port + 1 in BuildConnectionInfo — and seen green again. An earlier mutation attempt did not compile, and the log said 85 passing because the run never started and the previous log was still on disk; the second attempt deletes the log first, which is worth copying whenever a mutation "passes". dotnet format reports one pre-existing IDE1006 in DodoSSH.Api/Features/Events/EventsEndpoint.cs, in a project nothing here touches. Left alone. |
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jaap-jan
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d07b336868 |
Free the terminal from the Hosts screen, and fill the room it left
The WebView sat inside the Hosts grid, so navigating to Files or the keychain hid every open terminal and the strip that named them. A connection you had opened was invisible from four of the five screens. The window now has two surfaces rather than one: a nav rail that says which page you are on, and a terminal strip that is always there and switches the whole content area to a shell. Screen keeps meaning "which page" and never becomes a sixth kind of page, which is why this is two properties instead of one enum with a terminal member in it. Every screen lives inside one wrapper panel that collapses when a terminal is showing. That is not tidiness — the WebView hosts a Win32 child window that composites above everything Avalonia draws, so a screen left visible over its rectangle is a screen sliced in half, and this window has shipped that defect once already. One decision point, IsTerminalShowing, and a nested panel rather than five compound bindings nobody would remember to extend. The focus choreography is the part no test in this repo can see. Every reveal path now focuses in the same turn the WebView appeared, so all three of them post at DispatcherPriority.Loaded and let the native control re-push its bounds first. Going the other way had a real bug: the screen-changed branch called a bare Focus() where it had to release the keyboard from the native child, so switching from a terminal to Files silently ate the first keystrokes. Rare before this commit and the primary gesture after it. The tab strip grew a cross inside each tab, a plus that opens the quick-connect palette, and middle-click close. Nested buttons are correct here: Avalonia handles a left press on the cross and deliberately does not handle other buttons, which is exactly what lets middle-click bubble up from the cross as well as the tab. The test is PointerUpdateKind rather than IsMiddleButtonPressed, because the latter reports button state and is also true for a left press made while the middle button happens to be held. The handler is on the tab and not the strip, so the background closes nothing by construction. Plus opens the palette rather than a flyout, since a menu dropping into the WebView's rectangle may or may not composite above a child HWND and this repo does not make rendering claims it has not photographed. Everything a user reads now says keychain. The wire, the database and the cryptographic spec still say vault, deliberately: renaming those is a migration and a protocol change for a word. That split is written down rather than left to be rediscovered as an inconsistency. Four things that were squeezed into the keychain's category rail, or into nothing at all, now have screens. Pinned host keys get one, with fingerprints never truncated and a filter that matches them, because comparing what you have against what the operator published is the whole workflow; the approved date is read out of the item's UUIDv7 rather than added as a column, and says so, since it means first approval and not last use. Keys can be generated in the client, which needed the openssh-key-v1 container written by hand — there is no BCL or NSec helper, and the PKCS#8 route is unverified in the SSH library this uses. The armour carries no passphrase: encrypting it needs bcrypt_pbkdf, which is Blowfish with a swizzle, in a project whose crypto is otherwise entirely libsodium, for a protection the key's own remarks argue is redundant inside a vault. Generation fills the existing editor and stops, so SAVE stays the one thing that writes. ~/.ssh/config can be imported behind a preview that is ticked per row and writes nothing until the button; IdentityFile records the path and imports the key material only on an explicit opt-in, because reading somebody's private key into a vault is precisely the act this product exists to make deliberate. Match blocks and ProxyJump are reported rather than obeyed — one cannot be evaluated statically and the other has nothing behind it to route with, and a preview that implied otherwise would be worse than one that admits it. Files can be dragged in all four directions that are honestly available. Remote to Explorer does not ship and is not pretended to: the shell wants the bytes during the drop, which needs a virtual file and a native COM data object, outside what Avalonia offers. Note for the next person that Avalonia 12 replaced the drag model outright — DataObject and DataFormats are no-op stubs and IDataObject is not in the reference assembly, so every tutorial written for 11 does not compile here. Hosts can be grouped, flat and never nested. A parent id merged as a scalar lets two offline clients each re-parent A under B and B under A, producing a cycle inside an encrypted payload that no server can police and every reader would have to detect for ever. Membership lives in that payload rather than in the one plaintext concession ADR 0001 allows, whose test is that the relay cannot function without it — nothing on the server reads