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DodoSSH/tests/DodoSSH.Client.App.Tests/VaultSharingTests.cs
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jaap-jan bee6202949 Let a host be moved to another vault
The one thing the host editor's vault picker has always been unable to offer,
and the comment beside it said so: an existing host's vault was not a field
because the two vaults are encrypted under different keys. That is still true.
What changed is that it is no longer a reason to have nothing.

**A move is a copy and a tombstone, and it cannot be anything else.** A payload
is sealed under its vault's key and its AAD binds the vault, the entity id and
the item version, so no edit moves one and no server call could — the server
holds ciphertext it cannot read. What crosses is the plaintext, in this process,
between an unwrap under one key and a seal under another. VaultItemRepository
gained MoveAsync for it, so the three decisions below live in one place with
their reasons rather than being re-derived at each call site.

The item takes a new id. Keeping it would put one entity id in two vaults, and
the item table is keyed on the type and the id rather than on the vault — so the
destination's row and the source's tombstone would be the same row, and the move
would delete what it had just written.

The write comes first and the tombstone second, which decides what an
interruption leaves: a copy in both vaults, visible and deletable, rather than a
tombstone with nothing on the other side. Both are queued rather than sent, so
the window is a crash between two local writes; it is still worth being on the
survivable side of.

Two activity lines rather than one, because that is what the two vaults actually
record. A single "moved" line would have to be written to one of them and would
be missing from the other's history.

**The group and the tags stay behind, and that is the half that makes this
honest.** Both are items of the vault the host is leaving: the editor's group
picker offers one vault's groups and the chips are drawn from one vault's tags.
A host carrying either across would resolve it on the machine that moved it —
groups and tags are resolved over every readable vault — and dangle for everybody
else in the destination. The mover and their colleagues would be looking at two
different hosts. Cleared and reported beats carried and invisible.

The key or password binding is kept, and the difference is not inconsistency.
Those genuinely resolve across vaults — one key on twenty hosts in three vaults
is the arrangement they exist for — so clearing them would take a working host
and make one that cannot connect. What the message does instead is name a
binding that is now outside the destination, because that is precisely what the
other members of it will not be able to resolve.

**It is not in the editor**, on either head: the desktop puts it in the detail
pane's ⋯ menu above the separator Delete sits below, and the phone beside EDIT.
A picker inside the form would move a machine as a side effect of correcting a
port, which is the bug the editor's own vault picker was fenced off to prevent in
the first place. The panel takes the footer as the deletion question does, and
says what will be left behind before the tap rather than after it — on a phone,
where the status line afterwards is one line on a screen somebody has already
navigated away from, that is the only place it reliably gets read.

The phone hides the button where there is nowhere to go rather than offering one
that answers with a refusal; the desktop keeps its menu entry either way, because
a menu that grew and shrank would be a menu whose items move.

One thing found while writing the test and deliberately not changed. The pass
that follows every write on this screen reports what it moved and supersedes the
confirmation — for a save and a delete as much as for a move — so the move's own
sentence is what somebody sees offline. The test asserts it in that state and
says why. Making confirmations survive their own sync pass is a question about
the whole screen rather than about this.

Four places said an item could never be moved, two of them sentences on screen in
both heads. All four now say what is true, including the design gaps document,
where the chevron beside the vault name stays undrawn for a different reason: a
chevron on a subtitle implies an edit, and this is a re-seal, a new id and two
references left behind.
