Files
DodoSSH/tests/DodoSSH.Api.Tests/TestEnrollment.cs
jaap-jan a628762cd1 Add /me and enrollment with the identity-provider key binding (M1)
The last backend piece of M1. A client can now log in, discover it must
enroll, publish its identity key, and get a usable personal vault.

Enrollment is one indivisible act. One transaction writes the key, its
wraps, the device, the key log entry, the vault and the vault key grant,
because none of them is useful alone: a key with no vault leaves a user
unable to store anything, and a vault with no grant is a container nobody
can ever open -- including its owner, since only the client can wrap the
key and it has already moved on.

Two independent checks run, and neither substitutes for the other. The
Ed25519 self-signature proves possession of the private key. The
identity-provider binding proves whose key it is: the client hashed its
statement, used the hash as an OIDC nonce, and the resulting ID token is
the provider's signature over exactly those public keys. This server
cannot mint that signature, so it cannot invent a key for a user who never
enrolled -- which is the attack that would otherwise let an operator read
every vault by publishing its own key as yours.

The binding token is stored verbatim, not just summarised. Clients must
repeat the check against the provider's JWKS fetched directly, and storing
only our conclusion would ask them to trust the server about the one
question the design exists to avoid trusting it about.

Key log appends take a deployment-wide advisory lock. The falsification
matters more than the passing test: with the lock removed,
Enroll_ConcurrentEnrollmentsByDifferentUsers_LeaveAnUnbrokenChain fails
with entry 11 linked to the wrong predecessor. Different users trip no
unique index, so without serialising they all read the same head and the
chain forks -- indistinguishable from the key substitution the log exists
to make detectable, and permanent, because the log is append-only.

Enrollment is idempotent. Vault ids and keys are client-chosen, so a
client whose response was lost re-sends the identical body and gets the
identical result. Without that, a lost response leaves a user enrolled
against a vault they never learned the id of.

Contract change, breaking the v0.1 freeze deliberately. EnrollmentRequest
had DevicePublicKey but no wrap to go with it, which is unsatisfiable:
only the holder of the secret bundle can seal it, so the server could
never fill the gap. Added DeviceWrappedPrivateKey, and PersonalVault so
enrollment can be atomic rather than leaving an unopenable vault behind
two endpoints that do not exist yet. No client exists and no package is
published, which is exactly when PublicAPI.Unshipped.txt expects this.

Sync now requires the Enrolled policy, which until now was a stub whose
name promised a check it never made. The sync denial tests use enrolled
intruders instead of unenrolled ones -- an unenrolled caller is stopped
before the vault check runs, which would have left those tests passing
without exercising the thing they exist to prove.

Also fixed: omitting kdfParameters from the JSON body was a 500. A
record's non-nullable parameters are a compile-time promise, not a runtime
one.

268 tests pass, zero warnings on a clean rebuild, format clean.
2026-07-28 16:06:35 +02:00

