using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
using DodoSSH.Contracts;
namespace DodoSSH.Api.Tests;
///
/// Teams, membership, invitations and the vault key grants that make a team vault readable.
///
///
///
/// The half of M3 that runs on the server, which is the half that decides what will be served.
/// Whether a member can decrypt what they are served is decided by holding a key, and no test here can
/// assert it — that lives in the client suite, where a key exists. The two are separate on purpose and
/// these tests are written to keep them separate: none of them checks that a wrapped key is right,
/// because the server cannot.
///
///
/// The cases worth having are the ones where a mistake would be invisible. A member removed but still
/// served; a viewer allowed to push; a vault visible to a team it does not belong to; a grant accepted
/// for a key its recipient no longer holds. Each of those looks exactly like working software from the
/// outside.
///
///
/// Two boundaries in here are load-bearing beyond their own endpoint, and both are of that invisible
/// kind. An admin who can archive a team or hand it away is an admin who can take it from the person
/// who promoted them, and nothing about the response would say so. An invitation claimed on an address
/// the identity provider never vouched for is a way into somebody else's team, and every other part of
/// that request succeeds. Neither has a symptom; each has a test.
///
///
[Collection(ApiCollection.Name)]
public sealed class TeamEndpointTests(ApiFixture fixture)
{
private const string TeamsUrl = "/api/v1/teams";
private const string MeUrl = "/api/v1/me";
private const string EnrollUrl = "/api/v1/me/enrollment";
// ---- Creating and listing ----
[Fact]
public async Task CreatingATeam_MakesTheCallerItsOwner()
{
var client = await EnrolledClientAsync("team-owner");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(client, "Platform");
team.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Owner);
team.MemberCount.ShouldBe(1);
team.VaultCount.ShouldBe(0);
var listed = await ReadAsync>(client, TeamsUrl);
listed.ShouldContain(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId);
}
///
/// The same body twice, as a client whose response was lost would send it. Enrollment behaves this way
/// and a team create has the same shape — a client-chosen id — so it has to behave the same or a lost
/// response leaves somebody with two teams under one name.
///
[Fact]
public async Task RepeatingACreate_ReturnsTheSameTeamRatherThanASecondOne()
{
var client = await EnrolledClientAsync("team-retry");
var request = new CreateTeamRequest(
Guid.CreateVersion7(), "Retry", $"retry-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}", null);
var first = await PostAsync(client, TeamsUrl, request);
var second = await PostAsync(client, TeamsUrl, request);
second.TeamId.ShouldBe(first.TeamId);
var listed = await ReadAsync>(client, TeamsUrl);
listed.Count(row => row.TeamId == first.TeamId).ShouldBe(1);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ASlugAlreadyInUse_IsRefusedWithItsOwnCode()
{
var client = await EnrolledClientAsync("team-slug");
var slug = $"taken-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}";
await PostAsync(
client, TeamsUrl, new CreateTeamRequest(Guid.CreateVersion7(), "First", slug, null));
var response = await client.PostContractAsync(
TeamsUrl, new CreateTeamRequest(Guid.CreateVersion7(), "Second", slug, null));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(response, HttpStatusCode.Conflict, ProblemCodes.TeamSlugTaken);
}
///
/// A team somebody is not in answers 404, not 403. Distinguishing them would let a caller confirm
/// which team ids exist, and team ids travel in URLs.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ATeamTheCallerIsNotIn_IsIndistinguishableFromOneThatDoesNotExist()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("team-private-owner");
var stranger = await EnrolledClientAsync("team-private-stranger");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Private");
var real = await GetAsync(stranger, MembersUrl(team.TeamId));
var invented = await GetAsync(stranger, MembersUrl(Guid.CreateVersion7()));
real.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NotFound);
invented.StatusCode.ShouldBe(real.StatusCode);
}
// ---- Renaming ----
///
/// The rename is read back from the list rather than from the response body, because the list is
/// what a member's screen is built from and it is assembled by different code. The slug is asserted
/// unchanged because it is unique only among live teams: a rename that moved it could take a slug an
/// archived team still holds, and that archived team could then never be brought back.
///
[Fact]
public async Task RenamingATeam_ChangesTheListedNameAndLeavesTheSlugAlone()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("rename-owner");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Before");
var response = await owner.PutContractAsync(
TeamUrl(team.TeamId), new UpdateTeamRequest("After", "A description it did not have."));
response.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.OK);
var listed = await ReadAsync>(owner, TeamsUrl);
var renamed = listed.Where(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId).ShouldHaveSingleItem();
renamed.Name.ShouldBe("After");
renamed.Description.ShouldBe("A description it did not have.");
renamed.Slug.ShouldBe(team.Slug);
}
///
/// Null clears the description rather than leaving it alone. A PUT that treated an absent value as
/// "no change" would make a cleared description impossible to express at all, since there is no
/// other verb for it.
///
[Fact]
public async Task RenamingWithoutADescription_ClearsTheOneThatWasThere()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("rename-clear-owner");
var team = await PostAsync(
owner,
TeamsUrl,
new CreateTeamRequest(
Guid.CreateVersion7(), "Described", $"team-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}", "Something."));
team.Description.ShouldBe("Something.");
var response = await owner.PutContractAsync(
TeamUrl(team.TeamId), new UpdateTeamRequest("Described", null));
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
var listed = await ReadAsync>(owner, TeamsUrl);
listed.Where(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId)
.ShouldHaveSingleItem()
.Description.ShouldBeNull();
}
///
/// A member is refused with 403 rather than 404: the team is visible to them, so naming the reason
/// leaks nothing and "you are not an admin" is a more useful answer than "no such team".
