Files
jaap-jan 69bc9e270b Let a team be joined only by somebody who is already here
An invitation decided access from an assertion about an address. Everything else
in this model decides it from something a person did — an admin naming an
account, a key holder wrapping a vault key to a key they verified — and this was
the one place a token's email claim was the thing that let somebody in.

It was guarded as tightly as that can be guarded: the claim was refused outright
on an unverified or absent `email_verified`, with no setting to relax it. But the
guard and the risk were the same shape. The whole defence was one boolean sent by
a system the deployment does not control.

So `POST /teams/{id}/members` is the only way in, and an address with no account
is refused with `no-such-account` — which is now the end of the road rather than
the signal to invite. Both clients say the remedy: that person signs in here
once, which is what creates the account, and then they can be added. The desktop
leaves the address in the box, because a message telling you to come back later
is one you act on later.

Gone with it: the `team_invitation` table, the claim hook in the sign-in path,
and `Oidc:EmailVerifiedClaim`, which that hook was the only reader of. Nothing in
the server now reads the email claim to decide anything.

Pending invitations are dropped rather than converted. Converting one would mean
creating a membership because an address matched, which is the property being
removed — and an invitation to an address that did have an account here had
already been claimed by the hourly sweep, so what is left is offers to people who
never arrived.

Two tests carry the property rather than the feature: the endpoint inventory
asserts the three routes are absent, and the API suite adds an address that has
no account, watches the refusal, then signs that address in and checks it joined
nothing. Without the second half, a server that merely renamed the deferred path
would pass.
2026-08-05 08:28:57 +02:00

861 lines
32 KiB
C#

using DodoSSH.Client.Api;
using DodoSSH.Contracts;
using DodoSSH.Crypto;
namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// The team, directory and grant half of the fake server.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>The key log is real.</b> Entries are chained with <see cref="KeyLogChain.ComputeEntryHash"/> exactly
/// as the server chains them, because the client refuses to wrap a vault key to a directory answer that
/// does not appear in a log whose chain verifies — so a fake that returned a plausible-looking log would
/// make every sharing test pass against a check that was never exercised. It also means a test can break
/// the chain deliberately and watch the client refuse.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Everything else is deliberately thin. Roles, slugs and idempotency are the server's rules and are
/// tested against the real one in <c>DodoSSH.Api.Tests</c>; what the shell needs from here is that a team
/// can be created, a member added, and a vault key wrapped and recorded.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
internal sealed partial class FakeVaultServer : ITeamApi, IDirectoryApi, IVaultGrantApi
{
private readonly List<TeamSummary> teams = [];
private readonly Dictionary<Guid, List<TeamMemberSummary>> members = [];
private readonly Dictionary<Guid, VaultSummary> teamVaults = [];
/// <remarks>
/// Keyed by generation as well as by recipient, because the real table is: a rotation leaves a
/// member holding one grant per generation, and a fake that kept one per person would quietly model
/// sharing the history as overwriting it — which is the bug this half of the feature exists to
/// avoid.
/// </remarks>
private readonly Dictionary<(Guid VaultId, Guid UserId, uint KeyGeneration), IssueVaultGrantRequest>
grants = [];
private readonly List<KeyLogRecord> keyLog = [];
private readonly List<DirectoryEntry> directory = [];
/// <summary>
/// Every account on this fake server, enrolled or not.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Kept apart from <see cref="directory"/> because the real server keeps them apart, and the gap
/// between the two is where a real bug lived: the directory omits anybody who has not published a
/// key, so a fake that had only one list could not tell an account that does not exist from one
/// that exists and has not enrolled — which is exactly the distinction the add path turns on.
/// </remarks>
private readonly List<(Guid UserId, string Email, string DisplayName)> accounts = [];
/// <inheritdoc />
public ITeamApi Teams => this;
/// <inheritdoc />
public IDirectoryApi Directory => this;
/// <inheritdoc />
public IVaultGrantApi Grants => this;
/// <summary>
/// Grants this fake has been asked to record, newest generation per recipient.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Flattened to one entry per recipient because that is the question most tests are asking — can
/// this person open the vault as it stands. <see cref="GenerationsGranted"/> is for the ones asking
/// whether they were also given its history.
