using DodoSSH.Client.Session; // FakeDeviceKeyStore is compiled into this assembly from a source link and keeps its original namespace; // see the csproj for why it is shared rather than reimplemented. using DodoSSH.Client.Session.Tests; using DodoSSH.Client.Shell.ViewModels; using DodoSSH.Client.Ssh; using DodoSSH.Client.Storage; using DodoSSH.Client.Terminal; using DodoSSH.Contracts; using DodoSSH.Crypto; namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Tests; /// /// Vaults, from the side that holds the keys: make one, add somebody, and wrap its key to them. /// /// /// /// The reason this suite exists rather than leaving sharing to the server's own tests is that the /// interesting half is not on the server. Adding a member is a row; sharing is a decision the client /// makes about whether to trust a public key the server just handed it, and that decision is what /// stands between an end-to-end encrypted vault and one the operator can read by answering a directory /// lookup with a key of their own. /// /// /// So the fake server keeps a real key log — chained with the same KeyLogChain the server uses — /// and can be told to corrupt it. A test that only ever saw a well-formed log would be checking that /// sharing works, not that verification does. /// /// /// It was TeamSharingTests, and the screen it drives stopped being about teams: a vault is what /// gets made and named, and the membership list behind it is made with it. The team is still what the /// server authorises against, which is why the assertions about roles, hand-over and invitations are all /// still here — they are the same operations, reached through the vault they apply to. /// /// public sealed class VaultSharingTests : IAsyncLifetime { private const string Passphrase = "a sufficiently long passphrase"; private static readonly Argon2Profile CheapProfile = Argon2Profile.FromStoredParameters(memoryKibibytes: 8 * 1024, passes: 1, parallelism: 1); private readonly FakeVaultServer server = new(); private readonly FakeSshConnectionFactory ssh = new(); private string directory = null!; private ClientCacheFactory caches = null!; private TerminalWorkspace workspace = null!; private VaultKnownHostStore knownHosts = null!; private FakeDeviceKeyStore deviceKeys = null!; private MainWindowViewModel shell = null!; private static CancellationToken Token => TestContext.Current.CancellationToken; /// public ValueTask InitializeAsync() { directory = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"dodossh-vaults-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}"); var paths = new ClientPaths(directory); caches = ClientCacheFactory.ForFile(paths.CacheFile); knownHosts = new VaultKnownHostStore(); deviceKeys = new FakeDeviceKeyStore(); workspace = new TerminalWorkspace( new InMemoryTerminalAssetProvider( new Dictionary(StringComparer.Ordinal)), ssh, TimeProvider.System); shell = new MainWindowViewModel( paths, caches, workspace, knownHosts, deviceKeys, (_, _) => Task.FromResult(server), TimeProvider.System, NSubstitute.Substitute.For(), CheapProfile); return ValueTask.CompletedTask; } /// public async ValueTask DisposeAsync() { await shell.DisposeAsync(); knownHosts.Close(); await workspace.DisposeAsync(); caches.Dispose(); try { Directory.Delete(directory, recursive: true); } catch (IOException) { // A cache file the process has not finished releasing. The directory is under the temp path // and named per run, so leaving it costs a few kilobytes and never collides. } } /// /// The whole point of a shared vault, in one test. Adding somebody wraps the vault to them, so the /// status line names what they were given rather than what is still owed — and the grant is on the /// server before the add has finished reporting. /// [Fact] public async Task AddingSomebody_WrapsTheVaultToThemStraightAway() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status); server.IssuedGrants.ShouldContainKey( (vaultId, colleague), "adding somebody to a vault is what shares it with them"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Platform secrets"); } /// /// The manual path still works and is still worth having: a vault whose key this machine did not /// hold when somebody was added is shared by pressing the button once it does. Re-wrapping to /// somebody who already holds the key is the same call, and the server replaces the row rather than /// adding a second one. /// [Fact] public async Task SharingAVaultByHand_WrapsTheKeyAndSaysWhatItCannotPromise() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague); await vaults.ShareVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; server.IssuedGrants.ShouldContainKey((vaultId, colleague)); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Shared"); // The one thing verification cannot promise, said in the same breath as the success. vaults.Status.ShouldContain("fingerprint", Case.Insensitive); } /// /// /// The other half of the same idea. Removing somebody withdraws their grants — which only blocks /// future reads — so the vault is rotated in the same breath and the new key goes to the people who /// are left. From that moment nothing written is readable to the person who went. /// /// /// The remaining member is given the earlier generation as well as the new one, which is what keeps /// the vault's existing items readable to them: a rotation re-keys the vault, not its contents. /// /// [Fact] public async Task RemovingSomebody_RotatesTheVaultAndHandsTheNewKeyToWhoIsLeft() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var leaving = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example"); var