Public Access
Three things a user reported, one of which was a real bug and one of which was
not the bug it looked like.
**A vault shared with somebody never reached their machine.** The grant was
correct at both ends: the sharing client verified the recipient's key against the
key log and wrapped every generation to it, the server stored it, and /me would
have returned it. Nothing asked. VaultSession.RefreshVaultsAsync — the method
whose own summary says it is "called after a share and on a periodic pass" — had
no caller anywhere in the application, so the vault list was whatever the last
browser sign-in cached. A restart did not help: an offline unlock reads that same
cache. The vault appeared only if the recipient happened to sign in through the
browser again, which is why this looked like sharing being broken rather than
like a list that was never re-read.
So every synchronisation pass now re-reads it, before it syncs. SyncOnceAsync
takes the whole server rather than its sync half for that reason, and the order
matters: a vault admitted by the refresh is one that same pass then pulls, where
the other order would show a newly shared vault as an empty one until the minute
after. The shell is told only when the set actually changed — it rebuilds the tab
strip's vault menu from the session's list, and doing that on every quiet pass
would rebuild a menu once a minute for nothing.
The test needed the fake server to be able to do something no test here had
needed before: hand this account a vault it did not make. ShareVaultWithMe wraps
a real key to the encryption key this account enrolled, so the keyring opens it
exactly as it opens a real colleague's — a helper that filled the field with
bytes would let a vault appear in the list and never prove it could be read.
**Adding an S3 bucket on the desktop works, and could not be found.** The report
was that it is not possible; driving the real XAML headlessly says otherwise —
Keychain, + BUCKET, and the editor saves. What is true is that S3 is where
somebody goes looking, and from there SELECT BUCKET opened a combo box with
nothing in it and no sentence anywhere saying that a bucket is a keychain item.
From where the user was standing that is indistinguishable from an application
with no way to add one.
The empty state now says what a bucket is and offers a button that lands on the
keychain with the editor already open — navigating to the screen and leaving
+ BUCKET to be found among five buttons would be most of the same problem. The
phone gets the sentence and no button: its keychain screen reads and deletes and
edits nothing, so there is no editor to send anybody to, and naming the machine
that has one beats an empty control that reads as a screen still loading.
The keychain screen's layout test grew the two categories it never covered.
Tags and buckets arrived after it was written, and the header strip it measures
is one that has overflowed twice before.
**A vault can now be deleted.** DELETE /api/v1/vaults/{id}, gated on Admin —
the line the rename already drew, for a stronger version of its reason, since
this takes the vault from everybody in it at once. The row is soft-deleted and
every grant to it withdrawn in one write; VaultAccessService filters on the stamp
at both ends, so from that moment the vault is absent from every member's /me and
every call naming it answers 404. Their clients notice on the pass described
above.
The team behind it is archived when it owned nothing else, which is the mirror of
renaming it: a vault made from the vaults screen gets a team named after it that
nobody was ever shown, and leaving that behind would leave a membership list no
screen has a row for. That is a second call rather than one transaction —
archiving is TeamService's, it refuses while a team owns vaults, and it can only
tell that this one no longer does once the deletion is committed. A crash between
the two leaves an empty team: invisible, archivable afterwards, harmless, and a
better failure than a vault that could not be deleted because tidying up after it
did not work.
Two refusals worth stating. The personal vault cannot be deleted at either end:
it is created by enrollment, everything filed nowhere else lives in it, and no
call would make another. And the items are kept — ciphertext behind a vault
nothing will resolve, so deleting them buys no confidentiality while destroying
what an operator undoing a mistake would need.
The client drops the key from the keyring and the row from the cache rather than
waiting for a refresh, so the list is right immediately; the items stay, as they
stay for a vault whose grant was withdrawn, because a copy is on every other
member's machine too and removing these rows would be the client pretending to a
reach it does not have. The confirmation says that out loud before it is
answered. It is the one sentence this screen must not leave implied: deletion is
no more retroactive than revocation is. See ADR 0001.