///
[Fact]
public async Task APlainMember_CanRenameNothingAndCanNeitherArchiveNorHandOverTheTeam()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("member-limits-owner", "mlowner@example.com");
var member = await EnrolledClientAsync("member-limits-member", "mlmember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Limits");
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "mlmember@example.com");
var memberMe = await ReadAsync(member, MeUrl);
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var renamed = await member.PutContractAsync(
TeamUrl(team.TeamId), new UpdateTeamRequest("Theirs now", null));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(renamed, HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, ProblemCodes.Forbidden);
var archived = await DeleteAsync(member, TeamUrl(team.TeamId));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(archived, HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, ProblemCodes.Forbidden);
var transferred = await member.PostContractAsync(
OwnerUrl(team.TeamId), new TransferTeamOwnershipRequest(memberMe.UserId));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(transferred, HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, ProblemCodes.Forbidden);
}
///
///
/// The TeamAccess.IsOwner boundary, and the most important authorization test in this
/// feature. An admin may manage members and vaults, and that is deliberately not the same
/// permission as deciding whether the team continues to exist or who controls it. If either of
/// these checks were widened to CanAdminister — which is what every neighbouring endpoint
/// uses, so it is the easy mistake — anybody the owner promoted could archive the team out from
/// under them or take it outright, and nothing in the response of any other test would change.
///
///
/// The rename is asserted in the same test on purpose: it is what shows the admin genuinely holds
/// administrative rights here, so the two refusals are the boundary rather than a broken role.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task AnAdminWhoIsNotTheOwner_MayRenameButMayNotArchiveOrHandOverTheTeam()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("admin-boundary-owner", "abowner@example.com");
var admin = await EnrolledClientAsync("admin-boundary-admin", "abadmin@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Boundary");
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "abadmin@example.com");
var adminMe = await ReadAsync(admin, MeUrl);
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Admin);
// They really are an admin: this one succeeds.
var renamed = await admin.PutContractAsync(
TeamUrl(team.TeamId), new UpdateTeamRequest("Renamed by an admin", null));
renamed.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.OK);
var archived = await DeleteAsync(admin, TeamUrl(team.TeamId));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(archived, HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, ProblemCodes.Forbidden);
var transferred = await admin.PostContractAsync(
OwnerUrl(team.TeamId), new TransferTeamOwnershipRequest(adminMe.UserId));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(transferred, HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, ProblemCodes.Forbidden);
// And nothing moved: the team is still there and still owned by the person who made it.
var members = await ReadAsync>(
owner, MembersUrl(team.TeamId));
var ownerMe = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
members.Where(row => row.UserId == ownerMe.UserId)
.ShouldHaveSingleItem()
.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Owner);
}
// ---- Archiving ----
///
/// Archiving hides a team from every member's list at once, and a team vault resolves through
/// membership — so archiving one that still owned vaults would take those vaults away from
/// everybody holding a key, including the caller, with no way back because nothing in this product
/// deletes a vault. The refusal is the end of that road rather than a step on it, which is why the
/// team is asserted still listed afterwards.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ArchivingATeamThatOwnsAVault_IsRefusedAndLeavesTheTeamListed()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("archive-vault-owner");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Occupied");
await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var response = await DeleteAsync(owner, TeamUrl(team.TeamId));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(response, HttpStatusCode.Conflict, ProblemCodes.TeamNotEmpty);
var listed = await ReadAsync>(owner, TeamsUrl);
listed.ShouldContain(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId);
}
///
/// Every member's list, not just the caller's. Memberships are archived with the team in the same
/// transaction, and a live membership pointing at an archived team would leave the other member
/// still seeing it — which is the shape a half-applied archive takes.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ArchivingAnEmptyTeam_RemovesItFromEveryMembersList()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("archive-owner", "aowner@example.com");
var member = await EnrolledClientAsync("archive-member", "amember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Wound up");
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "amember@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
(await ReadAsync>(member, TeamsUrl))
.ShouldContain(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId);
var response = await DeleteAsync(owner, TeamUrl(team.TeamId));
response.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NoContent);
(await ReadAsync>(owner, TeamsUrl))
.ShouldNotContain(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId);
(await ReadAsync>(member, TeamsUrl))
.ShouldNotContain(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId);
// And it is gone the way a team nobody is in is gone, rather than merely unlisted.
(await GetAsync(owner, MembersUrl(team.TeamId))).StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NotFound);
}
// ---- Ownership ----
///
/// Both roles, because either alone would pass while the team was broken. Asserting only
/// that the recipient is now owner would pass with the team owned twice; asserting only that the
/// outgoing owner is an admin would pass with it owned by nobody. Ownership is sole and the two
/// writes are one transaction precisely so that neither of those states can exist, so the count of
/// owners is asserted too.
///
[Fact]
public async Task TransferringOwnership_MakesTheTargetOwnerAndTheOutgoingOwnerAnAdmin()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("transfer-owner", "towner@example.com");
var successor = await EnrolledClientAsync("transfer-successor", "tsuccessor@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Handover");
var ownerMe = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "tsuccessor@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
OwnerUrl(team.TeamId), new TransferTeamOwnershipRequest(entry.UserId));
response.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NoContent);
var members = await ReadAsync>(
owner, MembersUrl(team.TeamId));
members.Where(row => row.UserId == entry.UserId)
.ShouldHaveSingleItem()
.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Owner);
members.Where(row => row.UserId == ownerMe.UserId)
.ShouldHaveSingleItem()
.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Admin, "the outgoing owner is demoted, not removed");
members.Count(row => row.Role == TeamMemberRole.Owner).ShouldBe(1);
// And the recipient is told so by the endpoint their own screen reads.