2026-08-04 16:04:15 +02:00

1121 lines
44 KiB
C#

using DodoSSH.Client.Session;
// FakeDeviceKeyStore is compiled into this assembly from a source link and keeps its original namespace;
// see the csproj for why it is shared rather than reimplemented.
using DodoSSH.Client.Session.Tests;
using DodoSSH.Client.Shell.ViewModels;
using DodoSSH.Client.Ssh;
using DodoSSH.Client.Storage;
using DodoSSH.Client.Terminal;
using DodoSSH.Contracts;
using DodoSSH.Crypto;
namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Vaults, from the side that holds the keys: make one, add somebody, and wrap its key to them.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The reason this suite exists rather than leaving sharing to the server's own tests is that the
/// interesting half is not on the server. Adding a member is a row; <b>sharing is a decision the client
/// makes about whether to trust a public key the server just handed it</b>, and that decision is what
/// stands between an end-to-end encrypted vault and one the operator can read by answering a directory
/// lookup with a key of their own.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// So the fake server keeps a real key log — chained with the same <c>KeyLogChain</c> the server uses —
/// and can be told to corrupt it. A test that only ever saw a well-formed log would be checking that
/// sharing works, not that verification does.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// It was <c>TeamSharingTests</c>, and the screen it drives stopped being about teams: a vault is what
/// gets made and named, and the membership list behind it is made with it. The team is still what the
/// server authorises against, which is why the assertions about roles, hand-over and invitations are all
/// still here — they are the same operations, reached through the vault they apply to.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class VaultSharingTests : IAsyncLifetime
{
private const string Passphrase = "a sufficiently long passphrase";
private static readonly Argon2Profile CheapProfile =
Argon2Profile.FromStoredParameters(memoryKibibytes: 8 * 1024, passes: 1, parallelism: 1);
private readonly FakeVaultServer server = new();
private readonly FakeSshConnectionFactory ssh = new();
private string directory = null!;
private ClientCacheFactory caches = null!;
private TerminalWorkspace workspace = null!;
private VaultKnownHostStore knownHosts = null!;
private FakeDeviceKeyStore deviceKeys = null!;
private MainWindowViewModel shell = null!;
private static CancellationToken Token => TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
/// <inheritdoc />
public ValueTask InitializeAsync()
{
directory = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"dodossh-vaults-{Guid.CreateVersion7():N}");
var paths = new ClientPaths(directory);
caches = ClientCacheFactory.ForFile(paths.CacheFile);
knownHosts = new VaultKnownHostStore();
deviceKeys = new FakeDeviceKeyStore();
workspace = new TerminalWorkspace(
new InMemoryTerminalAssetProvider(
new Dictionary<string, TerminalAsset>(StringComparer.Ordinal)),
ssh,
TimeProvider.System);
shell = new MainWindowViewModel(
paths,
caches,
workspace,
knownHosts,
deviceKeys,
(_, _) => Task.FromResult<IVaultServer>(server),
TimeProvider.System,
NSubstitute.Substitute.For<ISftpSessionFactory>(),
CheapProfile);
return ValueTask.CompletedTask;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public async ValueTask DisposeAsync()
{
await shell.DisposeAsync();
knownHosts.Close();
await workspace.DisposeAsync();
caches.Dispose();
try
{
Directory.Delete(directory, recursive: true);
}
catch (IOException)
{
// A cache file the process has not finished releasing. The directory is under the temp path
// and named per run, so leaving it costs a few kilobytes and never collides.
}
}
/// <remarks>
/// The whole point of a shared vault, in one test. Adding somebody wraps the vault to them, so the
/// status line names what they were given rather than what is still owed — and the grant is on the
/// server before the add has finished reporting.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task AddingSomebody_WrapsTheVaultToThemStraightAway()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status);
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldContainKey(
(vaultId, colleague),
"adding somebody to a vault is what shares it with them");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Platform secrets");
}
/// <remarks>
/// The manual path still works and is still worth having: a vault whose key this machine did not
/// hold when somebody was added is shared by pressing the button once it does. Re-wrapping to
/// somebody who already holds the key is the same call, and the server replaces the row rather than
/// adding a second one.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task SharingAVaultByHand_WrapsTheKeyAndSaysWhatItCannotPromise()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
await vaults.ShareVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Shared");
// The one thing verification cannot promise, said in the same breath as the success.