Desktop only, deliberately. The Android vaults screen offers no rename and no
hand-over either, so adding delete alone there would be the one destructive vault
operation on a screen with no other.
Three places asserted that a vault can never be deleted — TeamService's refusal
message, the TeamNotEmpty problem code, and ADR 0009 — and each now names the
route instead.
758 lines
32 KiB
C#
758 lines
32 KiB
C#
using System.Security.Cryptography;
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using DodoSSH.Contracts;
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using DodoSSH.Domain;
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using DodoSSH.Infrastructure;
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using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
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using Npgsql;
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namespace DodoSSH.Api.Features.Teams;
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/// <summary>
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/// Team vaults and the key grants that make them readable.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// Everything here stores bytes it cannot interpret. A wrapped vault key is sealed to a recipient's
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/// X25519 key, and a grant signature is Ed25519 over a tuple this server never verifies — the two
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/// together are what let a client detect a fabricated grant, and moving either check onto the server
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/// would make it a convenience rather than the boundary. See docs/crypto.md §6 and §7.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// What the server <em>can</em> check is that a grant is not obviously useless: that the recipient is
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/// enrolled, that the fingerprint names their current key, and that the generation is the vault's
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/// current one. Each of those would otherwise surface at the far end as a tag failure the recipient
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/// reads as data corruption, days later, with nothing pointing at the grant that caused it.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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internal sealed class VaultGrantService(
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DodoDbContext database,
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TimeProvider clock,
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ILogger<VaultGrantService> logger)
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{
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/// <summary>
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/// Largest wrapped vault key accepted.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// A <c>SealTo</c> envelope over a 32-byte key is 6 + 32 + 24 + 48 = 110 bytes. The cap is loose
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/// enough to survive a future envelope — the reserved hybrid seal in docs/crypto.md §8 is far
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/// larger — and tight enough that this column cannot be used as free storage on a server that
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/// stores it without being able to read it.
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/// </remarks>
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private const int MaxWrappedKeyBytes = 4096;
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/// <summary>Creates a vault owned by a team, with the creator's own grant.</summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// The vault and its first grant are written together, for the reason enrollment gives about a
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/// personal vault: a vault with no grant is a container nobody can ever open, including whoever
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/// created it, because only a client can wrap the key and it has already moved on.
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/// </remarks>
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internal async Task<VaultSummary> CreateTeamVaultAsync(
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UserAccount user,
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Team team,
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CreateTeamVaultRequest request,
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CancellationToken cancellationToken)
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{
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var name = RequireVaultName(request.Name);
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if (request.VaultId == Guid.Empty)
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{
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throw new TeamInvalidException("A vault id is required. Generate a UUIDv7 on the client.");
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}
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RequireWrappedKey(request.WrappedVaultKey);
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RequireSignature(request.GrantSignature);
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var key = await RequireCurrentKeyAsync(user.Id, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
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var taken = await database.Vaults
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.AnyAsync(v => v.Id == request.VaultId, cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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if (taken)
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{
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throw new TeamInvalidException(
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"That vault id is already in use. Generate a new UUIDv7 and retry.");
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}
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AddVaultWithSelfGrant(user, team, request, name, key, clock.GetUtcNow());
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try
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{
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await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
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}
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catch (DbUpdateException exception) when (IsUniqueViolation(exception))
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{
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// The pre-check covers the ordinary case; this is the race between two creates choosing
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// the same id, which must not surface as a 500 about a constraint.