(await ReadAsync>(successor, TeamsUrl))
.Where(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId)
.ShouldHaveSingleItem()
.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Owner);
}
///
/// The thing that was impossible before this endpoint existed. An owner could not be removed and
/// could not be demoted, so somebody who left the company owning a team left it owned by them for
/// ever — a state only an operator with database access could fix.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AfterATransfer_TheFormerOwnerCanFinallyBeRemoved()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("departing-owner", "downer@example.com");
var successor = await EnrolledClientAsync("departing-successor", "dsuccessor@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Departure");
var ownerMe = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "dsuccessor@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var transferred = await owner.PostContractAsync(
OwnerUrl(team.TeamId), new TransferTeamOwnershipRequest(entry.UserId));
transferred.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NoContent);
var removed = await DeleteAsync(successor, MemberUrl(team.TeamId, ownerMe.UserId));
removed.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NoContent);
(await ReadAsync>(owner, TeamsUrl))
.ShouldNotContain(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId);
}
///
/// Adding somebody and handing them the team in one step would let an id supplied once take it, so
/// the recipient has to be an active member already. This is the same refusal that stops a stranger
/// being made owner by pasting their id.
///
[Fact]
public async Task TransferringToSomebodyWhoIsNotAMember_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("transfer-closed-owner", "tcowner@example.com");
await EnrolledClientAsync("transfer-outsider", "toutsider@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Closed handover");
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "toutsider@example.com");
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
OwnerUrl(team.TeamId), new TransferTeamOwnershipRequest(entry.UserId));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(response, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidTeam);
}
[Fact]
public async Task TransferringToYourself_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("transfer-self-owner");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Already mine");
var me = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
OwnerUrl(team.TeamId), new TransferTeamOwnershipRequest(me.UserId));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(response, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidTeam);
}
// ---- Membership ----
///
/// The membership half of M3 in one test: a team vault appears in the other member's /me the
/// moment they are added, and it appears without a wrapped key. That null is the whole
/// design — the server can grant access to the ciphertext and cannot grant the ability to read it.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AnAddedMember_SeesTheTeamVaultWithNoKeyUntilSomebodyWrapsOne()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("grant-owner", "owner@example.com");
var member = await EnrolledClientAsync("grant-member", "member@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Sharing");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "member@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var me = await ReadAsync(member, MeUrl);
var vault = me.Vaults.SingleOrDefault(summary => summary.VaultId == vaultId);
vault.ShouldNotBeNull("membership is what makes a team vault visible");
vault.WrappedVaultKey.ShouldBeNull("and it is not what makes it readable");
vault.IsPersonal.ShouldBeFalse();
vault.TeamId.ShouldBe(team.TeamId);
}
///
///
/// An account exists from its owner's first authenticated request and publishes no key until they
/// enroll, and the directory omits it for that whole window — deliberately, because an entry exists
/// to be wrapped to. So the lookup is asserted empty first: that is not a missing account, and a
/// caller that read it as one would invite an address that already has one.
///
///
/// Adding by address is what covers the gap, and the member it produces says IsEnrolled
/// false. Membership is authorization and grants nothing readable, so there is nothing inconsistent
/// about a member with no key — it is the state everybody passes through.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task AnAccountThatHasNotEnrolled_CanBeAddedByAddressThoughTheDirectoryOmitsIt()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("unenrolled-owner", "uowner@example.com");
var address = NewAddress();
var (_, userId) = await SignInAsync(address);
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Newcomers");
var found = await ReadAsync>(
owner, $"/api/v1/directory?email={Uri.EscapeDataString(address)}");
found.ShouldBeEmpty("they have published no key, so there is nothing to wrap to");
var member = await PostAsync(
owner,
MembersUrl(team.TeamId),
new AddTeamMemberRequest(Guid.Empty, TeamMemberRole.Member, address));
member.UserId.ShouldBe(userId);
member.IsEnrolled.ShouldBeFalse();
member.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Member);
var listed = await ReadAsync>(
owner, MembersUrl(team.TeamId));
listed.ShouldContain(row => row.UserId == userId && !row.IsEnrolled);
}
///
/// The other side of it. An address with no account is refused under its own code rather than the
/// general one, because the caller can act on it unprompted — there is nobody to add, so invite
/// them — and a code shared with a rejected role would leave them guessing which had happened.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AddingAnAddressWithNoAccount_IsRefusedWithItsOwnCode()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("no-account-owner", "naowner@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Nobody");
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
MembersUrl(team.TeamId),
new AddTeamMemberRequest(Guid.Empty, TeamMemberRole.Member, NewAddress()));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(
response, HttpStatusCode.NotFound, ProblemCodes.NoSuchAccount);
}
///
/// A viewer may read the vault and may not write to it. The failure this guards is the quiet one: a
/// role that resolved to the wrong flags would let somebody who was added to look at a vault change
/// what everybody else connects with.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AViewer_MayPullAndMayNotPush()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("viewer-owner", "vowner@example.com");
var viewer = await EnrolledClientAsync("viewer-member", "viewer@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Read only");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "viewer@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Viewer);
var pull = await viewer.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/sync/pull", new SyncPullRequest(null, null, null));
pull.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.OK);
var push = await viewer.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/sync/push", new SyncPushRequest([]));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(push, HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, ProblemCodes.Forbidden);
}
///
/// And the reverse, which is what removal has to mean: the vault stops being served at all. Note what
/// is not asserted — that they have forgotten anything. They have not, and ADR 0001 says so.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ARemovedMember_StopsBeingServedTheTeamsVault()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("removal-owner", "rowner@example.com");
var member = await EnrolledClientAsync("removal-member", "rmember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Departures");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "rmember@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var before = await ReadAsync(member, MeUrl);
before.Vaults.ShouldContain(summary => summary.VaultId == vaultId);
var removed = await DeleteAsync(owner, MemberUrl(team.TeamId, entry.UserId));
removed.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NoContent);
var after = await ReadAsync(member, MeUrl);
after.Vaults.ShouldNotContain(summary => summary.VaultId == vaultId);
var pull = await member.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/sync/pull", new SyncPullRequest(null, null, null));
pull.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NotFound);
}
///
/// Removing a member leaves the vault flagged for rekey, which is a promise the server records and
/// cannot keep on its own: rekeying re-wraps every item's data key and only a client holding the
/// current one can do that. The flag is what the interface reads to say so; M5 is what acts on it.