a group, so what plaintext would hand over is a clustering of the estate for nothing. The plaintext column reserved for it is dropped, provably always null, and the server now refuses a client that sends one; it was never populated, was copied on apply, and was not cleared on delete, so a group id would have outlived the host it described. Snippets insert through xterm rather than through the pump, because xterm is the only thing that knows whether the remote has bracketed paste on, and that is what makes a shell treat embedded newlines as text instead of as execute. The host process moves opaque bytes and never parses output, so it would have to guess, and guessing wrong runs every line. Running is off by default and the copy says the text goes into whatever is there — the terminal has no notion of being at a prompt, and may be in vi or at a password prompt with echo off, so the Enter the user presses themselves is the entire safety property. Connections and keychain changes are recorded as synced encrypted items, which is what makes them auditable by a team later and costs the server knowledge of connection rate and timing from row counts alone. ADR 0001 already concedes it cannot hide that class of metadata; the trade is now written into it rather than left implicit. A connection entry is written once, at close, which is what makes a synced log tractable: nothing to merge, one outbox row, no chance of colliding with itself. Live sessions come from memory, not from the log. The write is void by contract and posts to a bounded channel, because putting an encrypt-and-write on the teardown path of every session is how closing the application comes to take four seconds. A ticket opened before a lock still closes afterwards, since a shell outlives the vault. The activity log hooks the one generic repository every kind writes through, so it cannot miss a caller — which is also why the log kinds themselves declare they are not audited, or the first entry would write an entry about writing an entry. It records the names of the fields that changed and never their values; a log with an old password in it would be a plaintext credential store with no vault around it. Retention is 90 days or 5,000 entries, whichever bites first, pruned on the sync loop rather than on a second timer. That log traffic then broke the status line, which is worth recording because the fix is a shape and not a patch: background sync counted its own log rows as pushed items, so the quiet rule stopped being quiet and every action's message was overwritten a second later by a sync report. The report now separates log rows from user items and the rule reads the latter. S3 buckets appear as a remote in the file browser, behind the same interface an SFTP session implements, so the queue and both panes did not have to learn what they are talking to. Uploads go through a pipe, because the queue wants to write and the SDK wants to read; memory is then bounded by the part size instead of buffering a file to disk twice. Finally, the Windows device key store moved out of the session project, which was the one thing keeping it from being portable — everything else in it is platform-neutral, and a Windows CNG dependency in the middle of the vault code meant a second head could not reference it without dragging Windows along. The seam that made the move free was already there. docs/android-port.md is the audit behind that: what ports, what does not, in order of cost, the four decisions taken, and an inventory of every screen and state the interface has to carry, written so a design can be made from it directly. dotnet build, dotnet test and dotnet format --verify-no-changes are all clean: 1240 tests at zero warnings, including the end-to-end suite against real containers. The manual checks that headless Avalonia cannot make — the drag from Explorer, a generated key against a real host, twelve tabs at the minimum window width — are listed in docs/manual-checks.md and are still outstanding. |
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jaap-jan
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04faef6597 |
Move files to and from a host over SFTP
M2's file transfer, built bottom-up: an SFTP session on the SSH layer, a transfer queue in a project of its own, and the two-pane browser the design asked for replacing the screen that said it did not exist. Remote listings carry names, sizes, modification times and a real drwxr-xr-x — nothing in this repository could render a POSIX mode before — and the queue moves one file at a time with progress, throughput and resume. The design import assumed this would be an SFTP subsystem channel on ISshConnection, beside the shell on a transport that is already up. SSH.NET does not offer that: SftpClient derives from BaseClient and owns its own transport, and there is no supported way to hand it an SshClient's session. So file transfer opens a second authenticated connection, and it is named for that rather than dressed up as a channel — OpenSftpAsync is on ISftpSessionFactory, not on a connection. The difference is visible to a user: the host records a second login, and a host whose password is typed each time asks for it again on this screen. It goes through the same host key gate, the same pin and the same two refusals a shell does, so a fingerprint approved for a terminal is approved here and one approved here reaches the other machines with the next sync. docs/design-import-gaps.md is corrected, and marked as the one row where what shipped differs from what it predicted. Nothing is written at its final name until it is complete. Every transfer