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throw new TeamInvalidException(
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"That vault id is already in use. Generate a new UUIDv7 and retry.");
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}
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TeamLog.TeamVaultCreated(logger, request.VaultId, team.Id, user.Id);
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return new VaultSummary(
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VaultId: request.VaultId,
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Name: name,
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IsPersonal: false,
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TeamId: team.Id,
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KeyGeneration: 1,
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Permissions: 0,
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WrappedVaultKey: request.WrappedVaultKey,
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RekeyRequired: false);
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}
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/// <summary>Adds the vault row and the creator's own grant, in one unit of work.</summary>
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private void AddVaultWithSelfGrant(
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UserAccount user,
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Team team,
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CreateTeamVaultRequest request,
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string name,
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UserKey key,
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DateTimeOffset now)
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{
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database.Vaults.Add(new Vault
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{
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Id = request.VaultId,
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Name = name,
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OwnerKind = VaultOwnerKind.Team,
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TeamId = team.Id,
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KeyGeneration = 1,
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CreatedAtUtc = now,
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UpdatedAtUtc = now,
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});
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database.VaultKeyGrants.Add(new VaultKeyGrant
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{
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Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
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VaultId = request.VaultId,
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KeyGeneration = 1,
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Kind = GrantKind.Member,
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RecipientUserId = user.Id,
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RecipientKeyFingerprint = key.FingerprintSha256,
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WrappedKey = request.WrappedVaultKey,
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GranterUserId = user.Id,
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GranterKeyFingerprint = key.FingerprintSha256,
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// No key log head, exactly as a personal vault's self-grant carries none: there is no
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// third party whose key could have been substituted here.
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KeyLogHead = null,
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Signature = request.GrantSignature,
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State = GrantState.Active,
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CreatedAtUtc = now,
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});
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}
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private static string RequireVaultName(string? value)
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{
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var name = (value ?? string.Empty).Trim();
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return name.Length is 0 or > 256
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? throw new TeamInvalidException("A vault name of 1 to 256 characters is required.")
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: name;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Renames a vault, and the team behind it where that team exists to carry this vault alone.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>The team is renamed with it, and only when it owns nothing else.</b> A vault made from the
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/// vaults screen gets a team of its own named after it, and that team is not a thing the person who
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/// made it was ever shown — so a rename that moved the vault's name and left the team's would leave
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/// the operator, the logs and the database naming it something nobody uses. A team owning several
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/// vaults is a different situation: it has a name of its own that somebody chose, and renaming one of
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/// its vaults must not take it.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// The slug never moves, exactly as <c>UpdateTeamRequest</c> records: it is unique only among live
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/// teams, so a rename that changed it could take one an archived team is still holding.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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internal async Task<VaultSummary> RenameVaultAsync(
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Vault vault,
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UpdateVaultRequest request,
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CancellationToken cancellationToken)
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{
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var name = RequireVaultName(request.Name);
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vault.Name = name;
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vault.UpdatedAtUtc = clock.GetUtcNow();
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if (vault.TeamId is { } teamId)
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{
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var alone = !await database.Vaults
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.AnyAsync(
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other => other.TeamId == teamId
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&& other.Id != vault.Id
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&& other.DeletedAtUtc == null,
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cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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if (alone)
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{
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var team = await database.Teams
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.SingleOrDefaultAsync(t => t.Id == teamId && t.DeletedAtUtc == null, cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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if (team is not null)
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{
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team.Name = name;
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}
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}
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}
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await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
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TeamLog.VaultRenamed(logger, vault.Id, vault.TeamId);
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return new VaultSummary(
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VaultId: vault.Id,
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Name: name,
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IsPersonal: vault.OwnerKind == VaultOwnerKind.Personal,
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TeamId: vault.TeamId,
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KeyGeneration: (uint)vault.KeyGeneration,
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Permissions: 0,
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WrappedVaultKey: null,
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RekeyRequired: vault.RekeyRequired);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Deletes a vault, and the team behind it where that team exists to carry this vault alone.
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/// </summary>
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/// <returns>
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/// The team that has been left owning nothing by this, or null where there is none. The caller
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/// archives it; see <see cref="DeleteVaultEndpoint"/> for why that is a second step.