///
[Fact]
public async Task RemovingAMember_FlagsTheTeamsVaultsForRekey()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("rekey-owner", "kowner@example.com");
await EnrolledClientAsync("rekey-member", "kmember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Rekeys");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "kmember@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
await DeleteAsync(owner, MemberUrl(team.TeamId, entry.UserId));
var grants = await ReadAsync(owner, $"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/grants");
grants.RekeyRequired.ShouldBeTrue();
}
///
/// The owner cannot be removed even now that ownership can be handed over, and this is the standing
/// guarantee rather than a leftover: transferring is what makes the team's next owner exist, so
/// removing the current one first would still leave it with nobody who can manage it. Refused with a
/// code the client can act on rather than a bare 400, since "you cannot do that" and "you did that
/// wrong" lead somewhere different.
///
[Fact]
public async Task TheOwner_CannotBeRemoved()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("sole-owner", "sole@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Sole");
var me = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
var response = await DeleteAsync(owner, MemberUrl(team.TeamId, me.UserId));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(response, HttpStatusCode.Conflict, ProblemCodes.LastTeamOwner);
}
///
/// The other half of the same guarantee, and the one a transfer endpoint could plausibly have
/// loosened. Demoting the owner through the role endpoint cannot appoint a replacement in the same
/// breath, so it would leave the team ownerless — which is exactly the state
/// TransferOwnershipAsync does two writes in one transaction to avoid.
///
[Fact]
public async Task TheOwner_CannotBeDemotedOnTheirOwn()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("demote-owner", "demote@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Undemotable");
var me = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
var response = await owner.PutContractAsync(
MemberRoleUrl(team.TeamId, me.UserId),
new ChangeTeamMemberRoleRequest(TeamMemberRole.Admin));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(response, HttpStatusCode.Conflict, ProblemCodes.LastTeamOwner);
var members = await ReadAsync>(
owner, MembersUrl(team.TeamId));
members.Where(row => row.UserId == me.UserId)
.ShouldHaveSingleItem()
.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Owner);
}
///
/// A real value, not a placeholder. LastActiveAt is the field the teams screen uses to say
/// whether a colleague has been here at all, and the failure it guards against is the one that made
/// the column impossible to offer before: a null for somebody who has plainly been making requests
/// reads as "never", which is a lie about a person.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AMemberListing_ReportsWhenAnAccountWasLastActive()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("last-seen-owner");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Last seen");
var me = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
var members = await ReadAsync>(
owner, MembersUrl(team.TeamId));
var self = members.Where(row => row.UserId == me.UserId).ShouldHaveSingleItem();
self.LastActiveAt.ShouldNotBeNull(
"this account has made several authenticated requests already");
// Within the window the server writes on, which is the whole of the precision this carries.
self.LastActiveAt.Value.ShouldBeGreaterThan(TimeProvider.System.GetUtcNow().AddHours(-1));
}
// ---- Invitations ----
///
/// The expiry is asserted rather than merely present. An invitation that never lapsed would be a
/// standing offer against an address, and company addresses are handed to the next person to hold
/// the job — so the person who inherits the mailbox would inherit the team.
///
[Fact]
public async Task InvitingAnAddress_ListsItAsPendingWithItsRoleAndAnExpiry()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("invite-owner");
var address = NewAddress();
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Invitations");
var created = await InviteAsync(owner, team.TeamId, address, TeamMemberRole.Admin);
var listed = await FindInvitationAsync(owner, team.TeamId, created.InvitationId);
listed.Email.ShouldBe(address);
listed.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Admin);
listed.State.ShouldBe(TeamInvitationState.Pending);
listed.AcceptedAt.ShouldBeNull();
(listed.ExpiresAt - listed.CreatedAt).ShouldBe(TimeSpan.FromDays(14));
}
///
/// The same body twice, as a client whose response was lost would send it — the shape team and
/// vault creation already have. Two invitations to one address would show the same person twice on
/// the teams screen and take two revocations to withdraw.
///
[Fact]
public async Task RepeatingAnInvitation_ReturnsTheSameOneRatherThanASecond()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("invite-retry-owner");
var address = NewAddress();
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Retried invitations");
var request = new CreateTeamInvitationRequest(
Guid.CreateVersion7(), address, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var first = await PostAsync(
owner, InvitationsUrl(team.TeamId), request);
var second = await PostAsync(
owner, InvitationsUrl(team.TeamId), request);
second.InvitationId.ShouldBe(first.InvitationId);
var listed = await ReadAsync>(
owner, InvitationsUrl(team.TeamId));
// Case-insensitively, because the column is citext and two addresses differing only in case
// are one address — a second row under a different casing would still be a second invitation.
listed.Count(row => string.Equals(row.Email, address, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
.ShouldBe(1);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ASecondInvitationToTheSameAddress_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("invite-duplicate-owner");
var address = NewAddress();
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Duplicate invitations");
await InviteAsync(owner, team.TeamId, address);
// A different id, so this is a second invitation rather than a retry of the first.