staying = server.AddAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; foreach (var address in (string[])["bob@example.com", "carol@example.com"]) { vaults.InviteEmail = address; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); } vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(3, vaults.Status); vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == leaving); await vaults.RemoveMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Rotated", customMessage: vaults.Status); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Platform secrets"); // The last act of a rotation is moving what is already stored onto the new key. Proven by the // bytes in DodoSSH.Client.Sync.Tests; what this asserts is that the shell asks for it at all, // and says which of the two guarantees the user has ended up with. vaults.Status.ShouldContain("re-sealed under the new key", customMessage: vaults.Status); // Gone entirely, at every generation. A revocation that left the history behind would leave them // able to read everything written before they went, from a copy of the ciphertext. server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, leaving).ShouldBeEmpty(); // And the member who stayed holds both: the new key for what comes next, the old one for what // is already stored under it. server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, staying).ShouldBe([1u, 2u]); } /// /// Somebody added after a rotation is given every generation the sharing machine holds, not only the /// newest. A vault shared as one key would open to a list of items that will not decrypt, which /// reads as corruption rather than as the missing grant it is. /// [Fact] public async Task AddingSomebodyToARotatedVault_HandsThemItsHistoryAsWell() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var first = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example"); var second = server.AddAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); // Removing them is what rotates the vault, so the next person to be added arrives at a vault // with a history rather than one that has only ever had a single key. vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == first); await vaults.RemoveMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.InviteEmail = "carol@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, second).ShouldBe([1u, 2u], vaults.Status); } /// /// /// The test this whole design exists for. A server that wants to read a shared vault only has to /// answer one directory lookup with a key it holds the private half of — so the client reads the /// append-only key log, verifies its chain, and refuses to wrap anything unless the key it was /// offered is in there unchanged. /// /// /// Nothing may be sent. A refusal that still issued the grant, or that issued it on a retry, would be /// worse than no check at all, because the interface would have said it was verified. /// /// [Fact] public async Task ATamperedKeyLog_StopsTheShareRatherThanWarningAboutIt() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var colleague = server.AddAccount("mallory@example.com", "Mallory Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); // Before the add, because the add now shares. Both routes to a wrap have to refuse, and a test // that corrupted the log afterwards would be asserting about the second one only. server.CorruptKeyLog = true; vaults.InviteEmail = "mallory@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; server.IssuedGrants.ShouldNotContainKey((vaultId, colleague)); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Could not share"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("key log"); vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague); await vaults.ShareVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); server.IssuedGrants.ShouldNotContainKey((vaultId, colleague)); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Did not share"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("key log"); } /// /// A vault created here is usable here, without a relock. The key was generated in this process, so /// making the user lock and unlock to reach the vault they just made would be asking them to work /// around bookkeeping. /// [Fact] public async Task AVaultCreatedHere_IsImmediatelyReadableAndWritable() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; var session = shell.Vault!.Session; session.ReadableVaults.Select(vault => vault.VaultId).ShouldContain(vaultId); // And it is offered as somewhere to file a new item, which is what makes it worth having. await shell.Vault.LoadAsync(Token); shell.Vault.TargetVaults.Select(choice => choice.VaultId).ShouldContain(vaultId); shell.Vault.HasVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue(); } /// /// Making a vault makes exactly one membership list, and this is the assertion that the two-step create /// has not started leaking them: the screen no longer offers to make one on its own, so a second one /// per vault would be invisible in the interface and visible only to an operator. /// [Fact] public async Task CreatingAVault_MakesOneMembershipListWithTheCallerAsItsOwner() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); server.TeamCreates.ShouldBe(1); var row = vaults.Vaults.Single( vault => string.Equals(vault.Name, "Platform secrets", StringComparison.Ordinal)); row.IsShared.ShouldBeTrue("a vault made here is one other people can be added to"); row.IsOwned.