/// </remarks>
internal IReadOnlyDictionary<(Guid VaultId, Guid UserId), IssueVaultGrantRequest> IssuedGrants =>
grants
.GroupBy(entry => (entry.Key.VaultId, entry.Key.UserId))
.ToDictionary(
group => group.Key,
group => group.OrderByDescending(entry => entry.Key.KeyGeneration).First().Value);
/// <summary>Which generations of one vault's key a recipient has been wrapped, oldest first.</summary>
internal IReadOnlyList<uint> GenerationsGranted(Guid vaultId, Guid userId) =>
[
.. grants.Keys
.Where(key => key.VaultId == vaultId && key.UserId == userId)
.Select(key => key.KeyGeneration)
.Order(),
];
/// <summary>
/// When true, the log served omits its last entry's link, so its chain no longer verifies.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The switch a test flips to prove the client refuses rather than shares. A fake with no way to be
/// wrong can only ever confirm the happy path.
/// </remarks>
internal bool CorruptKeyLog { get; set; }
/// <summary>Slugs this fake refuses, as the real server refuses one already in use.</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// A vault's slug is derived from its name rather than typed, so a collision is something the client
/// has to get out of on its own — and a fake that accepted every slug could not tell whether it does.
/// </remarks>
internal HashSet<string> TakenSlugs { get; } = new(StringComparer.Ordinal);
/// <summary>How many vault creates to refuse before answering normally.</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Creating a vault of its own is two calls, and the failure worth testing is the one between them:
/// the team is made and the vault is not. One refusal is enough to leave the client in that state and
/// let the test press CREATE again.
/// </remarks>
internal int VaultCreateFailures { get; set; }
/// <summary>How many team creates have been asked for, for a test to assert on.</summary>
internal int TeamCreates { get; private set; }
/// <summary>Registers another account, as though they had signed in and enrolled here.</summary>
/// <returns>Their user id.</returns>
internal Guid AddAccount(string email, string displayName)
{
var userId = Guid.CreateVersion7();
// Real keys rather than filler: the client recomputes the fingerprint over both halves and refuses
// an entry whose fingerprint does not match, so random bytes would fail for the wrong reason.
using var bundle = UserSecretBundle.Create(DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch);
var sequence = AppendKeyLog(
userId, bundle.EncryptionPublicKey, bundle.SigningPublicKey, new byte[64]);
directory.Add(new DirectoryEntry(
userId,
email,
displayName,
bundle.EncryptionPublicKey,
bundle.SigningPublicKey,
DshCrypto.ComputeFingerprint(bundle.EncryptionPublicKey, bundle.SigningPublicKey),
KeyGeneration: 1,
KeyLogSequence: sequence));
accounts.Add((userId, email, displayName));
return userId;
}
/// <summary>
/// Registers an account that has signed in here but has not enrolled a key.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Normal rather than exotic: an account exists from its owner's first authenticated request and
/// stays keyless until they choose a passphrase on their own machine. It is absent from the
/// directory throughout, because a directory entry exists to be wrapped to and this one has nothing
/// to wrap. It can still be made a member — membership grants nothing readable.
/// </remarks>
/// <returns>Their user id.</returns>
internal Guid AddUnenrolledAccount(string email, string displayName)
{
var userId = Guid.CreateVersion7();
accounts.Add((userId, email, displayName));
return userId;
}
/// <summary>
/// Puts a vault somebody else made, and shared with this account, on the server.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The other half of sharing, which no test can otherwise reach: every vault in this suite is one
/// this client made, and a vault this client made is one it already holds the key to. What arrives
/// on the machine somebody shared <em>with</em> is different — a vault that appears in <c>/me</c>
/// out of nowhere, with a key wrapped to this account by a client this one never spoke to.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The wrap is real, made against the encryption key this account enrolled, so the keyring opens it
/// exactly as it opens one from a real colleague. A helper that filled the field with bytes would
/// let a vault appear in the list and never prove it could be read.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="name">What the vault is called.</param>
/// <param name="sharedBy">The account that made it, from <see cref="AddAccount"/>.</param>
/// <returns>The vault's id.</returns>
internal Guid ShareVaultWithMe(string name, Guid sharedBy)
{
if (statement is not { } enrolled)
{
throw new InvalidOperationException(
"Nothing can be wrapped to this account until it has enrolled a key.");
}
var teamId = Guid.CreateVersion7();
var vaultId = Guid.CreateVersion7();
var vaultKey = VaultKeys.Create();
var wrapped = VaultKeys.WrapTo(vaultKey, enrolled.EncryptionPublicKey, vaultId, 1);
teams.Add(new TeamSummary(
teamId,
name,
name.ToLowerInvariant().Replace(' ', '-'),
Description: null,
// A member rather than an owner: somebody else made this and this account was added to it,
// which is what decides whether the screen offers to rename or remove it.
