using System.Net;
using System.Net.Sockets;
using DodoSSH.Api.Authorization;
using DodoSSH.Api.Setup;
using DodoSSH.Contracts;
using DodoSSH.Domain.Authorization;
using DodoSSH.Infrastructure;
using FastEndpoints;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.HttpResults;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
namespace DodoSSH.Api.Features.Relay;
///
/// Issues the ticket that lets exactly one relay socket reach exactly one host.
///
///
///
/// Every decision the relay makes is made here, with the full bearer token and the full access model in
/// hand: which host, whether the caller may connect to it, which addresses its name resolves to and
/// which of those the policy permits. The socket that follows decides nothing. It checks that the ticket
/// is genuine, fresh and unused, and dials what the ticket says. See ADR 0004.
///
///
/// Every refusal about the target is the same refusal. A host that does not exist, one in a vault
/// the caller cannot reach, one without the relay switched on, one whose name does not resolve, and one
/// whose every address the policy refuses all answer 403 relay-target-rejected with the same
/// sentence. Anyone who can write a host can set its address to anything, so a distinct answer for
/// "resolves, but refused" would turn this endpoint into a scanner for the operator's internal DNS. The
/// real reason goes to the server log, where the operator can read it.
///
///
internal sealed class RelayTicketEndpoint(
ICurrentUserContext currentUser,
IVaultAccessService vaultAccess,
DodoDbContext database,
IRelayNetwork network,
RelayTicketCodec codec,
RelaySessionRegistry sessions,
IOptions options,
TimeProvider clock,
ILogger logger)
: Endpoint, ProblemHttpResult>>
{
/// What every target refusal says, whatever the reason was.
private const string RejectedDetail =
"The relay will not connect to this host. Check that the relay is switched on for it and that its "
+ "address is one this server may reach; the server's log records which.";
///
public override void Configure()
{
Post(RelayProtocol.TicketsPath);
// Enrolled, matching sync. A relayed host is still a host whose name, username and key are
// ciphertext, so a caller with no identity key has no way to have learned which host to ask for.
Policies(Auth.EnrolledPolicy);
Description(b => b
.WithName("IssueRelayTicket")
.WithSummary("Issues a single-use ticket for one relay connection to one host.")
.WithTags("Relay"));
}
///
public override async Task, ProblemHttpResult>> ExecuteAsync(
RelayTicketRequest req,
CancellationToken ct)
{
var settings = options.Value;
if (!settings.Enabled)
{
return Problems.Coded(
StatusCodes.Status404NotFound,
ProblemCodes.RelayUnavailable,
"This server does not relay. Connect to the host directly; GET /api/v1/meta lists the "
+ "features this server does offer.");
}
var user = await currentUser.GetOrProvisionAsync(ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
var (target, refusal) = await FindTargetAsync(user.Id, req, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (target is not var (hostname, port, vaultId))
{
return Rejected(user.Id, req.HostId, refusal!);
}
// Before resolving rather than after: a caller already at the cap is told so without this server
// spending a DNS query on a ticket that could not be redeemed.
if (!sessions.HasRoomFor(user.Id))
{
RelayLog.LimitReached(logger, user.Id, sessions.Count);
return Problems.Coded(
StatusCodes.Status429TooManyRequests,
ProblemCodes.RelayLimitReached,
"You have as many relay sessions open as this server allows. Close one and try again.");
}
var addresses = await ResolvePermittedAsync(hostname, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (addresses is not { Length: > 0 })
{
return Rejected(user.Id, req.HostId, addresses is null
? "its name did not resolve"
: "every address its name resolved to is refused by policy");
}
var ticket = new RelayTicket(
TicketId: Guid.CreateVersion7(),
SessionId: Guid.CreateVersion7(),
UserId: user.Id,
HostId: req.HostId,
VaultId: vaultId,
TargetHost: hostname,
TargetAddresses: addresses,
TargetPort: port,
ExpiresAt: clock.GetUtcNow() + settings.TicketLifetime);
RelayLog.TicketIssued(logger, user.Id, req.HostId, ticket.SessionId, addresses.Length);
return TypedResults.Ok(new RelayTicketResponse(
Ticket: codec.Seal(ticket),
WebSocketUrl: new Uri(settings.WebSocketUrl!, UriKind.Absolute),
SubProtocol: RelayProtocol.SubProtocol,
SessionId: ticket.SessionId,
ExpiresAt: ticket.ExpiresAt));
}
///
/// Finds the host, and decides whether this caller may be relayed to it at all.
///
/// The stored target, or the reason there is none — for the log, never for the caller.
private async Task<((string Hostname, int Port, Guid VaultId)? Target, string? Refusal)> FindTargetAsync(
Guid userId,
RelayTicketRequest req,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (req.PortForwardId is not null)
{
return (null, "a port forward was requested, which v1 does not relay");
}
var host = await database.Hosts
.AsNoTracking()
.SingleOrDefaultAsync(h => h.Id == req.HostId && h.DeletedAtUtc == null, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
if (host is null)
{
return (null, "no such host");
}
var access = await vaultAccess.ResolveAsync(userId, host.VaultId, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
// Connect rather than Read, because Connect is the permission that says what this is. Every role
// that reads today also connects — see VaultAccessService.ForRole — but a role that ever split
// them should be refused a relay here without anybody remembering to look.
if (!access.Granted || !access.Permissions.HasFlag(PermissionFlags.Connect))
{
return (null, "the caller may not connect to this host's vault");
}
// The CHECK constraint makes the second half unreachable while the first is true. Tested anyway,
// because the cost of trusting it is dialling a null.
if (!host.RelayEnabled || host.Hostname is not { } hostname || host.Port is not { } port)
{
return (null, "the relay is not switched on for this host");
}
return RelayAddressPolicy.PermitsPort(port)
? ((hostname, port, host.VaultId), null)
: (null, $"port {port} is refused by policy");
}
///
/// Resolves the stored name, and keeps the addresses the policy permits.
///
/// The permitted addresses, possibly none; or null when the name did not resolve.
///
///
/// Filtered rather than refused as a whole when one answer is bad. A name that resolves to a public
/// address and a link-local one is dialled on the public address, and never on the other — the
/// ticket carries only what passed, so there is nothing else for the socket to try.
///
///
/// The addresses kept are the normalised ones, so what is dialled is exactly what was judged rather
/// than a second spelling of it.
///
///
private async Task ResolvePermittedAsync(string hostname, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var policy = new RelayAddressPolicy(options.Value);
using var timeout = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(cancellationToken);
timeout.CancelAfter(options.Value.ConnectTimeout);
IPAddress[] resolved;
try
{
resolved = await network.ResolveAsync(hostname, timeout.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (SocketException)
{
return null;
}
catch (OperationCanceledException) when (!cancellationToken.IsCancellationRequested)
{
return null;
}
return
[
.. resolved
.Where(policy.Permits)
.Select(RelayAddressPolicy.Normalise)
.Distinct()
.Take(RelayTicketCodec.MaxAddresses),
];
}
private ProblemHttpResult Rejected(Guid userId, Guid hostId, string reason)
{
RelayLog.TargetRejected(logger, userId, hostId, reason);
return Problems.Coded(StatusCodes.Status403Forbidden, ProblemCodes.RelayTargetRejected, RejectedDetail);
}
}