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DodoSSH/src/DodoSSH.Client.App/Views/DevicePinWindow.axaml.cs
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Let the Linux head check for updates, and seal its device key in the TPM
Two things the RPM shipped without, and the reason they arrive together is
that both are the same question — what may this platform ask of the machine,
and what must it not ask of the user.

◆ UPDATES: THIS CLIENT CHECKS AND FETCHES, AND PACKAGEKIT INSTALLS.

ADR 0013 rule 11 said there was no updater at all, and that went too far. It
conflated noticing that a newer build exists with installing it: the second is
what the trust argument is about, and the first is not — a client that checks
a fixed address and tells you what it found has taken no capability from
anybody. Written as a flat refusal, the rule bought its safety by paying a cost
that was avoidable, and the ADR now says so in its own words.

So LinuxUpdateChannel reads the rolling nightly release, compares versions the
way rpm compares them, downloads the package, verifies its digest and hands the
file to PackageKit over gdbus. Polkit asks; the user may say no; nothing is
torn down before the answer, because ApplyingEndsTheProcess is false and the
shell already knows what that means — it is the phone's shape, and declining an
update must not cost somebody their open shells.

Three details that are load-bearing rather than incidental:

  - The comparison is rpmvercmp and not SemVer, because rpm is what will accept
    or refuse the install. Same argument ADR 0014 makes for versionCode. The
    installed side is read out of the rpm database rather than derived from the
    assembly, so the SemVer-to-rpm translation exists in exactly one place. All
    28 expected values in RpmVersionTests came out of rpm itself rather than out
    of a reading of the algorithm.

  - The digest is checked and is not a signature. Velopack verifies its own
    downloads and Android checks a signature; an RPM over HTTPS has neither. The
    manifest names a SHA-256 and a mismatch deletes the file rather than leaving
    something installable-by-hand in the profile directory.

  - ONLY_TRUSTED is cleared, which is what routes the request to polkit's
    package-install-untrusted action. The package is unsigned, so requiring
    trust would fail every update at the last step.

◆ THE DEVICE KEY: SEALED IN THE TPM, BEHIND A PIN THE TPM CHECKS.

ADR 0007's amendment is the bar: a gate inside the process is not a gate. The
key is sealed into a TPM 2.0 keyedhash object whose userAuth comes from a PIN,
so unsealing is a command the chip refuses; the blob is encrypted to the storage
hierarchy and is useless on any other machine; nothing here ever compares a PIN.

The sealed object deliberately carries no NoDA attribute, and that one omission
is the whole reason four digits is enough: every wrong answer advances the TPM's
dictionary-attack counter and the chip stops answering entirely once it trips.
Measured at four wrong tries against a software TPM, after which the correct PIN
gets nothing either. It is asserted by a test rather than left to a reading of
the template, because removing the attribute leaves every other assertion
passing.

This is weaker than Hello and Touch ID and the difference is invisible, so it is
written down in three places rather than smoothed over: those raise their prompt
from inside the platform and this one is a window we draw. The prompt is
deliberately plain for that reason — teaching people that a convincing DodoSSH
PIN box is a system dialog is the one thing this design must not do.

Rejected, each for failing the amendment: the Secret Service API, which has no
per-use consent and is DPAPI's shape exactly; fprintd, which answers a question
and holds nothing, so skipping the call skips the gate; and a polkit-gated root
helper, which would work and puts a privileged component in a package that
installs nothing setuid.

Availability is narrower than "has a TPM": on Fedora /dev/tpmrm0 is root:tss and
desktop users are not in tss, so the ordinary case reports unavailable and keeps
asking for the passphrase. Shipping a udev rule to widen that is refused — it is
the administrator's decision, not an application package's.

◆ WHAT IS ACTUALLY VERIFIED, SINCE THAT IS THE PART THAT USUALLY ISN'T.

This is the only device key store in the repository with real coverage, and it
is only possible because the PIN is a delegate and the TPM is a device: seal,
unseal, wrong PIN, lockout, decline and a foreign blob all run unattended
against a software TPM. Windows and macOS cannot be tested at all — their
prompts block a suite forever, which WindowsDeviceKeyStoreTests records.

TSS.Net's own TcpTpmDevice cannot reach swtpm: it opens the platform socket too
and exchanges a handshake only the Microsoft reference simulator answers, so
Connect() blocks with no error and no timeout. SoftwareTpm speaks the data
channel and nothing else.

The suite also lied once and was fixed: the lockout test trips shared state, and
without a DictionaryAttackLockReset in Dispose every later test got null from a
correct PIN — six of them assert null and passed for entirely the wrong reason.

End to end on a real Fedora 44: a genuine linux-x64 publish packages, installs,
and every DT_NEEDED in the installed tree resolves except liblttng-ust, which is
the one this spec deliberately excludes. What no runner covers is /dev/tpmrm0,
PackageKit and polkit, and Phase 19 grew five checks for exactly those.

