using System.Security.Cryptography; using DodoSSH.Client.Domain; using DodoSSH.Contracts; using DodoSSH.Crypto; namespace DodoSSH.Client.Sync; /// /// Turns a credential into an item payload and back. /// /// /// /// Mirrors exactly, including the rule that a payload is sealed at the version the /// server will assign rather than the one it replaces — see . /// /// /// The resource type is the one thing not to copy. As with , the AAD binds /// it and the two enums that name item types do not agree: SyncEntityType.Credential is 2 while /// CryptoSpec.AadResourceType.Credential is 5, because the crypto enum carries None, User, Device and /// Vault ahead of the item types. Casting one to the other would seal a password under the resource type for /// a user — which encrypts perfectly, decrypts perfectly on the machine that wrote it, and is a /// specification violation nothing would notice until an interoperating client refused the item. /// /// public static class CredentialCipher { private const CryptoSpec.AadResourceType Resource = CryptoSpec.AadResourceType.Credential; /// Encrypts a credential. /// The credential. Must be valid for storage. /// The vault key, which the data key is wrapped under. /// The item id, which the AAD binds. /// The vault's current key generation. /// The version this payload will hold once the server accepts it. public static EncryptedPayload Seal( CredentialSecret credential, ReadOnlySpan vaultKey, Guid entityId, uint keyGeneration, int itemVersion) { ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(credential); ArgumentOutOfRangeException.ThrowIfLessThan(itemVersion, 1); var plaintext = CredentialSecretCodec.Encode(credential); var dataKey = ItemKeys.CreateDataKey(); try { var dataKeyId = Guid.CreateVersion7(); var wrappedDataKey = ItemKeys.WrapDataKey( dataKey, vaultKey, Resource, entityId, keyGeneration, (uint)itemVersion); var envelope = ItemKeys.SealPayload( dataKey, plaintext, Resource, entityId, dataKeyId, keyGeneration, (uint)itemVersion); return new EncryptedPayload( envelope, wrappedDataKey, dataKeyId, keyGeneration, CryptoSpec.CurrentAadVersion); } finally { CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory(dataKey); // The encoded password, wiped. As with a key, this is the one buffer holding the secret that can // actually be cleared — the strings the codec read it from cannot be. CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory(plaintext); } } /// Decrypts a credential. /// public static CredentialSecretDocument? TryOpen( EncryptedPayload payload, ReadOnlySpan vaultKey, Guid entityId, int itemVersion) { ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(payload); if (itemVersion < 1 || payload.WrappedDataKey.Length == 0) { return null; } var dataKey = ItemKeys.TryUnwrapDataKey( vaultKey, payload.WrappedDataKey, Resource, entityId, payload.KeyGeneration, (uint)itemVersion); if (dataKey is null) { return null; } try { var plaintext = ItemKeys.TryOpenPayload( dataKey, payload.Envelope, Resource, entityId, payload.DataKeyId, payload.KeyGeneration, (uint)itemVersion); if (plaintext is null) { return null; } try { return CredentialSecretCodec.TryDecode(plaintext, out var document) ? document : null; } finally { CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory(plaintext); } } finally { CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory(dataKey); } } }