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/// </returns>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>Soft, like every other removal here.</b> The row is stamped rather than dropped, so an operator
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/// can see that a vault existed and what became of it — and so the foreign keys from its items and its
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/// grants stay valid. <c>VaultAccessService</c> filters on the stamp at both ends, so from the moment
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/// this commits the vault is absent from every member's <c>/me</c> and every call naming it answers 404.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>The items are deliberately left alone.</b> They are ciphertext behind a vault nothing will now
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/// resolve, so deleting them buys no confidentiality — and it would destroy the one thing an operator
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/// restoring a vault deleted by mistake would need. What this is not is a promise about other people's
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/// machines: a member who synced yesterday still holds their copy, exactly as ADR 0001 says about
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/// revocation, and the deletion message says so.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>Every grant is withdrawn in the same write.</b> Nothing reads them once the vault is gone, but a
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/// live grant on a deleted vault is a row that says somebody holds a key to something that no longer
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/// exists — and the grant list is the thing an operator reads to answer "who could open this".
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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internal async Task<Team?> DeleteVaultAsync(
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UserAccount actor,
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Vault vault,
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CancellationToken cancellationToken)
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{
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ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(vault);
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// A personal vault is where everything filed nowhere else lives, and it is created by enrollment
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// rather than by anybody choosing to make it. Deleting one would leave an enrolled account with a
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// key, no vault, and no way to make the vault it is supposed to have.
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if (vault.OwnerKind != VaultOwnerKind.Team || vault.TeamId is not { } teamId)
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{
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throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
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"A personal vault cannot be deleted. It is where everything filed nowhere else lives, and "
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+ "the account has no way to make another. Move what you want to keep into a shared vault "
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+ "and delete that instead.");
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}
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var now = clock.GetUtcNow();
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var grants = await database.VaultKeyGrants
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.Where(g => g.VaultId == vault.Id && g.RevokedAtUtc == null)
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.ToListAsync(cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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foreach (var grant in grants)
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{
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grant.State = GrantState.Revoked;
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grant.RevokedAtUtc = now;
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}
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vault.DeletedAtUtc = now;
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vault.UpdatedAtUtc = now;
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await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
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TeamLog.VaultDeleted(logger, vault.Id, teamId, actor.Id, grants.Count);
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// Read after the save, so "owns nothing else" is asked of a database that already knows this one
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// is gone. The team is returned rather than archived here for the reason the rename gives about
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// renaming it: a team carrying several vaults has a name and a membership list somebody chose, and
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// one made to carry this vault alone is a thing its creator was never shown.
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var alone = !await database.Vaults
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.AnyAsync(other => other.TeamId == teamId && other.DeletedAtUtc == null, cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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return alone
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? await database.Teams
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.SingleOrDefaultAsync(t => t.Id == teamId && t.DeletedAtUtc == null, cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false)
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: null;
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}
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/// <summary>Lists who can open a vault.</summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// One row per holder, not one per grant. A rotated vault holds several grants per member — one per
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/// generation, which is what lets them read its history — and a listing that showed each of them
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/// would answer "who can open this" with the same person three times. The row carries the best key
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/// they hold: the live grant at the highest generation, or, for somebody whose access has been
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/// withdrawn, the most recent grant they had, so the withdrawal is still visible.
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/// </remarks>
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internal async Task<VaultGrantsResponse> ListGrantsAsync(
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Vault vault,
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CancellationToken cancellationToken)
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{
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var grants = await database.VaultKeyGrants
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.Where(g => g.VaultId == vault.Id && g.Kind == GrantKind.Member)
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.Include(g => g.RecipientUser)
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.OrderBy(g => g.CreatedAtUtc)
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.ToListAsync(cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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var holders = grants
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.GroupBy(g => g.RecipientUserId!.Value)
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.Select(group => group
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.OrderByDescending(g => g.RevokedAtUtc is null)
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.ThenByDescending(g => g.KeyGeneration)
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.First())
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// The order the first grant of each holder was made in, so the list reads as the vault was
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// shared rather than reshuffling itself every time somebody is re-wrapped.