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
InvitationsUrl(team.TeamId),
new CreateTeamInvitationRequest(Guid.CreateVersion7(), address, TeamMemberRole.Admin));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(
response, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidTeamInvitation);
}
///
/// Ownership is sole and is handed over deliberately. An invitation that conferred it would let an
/// address typed once take the team the moment somebody signed in with it — and the invitee is by
/// definition somebody nobody here has met.
///
[Fact]
public async Task InvitingSomebodyAsOwner_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("invite-owner-role-owner");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Not for sale");
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
InvitationsUrl(team.TeamId),
new CreateTeamInvitationRequest(
Guid.CreateVersion7(), NewAddress(), TeamMemberRole.Owner));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(
response, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidTeamInvitation);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AMalformedAddress_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("invite-malformed-owner");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Shapes");
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
InvitationsUrl(team.TeamId),
new CreateTeamInvitationRequest(
Guid.CreateVersion7(), "not an address", TeamMemberRole.Member));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(
response, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidTeamInvitation);
}
///
/// A withdrawn invitation stays in the listing rather than vanishing, so the screen can show that it
/// was withdrawn rather than letting it read as never sent. Withdrawing it twice is 404, for the
/// reason revoking a device grant gives: a caller driving towards "that invitation will not let
/// anybody in" can treat 404 as having arrived.
///
[Fact]
public async Task RevokingAnInvitation_MarksItRevokedAndCannotBeDoneTwice()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("invite-revoke-owner");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Withdrawals");
var invitation = await InviteAsync(owner, team.TeamId, NewAddress());
var revoked = await DeleteAsync(
owner, InvitationUrl(team.TeamId, invitation.InvitationId));
revoked.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NoContent);
var listed = await FindInvitationAsync(owner, team.TeamId, invitation.InvitationId);
listed.State.ShouldBe(TeamInvitationState.Revoked);
var again = await DeleteAsync(owner, InvitationUrl(team.TeamId, invitation.InvitationId));
again.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NotFound);
}
///
/// An invitation is a fact about the team, so any member may read the list — whoever is about to be
/// handed a vault key needs to see who else is on their way in — but only an admin may write one.
///
[Fact]
public async Task APlainMember_MayReadInvitationsAndMayNotIssueThem()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("invite-reader-owner", "irowner@example.com");
var member = await EnrolledClientAsync("invite-reader-member", "irmember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Readable invitations");
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "irmember@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var invitation = await InviteAsync(owner, team.TeamId, NewAddress());
var listed = await ReadAsync>(
member, InvitationsUrl(team.TeamId));
listed.ShouldContain(row => row.InvitationId == invitation.InvitationId);
var refused = await member.PostContractAsync(
InvitationsUrl(team.TeamId),
new CreateTeamInvitationRequest(
Guid.CreateVersion7(), NewAddress(), TeamMemberRole.Member));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(refused, HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, ProblemCodes.Forbidden);
}
// ---- Claiming an invitation at sign-in ----
///
/// The heart of the feature, and the only path by which an invitation becomes anything. There is no
/// token and no mail: the row says "the next account to sign in with this address joins this team",
/// and just-in-time provisioning is what reads it. What it creates is a membership and not a key —
/// the vault key still has to be wrapped to them from a machine that holds one.
///
[Fact]
public async Task SigningInWithAnInvitedAddress_JoinsTheTeamAndMarksTheInvitationAccepted()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("claim-owner");
var address = NewAddress();
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Claimed");
var invitation = await InviteAsync(owner, team.TeamId, address, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var (invitee, inviteeUserId) = await SignInAsync(address);
(await ReadAsync>(invitee, TeamsUrl))
.Where(row => row.TeamId == team.TeamId)
.ShouldHaveSingleItem()
.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Member);
var members = await ReadAsync>(
owner, MembersUrl(team.TeamId));
var joined = members.Where(row => row.UserId == inviteeUserId).ShouldHaveSingleItem();
joined.Status.ShouldBe(TeamMemberStatus.Active);
joined.Role.ShouldBe(TeamMemberRole.Member);
joined.IsEnrolled.ShouldBeFalse("membership is authorization, and they hold no key yet");
var listed = await FindInvitationAsync(owner, team.TeamId, invitation.InvitationId);
listed.State.ShouldBe(TeamInvitationState.Accepted);
listed.AcceptedAt.ShouldNotBeNull();
}
///
/// The security test this feature stands on. An invitation is authorization: claiming one is
/// what decides that this server will serve somebody a team's vaults. An address the identity
/// provider has not vouched for is an address anybody able to obtain a token can name, so an
/// unverified one must confer nothing — that is the same attack AllowEmailLinking exists to
/// refuse, arriving by a different door. The failure would be silent by construction: the account is
/// provisioned either way and every other part of the request succeeds, so nothing but this would
/// notice that the wrong person had walked into the team.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AnAddressTheProviderHasNotVerified_ClaimsNothing()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("unverified-owner");
var address = NewAddress();
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Verified only");
var invitation = await InviteAsync(owner, team.TeamId, address);
var (impostor, _) = await SignInAsync(address, emailVerified: false);
(await ReadAsync>(impostor, TeamsUrl)).ShouldBeEmpty();
var listed = await FindInvitationAsync(owner, team.TeamId, invitation.InvitationId);
listed.State.ShouldBe(TeamInvitationState.Pending);
listed.AcceptedAt.ShouldBeNull();
}
///
/// A withdrawn invitation is withdrawn, which the claim path has to honour independently — it reads
/// the invitation table directly rather than going back through the endpoint that refused.
