using System.Buffers.Binary;
using System.Globalization;
using NSec.Cryptography;
namespace DodoSSH.Crypto.Tests;
///
/// The user secret bundle and the passphrase-derived keys that wrap it. See docs/crypto.md §3.
///
///
/// The encoding is checked against an independent implementation written here rather than by
/// round-tripping production code against itself. A round trip passes just as happily when both
/// directions are wrong in the same way, and this format cannot be changed after a single bundle has
/// been stored — the server holds no keys, so only clients could ever re-encrypt.
///
public sealed class UserSecretBundleTests
{
private static readonly Guid Alice = Guid.Parse("0192f0c8-1a2b-7c3d-8e4f-5a6b7c8d9e0f");
private static readonly Guid Bob = Guid.Parse("0192f0c8-1a2b-7c3d-8e4f-5a6b7c8d9e10");
private static readonly DateTimeOffset CreatedAt = DateTimeOffset.FromUnixTimeMilliseconds(1_750_000_000_123);
///
/// The layout of §3.1, pinned. Built from the fixed keys below at generation 1 and
/// .
///
///
/// This constant is the golden vector for the bundle format. A change here that is not a
/// deliberate, versioned format change makes every stored wrap unopenable, with no server-side
/// remedy and no rollback.
///
private const string ExpectedEncodingHex =
"647368312f62756e646c652f7631" // "dsh1/bundle/v1"
+ "0001" // version 1
+ "00000001" // key generation 1
+ "000001977420dc7b" // created at, Unix ms
+ "4041424344454647484950515253545556575859606162636465666768697071" // x25519 sk
+ "8081828384858687888990919293949596979899a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9b0b1"; // ed25519 sk
private static byte[] EncryptionPrivateKey { get; } =
Convert.FromHexString("4041424344454647484950515253545556575859606162636465666768697071");
private static byte[] SigningPrivateKey { get; } =
Convert.FromHexString("8081828384858687888990919293949596979899a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9b0b1");
// ---- Encoding ----
[Fact]
public void TheEncodedLength_IsNinetyTwoBytes()
{
UserSecretBundle.EncodedLength.ShouldBe(92);
ExpectedEncodingHex.Length.ShouldBe(UserSecretBundle.EncodedLength * 2);
}
[Fact]
public void TheDecoder_AcceptsAnIndependentlyBuiltEncoding()
{
// Proves the reader matches the specification rather than matching our writer.
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
var envelope = DshCrypto.Seal(kek, Convert.FromHexString(ExpectedEncodingHex), descriptor);
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(kek, envelope, descriptor);
bundle.ShouldNotBeNull();
bundle.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(1u);
bundle.CreatedAt.ToUnixTimeMilliseconds().ShouldBe(CreatedAt.ToUnixTimeMilliseconds());
bundle.EncryptionPublicKey.ShouldBe(PublicKeyOf(KeyAgreementAlgorithm.X25519, EncryptionPrivateKey));
bundle.SigningPublicKey.ShouldBe(PublicKeyOf(SignatureAlgorithm.Ed25519, SigningPrivateKey));
}
[Fact]
public void TheEncoder_ProducesWhatAnIndependentDecoderExpects()
{
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt, keyGeneration: 3);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice, keyGeneration: 3);
var envelope = bundle.WrapUnder(kek, descriptor);
var plaintext = DshCrypto.Open(kek, envelope, descriptor);
plaintext.ShouldNotBeNull();
plaintext.Length.ShouldBe(UserSecretBundle.EncodedLength);
var decoded = DecodeIndependently(plaintext);
decoded.Label.ShouldBe("dsh1/bundle/v1");
decoded.Version.ShouldBe(1);
decoded.KeyGeneration.ShouldBe(3u);
decoded.CreatedAtUnixMilliseconds.ShouldBe(CreatedAt.ToUnixTimeMilliseconds());
// The private keys in the encoding must be the ones whose public halves the bundle reports.
