using DodoSSH.Client.Session;
// FakeDeviceKeyStore is compiled into this assembly from a source link and keeps its original namespace;
// see the csproj for why it is shared rather than reimplemented.
using DodoSSH.Client.Session.Tests;
using DodoSSH.Client.Shell.ViewModels;
using DodoSSH.Client.Ssh;
using DodoSSH.Client.Storage;
using DodoSSH.Client.Terminal;
using DodoSSH.Contracts;
using DodoSSH.Crypto;
namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Tests;
///
/// Vaults, from the side that holds the keys: make one, add somebody, and wrap its key to them.
///
///
///
/// The reason this suite exists rather than leaving sharing to the server's own tests is that the
/// interesting half is not on the server. Adding a member is a row; sharing is a decision the client
/// makes about whether to trust a public key the server just handed it, and that decision is what
/// stands between an end-to-end encrypted vault and one the operator can read by answering a directory
/// lookup with a key of their own.
///
///
/// So the fake server keeps a real key log — chained with the same KeyLogChain the server uses —
/// and can be told to corrupt it. A test that only ever saw a well-formed log would be checking that
/// sharing works, not that verification does.
///
///
/// It was TeamSharingTests, and the screen it drives stopped being about teams: a vault is what
/// gets made and named, and the membership list behind it is made with it. The team is still what the
/// server authorises against, which is why the assertions about roles, hand-over and invitations are all
/// still here — they are the same operations, reached through the vault they apply to.
///
///
public sealed class VaultSharingTests : IAsyncLifetime
{
private const string Passphrase = "a sufficiently long passphrase";
private static readonly Argon2Profile CheapProfile =
Argon2Profile.FromStoredParameters(memoryKibibytes: 8 * 1024, passes: 1, parallelism: 1);
private readonly FakeVaultServer server = new();
private readonly FakeSshConnectionFactory ssh = new();
private string directory = null!;
private ClientCacheFactory caches = null!;
private TerminalWorkspace workspace = null!;
private VaultKnownHostStore knownHosts = null!;
private FakeDeviceKeyStore deviceKeys = null!;
private MainWindowViewModel shell = null!;
private static CancellationToken Token => TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
///
public ValueTask InitializeAsync()
{
directory = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"dodossh-vaults-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}");
var paths = new ClientPaths(directory);
caches = ClientCacheFactory.ForFile(paths.CacheFile);
knownHosts = new VaultKnownHostStore();
deviceKeys = new FakeDeviceKeyStore();
workspace = new TerminalWorkspace(
new InMemoryTerminalAssetProvider(
new Dictionary(StringComparer.Ordinal)),
ssh,
TimeProvider.System);
shell = new MainWindowViewModel(
paths,
caches,
workspace,
knownHosts,
deviceKeys,
(_, _) => Task.FromResult(server),
TimeProvider.System,
NSubstitute.Substitute.For(),
CheapProfile);
return ValueTask.CompletedTask;
}
///
public async ValueTask DisposeAsync()
{
await shell.DisposeAsync();
knownHosts.Close();
await workspace.DisposeAsync();
caches.Dispose();
try
{
Directory.Delete(directory, recursive: true);
}
catch (IOException)
{
// A cache file the process has not finished releasing. The directory is under the temp path
// and named per run, so leaving it costs a few kilobytes and never collides.
}
}
///
/// The whole point of a shared vault, in one test. Adding somebody wraps the vault to them, so the
/// status line names what they were given rather than what is still owed — and the grant is on the
/// server before the add has finished reporting.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AddingSomebody_WrapsTheVaultToThemStraightAway()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status);
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldContainKey(
(vaultId, colleague),
"adding somebody to a vault is what shares it with them");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Platform secrets");
}
///
/// The manual path still works and is still worth having: a vault whose key this machine did not
/// hold when somebody was added is shared by pressing the button once it does. Re-wrapping to
/// somebody who already holds the key is the same call, and the server replaces the row rather than
/// adding a second one.
///
[Fact]
public async Task SharingAVaultByHand_WrapsTheKeyAndSaysWhatItCannotPromise()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
await vaults.ShareVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Shared");
// The one thing verification cannot promise, said in the same breath as the success.
