Files
DodoSSH/tests/DodoSSH.Client.Auth.Tests/OidcClientTests.cs
jaap-jan 94f66be5e8 Add the OIDC client: PKCE loopback sign-in and the key binding flow
Authorization Code with PKCE on a loopback redirect, per RFC 6749, RFC 7636
and RFC 8252. Zero package references: the flow is fully specified, and the
one thing a library would own for us -- nonce generation and validation -- is
exactly what the key binding needs to control. Duende's OidcClient generates
and validates its own nonce as an internal detail, and the binding requires
the nonce be a specific value: the hash of the key statement being enrolled.
Fighting that is worse than owning the flow.

AuthorizeKeyBindingAsync is the client half of the primary trust anchor. It
runs a second authorization with nonce set to the statement hash and
prompt=login, so the ID token that returns is the provider's signature over
exactly those public keys, attesting to a user present now rather than to a
session opened at some unknown earlier time. It requests only openid -- a
second refresh token would be one more long-lived credential for no benefit
-- and rejects a token whose nonce is not the one it asked for, because
enrolling that would store evidence verifying against keys we are not
publishing.

The nonce is read without validating the ID token's signature. Sanctioned by
OIDC Core 3.1.3.7: for a token received by direct communication with the
token endpoint, TLS server authentication may stand in for signature
checking. That reasoning does not extend to another user's binding, which
arrives via the DodoSSH server and must be verified against JWKS fetched
directly -- the directory work in M3.

Raw TcpListener rather than HttpListener for the redirect: an ephemeral port
can be bound and read atomically instead of picking one and hoping it is
still free, there is no HTTP.SYS URL-ACL question on Windows, and the whole
surface is one request line. It answers 404 on other paths and keeps
waiting, because a browser asks for /favicon.ico first and treating that as
the callback would abort every sign-in. 127.0.0.1 rather than localhost: RFC
8252 permits either, but the name resolves through the hosts file.

20 tests, driving the real listener over TCP with a fake browser that
actually fetches the redirect -- injecting a fabricated callback would skip
the parsing, path filtering and response writing that can break. Mostly
negative, because the loopback port is reachable by every local process: a
response with the wrong state is rejected *and* never reaches the token
endpoint, metadata declaring an issuer other than its own authority is
rejected (RFC 8414 3.3, without which a mix-up attack works), a provider
offering only 'plain' is fatal rather than a silent downgrade, and the
verifier sent is checked against the challenge advertised so PKCE is not
theatre that only fails in production.

Two bugs caught by writing the tests: the authorize URL builder dropped
client_id entirely after a refactor, and CancellationTokenSource.CancelAfter
has no TimeProvider overload -- so the browser timeout is now constructed
with the clock and a test can advance it instead of waiting five minutes.
2026-07-28 21:13:35 +02:00