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status); row.SharedWithOtherVaults.ShouldBe(0, "it was made with a membership list of its own"); vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Role.ShouldBe("OWNER"); } /// /// The personal vault is in the list, is marked as the one thing it is, and offers nothing to share: /// the server refuses a grant on one outright, so a screen that let somebody try would be sending them /// at a refusal. /// [Fact] public async Task ThePersonalVault_IsListedAndCannotBeSharedWithAnybody() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await vaults.LoadAsync(Token); var personal = vaults.Vaults.ShouldHaveSingleItem(); personal.IsPersonal.ShouldBeTrue(); personal.IsShared.ShouldBeFalse(); personal.RoleLabel.ShouldBe("PERSONAL"); vaults.SelectedVault = personal; vaults.SelectedIsShared.ShouldBeFalse(); vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Members.ShouldBeEmpty(); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("cannot be shared"); } /// /// Filing into a shared vault has to be chosen and has to stick. The bug this guards is the obvious /// one: an editor that read the picker at save time rather than at open time, so changing the picker /// with a half-typed host on screen would move it. /// [Fact] public async Task AHostFiledIntoASharedVault_StaysThere() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var vault = shell.Vault!; var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; await vault.LoadAsync(Token); vault.SelectedTargetVault = vault.TargetVaults.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId); vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null); vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db"; vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal"; vault.EditorUsername = "deploy"; // Moved back after the editor opened. The host must still land in the shared vault: the keychain // screen's picker seeds the editor's and stops mattering from there. vault.SelectedTargetVault = vault.TargetVaults.First(choice => choice.VaultId != sharedVaultId); await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); var row = vault.Hosts.Single( host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal)); row.VaultId.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId); } /// /// /// The picker the host editor grew, and the thing it is for: choosing at the moment a host is created, /// on the form the host is being typed into, rather than through a standing preference on another /// screen. /// /// /// It is asserted from the editor's own selection rather than the keychain screen's, because the two /// are deliberately separate — moving one must not move the other. /// /// [Fact] public async Task TheHostEditorChoosesItsOwnVault_WithoutMovingTheKeychainScreensPicker() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var vault = shell.Vault!; var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; await vault.LoadAsync(Token); vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null); vault.ShowsEditorVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue("there are two vaults to choose between"); var personal = vault.SelectedTargetVault!; vault.EditorSelectedVault = vault.EditorVaultChoices.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId); vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db"; vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal"; await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vault.Hosts .Single(host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal)) .VaultId .ShouldBe(sharedVaultId); vault.SelectedTargetVault.ShouldBe( personal, "the editor's picker is the host's, not the screen's standing preference"); } /// /// An existing host is not offered the picker at all. Moving an item between vaults is a delete and a /// retype — they are encrypted under different keys — so a control that appeared to offer it would be /// offering something no layer below can do. /// [Fact] public async Task EditingAnExistingHost_DoesNotOfferToMoveItBetweenVaults() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var vault = shell.Vault!; await vault.LoadAsync(Token); vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null); vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db"; vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal"; await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vault.SelectedHost = vault.Hosts.Single( host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal)); vault.EditSelectedHostCommand.Execute(null); vault.IsEditing.ShouldBeTrue(vault.Status); vault.ShowsEditorVaultChoice.ShouldBeFalse("an item cannot be moved between vaults"); } /// /// The mirror image of the host test above, and it goes the other way on purpose. A host filed into a /// shared vault has to stay there, because hosts are read across every readable vault and so come back. /// Tags are not — the editable list is the active vault's alone, like groups and buckets — so a tag /// filed anywhere else would be created, pushed, reported as added and then invisible, with nothing on /// the keychain screen able to rename or delete it and no active-vault switcher to go and find it with. /// [Fact] public async Task ATagIgnoresTheTargetPicker_BecauseItsListOnlyEverShowsOneVault() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; var vault = shell.Vault!; await vault.LoadAsync(Token); vault.HasVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue("this test is meaningless with one vault"); vault.SelectedTargetVault = vault.TargetVaults.Single( choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId); vault.NewTagCommand.Execute(null); vault.TagEditorLabel = "eu-west-1"; await vault.SaveTagCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vault.Tags.