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("fingerprint", Case.Insensitive);
}
///
///
/// The other half of the same idea. Removing somebody withdraws their grants — which only blocks
/// future reads — so the vault is rotated in the same breath and the new key goes to the people who
/// are left. From that moment nothing written is readable to the person who went.
///
///
/// The remaining member is given the earlier generation as well as the new one, which is what keeps
/// the vault's existing items readable to them: a rotation re-keys the vault, not its contents.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task RemovingSomebody_RotatesTheVaultAndHandsTheNewKeyToWhoIsLeft()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var leaving = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
var staying = server.AddAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
foreach (var address in (string[])["bob@example.com", "carol@example.com"])
{
vaults.InviteEmail = address;
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
}
vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(3, vaults.Status);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == leaving);
await vaults.RemoveMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Rotated", customMessage: vaults.Status);
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Platform secrets");
// The last act of a rotation is moving what is already stored onto the new key. Proven by the
// bytes in DodoSSH.Client.Sync.Tests; what this asserts is that the shell asks for it at all,
// and says which of the two guarantees the user has ended up with.
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("re-sealed under the new key", customMessage: vaults.Status);
// Gone entirely, at every generation. A revocation that left the history behind would leave them
// able to read everything written before they went, from a copy of the ciphertext.
server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, leaving).ShouldBeEmpty();
// And the member who stayed holds both: the new key for what comes next, the old one for what
// is already stored under it.
server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, staying).ShouldBe([1u, 2u]);
}
///
/// Somebody added after a rotation is given every generation the sharing machine holds, not only the
/// newest. A vault shared as one key would open to a list of items that will not decrypt, which
/// reads as corruption rather than as the missing grant it is.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AddingSomebodyToARotatedVault_HandsThemItsHistoryAsWell()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var first = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
var second = server.AddAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
// Removing them is what rotates the vault, so the next person to be added arrives at a vault
// with a history rather than one that has only ever had a single key.
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == first);
await vaults.RemoveMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.InviteEmail = "carol@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, second).ShouldBe([1u, 2u], vaults.Status);
}
///
///
/// The test this whole design exists for. A server that wants to read a shared vault only has to
/// answer one directory lookup with a key it holds the private half of — so the client reads the
/// append-only key log, verifies its chain, and refuses to wrap anything unless the key it was
/// offered is in there unchanged.
///
///
/// Nothing may be sent. A refusal that still issued the grant, or that issued it on a retry, would be
/// worse than no check at all, because the interface would have said it was verified.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task ATamperedKeyLog_StopsTheShareRatherThanWarningAboutIt()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("mallory@example.com", "Mallory Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
// Before the add, because the add now shares. Both routes to a wrap have to refuse, and a test
// that corrupted the log afterwards would be asserting about the second one only.
server.CorruptKeyLog = true;
vaults.InviteEmail = "mallory@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldNotContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Could not share");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("key log");
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
await vaults.ShareVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldNotContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Did not share");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("key log");
}
///
/// A vault created here is usable here, without a relock. The key was generated in this process, so
/// making the user lock and unlock to reach the vault they just made would be asking them to work
/// around bookkeeping.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AVaultCreatedHere_IsImmediatelyReadableAndWritable()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
var session = shell.Vault!.Session;
session.ReadableVaults.Select(vault => vault.VaultId).ShouldContain(vaultId);
// And it is offered as somewhere to file a new item, which is what makes it worth having.
await shell.Vault.LoadAsync(Token);
shell.Vault.TargetVaults.Select(choice => choice.VaultId).ShouldContain(vaultId);
shell.Vault.HasVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue();
}
///
/// Making a vault makes exactly one membership list, and this is the assertion that the two-step create
/// has not started leaking them: the screen no longer offers to make one on its own, so a second one
/// per vault would be invisible in the interface and visible only to an operator.