TeamMemberRole.Member,
MemberCount: 2,
VaultCount: 1,
DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch));
var sharer = accounts.Find(account => account.UserId == sharedBy);
members[teamId] =
[
Member(sharedBy, sharer.Email, sharer.DisplayName, TeamMemberRole.Owner),
Member(UserId, "alice@example.com", "Alice Example", TeamMemberRole.Member),
];
teamVaults[vaultId] = new VaultSummary(
vaultId,
name,
IsPersonal: false,
TeamId: teamId,
KeyGeneration: 1,
Permissions: 31,
wrapped,
RekeyRequired: false);
return vaultId;
}
/// <summary>One active, enrolled member, which is the only kind this helper makes.</summary>
private static TeamMemberSummary Member(
Guid userId,
string email,
string displayName,
TeamMemberRole role) =>
new(
userId,
email,
displayName,
role,
TeamMemberStatus.Active,
IsEnrolled: true,
DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<IReadOnlyList<TeamSummary>> ListTeamsAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult<IReadOnlyList<TeamSummary>>([.. teams]);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<TeamSummary> CreateTeamAsync(
CreateTeamRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
TeamCreates++;
// Idempotent on the client-chosen id, as the real one is. That is the whole of how a create whose
// second half failed is retried without leaving a second team behind, so a fake that made one
// anyway would let the bug through.
if (teams.Find(row => row.TeamId == request.TeamId) is { } existing)
{
return Task.FromResult(existing);
}
if (TakenSlugs.Contains(request.Slug))
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.Conflict,
ProblemCodes.TeamSlugTaken,
$"The slug '{request.Slug}' is already in use.");
}
var team = new TeamSummary(
request.TeamId,
request.Name,
request.Slug,
request.Description,
TeamMemberRole.Owner,
MemberCount: 1,
VaultCount: 0,
DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch);
teams.Add(team);
members[team.TeamId] =
[
new TeamMemberSummary(
UserId,
"alice@example.com",
"Alice Example",
TeamMemberRole.Owner,
TeamMemberStatus.Active,
IsEnrolled: true,
DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch),
];
return Task.FromResult(team);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<TeamSummary> UpdateTeamAsync(
Guid teamId,
UpdateTeamRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var index = teams.FindIndex(team => team.TeamId == teamId);
if (index < 0)
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.NotFound, ProblemCodes.InvalidTeam, "No such team.");
}
// The slug is deliberately not touched, matching the server: a rename changes the display
// name only. A fake that also moved the slug would let a test assert behaviour nothing has.
teams[index] = teams[index] with
{
Name = request.Name,
Description = request.Description,
};
return Task.FromResult(teams[index]);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
/// <remarks>
/// The vault refusal is reproduced rather than skipped, unlike the other server rules here. It is
/// the one whose consequence the shell has to render — a status line explaining why nothing
/// happened — so a fake that always succeeded would leave that path untested.
/// </remarks>
public Task<bool> ArchiveTeamAsync(Guid teamId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var index = teams.FindIndex(team => team.TeamId == teamId);
if (index < 0)
{
return Task.FromResult(false);
}
if (teamVaults.Values.Any(vault => vault.TeamId == teamId))
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.Conflict,
ProblemCodes.TeamNotEmpty,
"This team still owns vaults, and archiving it would take them away from everybody "
+ "holding a key — including you.");
}
teams.RemoveAt(index);
members.Remove(teamId);
return Task.FromResult(true);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
/// <remarks>
/// Both rows move, because a fake that only promoted the recipient would let a test pass while
/// the team was owned twice — which is the exact failure the real service uses a transaction to
/// make impossible.
