Files
DodoSSH/src/DodoSSH.Api/Authorization/ActiveAccountRequirement.cs
T
jaap-jan 6846f67c20 Server: send each item at the revision its ciphertext is sealed at, keep team archiving with the owner, refuse suspended accounts, and stop enrolment failing after an hour
- Pull hydrated every historical change entry with the item's current ciphertext under that entry's
  old revision. The AAD binds the revision, so a client opened it at the wrong version, failed, and
  parked its own pending edit as undecryptable. Entries an item has since moved past are left out; the
  later entry carries the same payload under the right number, and a fresh device no longer downloads
  an item once per edit it ever had.
- Deleting a team's last vault archived the team whoever deleted it, so an admin could archive it out
  from under its owner. Only the owner's delete archives it now, and TeamService.ArchiveAsync checks.
- UserStatus was checked nowhere on the request path. ActiveAccountRequirement on both policies answers
  403 account-not-active for a suspended or deprovisioned account.
- The hourly last-seen update moves xmin under the tracked user, and enrolment then saved that user
  against the stale token: a 500 for anybody enrolling more than an hour after first signing in. The
  entity is reloaded after the update.
2026-10-02 13:16:48 +02:00

50 lines
2.0 KiB
C#

using DodoSSH.Domain;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
namespace DodoSSH.Api.Authorization;
/// <summary>Requires the caller's account to be <see cref="UserStatus.Active"/>.</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <see cref="UserStatus.Suspended"/> is documented as "sign-in blocked", and nothing blocked it: the identity
/// provider still issues tokens for the person, every endpoint resolved them through the current-user context,
/// and that context looked an account up by issuer, subject and deletion alone. A suspended account could pull
/// and push vaults, take relay tickets and hold the events socket open. This is the check, on both policies, so
/// that no endpoint can be reached without it.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// A connection already open when the account is suspended — a relay tunnel, the events socket — is not
/// reached by this; it ends on its own idle and lifetime limits.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
internal sealed class ActiveAccountRequirement : IAuthorizationRequirement;
/// <summary>Satisfies <see cref="ActiveAccountRequirement"/> from the account row.</summary>
internal sealed class ActiveAccountHandler(ICurrentUserContext currentUser, IHttpContextAccessor accessor)
: AuthorizationHandler<ActiveAccountRequirement>
{
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override async Task HandleRequirementAsync(
AuthorizationHandlerContext context,
ActiveAccountRequirement requirement)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(context);
// The policy's authentication requirement already refuses an anonymous caller with a 401; failing this
// as well would turn that into a 403.
if (context.User.Identity?.IsAuthenticated != true)
{
return;
}
var cancellationToken = accessor.HttpContext?.RequestAborted ?? CancellationToken.None;
var user = await currentUser.GetOrProvisionAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (user.Status == UserStatus.Active)
{
context.Succeed(requirement);
}
}
}