///
[Fact]
public async Task CreatingAVault_MakesOneMembershipListWithTheCallerAsItsOwner()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
server.TeamCreates.ShouldBe(1);
var row = vaults.Vaults.Single(
vault => string.Equals(vault.Name, "Platform secrets", StringComparison.Ordinal));
row.IsShared.ShouldBeTrue("a vault made here is one other people can be added to");
row.IsOwned.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status);
row.SharedWithOtherVaults.ShouldBe(0, "it was made with a membership list of its own");
vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Role.ShouldBe("OWNER");
}
///
///
/// Sharing from the receiving end, which is the half that has to happen on somebody else's machine and
/// the half that was missing. A vault wrapped to this account appears in /me and nowhere else —
/// there is no push channel — so a client that never re-read that list showed nothing, indefinitely,
/// while the server and the grant were both perfectly correct.
///
///
/// Readable rather than merely listed, because those are two different failures with the same symptom:
/// a row that cannot be opened is a vault whose key never arrived, and this asserts the wrap was taken
/// into the keyring. The switch is asserted too — it is built by the shell rather than by the vault, so
/// it is the one thing a pass could admit a vault without redrawing.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task AVaultSomebodyElseShared_ArrivesOnTheNextSynchronisation()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
var vaultId = server.ShareVaultWithMe("Platform secrets", colleague);
var vault = shell.Vault.ShouldNotBeNull();
await vault.SyncCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.Session.ReadableVaults.ShouldContain(
row => row.VaultId == vaultId,
"a vault shared with this account arrives on a synchronisation pass, with its key");
shell.VaultToggles.ShouldContain(
toggle => toggle.VaultId == vaultId,
"the tab strip's vault menu is built by the shell and has to be told");
await shell.Vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
var row = shell.Vaults.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.VaultId == vaultId);
row.IsReadable.ShouldBeTrue(shell.Vaults.Status);
row.IsOwned.ShouldBeFalse("somebody else made this one");
}
///
///
/// Deleting a shared vault, which is an admin's operation and the only one on this screen that cannot
/// be undone. It has to take three things with it: the vault, everybody's key to it — including the
/// people it was shared with — and this machine's own copy of the row, so the list is right before the
/// next refresh rather than after it.
///
///
/// The status line is asserted for what it says about the limit rather than for its wording. A message
/// implying that deletion reaches a colleague's laptop would be the one dishonest sentence this screen
/// could print; see ADR 0001.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task DeletingAVault_TakesItAndEverybodysKeyToIt()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
vaults.CanDeleteSelected.ShouldBeTrue("an admin may delete a shared vault");
vaults.DeleteVaultCommand.Execute(null);
var question = vaults.PendingAction.ShouldNotBeNull("deletion is never carried out unasked");
question.Consequence.ShouldContain(
"already synced", Case.Insensitive, "the one limit this must not leave implied");
await vaults.ConfirmActionCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Vaults.ShouldNotContain(row => row.VaultId == vaultId, vaults.Status);
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldNotContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
shell.Vault!.Session.Vaults.ShouldNotContain(
row => row.VaultId == vaultId,
"the machine that deleted it does not wait for a refresh to stop listing it");
shell.VaultToggles.ShouldNotContain(toggle => toggle.VaultId == vaultId);
}
///
/// The one vault deletion cannot reach, refused by the screen rather than by the server: everything
/// filed nowhere else lives in it and nothing can make another, so the button is not offered and the
/// command says why if something reaches it anyway.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ThePersonalVault_CannotBeDeleted()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
vaults.SelectedVault = vaults.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.IsPersonal);
vaults.CanDeleteSelected.ShouldBeFalse();
vaults.DeleteVaultCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.PendingAction.ShouldBeNull("nothing was armed");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("cannot be deleted");
vaults.Vaults.ShouldContain(vault => vault.IsPersonal);
}
///
/// The personal vault is in the list, is marked as the one thing it is, and offers nothing to share:
/// the server refuses a grant on one outright, so a screen that let somebody try would be sending them
/// at a refusal.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ThePersonalVault_IsListedAndCannotBeSharedWithAnybody()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
var personal = vaults.Vaults.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
personal.IsPersonal.ShouldBeTrue();
personal.IsShared.ShouldBeFalse();
personal.RoleLabel.ShouldBe("PERSONAL");
vaults.SelectedVault = personal;
vaults.SelectedIsShared.ShouldBeFalse();
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.ShouldBeEmpty();
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("cannot be shared");
}
///
/// Filing into a shared vault has to be chosen and has to stick. The bug this guards is the obvious
/// one: an editor that read the picker at save time rather than at open time, so changing the picker
/// with a half-typed host on screen would move it.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AHostFiledIntoASharedVault_StaysThere()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.SelectedTargetVault =
vault.TargetVaults.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
vault.EditorUsername = "deploy";
// Moved back after the editor opened. The host must still land in the shared vault: the keychain
// screen's picker seeds the editor's and stops mattering from there.