/// </remarks>
public Task TransferTeamOwnershipAsync(
Guid teamId,
TransferTeamOwnershipRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var list = members.GetValueOrDefault(teamId, []);
var incoming = list.FindIndex(member => member.UserId == request.UserId);
if (incoming < 0)
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.BadRequest,
ProblemCodes.InvalidTeam,
"That account is not an active member of this team.");
}
var outgoing = list.FindIndex(member => member.Role == TeamMemberRole.Owner);
list[incoming] = list[incoming] with { Role = TeamMemberRole.Owner };
if (outgoing >= 0)
{
list[outgoing] = list[outgoing] with { Role = TeamMemberRole.Admin };
}
var index = teams.FindIndex(team => team.TeamId == teamId);
if (index >= 0)
{
teams[index] = teams[index] with { Role = TeamMemberRole.Admin };
}
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
/// <summary>
/// When set, a member read waits on it before answering.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Every other method here answers from memory and therefore completes before its caller's await
/// ever suspends, which hides anything the screen only gets wrong while a read is in flight — the
/// state a real server leaves it in for the length of a round trip. A test that wants that state
/// holds the gate.
/// </remarks>
internal TaskCompletionSource? MemberReadGate { get; set; }
/// <summary>How many member reads have been asked for, for a test to assert on.</summary>
internal int MemberReads { get; private set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public async Task<IReadOnlyList<TeamMemberSummary>> ListTeamMembersAsync(
Guid teamId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
MemberReads++;
if (MemberReadGate is { } gate)
{
await gate.Task.WaitAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
return members.TryGetValue(teamId, out var list) ? [.. list] : [];
}
/// <summary>Adds a member, resolved by id when the caller has one and by address otherwise.</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Resolved against <see cref="accounts"/> rather than <see cref="directory"/>, which is the whole
/// point of the two being separate here: an account with no published key is missing from the
/// directory and is still perfectly addable. <c>IsEnrolled</c> is reported from whether the
/// directory has them rather than hardcoded, so a member row can say it holds no key.
/// </remarks>
public Task<TeamMemberSummary> AddTeamMemberAsync(
Guid teamId,
AddTeamMemberRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var account = request.UserId != Guid.Empty
? accounts.Find(candidate => candidate.UserId == request.UserId)
: accounts.Find(candidate => string.Equals(
candidate.Email, request.Email, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
if (account.UserId == Guid.Empty)
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.NotFound,
ProblemCodes.NoSuchAccount,
"No such account on this server.");
}
// LastActiveAt is left null: this account has been added, not seen. The owner's row carries a
// real one, so both branches of the interface's "last active / never" split are exercised.
var member = new TeamMemberSummary(
account.UserId,
account.Email,
account.DisplayName,
request.Role,
TeamMemberStatus.Active,
IsEnrolled: directory.Exists(entry => entry.UserId == account.UserId),
DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
LastActiveAt: null);
members[teamId] = [.. members.GetValueOrDefault(teamId, []), member];
Recount(teamId);
return Task.FromResult(member);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<TeamMemberSummary> ChangeTeamMemberRoleAsync(
Guid teamId,
Guid userId,
ChangeTeamMemberRoleRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var list = members.GetValueOrDefault(teamId, []);
var index = list.FindIndex(member => member.UserId == userId);
if (index < 0)
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.BadRequest,
ProblemCodes.InvalidTeam,
"That account is not an active member of this team.");
}
list[index] = list[index] with { Role = request.Role };
return Task.FromResult(list[index]);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<bool> RemoveTeamMemberAsync(
Guid teamId,
Guid userId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var list = members.GetValueOrDefault(teamId, []);
var removed = list.RemoveAll(member => member.UserId == userId) > 0;
// Every grant they held from this team goes with them, as the real service revokes them in the
// same transaction. A fake that removed the membership and left the grants would let a test
// "prove" a revocation that had not happened.
var theirs = grants.Keys
.Where(key => key.UserId == userId
&& teamVaults.TryGetValue(key.VaultId, out var vault)
&& vault.TeamId == teamId)
.ToList();
// Every generation, not only the newest. A revocation that left the history behind would let
// them go on reading everything written before the rotation that follows.
foreach (var key in theirs)
{
grants.Remove(key);
}
Recount(teamId);
return Task.FromResult(removed);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<VaultSummary> CreateTeamVaultAsync(
Guid teamId,
CreateTeamVaultRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (VaultCreateFailures > 0)
{
VaultCreateFailures--;
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.ServiceUnavailable,
code: null,
"The server is not answering.");
}
var vault = new VaultSummary(
request.VaultId,
request.Name,
IsPersonal: false,
TeamId: teamId,
KeyGeneration: 1,
Permissions: 31,
request.WrappedVaultKey,
RekeyRequired: false);
teamVaults[vault.VaultId] = vault;
// The creator's own grant, as the real create records it in the same transaction. Without it a
// rotation here would report no earlier wraps and the vault's first generation would vanish.