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("fingerprint", Case.Insensitive);
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The other half of the same idea. Removing somebody withdraws their grants — which only blocks
/// future reads — so the vault is rotated in the same breath and the new key goes to the people who
/// are left. From that moment nothing written is readable to the person who went.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The remaining member is given the earlier generation as well as the new one, which is what keeps
/// the vault's existing items readable to them: a rotation re-keys the vault, not its contents.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task RemovingSomebody_RotatesTheVaultAndHandsTheNewKeyToWhoIsLeft()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var leaving = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
var staying = server.AddAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
foreach (var address in (string[])["bob@example.com", "carol@example.com"])
{
vaults.InviteEmail = address;
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
}
vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(3, vaults.Status);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == leaving);
await vaults.RemoveMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Rotated", customMessage: vaults.Status);
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Platform secrets");
// The last act of a rotation is moving what is already stored onto the new key. Proven by the
// bytes in DodoSSH.Client.Sync.Tests; what this asserts is that the shell asks for it at all,
// and says which of the two guarantees the user has ended up with.
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("re-sealed under the new key", customMessage: vaults.Status);
// Gone entirely, at every generation. A revocation that left the history behind would leave them
// able to read everything written before they went, from a copy of the ciphertext.
server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, leaving).ShouldBeEmpty();
// And the member who stayed holds both: the new key for what comes next, the old one for what
// is already stored under it.
server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, staying).ShouldBe([1u, 2u]);
}
/// <remarks>
/// Somebody added after a rotation is given every generation the sharing machine holds, not only the
/// newest. A vault shared as one key would open to a list of items that will not decrypt, which
/// reads as corruption rather than as the missing grant it is.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task AddingSomebodyToARotatedVault_HandsThemItsHistoryAsWell()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var first = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
var second = server.AddAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
// Removing them is what rotates the vault, so the next person to be added arrives at a vault
// with a history rather than one that has only ever had a single key.
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == first);
await vaults.RemoveMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.InviteEmail = "carol@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
server.GenerationsGranted(vaultId, second).ShouldBe([1u, 2u], vaults.Status);
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The test this whole design exists for. A server that wants to read a shared vault only has to
/// answer one directory lookup with a key it holds the private half of — so the client reads the
/// append-only key log, verifies its chain, and refuses to wrap anything unless the key it was
/// offered is in there unchanged.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Nothing may be sent. A refusal that still issued the grant, or that issued it on a retry, would be
/// worse than no check at all, because the interface would have said it was verified.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task ATamperedKeyLog_StopsTheShareRatherThanWarningAboutIt()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("mallory@example.com", "Mallory Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
// Before the add, because the add now shares. Both routes to a wrap have to refuse, and a test
// that corrupted the log afterwards would be asserting about the second one only.
server.CorruptKeyLog = true;
vaults.InviteEmail = "mallory@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldNotContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Could not share");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("key log");
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
await vaults.ShareVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldNotContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Did not share");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("key log");
}
/// <remarks>
/// A vault created here is usable here, without a relock. The key was generated in this process, so
/// making the user lock and unlock to reach the vault they just made would be asking them to work
/// around bookkeeping.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task AVaultCreatedHere_IsImmediatelyReadableAndWritable()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
var session = shell.Vault!.Session;
session.ReadableVaults.Select(vault => vault.VaultId).ShouldContain(vaultId);
// And it is offered as somewhere to file a new item, which is what makes it worth having.