vault.SelectedTargetVault =
vault.TargetVaults.First(choice => choice.VaultId != sharedVaultId);
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var row = vault.Hosts.Single(
host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal));
row.VaultId.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId);
}
///
///
/// The picker the host editor grew, and the thing it is for: choosing at the moment a host is created,
/// on the form the host is being typed into, rather than through a standing preference on another
/// screen.
///
///
/// It is asserted from the editor's own selection rather than the keychain screen's, because the two
/// are deliberately separate — moving one must not move the other.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task TheHostEditorChoosesItsOwnVault_WithoutMovingTheKeychainScreensPicker()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.ShowsEditorVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue("there are two vaults to choose between");
var personal = vault.SelectedTargetVault!;
vault.EditorSelectedVault =
vault.EditorVaultChoices.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.Hosts
.Single(host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal))
.VaultId
.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId);
vault.SelectedTargetVault.ShouldBe(
personal, "the editor's picker is the host's, not the screen's standing preference");
}
///
/// An existing host is not offered the picker at all. Moving an item between vaults is a delete and a
/// retype — they are encrypted under different keys — so a control that appeared to offer it would be
/// offering something no layer below can do.
///
[Fact]
public async Task EditingAnExistingHost_DoesNotOfferToMoveItBetweenVaults()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.SelectedHost = vault.Hosts.Single(
host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal));
vault.EditSelectedHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.IsEditing.ShouldBeTrue(vault.Status);
vault.ShowsEditorVaultChoice.ShouldBeFalse("an item cannot be moved between vaults");
}
///
///
/// A group is a shelf, and a shared vault is what makes it everybody's shelf. The assertions are the
/// three things that were missing while the group list was the active vault's alone: it is listed at
/// all, the row says which vault it is in, and a rename typed into it goes back to that vault rather
/// than forking a second group of the new name into the personal one.
///
///
/// Reloaded between the write and the read, so what is asserted is what came back out of the vault
/// rather than the row the save left behind.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task AGroupFiledIntoASharedVault_IsListedThereAndRenamedThere()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.NewGroupCommand.Execute(null);
vault.ShowsGroupEditorVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue("there are two vaults to choose between");
vault.GroupEditorSelectedVault =
vault.GroupEditorVaultChoices.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.GroupEditorLabel = "production";
await vault.SaveGroupCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
var group = vault.Groups.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
group.VaultId.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId, vault.Status);
group.VaultBadge.ShouldBe("PLATFORM SECRETS", "a card in a session holding two vaults says which");
vault.SelectedGroup = group;
vault.EditGroupCommand.Execute(null);
vault.ShowsGroupEditorVaultChoice.ShouldBeFalse("an item cannot be moved between vaults");
vault.DrawerSubtitle.ShouldBe(
"Platform secrets", "with no picker drawn, the header is what says whose shelf this is");
vault.GroupEditorLabel = "live";
await vault.SaveGroupCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
var renamed = vault.Groups.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
renamed.Label.ShouldBe("live");
renamed.VaultId.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId, "a rename must not fork a copy into the personal vault");
}
///
///
/// The group editor's picker is the group's, exactly as the host editor's is the host's: moving it must
/// not move the keychain screen's standing preference, and moving that one must not move a group
/// half-typed here.