///
[Fact]
public async Task SigningInAfterAnInvitationWasWithdrawn_JoinsNothing()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("withdrawn-owner");
var address = NewAddress();
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Withdrawn");
var invitation = await InviteAsync(owner, team.TeamId, address);
await DeleteAsync(owner, InvitationUrl(team.TeamId, invitation.InvitationId));
var (invitee, _) = await SignInAsync(address);
(await ReadAsync>(invitee, TeamsUrl)).ShouldBeEmpty();
}
// ---- Vault key grants ----
///
/// A grant to somebody outside the team is refused. It would be a row that looks like sharing and
/// does nothing, because the access check will go on refusing them the vault — and a sharing screen
/// listing a grant whose holder cannot fetch anything is worse than an error.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AGrantToANonMember_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("outsider-owner", "oowner@example.com");
await EnrolledClientAsync("outsider", "outsider@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Closed");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "outsider@example.com");
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/grants",
new IssueVaultGrantRequest(
entry.UserId,
entry.Fingerprint,
KeyGeneration: 1,
WrappedVaultKey: new byte[110],
KeyLogHead: new byte[32],
GrantSignature: new byte[64],
GrantedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(
response, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidVaultGrant);
}
///
/// A fingerprint that is not the recipient's current key is refused. The server cannot tell whether
/// the wrap contains the right key — nothing on that machine can — but it can tell that this grant
/// was made for a key nobody holds, which would otherwise surface at the far end days later as a tag
/// failure indistinguishable from corruption.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AGrantForAKeyTheRecipientDoesNotHold_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("stale-owner", "sowner@example.com");
await EnrolledClientAsync("stale-member", "smember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Stale");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "smember@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var response = await owner.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/grants",
new IssueVaultGrantRequest(
entry.UserId,
RecipientKeyFingerprint: new byte[32],
KeyGeneration: 1,
WrappedVaultKey: new byte[110],
KeyLogHead: new byte[32],
GrantSignature: new byte[64],
GrantedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch));
response.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.BadRequest);
}
///
/// The rotation itself: the generation advances, the caller holds the new key, and the flag a
/// removal set is cleared because the rotation it recorded has happened. What the server cannot do
/// is any part of the cryptography — the wrap arrives sealed and is stored as bytes.
///
[Fact]
public async Task RekeyingAVault_AdvancesTheGenerationAndWrapsItToTheCaller()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("rotate-owner", "rotowner@example.com");
await EnrolledClientAsync("rotate-member", "rotmember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Rotations");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "rotmember@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
await DeleteAsync(owner, MemberUrl(team.TeamId, entry.UserId));
var rotated = await RekeyAsync(owner, vaultId, generation: 2);
rotated.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(2u);
rotated.RekeyRequired.ShouldBeFalse();
var grants = await ReadAsync(owner, $"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/grants");
grants.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(2u);
grants.RekeyRequired.ShouldBeFalse();
var me = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
var summary = me.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.VaultId == vaultId);
summary.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(2u);
summary.WrappedVaultKey.ShouldNotBeNull();
}
///
/// The reason a rotation does not have to re-encrypt anything to be safe, and the reason it cannot
/// throw the old grants away: every item still carries the generation it was sealed under, so the
/// caller has to go on holding every key they were given or the vault's history becomes unreadable
/// to the people who are still in the team.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ARotatedVault_StillServesTheCallerTheGenerationsItHasMovedPast()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("history-owner", "histowner@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "History");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
await RekeyAsync(owner, vaultId, generation: 2);
await RekeyAsync(owner, vaultId, generation: 3);
var me = await ReadAsync(owner, MeUrl);
var summary = me.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.VaultId == vaultId);
summary.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(3u);
summary.PriorKeyWraps.ShouldNotBeNull();
summary.PriorKeyWraps.Select(wrap => wrap.KeyGeneration).ShouldBe([1u, 2u]);
}
///
/// The sharing list answers "who can open this", so a member appears once however many generations
/// they hold — and the generation on their row is the best key they have, which is what makes a row
/// below the vault's own generation mean "still owed the new key".
///
[Fact]
public async Task TheGrantListing_ShowsAMemberOnceWithTheBestKeyTheyHold()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("listing-owner", "listowner@example.com");
await EnrolledClientAsync("listing-member", "listmember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Listings");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "listmember@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
var issued = await owner.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/grants", GrantRequest(entry, generation: 1));
issued.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
await RekeyAsync(owner, vaultId, generation: 2);
var grants = await ReadAsync(owner, $"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/grants");
grants.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(2u);
grants.Grants.Count.ShouldBe(2);
// The rotating owner holds both generations and is listed at the newer one.
grants.Grants.Single(g => g.RecipientUserId != entry.UserId).KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(2u);
// The member has not been re-wrapped, so their row says so by generation rather than by state.
var stale = grants.Grants.Single(g => g.RecipientUserId == entry.UserId);
stale.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(1u);
stale.State.ShouldBe(VaultGrantState.Active);
}
///
/// Two admins rotating at once must not both succeed, or one of them ends up holding a key nobody
/// else has and every item they write is unreadable to the rest of the team. The generation is what
/// makes that decidable: the second request is no longer one past the current, and is refused with a
/// message that says to read the vault again.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ARekeyFromASupersededGeneration_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("race-owner", "raceowner@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Races");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
await RekeyAsync(owner, vaultId, generation: 2);
var stale = await owner.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/rekey", RekeyRequest(generation: 2));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(stale, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidVaultGrant);
}
///
/// A member with no key to the current generation cannot rotate. They could not have wrapped the
/// new key from the old one, so the request is either a mistake or a way to strand everybody else
/// behind a key nobody holds.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ARekeyByAMemberWhoHoldsNoKey_IsRefused()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("keyless-owner", "klowner@example.com");
var member = await EnrolledClientAsync("keyless-member", "klmember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Keyless");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "klmember@example.com");
// Admin, so permission is not what stops them: what stops them is holding no key.