407 lines
15 KiB
C#

using System.Collections.Specialized;
using DodoSSH.Crypto;
namespace DodoSSH.Client.Auth.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// The authorization code flow end to end, and the rejections that make it safe.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// A loopback redirect is reachable by every process on the machine, so most of the value here is in
/// the negative cases: a response with the wrong state, a provider whose metadata disagrees with its
/// own authority, an ID token that binds a different key statement.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class OidcClientTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly StubProvider provider = new();
private readonly HttpClient http = new();
/// <inheritdoc />
public void Dispose()
{
http.Dispose();
provider.Dispose();
}
// ---- The happy path ----
[Fact]
public async Task SignIn_CompletesTheFlowAndReturnsTokens()
{
provider.StubTokenResponse();
var browser = new FakeBrowser();
var tokens = await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
tokens.AccessToken.ShouldBe("access-token");
tokens.RefreshToken.ShouldBe("refresh-token");
tokens.ExpiresAtUtc.ShouldBeGreaterThan(TimeProvider.System.GetUtcNow());
await browser.CallbackDelivery!;
}
[Fact]
public async Task TheAuthorizationRequest_CarriesEverythingTheFlowNeeds()
{
// The client_id is asserted explicitly: an authorization request without it is rejected by
// the provider with an opaque error, and it is easy to drop while refactoring the builder.
provider.StubTokenResponse();
var browser = new FakeBrowser();
await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var parameters = browser.AuthorizeParameters;
parameters["response_type"].ShouldBe("code");
parameters["client_id"].ShouldBe("dodossh-desktop");
parameters["code_challenge_method"].ShouldBe("S256");
parameters["code_challenge"].ShouldNotBeNullOrWhiteSpace();
parameters["state"].ShouldNotBeNullOrWhiteSpace();
parameters["scope"].ShouldBe("openid profile email offline_access");
parameters["redirect_uri"].ShouldNotBeNull();
parameters["redirect_uri"]!.ShouldStartWith("http://127.0.0.1:");
await browser.CallbackDelivery!;
}
[Fact]
public async Task TheTokenExchange_SendsTheVerifierAndTheSameRedirectUri()
{
// The token endpoint compares redirect_uri byte-for-byte against what it saw at
// authorization time, so a reconstructed value fails in a way that is hard to diagnose.
provider.StubTokenResponse();
var browser = new FakeBrowser();
await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var form = provider.LastTokenRequestForm();
form["grant_type"].ShouldBe("authorization_code");
form["code"].ShouldBe("authorization-code");
form["client_id"].ShouldBe("dodossh-desktop");
form["code_verifier"].ShouldNotBeNullOrWhiteSpace();
form["redirect_uri"].ShouldBe(browser.AuthorizeParameters["redirect_uri"]);
await browser.CallbackDelivery!;
}
[Fact]
public async Task TheVerifierSent_MatchesTheChallengeAdvertised()
{
// Otherwise PKCE is theatre: the provider would reject it, but only in production.
provider.StubTokenResponse();
var browser = new FakeBrowser();
await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var verifier = provider.LastTokenRequestForm()["code_verifier"];
var challenge = browser.AuthorizeParameters["code_challenge"];
Recompute(verifier).ShouldBe(challenge);
await browser.CallbackDelivery!;
}
// ---- Rejections ----
[Fact]
public async Task AResponseWithTheWrongState_IsRejected()
{
// The CSRF defence, and on loopback the defence against any local process racing to deliver
// its own code to our listener.
provider.StubTokenResponse();
var browser = new FakeBrowser(_ => new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["code"] = "attacker-code",
["state"] = "not-the-state-we-sent",
});
var exception = await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
exception.Message.ShouldContain("state");
}
[Fact]
public async Task AResponseWithTheWrongState_NeverReachesTheTokenEndpoint()
{
// A rejection that still redeemed the code would defeat the point.
provider.StubTokenResponse();
var browser = new FakeBrowser(_ => new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["code"] = "attacker-code",
["state"] = "wrong",
});
await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
Should.Throw<InvalidOperationException>(() => provider.LastTokenRequestForm());
}
[Fact]
public async Task AProviderRefusal_SurfacesWithItsErrorCode()
{
var browser = new FakeBrowser(_ => new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["error"] = "access_denied",
["error_description"] = "The user said no",
});
var exception = await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
exception.ErrorCode.ShouldBe("access_denied");
exception.Message.ShouldContain("The user said no");
}
[Fact]
public async Task ACallbackWithNoCode_IsRejected()
{
var browser = new FakeBrowser(parameters =>
new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["state"] = parameters["state"] ?? string.Empty,
});
await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ATokenEndpointError_Surfaces()
{
provider.StubTokenError(400, "invalid_grant", "Code already redeemed");
var browser = new FakeBrowser();
var exception = await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await CreateClient(browser).SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
exception.ErrorCode.ShouldBe("invalid_grant");
}
[Fact]
public async Task AProviderThatDoesNotOfferS256_IsRejected()
{
// Falling back to 'plain' is not an option for a public client, so this is fatal rather than
// a silent downgrade.
using var plainOnly = new StubProvider(advertiseS256: false);
plainOnly.StubTokenResponse();
var client = new OidcClient(
http,
new FakeBrowser(),
TimeProvider.System,
OptionsFor(plainOnly.Authority));
var exception = await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await client.SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
exception.Message.ShouldContain("S256");
}
[Fact]
public async Task AProviderWhoseMetadataDeclaresAnotherIssuer_IsRejected()
{
// RFC 8414 §3.3. Without this check an attacker-controlled authority can serve metadata
// pointing at its own token endpoint, and the client hands over the code believing it is
// talking to the real provider.