///
///
/// The second half is the one worth the test. The picker is read when the form opens and the vault is
/// captured there, so a click on the other screen between typing the name and pressing ADD cannot
/// redirect the group somebody was making.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task TheGroupEditorChoosesItsOwnVault_WithoutMovingTheKeychainScreensPicker()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
var personal = vault.SelectedTargetVault!;
vault.NewGroupCommand.Execute(null);
vault.GroupEditorSelectedVault =
vault.GroupEditorVaultChoices.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.GroupEditorLabel = "production";
// Moved back after the editor opened, the way a click on the keychain screen would. The group must
// still land in the shared vault.
vault.SelectedTargetVault = personal;
await vault.SaveGroupCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.Groups.ShouldHaveSingleItem().VaultId.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId, vault.Status);
vault.SelectedTargetVault.ShouldBe(
personal, "the editor's picker is the group's, not the screen's standing preference");
}
///
/// A parent belongs to one vault, and a group filed under one in another vault would be a level half
/// the people holding the key cannot resolve — their hosts would inherit a port and a username from
/// nothing. The same rule the host editor's group picker follows, one level up the same tree.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AGroupsParentPicker_OffersOnlyTheVaultItIsGoingInto()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
// In the personal vault, which is where the standing preference points.
vault.NewGroupCommand.Execute(null);
vault.GroupEditorLabel = "estate";
await vault.SaveGroupCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.Groups.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Label.ShouldBe("estate", vault.Status);
vault.NewGroupCommand.Execute(null);
vault.GroupEditorParentChoices
.Any(choice => string.Equals(choice.Label, "estate", StringComparison.Ordinal))
.ShouldBeTrue("a group in the personal vault may be filed under a personal group");
vault.GroupEditorSelectedVault =
vault.GroupEditorVaultChoices.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.GroupEditorParentChoices.ShouldHaveSingleItem()
.EntityId.ShouldBeNull("only 'no parent' is left once the group is going somewhere else");
}
///
///
/// Dragging a host card onto a group card is the one gesture that files a host without opening its
/// editor, and it can now be aimed across a vault boundary, because both grids draw every readable
/// vault. The write it would make is the exact thing the host editor's group picker was fixed to
/// prevent: an id only the other vault's holders can resolve.
///
///
/// Refused and said so, rather than quietly treated as "no group" — the user is plainly filing
/// something, and unfiling it instead would be the wrong answer delivered silently.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task AHostDraggedOntoAnotherVaultsGroup_IsRefusedRatherThanFiledUnderIt()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.NewGroupCommand.Execute(null);
vault.GroupEditorSelectedVault =
vault.GroupEditorVaultChoices.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.GroupEditorLabel = "production";
await vault.SaveGroupCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
// The host stays in the personal vault, which is where a new one goes without being told otherwise.
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var host = vault.Hosts.Single(row => string.Equals(row.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal));
var group = vault.Groups.Single(row => row.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
host.VaultId.ShouldNotBe(sharedVaultId, "this test is meaningless with both in one vault");
await vault.MoveHostToGroupCommand.ExecuteAsync(new HostGroupMove(host, group.EntityId));
vault.Status.ShouldContain("its own vault");
vault.Hosts
.Single(row => string.Equals(row.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal))
.Host.GroupId
.ShouldBeNull("the host is left where it was rather than filed under an unresolvable group");
}
///
/// The mirror image of the host test above, and it goes the other way on purpose. A host filed into a
/// shared vault has to stay there, because hosts are read across every readable vault and so come back;
/// so does a group, since its list spans them too. Tags are not — the editable list is the active
/// vault's alone, like buckets — so a tag filed anywhere else would be created, pushed, reported as
/// added and then invisible, with nothing on the keychain screen able to rename or delete it and no
/// active-vault switcher to go and find it with.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ATagIgnoresTheTargetPicker_BecauseItsListOnlyEverShowsOneVault()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
var vault = shell.Vault!;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.HasVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue("this test is meaningless with one vault");
vault.SelectedTargetVault = vault.TargetVaults.Single(
choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.NewTagCommand.Execute(null);
vault.TagEditorLabel = "eu-west-1";
await vault.SaveTagCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.Tags.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Label
.ShouldBe("eu-west-1", "a tag that is not in the list is a tag nothing can reach");
}
///
/// The screen's answer to "who can actually open this". Asserted after somebody has been added
/// rather than before, because an empty list proves nothing about whether the call was made.