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Admin);
var response = await member.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/rekey", RekeyRequest(generation: 2));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(response, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidVaultGrant);
}
///
/// Sharing a rotated vault means handing over its history too, so a grant for a generation the vault
/// has moved past is accepted. One for a generation it has not reached is not: nothing is sealed
/// under it, and accepting it would let a client move the vault forward outside the one transaction
/// that is allowed to.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AGrantForAnEarlierGeneration_IsAcceptedAndOneForALaterOneIsNot()
{
var owner = await EnrolledClientAsync("gen-owner", "genowner@example.com");
var member = await EnrolledClientAsync("gen-member", "genmember@example.com");
var team = await CreateTeamAsync(owner, "Generations");
var vaultId = await CreateVaultAsync(owner, team.TeamId);
var entry = await LookupAsync(owner, "genmember@example.com");
await AddMemberAsync(owner, team.TeamId, entry.UserId, TeamMemberRole.Member);
await RekeyAsync(owner, vaultId, generation: 2);
foreach (var generation in (uint[])[1, 2])
{
var accepted = await owner.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/grants", GrantRequest(entry, generation));
accepted.StatusCode.ShouldBe(HttpStatusCode.NoContent);
}
var ahead = await owner.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/grants", GrantRequest(entry, generation: 3));
await ShouldBeProblemAsync(ahead, HttpStatusCode.BadRequest, ProblemCodes.InvalidVaultGrant);
// Both grants are live at once, which is what lets the recipient read the vault's history and
// its present. A single row per recipient would have made one of them overwrite the other.
var me = await ReadAsync(member, MeUrl);
var summary = me.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.VaultId == vaultId);
summary.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(2u);
summary.PriorKeyWraps.ShouldNotBeNull().ShouldHaveSingleItem().KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(1u);
}
// ---- The directory and the key log ----
///
/// The directory has no search. Asserting it rather than trusting the implementation, because a
/// prefix match added later for convenience turns a server that stores addresses in plaintext into a
/// way to enumerate an organisation's staff.
///
[Fact]
public async Task TheDirectory_MatchesAnExactAddressAndNothingElse()
{
var client = await EnrolledClientAsync("directory-self", "findme@example.com");
var address = addresses["findme@example.com"];
var exact = await ReadAsync>(
client, $"/api/v1/directory?email={Uri.EscapeDataString(address)}");
exact.Count.ShouldBe(1);
// Case-insensitive, because the column is citext and two addresses differing only in case are
// one account. That is a match, not a search.
var cased = await ReadAsync>(
client, $"/api/v1/directory?email={Uri.EscapeDataString(address.ToUpperInvariant())}");
cased.Count.ShouldBe(1);
// The address with its last character removed. A directory that answered this would be a way to
// walk an organisation's staff list out of a server that stores addresses in plaintext.
var prefix = await ReadAsync>(
client, $"/api/v1/directory?email={Uri.EscapeDataString(address[..^1])}");
prefix.ShouldBeEmpty();
}
///
/// The key log has to verify from genesis with the hashes the server publishes, because that is the
/// whole of what a client can check. A chain that only the server could reproduce would make key
/// transparency a claim rather than a mechanism.
///
[Fact]
public async Task TheKeyLog_ChainsFromGenesisWithTheHashesItPublishes()
{
var client = await EnrolledClientAsync("keylog-reader", "keylog@example.com");
var page = await ReadAsync(client, "/api/v1/keylog?after=0");
page.Entries.ShouldNotBeEmpty();
var previous = Crypto.KeyLogChain.CreateGenesisPreviousHash();
foreach (var entry in page.Entries)
{
entry.PreviousHash.ShouldBe(previous);
Crypto.KeyLogChain.ComputeEntryHash(
entry.PreviousHash,
entry.UserId,
entry.Generation,
entry.EncryptionPublicKey,
entry.SigningPublicKey,
entry.StatementSignature,
entry.CreatedAt).ShouldBe(entry.Hash);
previous = entry.Hash;
}
// And the head the page reports is the last link, or a client that paged to the end could not
// tell whether it had seen the whole log.
if (!page.HasMore)
{
page.Head.ShouldBe(previous);
}
}
// ---- Helpers ----
private static string TeamUrl(Guid teamId) => $"{TeamsUrl}/{teamId}";
private static string OwnerUrl(Guid teamId) => $"{TeamsUrl}/{teamId}/owner";
private static string MembersUrl(Guid teamId) => $"{TeamsUrl}/{teamId}/members";
private static string MemberUrl(Guid teamId, Guid userId) => $"{MembersUrl(teamId)}/{userId}";
private static string MemberRoleUrl(Guid teamId, Guid userId) =>
$"{MemberUrl(teamId, userId)}/role";
private static string InvitationsUrl(Guid teamId) => $"{TeamsUrl}/{teamId}/invitations";
private static string InvitationUrl(Guid teamId, Guid invitationId) =>
$"{InvitationsUrl(teamId)}/{invitationId}";
private static string TeamVaultsUrl(Guid teamId) => $"{TeamsUrl}/{teamId}/vaults";
/// An address no account holds, uniquified because the container is shared.
private static string NewAddress() => $"invitee-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}@example.com";
private async Task EnrolledClientAsync(string subject, string? email = null)
{
var unique = $"{subject}-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}";
var address = email is null ? null : $"{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}-{email}";
using var enrollment = new TestEnrollment(fixture.IdentityProvider, unique, address);
var client = fixture.CreateClientFor(unique, address);
var response = await client.PostContractAsync(EnrollUrl, enrollment.Build());
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
// The address is remembered on the client so a later directory lookup can name it: the tests
// uniquify addresses so that runs against a shared container cannot collide.
if (address is not null)
{
addresses[email!] = address;
}
return client;
}
/// Signs a brand-new account in, which is what claims any invitation to its address.