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Label .ShouldBe("eu-west-1", "a tag that is not in the list is a tag nothing can reach"); } /// /// The screen's answer to "who can actually open this". Asserted after somebody has been added /// rather than before, because an empty list proves nothing about whether the call was made. /// [Fact] public async Task SelectingAVault_ListsWhoHoldsAKeyToIt() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); // Two, and the creator is the other: their own self-grant is what makes a vault they just made // readable at all, so a list that left it out would show the one person who can certainly open // this vault as somebody who cannot. vaults.Grants.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status); var holder = vaults.Grants.Single(row => row.UserId == colleague); holder.IsLive.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status); holder.State.ShouldBe("holds a key"); } /// /// A role change is authorization only. The status line has to say so, because the obvious reading /// of "demoted to viewer" is that they can no longer read the vault — and they still can, with the /// key they were already wrapped. Withdrawing that is a separate act. /// [Fact] public async Task ChangingAMembersRole_SaysItDoesNotTakeBackTheKeyTheyHold() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague); await vaults.ChangeRoleCommand.ExecuteAsync(TeamMemberRole.Admin); vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("ADMIN"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("does not withdraw a vault key"); } /// /// The owner's role is the one that cannot be changed this way, and the interface has to refuse it /// itself rather than letting the server do it: a button that produced a server error would be /// reporting a rule the screen already knew. /// [Fact] public async Task MakingSomebodyOwnerThroughTheRolePicker_IsRefusedAndPointsAtHandingOver() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague); await vaults.ChangeRoleCommand.ExecuteAsync(TeamMemberRole.Owner); vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("MEMBER"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("HAND OVER"); } /// /// /// Both halves, because a transfer that only promoted the recipient would leave the vault owned /// twice and a test asserting one role would pass anyway. That is the exact failure the server uses /// a single transaction to make impossible, so the client test asserts the same pair. /// /// /// It also goes through the armed confirmation rather than calling the command directly, since /// arming and confirming are where the target ids are carried — and carrying them on the selection /// instead is how a confirmation ends up applied to whatever was clicked last. /// /// [Fact] public async Task HandingOverAVault_MakesThemTheOwnerAndTheCallerAnAdmin() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague); vaults.HandOverCommand.Execute(null); vaults.IsConfirming.ShouldBeTrue("the hand-over has to be answered, not just pressed"); vaults.ShowsVaultActions.ShouldBeFalse("the buttons that armed it are replaced, not left live"); await vaults.ConfirmActionCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("OWNER"); vaults.Members.Single(member => member.IsSelf).Role.ShouldBe("ADMIN"); vaults.IsConfirming.ShouldBeFalse(); } /// /// Renaming reaches the rest of the shell, which is the half a client can get wrong quietly: the name /// is drawn on the badge of every host card in a session holding more than one vault, in the /// file-this-into picker, and in the tab strip's menu. /// [Fact] public async Task RenamingAVault_ReachesTheKeychainScreensPickerToo() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId; vaults.RenameVaultCommand.Execute(null); vaults.EditVaultName = "Platform"; await vaults.SaveVaultNameCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.VaultId == vaultId).Name.ShouldBe("Platform"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("re-encrypted"); await shell.Vault!.LoadAsync(Token); shell.Vault.TargetVaults .Single(choice => choice.VaultId == vaultId) .Name .ShouldBe("Platform"); } /// /// /// The address the directory does not know used to be a dead end — the screen said they had to sign /// in first and stopped. It invites them instead, from the same button, because which of the two /// applies is a fact about the server's account table rather than about what the user is doing. /// /// /// The status assertion is the point of the test. Nothing is sent, and an interface that said /// "invited" without saying that would leave somebody waiting for an email that is never coming. /// /// [Fact] public async Task AddingAnAddressWithNoAccount_InvitesItAndSaysNothingWasSent() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "newcomer@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem("nobody has joined — they have only been invited"); var invitation = vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem(); invitation.Email.ShouldBe("newcomer@example.com"); invitation.IsPending.ShouldBeTrue(); invitation.State.ShouldContain("Nothing was sent"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("cannot send mail"); } /// /// /// The regression this whole path was rewritten for. An account exists from its owner's first /// authenticated request and publishes no key until they choose a passphrase on their own machine, /// and the directory omits it for that entire window — an entry exists to be wrapped to, and this /// one has nothing to wrap. Reading that silence as "there is no such account" meant ADD quietly /// issued an invitation instead: the members list did not change, the screen said they had no /// account here, and they only actually joined on the next hourly sweep. /// /// /// So the assertion is that they are a member, not an invitation, and that the row says /// what is true of them — no key, so nothing can be shared with them yet. /// /// [Fact] public async Task AddingAnAccountThatHasNotEnrolled_MakesThemAMemberWithNoKey() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; var colleague = server.AddUnenrolledAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example"); await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "carol@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Invitations.ShouldBeEmpty("they have an account here, so there is nothing to invite"); vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status); var member = vaults.Members.Single(row => row.UserId == colleague); member.Email.ShouldBe("carol@example.com"); // The label the user asked to see, and the reason SHARE KEY is not the next step. member.KeyState.ShouldContain("no key yet"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Added"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("no key yet"); } /// /// The other half of the pair above: an address with no account at all still falls through to an /// invitation. It is the server that decides which, so this proves the fall-through survived being /// moved behind it rather than being replaced by an error. /// [Fact] public async Task AddingAnAddressWithNoAccount_StillInvitesRatherThanFailing() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "stranger@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem("nobody has joined — they have only been invited"); vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Email.ShouldBe("stranger@example.com"); } /// /// A withdrawn invitation stays on the list saying it was withdrawn, rather than vanishing. One that /// disappeared would read as never having been sent, which is the same thing the screen looks like /// before anybody does anything. /// [Fact] public async Task WithdrawingAnInvitation_LeavesItListedAsWithdrawn() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets"); vaults.InviteEmail = "newcomer@example.com"; await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.SelectedInvitation = vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem(); await vaults.RevokeInvitationCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem().State.ShouldBe("withdrawn"); vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Withdrew the invitation"); } /// /// /// A reload rebuilds the vault list and reselects, so a reload that changed the selection — creating /// the first shared vault is exactly that — used to leave two reads of the same membership list in /// flight: the one the reload awaits, and one the selection handler started on its own. Both clear the /// member list and then both append to it, so every member was drawn twice. On a vault nobody has been /// added to yet, whose only member is its owner, that read as the owner being in it twice. /// /// /// Counted rather than inferred from the list, and the gate is why: against a fake that answers from /// memory each read finishes before the next begins, so the duplicate never appears and the bug /// survives the test. Holding the read open is what makes this behave like a server. /// /// [Fact] public async Task CreatingAVault_ReadsItsMembersOnce() { await UnlockedAsync(); var vaults = shell.Vaults; await vaults.LoadAsync(Token); vaults.NewVaultCommand.Execute(null); vaults.NewVaultName = "Platform secrets"; var gate = new TaskCompletionSource(); server.MemberReadGate = gate; var create = vaults.CreateVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); // Asserted while the read is still in flight: that is the only moment at which a second read // started by the selection handler is distinguishable from the reload's own. server.MemberReads.ShouldBe(1, "a reload reads the selected vault's members once"); gate.SetResult(); await create; vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Role.ShouldBe("OWNER"); } /// /// Through the form rather than straight at the command, because the name is what the form is for — /// and because the form is now the only way in: there is no separate "make a team" step behind it. /// private static async Task CreateVaultAsync(VaultsViewModel vaults, string name) { await vaults.LoadAsync(Token); vaults.NewVaultCommand.Execute(null); vaults.NewVaultName = name; await vaults.CreateVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); vaults.IsCreatingVault.ShouldBeFalse(vaults.Status); vaults.SelectedVault.ShouldNotBeNull(vaults.Status); vaults.SelectedVault!.IsShared.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status); } /// /// The whole path rather than a shortcut into the unlocked state, because sharing needs an identity /// key that was really enrolled: the fake server publishes it into its key log during enrollment, and /// that entry is what the client verifies its own directory answer against. /// private async Task UnlockedAsync() { await shell.StartAsync(Token); await shell.SignInCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); shell.Passphrase = Passphrase; shell.ConfirmPassphrase = Passphrase; await shell.EnrollCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); shell.RecoveryCodeWrittenDown = true; shell.ConfirmRecoveryCodeCommand.Execute(null); shell.Passphrase = Passphrase; await shell.UnlockCommand.ExecuteAsync(null); shell.State.ShouldBe(ShellState.Unlocked, shell.StatusMessage); } }