grants[(vault.VaultId, UserId, 1)] = new IssueVaultGrantRequest(
UserId,
RecipientKeyFingerprint: new byte[32],
KeyGeneration: 1,
request.WrappedVaultKey,
KeyLogHead: new byte[32],
request.GrantSignature,
request.GrantedAt);
Recount(teamId);
return Task.FromResult(vault);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
/// <remarks>
/// The owning team is renamed with the vault when it owns nothing else, exactly as the real service
/// does it — a fake that moved only the vault would let a test pass while the two names disagreed,
/// which is the state the server code goes out of its way to avoid.
/// </remarks>
public Task<VaultSummary> RenameVaultAsync(
Guid vaultId,
UpdateVaultRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (personalVault is { } personal && personal.VaultId == vaultId)
{
personalVault = personal with { Name = request.Name };
return Task.FromResult(personalVault);
}
if (!teamVaults.TryGetValue(vaultId, out var vault))
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.NotFound, ProblemCodes.InvalidTeam, "No such vault.");
}
var renamed = vault with { Name = request.Name };
teamVaults[vaultId] = renamed;
if (renamed.TeamId is { } teamId
&& !teamVaults.Values.Any(other => other.TeamId == teamId && other.VaultId != vaultId))
{
var index = teams.FindIndex(team => team.TeamId == teamId);
if (index >= 0)
{
teams[index] = teams[index] with { Name = request.Name };
}
}
return Task.FromResult(renamed);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
/// <remarks>
/// Every grant to the vault goes with it, as the real service withdraws them in the same write, and the
/// team behind it is archived when it owns nothing else — the second half of what the endpoint does.
/// A fake that kept either would let a test assert a deletion that had left the vault readable, or
/// leave the vaults screen listing a membership list with no vault under it.
/// </remarks>
public Task<bool> DeleteVaultAsync(Guid vaultId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (personalVault is { } personal && personal.VaultId == vaultId)
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.BadRequest,
ProblemCodes.InvalidVaultGrant,
"A personal vault cannot be deleted.");
}
if (!teamVaults.Remove(vaultId, out var vault))
{
return Task.FromResult(false);
}
foreach (var key in grants.Keys.Where(key => key.VaultId == vaultId).ToList())
{
grants.Remove(key);
}
if (vault.TeamId is { } teamId && !teamVaults.Values.Any(other => other.TeamId == teamId))
{
teams.RemoveAll(team => team.TeamId == teamId);
members.Remove(teamId);
}
return Task.FromResult(true);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<IReadOnlyList<DirectoryEntry>> LookupByEmailAsync(
string email,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult<IReadOnlyList<DirectoryEntry>>(
[
.. directory.Where(entry =>
string.Equals(entry.Email, email, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)),
]);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<DirectoryEntry?> LookupByIdAsync(Guid userId, CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(directory.Find(entry => entry.UserId == userId));
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<KeyLogPage> ReadKeyLogAsync(
long afterSequence,
int? limit,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var page = keyLog.Where(entry => entry.Sequence > afterSequence).ToList();
if (CorruptKeyLog && page.Count > 0)
{
// One byte, in the field the chain is built from. Enough to break the link and nothing else,
// which is what a tampered log would look like.
var last = page[^1];
page[^1] = last with { EncryptionPublicKey = [.. last.EncryptionPublicKey.Reverse()] };
}
var head = keyLog.Count == 0
? KeyLogChain.CreateGenesisPreviousHash()
: keyLog[^1].Hash;
return Task.FromResult(new KeyLogPage(page, keyLog.Count, head, HasMore: false));
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<VaultGrantsResponse> ListVaultGrantsAsync(
Guid vaultId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(new VaultGrantsResponse(
vaultId,
KeyGeneration: Generation(vaultId),
RekeyRequired: false,
Grants:
[
// One row per holder rather than per grant, as the real listing shows a member once
// and lets the generation say whether their key is current.