///
/// No enrollment, because an invitee has no key and the claim path must not need one — requiring it
/// would be requiring it of exactly the person who cannot yet supply it. Driving /me is what
/// runs just-in-time provisioning, and provisioning is where the claim happens.
///
private async Task<(HttpClient Client, Guid UserId)> SignInAsync(
string email,
bool emailVerified = true)
{
var client = fixture.CreateClientFor(
$"invitee-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}", email, emailVerified);
var me = await ReadAsync(client, MeUrl);
return (client, me.UserId);
}
/// Uniquified addresses, keyed on the readable one a test wrote.
private readonly Dictionary addresses = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
///
/// The slug is generated rather than derived from the name, because a slug is lowercase letters,
/// digits and hyphens and a display name is not — deriving one would make these tests depend on a
/// transformation the product does not perform. It is uniquified because the container is shared
/// across every class in this assembly and the slug is unique deployment-wide.
///
private static Task CreateTeamAsync(HttpClient client, string name) =>
PostAsync(
client,
TeamsUrl,
new CreateTeamRequest(
Guid.CreateVersion7(), name, $"team-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}", null));
///
/// The wrapped key and the signature are the right shape and nothing more. The server stores both
/// opaquely and verifies neither — see docs/crypto.md §6 — so a real seal here would be testing the
/// crypto library rather than the endpoint.
///
private static async Task CreateVaultAsync(HttpClient client, Guid teamId)
{
var vault = await PostAsync(
client,
TeamVaultsUrl(teamId),
new CreateTeamVaultRequest(
Guid.CreateVersion7(),
"Team vault",
WrappedVaultKey: new byte[110],
GrantSignature: new byte[64],
GrantedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch));
return vault.VaultId;
}
///
/// The wrap is the right shape and nothing more, for the reason gives:
/// the server stores it opaquely, so a real seal here would be exercising the crypto library.
///
private static RekeyVaultRequest RekeyRequest(uint generation) =>
new(
KeyGeneration: generation,
WrappedVaultKey: new byte[110],
GrantSignature: new byte[64],
GrantedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch);
private static IssueVaultGrantRequest GrantRequest(DirectoryEntry entry, uint generation) =>
new(
entry.UserId,
entry.Fingerprint,
KeyGeneration: generation,
WrappedVaultKey: new byte[110],
KeyLogHead: new byte[32],
GrantSignature: new byte[64],
GrantedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch);
private static async Task RekeyAsync(
HttpClient client,
Guid vaultId,
uint generation)
{
var response = await client.PostContractAsync(
$"/api/v1/vaults/{vaultId}/rekey", RekeyRequest(generation));
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
return (await response.Content.ReadContractAsync())!;
}
private async Task LookupAsync(HttpClient client, string email)
{
var address = addresses.GetValueOrDefault(email, email);
var found = await ReadAsync>(
client, $"/api/v1/directory?email={Uri.EscapeDataString(address)}");
return found.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
}
private static async Task AddMemberAsync(
HttpClient client,
Guid teamId,
Guid userId,
TeamMemberRole role)
{
var response = await client.PostContractAsync(
MembersUrl(teamId), new AddTeamMemberRequest(userId, role));
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
}
private static Task InviteAsync(
HttpClient client,
Guid teamId,
string email,
TeamMemberRole role = TeamMemberRole.Member) =>
PostAsync(
client,
InvitationsUrl(teamId),
new CreateTeamInvitationRequest(Guid.CreateVersion7(), email, role));
///
/// Filtered by id rather than taken from a position in the list, because the container is shared and
/// every other class's invitations are in the same table. A count over the whole listing would pass
/// or fail depending on what else ran.
///
private static async Task FindInvitationAsync(
HttpClient client,
Guid teamId,
Guid invitationId)
{
var listed = await ReadAsync>(
client, InvitationsUrl(teamId));
return listed.Where(row => row.InvitationId == invitationId).ShouldHaveSingleItem();
}
private static async Task PostAsync(
HttpClient client,
string url,
TRequest body)
{
var response = await client.PostContractAsync(url, body);
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
return (await response.Content.ReadContractAsync())!;
}
private static async Task ReadAsync(HttpClient client, string url)
{
var response = await GetAsync(client, url);
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
return (await response.Content.ReadContractAsync())!;
}
private static Task GetAsync(HttpClient client, string url) =>
client.GetAsync(new Uri(url, UriKind.Relative), TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
private static Task DeleteAsync(HttpClient client, string url) =>
client.DeleteAsync(new Uri(url, UriKind.Relative), TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
///
/// Asserts on the code extension and never on the prose, for the reason
/// gives: the code is the contract and the wording is not.
///
private static async Task ShouldBeProblemAsync(
HttpResponseMessage response,
HttpStatusCode expectedStatus,
string expectedCode)
{
response.StatusCode.ShouldBe(expectedStatus);
var problem = await response.Content.ReadProblemAsync();
problem.ShouldNotBeNull();
problem.Code.ShouldBe(expectedCode);
}
}