///
[Fact]
public async Task SelectingAVault_ListsWhoHoldsAKeyToIt()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
// Two, and the creator is the other: their own self-grant is what makes a vault they just made
// readable at all, so a list that left it out would show the one person who can certainly open
// this vault as somebody who cannot.
vaults.Grants.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status);
var holder = vaults.Grants.Single(row => row.UserId == colleague);
holder.IsLive.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status);
holder.State.ShouldBe("holds a key");
}
///
/// A role change is authorization only. The status line has to say so, because the obvious reading
/// of "demoted to viewer" is that they can no longer read the vault — and they still can, with the
/// key they were already wrapped. Withdrawing that is a separate act.
///
[Fact]
public async Task ChangingAMembersRole_SaysItDoesNotTakeBackTheKeyTheyHold()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
await vaults.ChangeRoleCommand.ExecuteAsync(TeamMemberRole.Admin);
vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("ADMIN");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("does not withdraw a vault key");
}
///
/// The owner's role is the one that cannot be changed this way, and the interface has to refuse it
/// itself rather than letting the server do it: a button that produced a server error would be
/// reporting a rule the screen already knew.
///
[Fact]
public async Task MakingSomebodyOwnerThroughTheRolePicker_IsRefusedAndPointsAtHandingOver()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
await vaults.ChangeRoleCommand.ExecuteAsync(TeamMemberRole.Owner);
vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("MEMBER");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("HAND OVER");
}
///
///
/// Both halves, because a transfer that only promoted the recipient would leave the vault owned
/// twice and a test asserting one role would pass anyway. That is the exact failure the server uses
/// a single transaction to make impossible, so the client test asserts the same pair.
///
///
/// It also goes through the armed confirmation rather than calling the command directly, since
/// arming and confirming are where the target ids are carried — and carrying them on the selection
/// instead is how a confirmation ends up applied to whatever was clicked last.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task HandingOverAVault_MakesThemTheOwnerAndTheCallerAnAdmin()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
vaults.HandOverCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.IsConfirming.ShouldBeTrue("the hand-over has to be answered, not just pressed");
vaults.ShowsVaultActions.ShouldBeFalse("the buttons that armed it are replaced, not left live");
await vaults.ConfirmActionCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("OWNER");
vaults.Members.Single(member => member.IsSelf).Role.ShouldBe("ADMIN");
vaults.IsConfirming.ShouldBeFalse();
}
///
/// Renaming reaches the rest of the shell, which is the half a client can get wrong quietly: the name
/// is drawn on the badge of every host card in a session holding more than one vault, in the
/// file-this-into picker, and in the tab strip's menu.
///
[Fact]
public async Task RenamingAVault_ReachesTheKeychainScreensPickerToo()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
vaults.RenameVaultCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.EditVaultName = "Platform";
await vaults.SaveVaultNameCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.VaultId == vaultId).Name.ShouldBe("Platform");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("re-encrypted");
await shell.Vault!.LoadAsync(Token);
shell.Vault.TargetVaults
.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == vaultId)
.Name
.ShouldBe("Platform");
}
///
///
/// The address the directory does not know used to be a dead end — the screen said they had to sign
/// in first and stopped. It invites them instead, from the same button, because which of the two
/// applies is a fact about the server's account table rather than about what the user is doing.
///
///
/// The status assertion is the point of the test. Nothing is sent, and an interface that said
/// "invited" without saying that would leave somebody waiting for an email that is never coming.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task AddingAnAddressWithNoAccount_InvitesItAndSaysNothingWasSent()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "newcomer@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem("nobody has joined — they have only been invited");
var invitation = vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
invitation.Email.ShouldBe("newcomer@example.com");
invitation.IsPending.ShouldBeTrue();
invitation.State.ShouldContain("Nothing was sent");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("cannot send mail");
}
///
///
/// The regression this whole path was rewritten for. An account exists from its owner's first
/// authenticated request and publishes no key until they choose a passphrase on their own machine,
/// and the directory omits it for that entire window — an entry exists to be wrapped to, and this
/// one has nothing to wrap. Reading that silence as "there is no such account" meant ADD quietly
/// issued an invitation instead: the members list did not change, the screen said they had no
/// account here, and they only actually joined on the next hourly sweep.