PublicKeyOf(KeyAgreementAlgorithm.X25519, decoded.EncryptionPrivateKey)
.ShouldBe(bundle.EncryptionPublicKey);
PublicKeyOf(SignatureAlgorithm.Ed25519, decoded.SigningPrivateKey)
.ShouldBe(bundle.SigningPublicKey);
}
[Fact]
public void ASubMillisecondTimestamp_IsTruncatedSoTheEncodingIsStable()
{
using var exact = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
using var noisy = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt.AddTicks(9_999));
noisy.CreatedAt.ShouldBe(exact.CreatedAt);
}
// ---- The keys inside actually work ----
[Fact]
public void TheSigningKey_ProducesSignaturesItsPublicHalfVerifies()
{
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var statement = KeyStatementCodec.Encode(new KeyStatementFields(
1, "https://idp.example", "alice", null,
bundle.EncryptionPublicKey, bundle.SigningPublicKey,
1, CreatedAt, "laptop"));
var signature = DshSignatures.SignKeyStatement(bundle.SigningKey, statement);
DshSignatures.VerifyKeyStatement(bundle.SigningPublicKey, statement, signature).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void TheEncryptionKey_OpensWhatWasSealedToItsPublicHalf()
{
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var vaultKey = VaultKeys.Create();
var grant = VaultKeys.WrapTo(vaultKey, bundle.EncryptionPublicKey, Alice, 1);
VaultKeys.TryUnwrap(bundle.EncryptionKey, grant, Alice, 1).ShouldBe(vaultKey);
}
[Fact]
public void TheTwoKeys_AreDistinct()
{
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
bundle.EncryptionPublicKey.ShouldNotBe(bundle.SigningPublicKey);
}
// ---- The AAD binding ----
[Fact]
public void AWrapForAnotherUser_DoesNotOpen()
{
// The property that matters most. Without it a server could hand Bob's wrap to Alice, and if
// they ever shared a passphrase she would silently unlock his identity.
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var envelope = bundle.WrapUnder(kek, DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice));
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(kek, envelope, DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Bob)).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void AWrapFromAnotherKeyGeneration_DoesNotOpen()
{
// Stops a server serving back a superseded bundle after a key rotation.
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt, keyGeneration: 2);
var envelope = bundle.WrapUnder(kek, DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice, keyGeneration: 2));
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(kek, envelope, DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice, keyGeneration: 1))
.ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void AWrongKey_ReturnsNullRatherThanThrowing()
{
// The overwhelmingly common case is a mistyped passphrase, so this is a return value.
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var envelope = bundle.WrapUnder(kek, DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice));
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(new byte[32], envelope, DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice))
.ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void ASealedWrap_DoesNotOpenAsASymmetricOne()
{
using var device = Key.Create(KeyAgreementAlgorithm.X25519);
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
var sealedWrap = bundle.SealTo(device.PublicKey.Export(KeyBlobFormat.RawPublicKey), descriptor);
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(new byte[32], sealedWrap, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
// ---- Device wraps ----
[Fact]
public void ADeviceWrap_OpensWithTheDeviceKey()
{
using var device = Key.Create(KeyAgreementAlgorithm.X25519);
using var original = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
var wrap = original.SealTo(device.PublicKey.Export(KeyBlobFormat.RawPublicKey), descriptor);
using var reopened = UserSecretBundle.TryOpenSealed(device, wrap, descriptor);
reopened.ShouldNotBeNull();
reopened.EncryptionPublicKey.ShouldBe(original.EncryptionPublicKey);
reopened.SigningPublicKey.ShouldBe(original.SigningPublicKey);
}
[Fact]
public void ADeviceWrap_DoesNotOpenWithAnotherDevicesKey()
{
using var device = Key.Create(KeyAgreementAlgorithm.X25519);
using var other = Key.Create(KeyAgreementAlgorithm.X25519);
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
var wrap = bundle.SealTo(device.PublicKey.Export(KeyBlobFormat.RawPublicKey), descriptor);
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenSealed(other, wrap, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void ManyWrapsOfOneBundle_AllYieldTheSameIdentity()
{
// The load-bearing property of the whole hierarchy: a passphrase change re-wraps ~92 bytes
// and touches one row, because every wrap protects the same bundle.