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.OrderBy(g => grants.Find(first => first.RecipientUserId == g.RecipientUserId)!.CreatedAtUtc)
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.ToList();
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return new VaultGrantsResponse(
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VaultId: vault.Id,
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KeyGeneration: (uint)vault.KeyGeneration,
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RekeyRequired: vault.RekeyRequired,
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Grants:
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[
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.. holders.Select(g => new VaultGrantSummary(
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g.RecipientUserId!.Value,
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g.RecipientUser?.Email,
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g.RecipientUser?.DisplayName,
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(uint)g.KeyGeneration,
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ToContract(g.State),
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g.GranterUserId,
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g.CreatedAtUtc,
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g.RevokedAtUtc)),
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]);
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}
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/// <summary>Wraps a vault key to another member.</summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// Re-issuing to a recipient who already holds a live grant <em>for that generation</em> replaces it
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/// in place rather than inserting a second row, because the unique index permits exactly one live
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/// grant per recipient per generation — and because the operation somebody is actually performing
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/// when they do this is "wrap it again", after a botched first attempt.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// A recipient may hold one grant per generation at once, and after a rotation they need to: an item
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/// is sealed under whatever generation was current when it was written, so somebody given only the
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/// newest key would find everything older unreadable. Which generations get wrapped is the sharing
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/// client's decision — it is the only party that can tell which ones it holds.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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internal async Task IssueGrantAsync(
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UserAccount actor,
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Vault vault,
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IssueVaultGrantRequest request,
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CancellationToken cancellationToken)
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{
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await RequireIssuableAsync(vault, request, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
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var granterKey = await RequireCurrentKeyAsync(actor.Id, cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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var generation = (int)request.KeyGeneration;
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var existing = await database.VaultKeyGrants
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.SingleOrDefaultAsync(
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g => g.VaultId == vault.Id
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&& g.KeyGeneration == generation
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&& g.RecipientUserId == request.RecipientUserId
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&& g.RevokedAtUtc == null,
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cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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var grant = existing ?? new VaultKeyGrant
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{
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Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
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VaultId = vault.Id,
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KeyGeneration = generation,
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Kind = GrantKind.Member,
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RecipientUserId = request.RecipientUserId,
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CreatedAtUtc = clock.GetUtcNow(),
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};
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grant.RecipientKeyFingerprint = request.RecipientKeyFingerprint;
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grant.WrappedKey = request.WrappedVaultKey;
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grant.GranterUserId = actor.Id;
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// Taken from the server's own view of the caller's key rather than from the request. The
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// client signed over the same value, so an honest client is unaffected; a field that could
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// disagree with reality is one a reader would have to decide which copy to believe.
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grant.GranterKeyFingerprint = granterKey.FingerprintSha256;
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|
|
grant.KeyLogHead = request.KeyLogHead;
|
|
grant.Signature = request.GrantSignature;
|
|
grant.State = GrantState.Active;
|
|
|
|
if (existing is null)
|
|
{
|
|
database.VaultKeyGrants.Add(grant);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
TeamLog.GrantIssued(
|
|
logger, vault.Id, generation, request.RecipientUserId, actor.Id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Everything that can be checked about a grant without holding the vault key.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
/// <remarks>
|
|
/// None of this verifies that the wrap contains the right key — nothing on this machine can. Each
|
|
/// check exists because failing it would otherwise surface at the recipient as a tag failure they
|
|
/// read as data corruption, long after the request that caused it.
|
|
/// </remarks>
|
|
private async Task RequireIssuableAsync(
|
|
Vault vault,
|
|
IssueVaultGrantRequest request,
|
|
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
|
|
{
|
|
// Team vaults only. A personal vault has exactly one subject who may reach it, so a grant on
|
|
// one would seal a key to somebody the access check will go on refusing — a row that looks
|
|
// like sharing and is not. Moving the items into a team vault is the operation that shares.