await shell.Vault.LoadAsync(Token);
shell.Vault.TargetVaults.Select(choice => choice.VaultId).ShouldContain(vaultId);
shell.Vault.HasVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue();
}
/// <remarks>
/// Making a vault makes exactly one membership list, and this is the assertion that the two-step create
/// has not started leaking them: the screen no longer offers to make one on its own, so a second one
/// per vault would be invisible in the interface and visible only to an operator.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task CreatingAVault_MakesOneMembershipListWithTheCallerAsItsOwner()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
server.TeamCreates.ShouldBe(1);
var row = vaults.Vaults.Single(
vault => string.Equals(vault.Name, "Platform secrets", StringComparison.Ordinal));
row.IsShared.ShouldBeTrue("a vault made here is one other people can be added to");
row.IsOwned.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status);
row.SharedWithOtherVaults.ShouldBe(0, "it was made with a membership list of its own");
vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Role.ShouldBe("OWNER");
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Sharing from the receiving end, which is the half that has to happen on somebody else's machine and
/// the half that was missing. A vault wrapped to this account appears in <c>/me</c> and nowhere else —
/// there is no push channel — so a client that never re-read that list showed nothing, indefinitely,
/// while the server and the grant were both perfectly correct.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Readable rather than merely listed, because those are two different failures with the same symptom:
/// a row that cannot be opened is a vault whose key never arrived, and this asserts the wrap was taken
/// into the keyring. The switch is asserted too — it is built by the shell rather than by the vault, so
/// it is the one thing a pass could admit a vault without redrawing.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task AVaultSomebodyElseShared_ArrivesOnTheNextSynchronisation()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
var vaultId = server.ShareVaultWithMe("Platform secrets", colleague);
var vault = shell.Vault.ShouldNotBeNull();
await vault.SyncCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.Session.ReadableVaults.ShouldContain(
row => row.VaultId == vaultId,
"a vault shared with this account arrives on a synchronisation pass, with its key");
shell.VaultToggles.ShouldContain(
toggle => toggle.VaultId == vaultId,
"the tab strip's vault menu is built by the shell and has to be told");
await shell.Vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
var row = shell.Vaults.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.VaultId == vaultId);
row.IsReadable.ShouldBeTrue(shell.Vaults.Status);
row.IsOwned.ShouldBeFalse("somebody else made this one");
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Deleting a shared vault, which is an admin's operation and the only one on this screen that cannot
/// be undone. It has to take three things with it: the vault, everybody's key to it — including the
/// people it was shared with — and this machine's own copy of the row, so the list is right before the
/// next refresh rather than after it.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The status line is asserted for what it says about the limit rather than for its wording. A message
/// implying that deletion reaches a colleague's laptop would be the one dishonest sentence this screen
/// could print; see ADR 0001.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task DeletingAVault_TakesItAndEverybodysKeyToIt()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
vaults.CanDeleteSelected.ShouldBeTrue("an admin may delete a shared vault");
vaults.DeleteVaultCommand.Execute(null);
var question = vaults.PendingAction.ShouldNotBeNull("deletion is never carried out unasked");
question.Consequence.ShouldContain(
"already synced", Case.Insensitive, "the one limit this must not leave implied");
await vaults.ConfirmActionCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Vaults.ShouldNotContain(row => row.VaultId == vaultId, vaults.Status);
server.IssuedGrants.ShouldNotContainKey((vaultId, colleague));
shell.Vault!.Session.Vaults.ShouldNotContain(
row => row.VaultId == vaultId,
"the machine that deleted it does not wait for a refresh to stop listing it");
shell.VaultToggles.ShouldNotContain(toggle => toggle.VaultId == vaultId);
}
/// <remarks>
/// The one vault deletion cannot reach, refused by the screen rather than by the server: everything
/// filed nowhere else lives in it and nothing can make another, so the button is not offered and the
/// command says why if something reaches it anyway.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task ThePersonalVault_CannotBeDeleted()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
vaults.SelectedVault = vaults.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.IsPersonal);
vaults.CanDeleteSelected.ShouldBeFalse();
vaults.DeleteVaultCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.PendingAction.ShouldBeNull("nothing was armed");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("cannot be deleted");
vaults.Vaults.ShouldContain(vault => vault.IsPersonal);
}
/// <remarks>
/// The personal vault is in the list, is marked as the one thing it is, and offers nothing to share:
/// the server refuses a grant on one outright, so a screen that let somebody try would be sending them
/// at a refusal.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task ThePersonalVault_IsListedAndCannotBeSharedWithAnybody()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
var personal = vaults.Vaults.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
personal.IsPersonal.ShouldBeTrue();
personal.IsShared.ShouldBeFalse();
personal.RoleLabel.ShouldBe("PERSONAL");
vaults.SelectedVault = personal;
vaults.SelectedIsShared.ShouldBeFalse();
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.ShouldBeEmpty();
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("cannot be shared");
}
/// <remarks>
/// Filing into a shared vault has to be chosen and has to stick. The bug this guards is the obvious
/// one: an editor that read the picker at save time rather than at open time, so changing the picker
/// with a half-typed host on screen would move it.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task AHostFiledIntoASharedVault_StaysThere()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.SelectedTargetVault =
vault.TargetVaults.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
vault.EditorUsername = "deploy";
// Moved back after the editor opened. The host must still land in the shared vault: the keychain
// screen's picker seeds the editor's and stops mattering from there.
