using System.Security.Cryptography;
using DodoSSH.Client.App.Platform;
using DodoSSH.Client.Session;
using Tpm2Lib;
namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Tests;
///
/// The TPM-backed store, driven end to end against a software TPM.
///
///
///
/// This is the only device key store in the repository with real coverage, and the reason is worth
/// knowing. WindowsDeviceKeyStoreTests records that the Windows store cannot be exercised at
/// all: the consent policy prompts at creation as well as at use, so anything calling SaveAsync
/// blocks the suite forever waiting for a person. macOS is the same shape with a Touch ID sheet. Here the
/// PIN arrives through a delegate and the TPM through a device, so both can be supplied and the whole path
/// — seal, unseal, wrong PIN, lockout — runs unattended.
///
///
/// Skipped unless a software TPM is running, which CI does not start. The same arrangement the
/// Windows tests have on a machine with no TPM, and for the same reason: a suite that fails because the
/// hardware is absent is a suite people learn to ignore. Start one and they run:
///
///
/// docker run --rm -p 2321:2321 debian:bookworm-slim sh -c \
/// 'apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y -qq swtpm >/dev/null && \
/// swtpm socket --tpm2 --tpmstate dir=/tmp --server type=tcp,port=2321,bindaddr=0.0.0.0 \
/// --ctrl type=tcp,port=2322 --flags not-need-init,startup-clear'
/// DODOSSH_TPM_TCP=127.0.0.1 dotnet test tests/DodoSSH.Client.App.Tests
///
///
/// ◆ swtpm serves exactly one client, and anything else holding the port makes this suite fail in a
/// way that reads like a bug in the store. A second connection is accepted and then closed
/// immediately, so five tests fail at once with IOException: The TPM closed the connection and
/// nothing points at the cause. It was a shell readiness probe — exec 3<>/dev/tcp/… — sitting
/// on the socket. Wait for the container by looking at the container, not by opening the port.
///
///
/// What this cannot cover is the transport. Production opens /dev/tpmrm0 through TSS.Net's
/// LinuxTpmDevice and these tests open a socket, so everything above the device is proved here and
/// the device itself is proved by Phase 19 of docs/manual-checks.md on a machine with a real chip.
/// The split is deliberate: the commands, the templates and the attributes are where the security argument
/// lives, and they are identical either way.
///
///
public sealed class LinuxDeviceKeyStoreTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly string directory =
Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"dodossh-tpm-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}");
private static CancellationToken Token => TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
/// Where a software TPM is listening, if the person running this started one.
private static string? Simulator => Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("DODOSSH_TPM_TCP");
///
/// Clears the profile directory, and clears the TPM's lockout counter behind it.
///
///
/// ◆ The second half is not tidiness, and leaving it out made this suite lie. A software TPM is
/// one piece of shared mutable state and its dictionary-attack counter is the most global thing in it:
/// deliberately trips it, and every test that ran
/// afterwards then got null from a correct PIN. Six of them assert null and passed for entirely the
/// wrong reason; the one that asserts a successful unseal failed, which is the only reason this was
/// noticed at all.
///
public void Dispose()
{
if (Directory.Exists(directory))
{
Directory.Delete(directory, recursive: true);
}
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(Simulator))
{
return;
}
try
{
using var device = new SoftwareTpm(Simulator, 2321);
device.Connect();
// The lockout hierarchy has no auth value on a fresh simulator, which is exactly the state a
// real machine is not in — there, recovery is a timer measured in hours and an administrator.
// That difference is the point of Phase 19 rather than of this file.
new Tpm2(device).DictionaryAttackLockReset(TpmRh.Lockout);
}
catch (Exception exception) when (exception is not OutOfMemoryException)
{
// A simulator that has gone away between the test and here. The next test's own connect will
// report it far more clearly than a throw out of Dispose would.