using var device = Key.Create(KeyAgreementAlgorithm.X25519);
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
Span passphraseKek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(passphraseKek);
Span recoveryKek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
recoveryKek.Fill(0x5A);
using var viaPassphrase = UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(
passphraseKek, bundle.WrapUnder(passphraseKek, descriptor), descriptor);
using var viaRecovery = UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(
recoveryKek, bundle.WrapUnder(recoveryKek, descriptor), descriptor);
using var viaDevice = UserSecretBundle.TryOpenSealed(
device,
bundle.SealTo(device.PublicKey.Export(KeyBlobFormat.RawPublicKey), descriptor),
descriptor);
foreach (var opened in new[] { viaPassphrase, viaRecovery, viaDevice })
{
opened.ShouldNotBeNull();
opened.EncryptionPublicKey.ShouldBe(bundle.EncryptionPublicKey);
opened.SigningPublicKey.ShouldBe(bundle.SigningPublicKey);
}
}
// ---- Malformed plaintext ----
[Theory]
[InlineData(0)]
[InlineData(91)]
[InlineData(93)]
[InlineData(200)]
public void APlaintextOfTheWrongLength_IsRejected(int length)
{
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
var envelope = DshCrypto.Seal(kek, new byte[length], descriptor);
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(kek, envelope, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void APlaintextWithTheWrongLabel_IsRejected()
{
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
var tampered = Convert.FromHexString(ExpectedEncodingHex);
tampered[0] ^= 0xFF;
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
var envelope = DshCrypto.Seal(kek, tampered, descriptor);
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(kek, envelope, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void APlaintextWithAnUnknownVersion_IsRejected()
{
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
var tampered = Convert.FromHexString(ExpectedEncodingHex);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(tampered.AsSpan(14), 2);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
var envelope = DshCrypto.Seal(kek, tampered, descriptor);
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(kek, envelope, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void APlaintextWithGenerationZero_IsRejected()
{
Span kek = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
FillKek(kek);
var tampered = Convert.FromHexString(ExpectedEncodingHex);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(tampered.AsSpan(16), 0);
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
var envelope = DshCrypto.Seal(kek, tampered, descriptor);
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(kek, envelope, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
// ---- Lifetime ----
[Fact]
public void UsingADisposedBundle_Throws()
{
var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
bundle.Dispose();
Should.Throw(() => bundle.SigningKey);
Should.Throw(() => bundle.EncryptionKey);
}
[Fact]
public void DisposingTwice_IsHarmless()
{
var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
bundle.Dispose();
Should.NotThrow(bundle.Dispose);
}
[Fact]
public void Create_RejectsGenerationZero()
{
Should.Throw(() => UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt, 0));
}
// ---- Independent codec, for the differential assertions above ----
private static byte[] PublicKeyOf(Algorithm algorithm, byte[] privateKey)
{
using var key = Key.Import(algorithm, privateKey, KeyBlobFormat.RawPrivateKey);
return key.PublicKey.Export(KeyBlobFormat.RawPublicKey);
}
private static void FillKek(Span destination)
{
for (var i = 0; i < destination.Length; i++)
{
destination[i] = (byte)(0x10 + i);
}
}
/// Reads §3.1 from the document, independently of the production decoder.
private static DecodedBundle DecodeIndependently(byte[] encoded) =>
new(
Label: System.Text.Encoding.ASCII.GetString(encoded, 0, 14),
Version: BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(encoded.AsSpan(14)),
KeyGeneration: BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32BigEndian(encoded.AsSpan(16)),
CreatedAtUnixMilliseconds: BinaryPrimitives.ReadInt64BigEndian(encoded.AsSpan(20)),
EncryptionPrivateKey: encoded[28..60],
SigningPrivateKey: encoded[60..92]);
private sealed record DecodedBundle(
string Label,
int Version,
uint KeyGeneration,
long CreatedAtUnixMilliseconds,
byte[] EncryptionPrivateKey,
byte[] SigningPrivateKey);
}
///
/// Passphrase stretching and subkey derivation. See docs/crypto.md §2 and §3.
///
///
/// Uses the cheapest profile throughout. These tests are about the shape of the hierarchy, not about
/// how long Argon2id takes; the default profile would add several seconds per case for no extra
/// coverage. Cost calibration is a measurement, recorded in docs/platform-flags.md.