vault.SelectedTargetVault =
vault.TargetVaults.First(choice => choice.VaultId != sharedVaultId);
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var row = vault.Hosts.Single(
host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal));
row.VaultId.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId);
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Moving a host into a shared vault, which is the operation that used to require deleting it and
/// typing it again: the two vaults are encrypted under different keys, so what happens underneath is a
/// re-seal into one and a tombstone in the other. The host has to arrive intact, be gone from where it
/// was, and carry a new id — one entity id in two vaults would make the destination's row and the
/// source's tombstone the same row.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The group is asserted cleared, and that is the half worth a test rather than a comment. A group is
/// an item of the vault the host is leaving, so a host that carried the reference across would resolve
/// it on this machine — groups are resolved over every readable vault — and dangle for everybody else
/// in the destination. The mover and their colleagues would be looking at two different hosts.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task MovingAHostToAnotherVault_ReSealsItThereAndLeavesItsGroupBehind()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
// In the personal vault, under a group of its own, which is what the move has to leave behind.
vault.NewGroupCommand.Execute(null);
vault.GroupEditorLabel = "Production";
await vault.SaveGroupCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
vault.EditorUsername = "deploy";
vault.EditorSelectedGroup = vault.EditorGroupChoices.Single(
choice => string.Equals(choice.Label, "Production", StringComparison.Ordinal));
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var before = vault.Hosts.Single(
host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal));
before.VaultId.ShouldNotBe(sharedVaultId);
before.Host.GroupId.ShouldNotBeNull("the host was filed under a group before the move");
vault.SelectedHost = before;
vault.CanMoveSelectedHost.ShouldBeTrue("there is a second vault this session can write to");
vault.MoveHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.IsMovingHost.ShouldBeTrue(vault.Status);
vault.MoveVaultChoices.ShouldNotContain(choice => choice.VaultId == before.VaultId);
vault.SelectedMoveVault =
vault.MoveVaultChoices.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
// The pass that follows every write on this screen is made to fail, so that the move's own sentence
// is still on the status line to be read. That is not a contrivance to dodge a race: a successful
// pass reports what it moved and supersedes the confirmation of every save, delete and move alike —
// pre-existing behaviour of the whole screen — and the state asserted here is the one where the
// sentence matters most, because nothing has reached the server yet.