|
|
if (vault.OwnerKind != VaultOwnerKind.Team || vault.TeamId is not { } teamId)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
"Only a team vault can be shared. A personal vault is reachable by its owner alone, "
|
|
+ "so a grant on one would seal a key to somebody who still could not fetch it.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RequireWrappedKey(request.WrappedVaultKey);
|
|
RequireSignature(request.GrantSignature);
|
|
RequireDigest(request.RecipientKeyFingerprint, "recipient key fingerprint");
|
|
RequireDigest(request.KeyLogHead, "key log head");
|
|
|
|
// Any generation the vault has actually reached, not only the current one — sharing a rotated
|
|
// vault means handing over its history as well as its present. A generation ahead of the
|
|
// current one is refused: nothing is sealed under it, so the grant would open nothing, and
|
|
// accepting it would let a client move the vault forward without the transaction that does so.
|
|
if (request.KeyGeneration is 0 || request.KeyGeneration > (uint)vault.KeyGeneration)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
$"This vault is at key generation {vault.KeyGeneration}. A grant for generation "
|
|
+ $"{request.KeyGeneration} would open nothing.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var member = await database.TeamMemberships
|
|
.AnyAsync(
|
|
m => m.TeamId == teamId
|
|
&& m.UserId == request.RecipientUserId
|
|
&& m.Status == MembershipStatus.Active
|
|
&& m.DeletedAtUtc == null,
|
|
cancellationToken)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
if (!member)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
"That account is not an active member of the team that owns this vault. Add them to "
|
|
+ "the team first — a key wrapped to somebody the server will refuse to serve is a "
|
|
+ "grant that does nothing.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var recipientKey = await RequireCurrentKeyAsync(request.RecipientUserId, cancellationToken)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
// The fingerprint the client signed over must be the key the recipient actually holds.
|
|
// Otherwise the grant is sealed to a superseded key, opens nothing, and surfaces at the far
|
|
// end as an unexplained decryption failure rather than as the mistake it is.
|
|
if (!CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals(
|
|
recipientKey.FingerprintSha256, request.RecipientKeyFingerprint))
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
"The fingerprint does not name the recipient's current identity key. Re-read the "
|
|
+ "directory and wrap the key again — theirs has been rotated since you fetched it.");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Moves a vault to a fresh key generation, wrapped to the caller.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
/// <returns>The vault as the caller now sees it, at the generation this call created.</returns>
|
|
/// <remarks>
|
|
/// <para>
|
|
/// <b>What the server contributes is the moment, not the key.</b> It cannot generate a vault key, tell
|
|
/// that the one it is handed differs from the old one, or check that the caller held the old one at
|
|
/// all. What it can do — and what nothing else can — is advance the generation exactly once, so two
|
|
/// admins rotating the same vault at the same time do not both walk away believing they succeeded.
|
|
/// The stale one's generation is no longer one past the current, and it is refused.
|
|
/// </para>
|
|
/// <para>
|
|
/// <b>Earlier grants are left standing.</b> They are what the remaining members read the vault's
|
|
/// history with: an item carries the generation it was sealed under, and nothing here re-encrypts
|
|
/// items — only a client holding both keys could. The departed member is cut off by the revocation
|
|
/// that removal already performed, which takes every generation they held.
|
|
/// </para>
|
|
/// <para>
|
|
/// The rekey flag is cleared here rather than when the last member is re-wrapped, because it records
|
|
/// that a membership change left the vault owing a rotation, and the rotation is this. Who still
|
|
/// needs the new key is a different question, and the grant list answers it by generation.
|
|
/// </para>
|
|
/// </remarks>
|
|
internal async Task<VaultSummary> RekeyAsync(
|
|
UserAccount actor,
|
|
Vault vault,
|
|
int permissions,
|
|
RekeyVaultRequest request,
|
|
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
|
|
{
|
|
var key = await RequireRotatableAsync(actor, vault, request, cancellationToken)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
var now = clock.GetUtcNow();
|
|
var generation = (int)request.KeyGeneration;
|
|
|
|
AddSelfGrant(actor, vault, key, generation, request, now);
|
|
|
|
vault.KeyGeneration = generation;
|
|
vault.RekeyRequired = false;
|
|
vault.RekeyReason = RekeyReason.None;
|
|
vault.UpdatedAtUtc = now;
|
|
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
// One SaveChanges, so the row and the grant land together. The vault's xmin concurrency
|
|
// token is what makes the generation check above binding rather than advisory: a second
|
|
// rotation that read the same generation fails here instead of overwriting this one.
|
|
await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
}
|
|
catch (DbUpdateConcurrencyException)
|
|
{
|
|
// Reported as the same refusal the pre-check gives, because it is the same situation seen a
|
|
// moment later — and a 500 about a concurrency token would tell the user nothing they could
|
|
// act on. Retrying is safe: the caller generates a fresh key and reads the generation again.