Also fixed: the magic-bytes literal picked up raw control characters, which made
LinuxDeviceKeyStore.cs binary to git — no diffs and no line-ending normalisation.
2026-08-22 20:02:30 +02:00

204 lines
6.9 KiB
C#

using Avalonia.Controls;
using Avalonia.Input;
using Avalonia.Interactivity;
using Avalonia.Markup.Xaml;
using Avalonia.Threading;
using DodoSSH.Client.App.Platform;
namespace DodoSSH.Client.App.Views;
/// <summary>
/// Asks for the PIN that unseals this machine's device key.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Raised by <see cref="LinuxDeviceKeyStore"/> through the delegate <c>App.axaml.cs</c> supplies, and by
/// nothing else. See the markup for why this is a window rather than a card, and why it is plain.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Cancelling is an ordinary answer, not an error.</b> Escape, the close button and CANCEL all resolve
/// to null, which the store reads as "no PIN" and the unlock path answers with the passphrase screen. That
/// is the same contract <c>IDeviceKeyStore.TryLoadAsync</c> documents for a declined fingerprint.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed partial class DevicePinWindow : Window
{
/// <summary>
/// The shortest PIN this will accept, and the reason it is this short rather than longer.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Four, because the TPM counts wrong answers and stops — which is exactly the property that makes a
/// short secret safe here and does not exist for anything kept in a file. A PIN long enough to be safe
/// without hardware counting would be a second passphrase, and somebody asked for a second passphrase
/// reuses the first.
/// </remarks>
private const int ShortestPin = 4;
private TaskCompletionSource<string?>? answer;
/// <summary>Creates the window. Avalonia's designer needs this; nothing else should call it.</summary>
public DevicePinWindow()
{
AvaloniaXamlLoader.Load(this);
Accept.Click += OnAccept;
Cancel.Click += OnCancel;
KeyDown += OnKeyDown;
Pin.KeyDown += OnKeyDown;
Confirm.KeyDown += OnKeyDown;
}
/// <summary>
/// Shows the prompt over the main window and answers with what was typed, or null.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>Marshalled onto the UI thread here rather than at the call site.</b> The store is called from
/// wherever the unlock happens to be running — a background task on launch, a command handler on a
/// button — and none of those should have to know that this ends in a window. Avalonia throws rather
/// than misbehaving if it is wrong, which would turn a device unlock into a crash.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// A missing owner answers null rather than showing an ownerless window. It means the main window is
/// gone or not up yet, and a modal dialog with nothing behind it is a prompt the user cannot place —
/// which is precisely the shape of the thing this application must not train people to accept.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="owner">The window to sit over.</param>
/// <param name="purpose">Whether a PIN is being chosen or entered.</param>
/// <param name="cancellationToken">Cancellation token.</param>
public static ValueTask<string?> AskAsync(
Func<Window?> owner,
DevicePinPurpose purpose,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(owner);
return new ValueTask<string?>(
Dispatcher.UIThread.InvokeAsync(
async () =>
{
if (owner() is not { } parent)
{
return null;
}
var window = new DevicePinWindow();
window.Prepare(purpose);
using var registration = cancellationToken.Register(window.Close);
return await window.ShowFor(parent).ConfigureAwait(true);
}));
}
private void Prepare(DevicePinPurpose purpose)
{
var choosing = purpose == DevicePinPurpose.Choosing;
Heading.Text = choosing ? "Choose a PIN for this computer" : "Enter your DodoSSH PIN";
Explanation.Text = choosing
? "Your device key is sealed into this computer's TPM. The PIN is checked by the TPM itself, "
+ "which stops answering after a few wrong tries — so a short one is enough, and it only "
+ "ever works on this computer."
: "This unlocks the key sealed into this computer's TPM. Cancel to use your passphrase "
+ "instead.";
Confirm.IsVisible = choosing;
Accept.Content = choosing ? "SET PIN" : "UNLOCK";
}
private async Task<string?> ShowFor(Window parent)
{
answer = new TaskCompletionSource<string?>(TaskCreationOptions.RunContinuationsAsynchronously);
// Resolves the pending answer however the window goes away — the close button, Escape, or the
// cancellation registration above. Without it a closed window leaves an await that never returns,
// and the unlock path hangs rather than falling back to the passphrase.
Closed += (_, _) => answer.TrySetResult(null);
Pin.Focus();
await ShowDialog(parent).ConfigureAwait(true);
return await answer.Task.ConfigureAwait(true);
}
private void OnKeyDown(object? sender, KeyEventArgs e)
{
switch (e.Key)
{
case Key.Escape:
Complete(null);
e.Handled = true;
break;
case Key.Enter:
Submit();
e.Handled = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
private void OnAccept(object? sender, RoutedEventArgs e) => Submit();
private void OnCancel(object? sender, RoutedEventArgs e) => Complete(null);
/// <summary>
/// Checks what was typed and either answers with it or says what is wrong.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Both checks are about a PIN being <em>chosen</em>. Nothing validates a PIN being entered, because
/// the only thing that can judge that is the TPM — refusing a four-character entry here because the
/// stored one was six would be this process deciding something it has no way to know.
/// </remarks>
private void Submit()
{
var pin = Pin.Text ?? string.Empty;
if (!Confirm.IsVisible)
{
if (pin.Length > 0)
{
Complete(pin);
}
return;
}
if (pin.Length < ShortestPin)
{
Show($"A PIN needs at least {ShortestPin} characters.");
return;
}
if (!string.Equals(pin, Confirm.Text ?? string.Empty, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
Show("Those two do not match.");
return;
}
Complete(pin);
}
private void Show(string problem)
{
Problem.Text = problem;
Problem.IsVisible = true;
}
private void Complete(string? pin)
{
answer?.TrySetResult(pin);
Close();
}
}