server.SyncFailure = new IOException("The server is not answering.");
await vault.ConfirmMoveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
var after = vault.Hosts.Single(
host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal));
after.VaultId.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId, vault.Status);
after.EntityId.ShouldNotBe(before.EntityId, "an id belongs to one vault");
after.Host.Hostname.ShouldBe("db.internal");
after.Host.Username.ShouldBe("deploy");
after.Host.GroupId.ShouldBeNull("a group belongs to the vault the host came from");
vault.SelectedHost?.EntityId.ShouldBe(after.EntityId, "the pane follows the host it moved");
vault.Status.ShouldContain("Platform secrets");
vault.Status.ShouldContain("group", Case.Insensitive);
}
/// <remarks>
/// The move is refused where it would have nowhere to go, by the command rather than by an empty
/// picker — and the phone reads the same question to decide whether to draw the button at all.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task MovingAHostWithNowhereToMoveIt_SaysSoRatherThanOpeningAnEmptyPicker()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vault = shell.Vault!;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
vault.EditorUsername = "deploy";
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.SelectedHost = vault.Hosts.Single(
host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal));
vault.CanMoveSelectedHost.ShouldBeFalse("the personal vault is the only one there is");
vault.MoveHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.IsMovingHost.ShouldBeFalse();
vault.MoveVaultChoices.ShouldBeEmpty();
vault.Status.ShouldContain("only vault you can write to");
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The picker the host editor grew, and the thing it is for: choosing at the moment a host is created,
/// on the form the host is being typed into, rather than through a standing preference on another
/// screen.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// It is asserted from the editor's own selection rather than the keychain screen's, because the two
/// are deliberately separate — moving one must not move the other.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task TheHostEditorChoosesItsOwnVault_WithoutMovingTheKeychainScreensPicker()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.ShowsEditorVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue("there are two vaults to choose between");
var personal = vault.SelectedTargetVault!;
vault.EditorSelectedVault =
vault.EditorVaultChoices.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.Hosts
.Single(host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal))
.VaultId
.ShouldBe(sharedVaultId);
vault.SelectedTargetVault.ShouldBe(
personal, "the editor's picker is the host's, not the screen's standing preference");
}
/// <remarks>
/// An existing host is not offered the picker at all. Moving an item between vaults is a delete and a
/// retype — they are encrypted under different keys — so a control that appeared to offer it would be
/// offering something no layer below can do.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task EditingAnExistingHost_DoesNotOfferToMoveItBetweenVaults()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vault = shell.Vault!;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.NewHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.EditorLabel = "prod-db";
vault.EditorHostname = "db.internal";
await vault.SaveHostCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.SelectedHost = vault.Hosts.Single(
host => string.Equals(host.Label, "prod-db", StringComparison.Ordinal));
vault.EditSelectedHostCommand.Execute(null);
vault.IsEditing.ShouldBeTrue(vault.Status);
vault.ShowsEditorVaultChoice.ShouldBeFalse("an item cannot be moved between vaults");
}
/// <remarks>
/// The mirror image of the host test above, and it goes the other way on purpose. A host filed into a
/// shared vault has to stay there, because hosts are read across every readable vault and so come back.
/// Tags are not — the editable list is the active vault's alone, like groups and buckets — so a tag
/// filed anywhere else would be created, pushed, reported as added and then invisible, with nothing on
/// the keychain screen able to rename or delete it and no active-vault switcher to go and find it with.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task ATagIgnoresTheTargetPicker_BecauseItsListOnlyEverShowsOneVault()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var sharedVaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
var vault = shell.Vault!;
await vault.LoadAsync(Token);
vault.HasVaultChoice.ShouldBeTrue("this test is meaningless with one vault");
vault.SelectedTargetVault = vault.TargetVaults.Single(
choice => choice.VaultId == sharedVaultId);
vault.NewTagCommand.Execute(null);
vault.TagEditorLabel = "eu-west-1";
await vault.SaveTagCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vault.Tags.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Label
.ShouldBe("eu-west-1", "a tag that is not in the list is a tag nothing can reach");
}
/// <remarks>
/// The screen's answer to "who can actually open this". Asserted after somebody has been added
/// rather than before, because an empty list proves nothing about whether the call was made.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task SelectingAVault_ListsWhoHoldsAKeyToIt()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
// Two, and the creator is the other: their own self-grant is what makes a vault they just made
// readable at all, so a list that left it out would show the one person who can certainly open
// this vault as somebody who cannot.