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
"Somebody else rotated this vault while this rotation was being recorded. Read it again "
|
|
+ "and rotate from the generation they left behind.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TeamLog.VaultRekeyed(logger, vault.Id, generation, actor.Id);
|
|
|
|
var prior = await database.VaultKeyGrants
|
|
.Where(g => g.VaultId == vault.Id
|
|
&& g.RecipientUserId == actor.Id
|
|
&& g.KeyGeneration < generation
|
|
&& g.State == GrantState.Active
|
|
&& g.RevokedAtUtc == null)
|
|
.OrderBy(g => g.KeyGeneration)
|
|
.Select(g => new VaultKeyWrap((uint)g.KeyGeneration, g.WrappedKey))
|
|
.ToListAsync(cancellationToken)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
return new VaultSummary(
|
|
VaultId: vault.Id,
|
|
Name: vault.Name,
|
|
IsPersonal: false,
|
|
TeamId: vault.TeamId,
|
|
KeyGeneration: request.KeyGeneration,
|
|
Permissions: permissions,
|
|
WrappedVaultKey: request.WrappedVaultKey,
|
|
RekeyRequired: false,
|
|
PriorKeyWraps: prior);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>Records the rotating client's grant for the generation it has just created.</summary>
|
|
private void AddSelfGrant(
|
|
UserAccount actor,
|
|
Vault vault,
|
|
UserKey key,
|
|
int generation,
|
|
RekeyVaultRequest request,
|
|
DateTimeOffset now) =>
|
|
database.VaultKeyGrants.Add(new VaultKeyGrant
|
|
{
|
|
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
|
|
VaultId = vault.Id,
|
|
KeyGeneration = generation,
|
|
Kind = GrantKind.Member,
|
|
RecipientUserId = actor.Id,
|
|
RecipientKeyFingerprint = key.FingerprintSha256,
|
|
WrappedKey = request.WrappedVaultKey,
|
|
GranterUserId = actor.Id,
|
|
GranterKeyFingerprint = key.FingerprintSha256,
|
|
|
|
// No key log head, as every self-grant carries none: there is no third party whose key
|
|
// could have been substituted when you wrap something to yourself.
|
|
KeyLogHead = null,
|
|
Signature = request.GrantSignature,
|
|
State = GrantState.Active,
|
|
CreatedAtUtc = now,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Everything that can be checked about a rotation before it is recorded.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
/// <returns>The caller's current identity key, which the new grant is filed against.</returns>
|
|
private async Task<UserKey> RequireRotatableAsync(
|
|
UserAccount actor,
|
|
Vault vault,
|
|
RekeyVaultRequest request,
|
|
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
|
|
{
|
|
if (vault.OwnerKind != VaultOwnerKind.Team || vault.TeamId is null)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
"Only a team vault can be rotated. A personal vault has one reader, so a rotation "
|
|
+ "would re-wrap a key to the same person and change nothing about who can read it.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RequireWrappedKey(request.WrappedVaultKey);
|
|
RequireSignature(request.GrantSignature);
|
|
|
|
if (request.KeyGeneration != (uint)vault.KeyGeneration + 1)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
$"This vault is at key generation {vault.KeyGeneration}, so the next one is "
|
|
+ $"{vault.KeyGeneration + 1} and not {request.KeyGeneration}. Read the vault again — "
|
|
+ "somebody else has rotated it since you last looked.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var key = await RequireCurrentKeyAsync(actor.Id, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
// Held now, not merely permitted. The new key has to be wrapped from the old one, and an
|
|
// account that cannot open the current generation cannot have done that — so a request from
|
|
// one is either a mistake or an attempt to strand every other member behind a key nobody has.