using var lying = new StubProvider(issuerOverride: "https://someone-else.example");
var client = new OidcClient(
http,
new FakeBrowser(),
TimeProvider.System,
OptionsFor(lying.Authority));
var exception = await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await client.SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
exception.Message.ShouldContain("issuer");
}
[Fact]
public async Task APlaintextAuthority_IsRejectedWhenHttpsIsRequired()
{
var client = new OidcClient(
http,
new FakeBrowser(),
TimeProvider.System,
new OidcClientOptions
{
Authority = provider.Authority,
ClientId = "dodossh-desktop",
RequireHttpsMetadata = true,
});
var exception = await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await client.SignInAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
exception.Message.ShouldContain("HTTPS");
}
// ---- Refresh ----
[Fact]
public async Task Refresh_ExchangesTheToken()
{
provider.StubTokenResponse(accessToken: "fresh-access", refreshToken: "rotated-refresh");
var tokens = await CreateClient(new FakeBrowser())
.RefreshAsync("old-refresh", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
tokens.AccessToken.ShouldBe("fresh-access");
tokens.RefreshToken.ShouldBe("rotated-refresh");
var form = provider.LastTokenRequestForm();
form["grant_type"].ShouldBe("refresh_token");
form["refresh_token"].ShouldBe("old-refresh");
form["client_id"].ShouldBe("dodossh-desktop");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Refresh_CarriesForwardATokenTheProviderDidNotRotate()
{
// Many providers omit refresh_token when they do not rotate. Returning null there would make
// the caller discard a token that is still valid and sign the user out on the next launch.
provider.StubTokenResponse(refreshToken: null);
var tokens = await CreateClient(new FakeBrowser())
.RefreshAsync("still-good", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
tokens.RefreshToken.ShouldBe("still-good");
}
[Fact]
public async Task AnAbsentExpiresIn_YieldsAShortLifetimeRatherThanNone()
{
// Treating "unspecified" as "never expires" hands the caller a token it never refreshes.
provider.StubTokenResponse(expiresInSeconds: null);
var before = TimeProvider.System.GetUtcNow();
var tokens = await CreateClient(new FakeBrowser())
.RefreshAsync("refresh", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
tokens.ExpiresAtUtc.ShouldBeGreaterThan(before);
tokens.ExpiresAtUtc.ShouldBeLessThan(before.AddMinutes(10));
}
// ---- The key binding ----
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizeKeyBinding_SendsTheNonceAndForcesAFreshLogin()
{
// The primary public-key trust anchor. prompt=login means the assertion attests to a user
// present now, not to a session opened at some unknown earlier time.
var nonce = NonceFor("alice");
provider.StubTokenResponse(includeIdToken: true, idTokenNonce: nonce);
var browser = new FakeBrowser();
var idToken = await CreateClient(browser)
.AuthorizeKeyBindingAsync(nonce, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
idToken.ShouldNotBeNullOrWhiteSpace();
var parameters = browser.AuthorizeParameters;
parameters["nonce"].ShouldBe(nonce);
parameters["prompt"].ShouldBe("login");
await browser.CallbackDelivery!;
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizeKeyBinding_RequestsOnlyOpenid()
{
// A second refresh token would be one more long-lived credential to store for no benefit.
var nonce = NonceFor("alice");
provider.StubTokenResponse(includeIdToken: true, idTokenNonce: nonce);
var browser = new FakeBrowser();
await CreateClient(browser).AuthorizeKeyBindingAsync(nonce, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
browser.AuthorizeParameters["scope"].ShouldBe("openid");
await browser.CallbackDelivery!;
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizeKeyBinding_RejectsATokenBindingADifferentStatement()
{
// Accepting it would store evidence that verifies against keys we are not publishing, which
// is precisely the fabrication the binding exists to prevent.
var requested = NonceFor("alice");
var somethingElse = NonceFor("bob");
provider.StubTokenResponse(includeIdToken: true, idTokenNonce: somethingElse);
var exception = await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await CreateClient(new FakeBrowser())
.AuthorizeKeyBindingAsync(requested, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
exception.Message.ShouldContain("nonce");
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizeKeyBinding_RejectsATokenWithNoNonceAtAll()
{
var nonce = NonceFor("alice");
provider.StubTokenResponse(includeIdToken: true, idTokenNonce: null);
await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await CreateClient(new FakeBrowser())
.AuthorizeKeyBindingAsync(nonce, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizeKeyBinding_RejectsAResponseWithNoIdToken()
{
var nonce = NonceFor("alice");
provider.StubTokenResponse(includeIdToken: false);
var exception = await Should.ThrowAsync<OidcException>(async () =>
await CreateClient(new FakeBrowser())
.AuthorizeKeyBindingAsync(nonce, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
exception.Message.ShouldContain("ID token");
}
// ---- Helpers ----
private OidcClient CreateClient(IBrowserLauncher browser) =>
new(http, browser, TimeProvider.System, OptionsFor(provider.Authority));
private static OidcClientOptions OptionsFor(Uri authority) =>
new()
{
Authority = authority,
ClientId = "dodossh-desktop",
// The stub serves plaintext on a loopback port.
RequireHttpsMetadata = false,
};
/// <summary>A real binding nonce, from a real key statement.</summary>
private static string NonceFor(string subject) =>
KeyStatementCodec.ComputeNonce(new KeyStatementFields(
Version: 1,
Issuer: "https://idp.example",
Subject: subject,
Email: null,
EncryptionPublicKey: [.. Enumerable.Range(0, 32).Select(i => (byte)(0x40 + i))],
SigningPublicKey: [.. Enumerable.Range(0, 32).Select(i => (byte)(0x60 + i))],
KeyGeneration: 1,
CreatedAt: DateTimeOffset.FromUnixTimeMilliseconds(1_750_000_000_123),
DeviceName: "laptop"));
/// <summary>Recomputes an S256 challenge from a verifier, independently of PkcePair.</summary>
private static string Recompute(string? verifier) =>
System.Buffers.Text.Base64Url.EncodeToString(
System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256.HashData(
System.Text.Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(verifier ?? string.Empty)));
}