vaults.Grants.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status);
var holder = vaults.Grants.Single(row => row.UserId == colleague);
holder.IsLive.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status);
holder.State.ShouldBe("holds a key");
}
/// <remarks>
/// A role change is authorization only. The status line has to say so, because the obvious reading
/// of "demoted to viewer" is that they can no longer read the vault — and they still can, with the
/// key they were already wrapped. Withdrawing that is a separate act.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task ChangingAMembersRole_SaysItDoesNotTakeBackTheKeyTheyHold()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
await vaults.ChangeRoleCommand.ExecuteAsync(TeamMemberRole.Admin);
vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("ADMIN");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("does not withdraw a vault key");
}
/// <remarks>
/// The owner's role is the one that cannot be changed this way, and the interface has to refuse it
/// itself rather than letting the server do it: a button that produced a server error would be
/// reporting a rule the screen already knew.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task MakingSomebodyOwnerThroughTheRolePicker_IsRefusedAndPointsAtHandingOver()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
await vaults.ChangeRoleCommand.ExecuteAsync(TeamMemberRole.Owner);
vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("MEMBER");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("HAND OVER");
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Both halves, because a transfer that only promoted the recipient would leave the vault owned
/// twice and a test asserting one role would pass anyway. That is the exact failure the server uses
/// a single transaction to make impossible, so the client test asserts the same pair.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// It also goes through the armed confirmation rather than calling the command directly, since
/// arming and confirming are where the target ids are carried — and carrying them on the selection
/// instead is how a confirmation ends up applied to whatever was clicked last.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task HandingOverAVault_MakesThemTheOwnerAndTheCallerAnAdmin()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddAccount("bob@example.com", "Bob Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "bob@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedMember = vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague);
vaults.HandOverCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.IsConfirming.ShouldBeTrue("the hand-over has to be answered, not just pressed");
vaults.ShowsVaultActions.ShouldBeFalse("the buttons that armed it are replaced, not left live");
await vaults.ConfirmActionCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.Single(member => member.UserId == colleague).Role.ShouldBe("OWNER");
vaults.Members.Single(member => member.IsSelf).Role.ShouldBe("ADMIN");
vaults.IsConfirming.ShouldBeFalse();
}
/// <remarks>
/// Renaming reaches the rest of the shell, which is the half a client can get wrong quietly: the name
/// is drawn on the badge of every host card in a session holding more than one vault, in the
/// file-this-into picker, and in the tab strip's menu.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task RenamingAVault_ReachesTheKeychainScreensPickerToo()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
var vaultId = vaults.SelectedVault!.VaultId;
vaults.RenameVaultCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.EditVaultName = "Platform";
await vaults.SaveVaultNameCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Vaults.Single(vault => vault.VaultId == vaultId).Name.ShouldBe("Platform");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("re-encrypted");
await shell.Vault!.LoadAsync(Token);
shell.Vault.TargetVaults
.Single(choice => choice.VaultId == vaultId)
.Name
.ShouldBe("Platform");
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The address the directory does not know used to be a dead end — the screen said they had to sign
/// in first and stopped. It invites them instead, from the same button, because which of the two
/// applies is a fact about the server's account table rather than about what the user is doing.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The status assertion is the point of the test. Nothing is sent, and an interface that said
/// "invited" without saying that would leave somebody waiting for an email that is never coming.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task AddingAnAddressWithNoAccount_InvitesItAndSaysNothingWasSent()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "newcomer@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem("nobody has joined — they have only been invited");
var invitation = vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
invitation.Email.ShouldBe("newcomer@example.com");
invitation.IsPending.ShouldBeTrue();
invitation.State.ShouldContain("Nothing was sent");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("cannot send mail");
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The regression this whole path was rewritten for. An account exists from its owner's first
/// authenticated request and publishes no key until they choose a passphrase on their own machine,
/// and the directory omits it for that entire window — an entry exists to be wrapped to, and this
/// one has nothing to wrap. Reading that silence as "there is no such account" meant ADD quietly
/// issued an invitation instead: the members list did not change, the screen said they had no
/// account here, and they only actually joined on the next hourly sweep.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// So the assertion is that they are a <em>member</em>, not an invitation, and that the row says
/// what is true of them — no key, so nothing can be shared with them yet.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task AddingAnAccountThatHasNotEnrolled_MakesThemAMemberWithNoKey()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
var colleague = server.AddUnenrolledAccount("carol@example.com", "Carol Example");
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "carol@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Invitations.ShouldBeEmpty("they have an account here, so there is nothing to invite");
vaults.Members.Count.ShouldBe(2, vaults.Status);
var member = vaults.Members.Single(row => row.UserId == colleague);
member.Email.ShouldBe("carol@example.com");
// The label the user asked to see, and the reason SHARE KEY is not the next step.
