using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using Renci.SshNet.Common;

namespace DodoSSH.Client.Ssh.Tests;

/// <summary>
/// Public-key authentication through the path the vault actually uses, against a real sshd.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <c>PtyAndResizeSpikeTests</c> also authenticates with this fixture's key, and it does so by building
/// SSH.NET's <c>PrivateKeyAuthenticationMethod</c> itself — correct for a spike whose subject is the PTY,
/// and it leaves the application's own path unexercised. What runs here is what a vault-held key goes
/// through: <see cref="SshPrivateKeyCredential"/> carrying PEM bytes rather than a path, into
/// <see cref="SshNetConnectionFactory"/>, which hands them to <c>PrivateKeyFile</c> as a
/// <c>MemoryStream</c>. That indirection is the reason a key in this product never becomes a file on disk,
/// and until now nothing established that it authenticates.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The fixture's key is RSA because there is no BCL Ed25519, and the fixture has to render the public half
/// in <c>authorized_keys</c> form to install it. Which algorithm it is does not matter to anything under
/// test here — the client never parses the key, it forwards it.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Collection(SshCollection.Name)]
public sealed class KeyAuthenticationTests(SshServerFixture fixture)
{
    private static CancellationToken Token => TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;

    [Fact]
    public async Task AKeyHeldAsBytes_AuthenticatesAndOpensAShell()
    {
        await using var connection = await ConnectTrustedAsync(
            new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs1(fixture.ClientKey), Passphrase: null));

        connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();

        // The one place this suite checks Cipher against a real handshake rather than a fake's fixed string.
        // SSH.NET negotiates whatever the container's sshd offers first from its own preference list, so the
        // exact algorithm is not pinned here — only that ConnectionInfo.CurrentServerEncryption came back as
        // something rather than the empty string a stalled or pre-handshake read would produce.
        connection.Cipher.ShouldNotBeNullOrEmpty();

        // Authenticated is not the same as usable: a channel has to open on the connection too.
        await using var shell = await connection.OpenShellAsync(TerminalSize.Default, Token);

        shell.IsOpen.ShouldBeTrue();
    }

    [Fact]
    public async Task TheSameKeyInPkcs8Armour_AlsoAuthenticates()
    {
        // SshKeySecret stores whatever armour it was given, verbatim, and declines to normalise it. This is
        // the half of that claim which is about SSH.NET rather than the codec: the two commonest forms
        // ssh-keygen and openssl produce both load without the client knowing which it has.
        await using var connection = await ConnectTrustedAsync(
            new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs8(fixture.ClientKey), Passphrase: null));

        connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();
    }

    [Fact]
    public async Task AKeyTheServerDoesNotKnow_FailsAsAnAuthenticationError()
    {
        // The specific failure worth pinning is a misreport. The host key is already trusted here, so the
        // factory's gate must translate nothing and let the authentication error through — if it answered
        // with SshHostKeyUnknownException instead, the user would be shown a fingerprint to approve for a
        // problem that approving it cannot fix.
        using var stranger = RSA.Create(2048);

        var knownHosts = await TrustedStoreAsync();
        var factory = new SshNetConnectionFactory(knownHosts);

        await Should.ThrowAsync<SshAuthenticationException>(async () =>
            await factory.ConnectAsync(
                Request(new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs1(stranger), null)), progress: null, Token));
    }

    [Fact]
    public async Task APassphraseOnAnUnprotectedKey_IsIgnoredRatherThanRefused()
    {
        // Written expecting the opposite, and it records what SSH.NET measurably does: PrivateKeyFile
        // accepts a passphrase for a key that has none, and the connection authenticates as if it had not
        // been given. See docs/platform-flags.md — the consequence is that nothing downstream will catch a
        // stray passphrase, so a client that wants that caught has to notice it itself, and a client that
        // does not can stop worrying about the case.
        await using var connection = await ConnectTrustedAsync(
            new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs1(fixture.ClientKey), "a passphrase this key does not have"));

        connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();
    }

    /// <remarks>
    /// <para>
    /// <b>The test the key generator exists to pass.</b> Everything else about the hand-written
    /// <c>openssh-key-v1</c> container is checked against SSH.NET's own parser, which is the parser this
    /// application uses and therefore a fair oracle — but it is still one implementation agreeing with
    /// another. This is the one that puts the public half on a real OpenSSH server and authenticates with
    /// the private half, which is the only thing anybody actually wants to know.
    /// </para>
    /// <para>
    /// Both algorithms, because they are encoded by entirely different code: Ed25519 goes through the
    /// hand-written container, and RSA through the BCL's PKCS#1 export with only the public line
    /// hand-encoded. A failure on one says nothing about the other.
    /// </para>
    /// </remarks>
    [Theory]
    [InlineData(SshKeyAlgorithm.Ed25519)]
    [InlineData(SshKeyAlgorithm.Rsa4096)]
    public async Task AKeyThisClientGenerated_AuthenticatesAgainstARealServer(SshKeyAlgorithm algorithm)
    {
        var generated = SshKeyGenerator.Generate(algorithm, "dodossh@generated");

        await fixture.AuthorizeAsync(generated.PublicKeyLine, Token);

        await using var connection = await ConnectTrustedAsync(
            new SshPrivateKeyCredential(
                Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(generated.PrivateKeyArmour), Passphrase: null));

        connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();