}
}
[Fact]
public async Task WithNothingSaved_LoadingReturnsNullWithoutAsking()
{
// No TPM needed and no prompt allowed: a machine that has never registered must not raise a PIN
// box on the unlock screen. The delegate fails the test rather than answering, which is the only
// way to assert "was not asked" — see the ordering this depends on in TryLoadAsync.
var store = new LinuxDeviceKeyStore(
new ClientPaths(directory),
(_, _) => throw new InvalidOperationException("A PIN was asked for with nothing stored."),
() => throw new InvalidOperationException("The TPM was opened with nothing stored."));
(await store.TryLoadAsync(Token)).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public async Task ARoundTripReturnsTheSameKey()
{
SkipUnlessSimulated();
var key = RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(32);
var store = Store("1234");
await store.SaveAsync(key, Token);
// A second store over the same directory, because the point is that nothing survives in memory:
// the blob on disk and the TPM are between these two lines, and nothing else.
var loaded = await Store("1234").TryLoadAsync(Token);
loaded.ShouldNotBeNull();
loaded.ShouldBe(key);
}
[Fact]
public async Task TheWrongPinGetsNothing()
{
SkipUnlessSimulated();
await Store("1234").SaveAsync(RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(32), Token);
// Null rather than an exception, and rather than the key. This is the assertion the whole design
// exists for: the blob is readable by anyone who has the file, and it opens for nobody without the
// PIN, because the TPM and not this process is what checks it.
(await Store("9999").TryLoadAsync(Token)).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public async Task DecliningThePromptFallsBackWithoutTouchingTheTpm()
{
SkipUnlessSimulated();
await Store("1234").SaveAsync(RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(32), Token);
// Cancelling is ordinary — IDeviceKeyStore says so — and it must not spend one of the TPM's
// lockout attempts. The device factory throwing is what proves the TPM was never opened.
var declined = new LinuxDeviceKeyStore(
new ClientPaths(directory),
(_, _) => ValueTask.FromResult(null),
() => throw new InvalidOperationException("The TPM was opened after the prompt was declined."));
(await declined.TryLoadAsync(Token)).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public async Task WrongPinsEventuallyLockTheTpmOut()
{
SkipUnlessSimulated();
var key = RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(32);
await Store("1234").SaveAsync(key, Token);
// ◆ The property that makes a four-digit PIN safe here, asserted rather than assumed.
//
// The sealed object deliberately carries no NoDA attribute, so every wrong answer advances the
// TPM's dictionary-attack counter. Remove that one attribute and this test still passes every
// other assertion in this file while the PIN becomes guessable at full speed by anything holding
// the blob — which is why the lockout is asserted by observing the *correct* PIN stop working.
for (var attempt = 0; attempt < 8; attempt++)
{
(await Store("9999").TryLoadAsync(Token)).ShouldBeNull();
}
(await Store("1234").TryLoadAsync(Token)).ShouldBeNull(
"the TPM should have stopped answering, so even the right PIN gets nothing");
}
[Fact]
public async Task ForgettingLeavesNothingThatCanBeOpened()
{
SkipUnlessSimulated();
var store = Store("1234");
await store.SaveAsync(RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(32), Token);
await store.ForgetAsync(Token);
// Deleting the blob is the whole of it: the sealed object was never made persistent inside the
// TPM, so there is no chip state left to clean up and nothing for a later install to trip over.
File.Exists(new ClientPaths(directory).DeviceKeyFile).ShouldBeFalse();
(await Store("1234").TryLoadAsync(Token)).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public async Task ABlobFromSomewhereElseIsRefusedRatherThanParsed()
{
var paths = new ClientPaths(directory);
paths.EnsureCreated();
// What the Windows store writes is a bare RSA ciphertext with no header, and a dual-boot machine
// or a copied profile directory can put one here. Feeding it to the TPM as a marshalled structure
// is the failure this refuses; answering null lands on the passphrase, which works.
await File.WriteAllBytesAsync(paths.DeviceKeyFile, RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(256), Token);
var store = new LinuxDeviceKeyStore(
paths,
(_, _) => throw new InvalidOperationException("A PIN was asked for over an unusable blob."),
() => throw new InvalidOperationException("The TPM was opened for an unusable blob."));
(await store.TryLoadAsync(Token)).ShouldBeNull();
}
private LinuxDeviceKeyStore Store(string pin) =>
new(
new ClientPaths(directory),
(_, _) => ValueTask.FromResult(pin),
() => new SoftwareTpm(Simulator ?? "127.0.0.1", 2321));
private static void SkipUnlessSimulated() =>
Assert.SkipWhen(
string.IsNullOrEmpty(Simulator),
"No software TPM. See the remarks on this class for the one command that starts one.");
}