154 lines
6.3 KiB
C#

using DodoSSH.Contracts;
using DodoSSH.Crypto;
using NSec.Cryptography;
namespace DodoSSH.Api.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Builds a genuine enrollment: real X25519 and Ed25519 keys, a real Ed25519 statement signature,
/// and an ID token whose nonce is the statement's actual canonical hash.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Nothing here is stubbed. The point is that the server's two independent checks — the statement
/// self-signature and the identity-provider binding — both run for real, so a change that breaks
/// either shows up here rather than against a live Keycloak.
/// </remarks>
internal sealed class TestEnrollment : IDisposable
{
private static readonly DateTimeOffset CreatedAt =
DateTimeOffset.FromUnixTimeMilliseconds(1_750_000_000_123);
private readonly StubIdentityProvider identityProvider;
private readonly Key encryptionKey;
private readonly Key signingKey;
internal TestEnrollment(StubIdentityProvider identityProvider, string subject, string? email = null)
{
this.identityProvider = identityProvider;
Subject = subject;
encryptionKey = Key.Create(KeyAgreementAlgorithm.X25519);
signingKey = Key.Create(SignatureAlgorithm.Ed25519);
Statement = new KeyStatement(
Version: 1,
Issuer: identityProvider.Authority,
Subject: subject,
Email: email,
EncryptionPublicKey: encryptionKey.PublicKey.Export(KeyBlobFormat.RawPublicKey),
SigningPublicKey: signingKey.PublicKey.Export(KeyBlobFormat.RawPublicKey),
KeyGeneration: 1,
CreatedAt: CreatedAt,
DeviceName: "test-device");
}
/// <summary>The OIDC subject this enrollment is for.</summary>
internal string Subject { get; }
/// <summary>The client-chosen personal vault id.</summary>
internal Guid VaultId { get; } = Guid.CreateVersion7();
/// <summary>The default, well-formed statement.</summary>
internal KeyStatement Statement { get; }
/// <summary>The identity fingerprint the server should compute.</summary>
internal byte[] Fingerprint => DshCrypto.ComputeFingerprint(
Statement.EncryptionPublicKey,
Statement.SigningPublicKey);
/// <summary>Signs a statement with this enrollment's Ed25519 key.</summary>
internal byte[] Sign(KeyStatement statement) =>
DshSignatures.SignKeyStatement(signingKey, KeyStatementCodec.Encode(ToFields(statement)));
/// <summary>Mints an ID token whose nonce is the given statement's binding.</summary>
internal string MintIdToken(
KeyStatement statement,
string? subject = null,
string? audience = null,
string? issuer = null,
DateTime? expires = null,
bool omitNonce = false) =>
identityProvider.MintIdToken(
subject ?? Subject,
KeyStatementCodec.ComputeNonce(ToFields(statement)),
audience: audience,
issuer: issuer,
expires: expires,
omitNonce: omitNonce);
/// <summary>Builds a complete, valid request, with every part overridable for negative tests.</summary>
internal EnrollmentRequest Build(
KeyStatement? statement = null,
byte[]? statementSignature = null,
string? idToken = null,
KdfParameters? kdfParameters = null,
PersonalVaultRequest? personalVault = null,
bool includeDevice = true,
bool includeRecovery = true)
{
var effective = statement ?? Statement;
return new EnrollmentRequest(
Statement: effective,
StatementSignature: statementSignature ?? Sign(effective),
IdentityProviderToken: idToken ?? MintIdToken(effective),
WrappedPrivateKey: Bytes(220, 0x11),
KdfParameters: kdfParameters ?? DefaultKdf(),
DevicePublicKey: includeDevice ? Bytes(32, 0x22) : null,
DeviceWrappedPrivateKey: includeDevice ? Bytes(240, 0x33) : null,
RecoveryWrappedPrivateKey: includeRecovery ? Bytes(220, 0x44) : null,
RecoveryKdfParameters: includeRecovery ? RecoveryKdf() : null,
PersonalVault: personalVault ?? DefaultVault());
}
/// <summary>The passphrase KDF profile, matching <c>Argon2Profile.PassphraseDefault</c>.</summary>
internal static KdfParameters DefaultKdf() =>
new("argon2id", Bytes(16, 0x55), MemoryKibibytes: 256 * 1024, Passes: 4, Parallelism: 1);
/// <summary>The recovery KDF profile. Cheaper, because a recovery code carries real entropy.</summary>
internal static KdfParameters RecoveryKdf() =>
new("argon2id", Bytes(16, 0x66), MemoryKibibytes: 64 * 1024, Passes: 3, Parallelism: 1);
/// <remarks>
/// The grant signature is a real Ed25519 signature of the right length, but not over the §7
/// grant tuple: that canonical encoding lands with team sharing in M3, and the server stores
/// grant signatures opaquely rather than verifying them. Shape is what is under test here.
/// </remarks>
internal PersonalVaultRequest DefaultVault(Guid? vaultId = null, string name = "Personal") =>
new(
VaultId: vaultId ?? VaultId,
Name: name,
WrappedVaultKey: Bytes(80, 0x77),
GrantSignature: SignatureAlgorithm.Ed25519.Sign(signingKey, Bytes(32, 0x88)),
GrantedAt: CreatedAt);
/// <summary>Bearer client for this enrollment's subject.</summary>
internal HttpClient CreateClient(ApiFixture fixture) => fixture.CreateClientFor(Subject);
/// <inheritdoc />
public void Dispose()
{
encryptionKey.Dispose();
signingKey.Dispose();
}
private static byte[] Bytes(int length, byte seed) =>
[.. Enumerable.Range(0, length).Select(i => (byte)(seed + i))];
/// <remarks>
/// Mapped here rather than reusing the server's mapper, so a change to either side's field list
/// shows up as a failing enrollment instead of two copies of the same mistake agreeing.
/// </remarks>
private static KeyStatementFields ToFields(KeyStatement statement) =>
new(
statement.Version,
statement.Issuer,
statement.Subject,
statement.Email,
statement.EncryptionPublicKey,
statement.SigningPublicKey,
statement.KeyGeneration,
statement.CreatedAt,
statement.DeviceName);
}