        // Authenticated is not the same as usable, as above.
        await using var shell = await connection.OpenShellAsync(TerminalSize.Default, Token);

        shell.IsOpen.ShouldBeTrue();
    }

    /// <remarks>
    /// <para>
    /// The claim the connecting card is built on, checked where it can actually be checked: against a real
    /// handshake rather than a fake that reports whatever it was written to report. Every other test of the
    /// step list asserts that the shell draws what it is told; this one asserts that what it is told is
    /// true.
    /// </para>
    /// <para>
    /// The order is the assertion. A step list is only readable if the reports arrive in the order it draws
    /// them, and the middle one is the load-bearing part — <see cref="SshConnectionPhase.CheckingHostKey"/>
    /// comes out of SSH.NET's <c>HostKeyReceived</c>, which is the single interior moment the library gives
    /// anybody, and it has to land between the other two rather than beside them.
    /// </para>
    /// <para>
    /// <see cref="SshConnectionPhase.OpeningShell"/> is deliberately absent: this factory's work ends with
    /// an authenticated connection, and the phase for opening a channel on one belongs to the layer that
    /// opens it. <c>TerminalWorkspaceTests</c> covers that half.
    /// </para>
    /// </remarks>
    [Fact]
    public async Task AHandshake_ReportsItsPhasesInTheOrderTheyHappen()
    {
        var knownHosts = await TrustedStoreAsync();
        var reported = new List<SshConnectionPhase>();

        await using var connection = await new SshNetConnectionFactory(knownHosts).ConnectAsync(
            Request(new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs1(fixture.ClientKey), Passphrase: null)),
            new DelegateProgress<SshConnectionPhase>(phase =>
            {
                lock (reported)
                {
                    // Locked because the last two are reported from SSH.NET's own handshake thread rather
                    // than from the awaiting one, which is the whole reason the shell marshals them.
                    reported.Add(phase);
                }
            }),
            Token);

        connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();

        lock (reported)
        {
            reported.ShouldBe(
            [
                SshConnectionPhase.Reaching,
                SshConnectionPhase.CheckingHostKey,
                SshConnectionPhase.Authenticating,
            ]);
        }
    }

    /// <remarks>
    /// The other half of the phase contract, and the one that would be easy to get wrong by reporting
    /// optimistically: a refused key stops at the check. Nothing may claim the credential was offered, and
    /// against an unknown host nothing ever is — the gate returns false and SSH.NET abandons the handshake
    /// before authentication.
    /// </remarks>
    [Fact]
    public async Task AHostKeyRefusal_NeverClaimsToHaveAuthenticated()
    {
        var reported = new List<SshConnectionPhase>();

        await Should.ThrowAsync<SshHostKeyUnknownException>(async () =>
            await new SshNetConnectionFactory(new InMemoryKnownHostStore()).ConnectAsync(
                Request(new SshPasswordCredential(SshServerFixture.Password)),
                new DelegateProgress<SshConnectionPhase>(phase =>
                {
                    lock (reported)
                    {
                        reported.Add(phase);
                    }
                }),
                Token));

        lock (reported)
        {
            reported.ShouldBe([SshConnectionPhase.Reaching, SshConnectionPhase.CheckingHostKey]);
        }
    }

    private static byte[] Pkcs1(RSA key) => Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(key.ExportRSAPrivateKeyPem());

    private static byte[] Pkcs8(RSA key) => Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(key.ExportPkcs8PrivateKeyPem());

    private SshConnectionRequest Request(SshCredential credential) =>
        new(fixture.Host, fixture.Port, SshServerFixture.Username, credential);

    /// <summary>A store that already trusts the container's host key, so first contact is not the subject.</summary>
    private async Task<InMemoryKnownHostStore> TrustedStoreAsync()
    {
        var knownHosts = new InMemoryKnownHostStore();
        var factory = new SshNetConnectionFactory(knownHosts);

        // Learned by being refused, which is the only way this client learns a host key.
        var unknown = await Should.ThrowAsync<SshHostKeyUnknownException>(async () =>
            await factory.ConnectAsync(
                Request(new SshPasswordCredential(SshServerFixture.Password)), progress: null, Token));

        await knownHosts.TrustAsync(unknown.Presentation, Token);

        return knownHosts;
    }

    private async Task<ISshConnection> ConnectTrustedAsync(SshCredential credential)
    {
        var knownHosts = await TrustedStoreAsync();

        return await new SshNetConnectionFactory(knownHosts)
            .ConnectAsync(Request(credential), progress: null, Token);
    }
}