member.KeyState.ShouldContain("no key yet");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Added");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("no key yet");
}
/// <remarks>
/// The other half of the pair above: an address with no account at all still falls through to an
/// invitation. It is the server that decides which, so this proves the fall-through survived being
/// moved behind it rather than being replaced by an error.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task AddingAnAddressWithNoAccount_StillInvitesRatherThanFailing()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "stranger@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem("nobody has joined — they have only been invited");
vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Email.ShouldBe("stranger@example.com");
}
/// <remarks>
/// A withdrawn invitation stays on the list saying it was withdrawn, rather than vanishing. One that
/// disappeared would read as never having been sent, which is the same thing the screen looks like
/// before anybody does anything.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task WithdrawingAnInvitation_LeavesItListedAsWithdrawn()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await CreateVaultAsync(vaults, "Platform secrets");
vaults.InviteEmail = "newcomer@example.com";
await vaults.AddMemberCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.SelectedInvitation = vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
await vaults.RevokeInvitationCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.Invitations.ShouldHaveSingleItem().State.ShouldBe("withdrawn");
vaults.Status.ShouldContain("Withdrew the invitation");
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// A reload rebuilds the vault list and reselects, so a reload that changed the selection — creating
/// the first shared vault is exactly that — used to leave two reads of the same membership list in
/// flight: the one the reload awaits, and one the selection handler started on its own. Both clear the
/// member list and then both append to it, so every member was drawn twice. On a vault nobody has been
/// added to yet, whose only member is its owner, that read as the owner being in it twice.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Counted rather than inferred from the list, and the gate is why: against a fake that answers from
/// memory each read finishes before the next begins, so the duplicate never appears and the bug
/// survives the test. Holding the read open is what makes this behave like a server.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public async Task CreatingAVault_ReadsItsMembersOnce()
{
await UnlockedAsync();
var vaults = shell.Vaults;
await vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
vaults.NewVaultCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.NewVaultName = "Platform secrets";
var gate = new TaskCompletionSource();
server.MemberReadGate = gate;
var create = vaults.CreateVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
// Asserted while the read is still in flight: that is the only moment at which a second read
// started by the selection handler is distinguishable from the reload's own.
server.MemberReads.ShouldBe(1, "a reload reads the selected vault's members once");
gate.SetResult();
await create;
vaults.Members.ShouldHaveSingleItem().Role.ShouldBe("OWNER");
}
/// <remarks>
/// Through the form rather than straight at the command, because the name is what the form is for —
/// and because the form is now the only way in: there is no separate "make a team" step behind it.
/// </remarks>
private static async Task CreateVaultAsync(VaultsViewModel vaults, string name)
{
await vaults.LoadAsync(Token);
vaults.NewVaultCommand.Execute(null);
vaults.NewVaultName = name;
await vaults.CreateVaultCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
vaults.IsCreatingVault.ShouldBeFalse(vaults.Status);
vaults.SelectedVault.ShouldNotBeNull(vaults.Status);
vaults.SelectedVault!.IsShared.ShouldBeTrue(vaults.Status);
}
/// <remarks>
/// The whole path rather than a shortcut into the unlocked state, because sharing needs an identity
/// key that was really enrolled: the fake server publishes it into its key log during enrollment, and
/// that entry is what the client verifies its own directory answer against.
/// </remarks>
private async Task UnlockedAsync()
{
await shell.StartAsync(Token);
await shell.SignInCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
shell.Passphrase = Passphrase;
shell.ConfirmPassphrase = Passphrase;
await shell.EnrollCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
shell.RecoveryCodeWrittenDown = true;
shell.ConfirmRecoveryCodeCommand.Execute(null);
shell.Passphrase = Passphrase;
await shell.UnlockCommand.ExecuteAsync(null);
shell.State.ShouldBe(ShellState.Unlocked, shell.StatusMessage);
}
}