.. grants
.Where(entry => entry.Key.VaultId == vaultId)
.GroupBy(entry => entry.Key.UserId)
.Select(group => new VaultGrantSummary(
group.Key,
directory.Find(candidate => candidate.UserId == group.Key)?.Email,
null,
KeyGeneration: group.Max(entry => entry.Key.KeyGeneration),
VaultGrantState.Active,
UserId,
DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
null)),
]));
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task IssueVaultGrantAsync(
Guid vaultId,
IssueVaultGrantRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
grants[(vaultId, request.RecipientUserId, request.KeyGeneration)] = request;
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
/// <remarks>
/// Models the one part of a rotation that is the server's: the generation advances, the caller's own
/// grant for it is recorded, and everything older is left standing so the vault's stored items go on
/// opening. What comes back is what the real endpoint returns — the vault at its new generation,
/// with the caller's earlier wraps attached.
/// </remarks>
public Task<VaultSummary> RekeyVaultAsync(
Guid vaultId,
RekeyVaultRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (!teamVaults.TryGetValue(vaultId, out var vault))
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.NotFound, code: null, "No such vault.");
}
if (request.KeyGeneration != vault.KeyGeneration + 1)
{
throw new DodoSshApiException(
System.Net.HttpStatusCode.BadRequest,
ProblemCodes.InvalidVaultGrant,
$"This vault is at key generation {vault.KeyGeneration}.");
}
grants[(vaultId, UserId, request.KeyGeneration)] = new IssueVaultGrantRequest(
UserId,
RecipientKeyFingerprint: new byte[32],
request.KeyGeneration,
request.WrappedVaultKey,
KeyLogHead: new byte[32],
request.GrantSignature,
request.GrantedAt);
var prior = grants
.Where(entry => entry.Key.VaultId == vaultId
&& entry.Key.UserId == UserId
&& entry.Key.KeyGeneration < request.KeyGeneration)
.OrderBy(entry => entry.Key.KeyGeneration)
.Select(entry => new VaultKeyWrap(entry.Key.KeyGeneration, entry.Value.WrappedVaultKey))
.ToList();
var rotated = vault with
{
KeyGeneration = request.KeyGeneration,
WrappedVaultKey = request.WrappedVaultKey,
RekeyRequired = false,
PriorKeyWraps = prior,
};
teamVaults[vaultId] = rotated;
return Task.FromResult(rotated);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<bool> RevokeVaultGrantAsync(
Guid vaultId,
Guid userId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var theirs = grants.Keys
.Where(key => key.VaultId == vaultId && key.UserId == userId)
.ToList();
foreach (var key in theirs)
{
grants.Remove(key);
}
return Task.FromResult(theirs.Count > 0);
}
/// <summary>The generation a vault currently stands at.</summary>
private uint Generation(Guid vaultId) =>
teamVaults.TryGetValue(vaultId, out var vault) ? vault.KeyGeneration : 1;
/// <summary>Publishes the enrolling account's own key, in the directory and the key log.</summary>
private void RegisterSelf(KeyStatement statement, byte[] statementSignature)
{
if (directory.Exists(entry => entry.UserId == UserId))
{
return;
}
var sequence = AppendKeyLog(
UserId, statement.EncryptionPublicKey, statement.SigningPublicKey, statementSignature);
directory.Add(new DirectoryEntry(
UserId,
"alice@example.com",
"Alice Example",
statement.EncryptionPublicKey,
statement.SigningPublicKey,
DshCrypto.ComputeFingerprint(statement.EncryptionPublicKey, statement.SigningPublicKey),
statement.KeyGeneration,
sequence));
}
/// <summary>Appends a key log entry, chained as the real log chains it.</summary>
private long AppendKeyLog(
Guid userId,
byte[] encryptionPublicKey,
byte[] signingPublicKey,
byte[] statementSignature)
{
var previous = keyLog.Count == 0
? KeyLogChain.CreateGenesisPreviousHash()
: keyLog[^1].Hash;
var createdAt = KeyLogChain.TruncateTimestamp(DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch);
var sequence = keyLog.Count + 1;
var hash = KeyLogChain.ComputeEntryHash(
previous, userId, 1, encryptionPublicKey, signingPublicKey, statementSignature, createdAt);
keyLog.Add(new KeyLogRecord(
sequence,
userId,
Generation: 1,
encryptionPublicKey,
signingPublicKey,
statementSignature,
previous,
hash,
createdAt));
return sequence;
}
private void Recount(Guid teamId)
{
var index = teams.FindIndex(team => team.TeamId == teamId);
if (index < 0)
{
return;
}
teams[index] = teams[index] with
{
MemberCount = members.GetValueOrDefault(teamId, []).Count,
VaultCount = teamVaults.Values.Count(vault => vault.TeamId == teamId),
};
}
}