///
///
/// So the assertion is that they are a member, not an invitation, and that the row says
/// what is true of them — no key, so nothing can be shared with them yet.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task AddingAnAccountThatHasNotEnrolled_MakesThemAMemberWithNoKey()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddUnenrolledAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "carol@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Invitations.ShouldBeEmpty("they have an account here, so there is nothing to invite");
vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status);
var member = vaults.Members.Single(row => row.UserId == colleague);
member.Email.ShouldBe("carol@example.com");
// The label the user asked to see, and the reason SHARE KEY is not the next step.
member.KeyState.ShouldContain("no key yet");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Added");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("no key yet");
}
///
/// The other half of the pair above: an address with no account at all still falls through to an
/// invitation. It is the server that decides which, so this proves the fall-through survived being
/// moved behind it rather than being replaced by an error.
///
[Fact]
public async Task AddingAnAddressWithNoAccount_StillInvitesRatherThanFailing()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "stranger@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem("nobody has joined — they have only been invited");
vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Email.ShouldBe("stranger@example.com");
}
///
/// A withdrawn invitation stays on the list saying it was withdrawn, rather than vanishing. One that
/// disappeared would read as never having been sent, which is the same thing the screen looks like
/// before anybody does anything.
///
[Fact]
public async Task WithdrawingAnInvitation_LeavesItListedAsWithdrawn()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "newcomer@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedInvitation = vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
await vaults.RevokeInvitationCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem().State.ShouldBe("withdrawn");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Withdrew the invitation");
}
///
///
/// A reload rebuilds the vault list and reselects, so a reload that changed the selection — creating
/// the first shared vault is exactly that — used to leave two reads of the same membership list in
/// flight: the one the reload awaits, and one the selection handler started on its own. Both clear the
/// member list and then both append to it, so every member was drawn twice. On a vault nobody has been
/// added to yet, whose only member is its owner, that read as the owner being in it twice.
///
///
/// Counted rather than inferred from the list, and the gate is why: against a fake that answers from
/// memory each read finishes before the next begins, so the duplicate never appears and the bug
/// survives the test. Holding the read open is what makes this behave like a server.
///
///
[Fact]
public async Task CreatingAVault_ReadsItsMembersOnce()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
vaults.NewVaultCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.NewVaultName = "Platform secrets";
var gate = new TaskCompletionSource();
server.MemberReadGate = gate;
var create = vaults.CreateVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
// Asserted while the read is still in flight: that is the only moment at which a second read
// started by the selection handler is distinguishable from the reload's own.
server.MemberReads.ShouldBe(1, "a reload reads the selected vault's members once");
gate.SetResult();
await create;
vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Role.ShouldBe("OWNER");
}
///
/// Through the form rather than straight at the command, because the name is what the form is for —
/// and because the form is now the only way in: there is no separate "make a team" step behind it.
///
private static async Task CreateVaultAsync(VaultsViewModel vaults, string name)
{
await vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
vaults.NewVaultCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.NewVaultName = name;
await vaults.CreateVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.IsCreatingVault.ShouldBeFalse(vaults.Status);
vaults.SelectedVault.ShouldNotBeNull(vaults.Status);
vaults.SelectedVault!.IsShared.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status);
}
///
/// The whole path rather than a shortcut into the unlocked state, because sharing needs an identity
/// key that was really enrolled: the fake server publishes it into its key log during enrollment, and
/// that entry is what the client verifies its own directory answer against.
///
private async Task UnlockedAsync()
{
await shell.StartAsync(Token);
await shell.SignInCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
shell.Passphrase = Passphrase;
shell.ConfirmPassphrase = Passphrase;
await shell.EnrollCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
shell.RecoveryCodeWrittenDown = true;
shell.ConfirmRecoveryCodeCommand.Execute(null);
shell.Passphrase = Passphrase;
await shell.UnlockCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
shell.State.ShouldBe(ShellState.Unlocked, shell.StatusMessage);
}
}