goes to a .dodossh-part file beside its destination and is renamed into place at the end, so an interrupted transfer can never be mistaken for a finished one — which matters most for what this screen is actually for, which is copying a build artefact onto a server and then running it. A destination that already exists is refused outright rather than overwritten: the queue has no way to ask, and silently replacing a file somebody's process is serving is the worse of the two failures. The remote pane has DELETE and MKDIR so that refusal is not a dead end. A test against the container pins the assumption underneath all of this — that SFTP's rename does not clobber. Resume works within a run of the application and not across a restart, and the limit is deliberate rather than unfinished. Nothing records which source wrote a part file, and resuming one on the strength of its name matching is how a corrupt artefact gets delivered with nothing reporting a failure; a part file found at startup is started over. Making it survive a restart needs the preferences store this client still has not got. The offset a resume starts at is the part file's own length rather than the transfer's recorded progress: a cancellation can land between a write completing and the counter moving, and only one of those two is a fact about the bytes that are there. The queue and its connection outlive a lock, as shells do. LockAsync already argues that locking must not destroy work in flight — it is what somebody does when they walk away from the machine, which is exactly when a long transfer is most likely to be running — so TransfersViewModel is created once and the vault is attached on unlock and detached on lock. What locking takes is the host list, and it has to: those rows carry decrypted secrets. DodoSSH.Client.Transfer is a new project rather than more of Client.Ssh. The two answer different questions — one is about reaching a host, the other about moving bytes and what to do when moving them stops halfway — and this is the only client project that deliberately touches the local filesystem. Three defects the tests found, none of which review would have. SftpPath.Name answered an empty string for the root. NavigateRemoteAsync wrapped itself in the busy guard, so navigating from inside another command did nothing at all and the remote pane simply stayed empty after connecting, with no failure anywhere to explain it. And opening an SFTP session per test made two handshakes per test — this client learns a host key by being refused — which pushed the SSH assembly past sshd's MaxStartups and failed a different few unrelated tests each run; the session is shared through the fixture now, with the reason written where the next person will hit it. 1004 tests green across 18 projects, 24 of them new: the SFTP subsystem against the OpenSSH container, the queue against a real temporary directory and a fake host, and three more layout measurements because a screen this window has never laid out is a screen never checked. Not verified: the screen has not been looked at running. The layout harness measures it at the window's minimum in three shapes, which is the class of defect that has shipped here before, but reaching it in the application needs the compose stack, the migrations, the API and a browser sign-in. What is still absent — the status bar's transfer count, dragging between the panes, transferring a directory, and sftp over a bastion — is in docs/design-import-gaps.md. |
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jaap-jan
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885fb17bdc |
Clear the SSH gate: window-change reaches the remote, and licence as MIT
Licence is MIT, set solution-wide rather than only on the packable project: DodoSSH.Contracts is published so clients can build against it, and a package with no licence expression is one a corporate policy scanner rejects outright. The SSH.NET spike is the M1 client gate and it passes. SSH.NET 2025.1.0 exposes ShellStream.ChangeWindowSize, but a method existing is not the remote observing it, so the tests read `stty size` back from a real sshd after resizing rather than asserting the call did not throw. Repeated resizes each take effect too, which matters because dragging a window edge produces a stream of them. The IChannelSession fallback is not needed. Also verified against a real sshd: password and public-key auth, that the host key arrives as a raw blob we can fingerprint ourselves rather than reading SSH.NET's MD5 property, and that refusing the key via CanTrust actually aborts the connection -- without which the TOFU dialog would be decoration. Kept as a permanent suite, not deleted after the spike. An upgrade that silently stopped sending the request would present as wrapped output only after a resize, which is easy to misattribute to the terminal emulator. Two bugs in the test itself, both worth naming because either would have been read as "resize does not work": - A PTY emits CRLF, and the anchored regex rejected the CR. The output visibly contained `24 80` while the match failed. - Each read can begin with output still buffered from the previous command, including its size line. Taking the first match would have reported the pre-resize size. platform-flags.md now records window-change as resolved rather than unverified -- a stale flag is worse than none -- plus the three real SSH.NET limits found on the way: ShellStream does not override ReadAsync so every idle session parks a pool thread, one connection cannot serve both SshClient and SftpClient, and agent forwarding needs an upstream change. |