|
|
var holdsCurrent = await database.VaultKeyGrants
|
|
.AnyAsync(
|
|
g => g.VaultId == vault.Id
|
|
&& g.KeyGeneration == vault.KeyGeneration
|
|
&& g.RecipientUserId == actor.Id
|
|
&& g.State == GrantState.Active
|
|
&& g.RevokedAtUtc == null,
|
|
cancellationToken)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
return holdsCurrent
|
|
? key
|
|
: throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
"You hold no key to this vault at its current generation, so you cannot rotate it. Ask "
|
|
+ "a member who does.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Withdraws a member's key grant.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
/// <returns>Whether there was a live grant to withdraw.</returns>
|
|
/// <remarks>
|
|
/// Blocks future reads and nothing else. Anything the recipient has already pulled is on their
|
|
/// machine and stays there, which is why the vault is flagged for rekey and why the honest
|
|
/// remediation for a departure is rotating the SSH credential itself. See ADR 0001.
|
|
/// </remarks>
|
|
internal async Task<bool> RevokeGrantAsync(
|
|
UserAccount actor,
|
|
Vault vault,
|
|
Guid recipientUserId,
|
|
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
|
|
{
|
|
if (recipientUserId == actor.Id)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
"You cannot withdraw your own key. It would leave you unable to read a vault you can "
|
|
+ "still write to, and nothing here can hand it back.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var grants = await database.VaultKeyGrants
|
|
.Where(g => g.VaultId == vault.Id
|
|
&& g.RecipientUserId == recipientUserId
|
|
&& g.RevokedAtUtc == null)
|
|
.ToListAsync(cancellationToken)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
if (grants.Count == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var now = clock.GetUtcNow();
|
|
|
|
foreach (var grant in grants)
|
|
{
|
|
grant.State = GrantState.Revoked;
|
|
grant.RevokedAtUtc = now;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vault.RekeyRequired = true;
|
|
vault.RekeyReason = RekeyReason.Requested;
|
|
vault.UpdatedAtUtc = now;
|
|
|
|
await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
TeamLog.GrantRevoked(logger, vault.Id, recipientUserId, actor.Id);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private async Task<UserKey> RequireCurrentKeyAsync(Guid userId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
|
|
{
|
|
var key = await database.UserKeys
|
|
.SingleOrDefaultAsync(k => k.UserId == userId && k.IsCurrent, cancellationToken)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
return key
|
|
?? throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
"That account has not published an identity key yet, so there is nothing to wrap a "
|
|
+ "vault key to. They have to sign in and set up their vault first.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private static void RequireWrappedKey(byte[]? value)
|
|
{
|
|
if (value is null || value.Length == 0 || value.Length > MaxWrappedKeyBytes)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
|
|
$"A wrapped vault key of 1 to {MaxWrappedKeyBytes} bytes is required.");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private static void RequireSignature(byte[]? value)
|
|
{
|
|
if (value is null || value.Length != 64)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException("An Ed25519 grant signature is 64 bytes.");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private static void RequireDigest(byte[]? value, string field)
|
|
{
|
|
if (value is null || value.Length != 32)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException($"A {field} is 32 bytes.");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private static VaultGrantState ToContract(GrantState state) => state switch
|
|
{
|
|
GrantState.Active => VaultGrantState.Active,
|
|
GrantState.AwaitingRewrap => VaultGrantState.AwaitingRewrap,
|
|
GrantState.Revoked => VaultGrantState.Revoked,
|
|
_ => VaultGrantState.Unspecified,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
private static bool IsUniqueViolation(DbUpdateException exception) =>
|
|
string.Equals(
|
|
(exception.InnerException as PostgresException)?.SqlState,
|
|
PostgresErrorCodes.UniqueViolation,
|
|
StringComparison.Ordinal);
|
|
}
|