///
public sealed class MasterKeyTests
{
private static readonly Guid Alice = Guid.Parse("0192f0c8-1a2b-7c3d-8e4f-5a6b7c8d9e0f");
private static readonly DateTimeOffset CreatedAt = DateTimeOffset.FromUnixTimeMilliseconds(1_750_000_000_123);
private const string Passphrase = "correct horse battery staple";
private static byte[] Salt { get; } =
[.. Enumerable.Range(0, CryptoSpec.SaltSize).Select(i => (byte)(0x20 + i))];
[Fact]
public void ThePassphrase_UnlocksTheBundleItWrapped()
{
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
byte[] wrap;
byte[] expectedSigningKey;
using (var master = Derive())
using (var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt))
{
wrap = master.WrapBundle(bundle, descriptor);
expectedSigningKey = bundle.SigningPublicKey;
}
// A fresh derivation, as a later unlock on another device would do.
using var reopenedMaster = Derive();
using var reopened = reopenedMaster.TryOpenBundle(wrap, descriptor);
reopened.ShouldNotBeNull();
reopened.SigningPublicKey.ShouldBe(expectedSigningKey);
}
[Fact]
public void AWrongPassphrase_ReturnsNull()
{
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
using var master = Derive();
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var wrap = master.WrapBundle(bundle, descriptor);
using var wrong = MasterKey.Derive("not the passphrase", Salt, Argon2Profile.RandomSecret);
wrong.TryOpenBundle(wrap, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void ADifferentSalt_ProducesADifferentKey()
{
// Which is why the salt has to be cached locally: unlock must work offline, and fetching the
// salt at unlock time would make an offline launch impossible.
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
using var master = Derive();
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var wrap = master.WrapBundle(bundle, descriptor);
var otherSalt = Salt.ToArray();
otherSalt[0] ^= 0xFF;
using var other = MasterKey.Derive(Passphrase, otherSalt, Argon2Profile.RandomSecret);
other.TryOpenBundle(wrap, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void TheLocalCacheKey_CannotOpenABundleWrap()
{
// Domain separation, tested through behaviour rather than by comparing derived bytes. The
// cache and the vault live in different threat models and must not share a key.
var descriptor = DshAad.UserSecretBundle(Alice);
using var master = Derive();
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(CreatedAt);
var wrap = master.WrapBundle(bundle, descriptor);
Span cacheKey = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
master.DeriveLocalCacheKey(cacheKey);
UserSecretBundle.TryOpenUnder(cacheKey, wrap, descriptor).ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void TheLocalCacheKey_IsStableForTheSamePassphraseAndSalt()
{
Span first = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
Span second = stackalloc byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
using (var master = Derive())
{
master.DeriveLocalCacheKey(first);
}
using (var master = Derive())
{
master.DeriveLocalCacheKey(second);
}
first.SequenceEqual(second).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void ASaltShorterThanTheSpecifiedMinimum_IsRejected()
{
Should.Throw(() =>
MasterKey.Derive(Passphrase, new byte[CryptoSpec.SaltSize - 1], Argon2Profile.RandomSecret));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(null)]
public void AnEmptyPassphrase_IsRejected(string? passphrase)
{
Should.Throw(() =>
MasterKey.Derive(passphrase!, Salt, Argon2Profile.RandomSecret));
}
[Fact]
public void UsingADisposedMasterKey_Throws()
{
var master = Derive();
master.Dispose();
Should.Throw(() =>
{
var buffer = new byte[CryptoSpec.SymmetricKeySize];
master.DeriveLocalCacheKey(buffer);
});
}
[Fact]
public void ASubkeyBufferOfTheWrongSize_IsRejected()
{
using var master = Derive();
Should.Throw(() => master.DeriveLocalCacheKey(new byte[16]));
}
[Fact]
public void TheCheapestProfile_IsStillTheSpecifiedFloor()
{
// Guards the constant these tests lean on: if RandomSecret ever dropped below the server's
// enrollment floor, the tests would be exercising parameters the API rejects.
Argon2Profile.RandomSecret.MemoryKibibytes
.ShouldBeGreaterThanOrEqualTo(
64 * 1024,
string.Create(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, $"64 MiB is the enrollment floor."));
}
private static MasterKey Derive() =>
MasterKey.Derive(Passphrase, Salt, Argon2Profile.RandomSecret);
}