Files
DodoSSH/src/DodoSSH.Api/Features/Teams/VaultGrantService.cs
T
jaap-jan d5b1a73182 Move the keys when a membership changes, not just the flag
Adding somebody to a team granted them nothing readable and removing them
rotated nothing. Both were honest — the interface said so in as many words — and
both left the actual work to a button somebody had to remember to press, on a
machine that happened to hold the key. Adding now wraps every team vault this
machine can open to the new member, and removing revokes their grants and moves
each of those vaults to a fresh key that goes to whoever is left.

The rotation is where the design had to be decided rather than written. A vault
key is per generation and an item carries the generation it was sealed under, so
advancing the vault and withdrawing the old grants would make everything already
stored unreadable to everybody, including whoever pressed the button. So earlier
grants are kept: a member holds one per generation, /me serves them as
PriorKeyWraps, and VaultKeyring holds a key per generation — the newest for
writing, the item's own for reading, chosen per item on every read path. Sharing
issues one grant per generation held, because a recipient handed only the current
key would open the vault to find most of it undecryptable; revocation takes every
generation, because leaving the history behind leaves them able to read
everything written before the rotation.

The bump itself is one server transaction. POST /vaults/{id}/rekey must name
exactly current + 1 and the vault's xmin token makes that binding, so two admins
rotating at once do not both walk away believing they succeeded — the second is
refused and told to read the vault again. The server contributes the moment and
no cryptography: it cannot generate the key, cannot tell that the one it is
handed differs from the old one, and checks that the caller held the old one the
only way it can, by requiring a live grant at the current generation.

What this does not do is re-encrypt what is already stored, and the product says
so rather than the reassuring version: everything written from the rotation
onwards is unreadable to the person who left, and nothing about the past changes.
That half is deferred and is safe to add incrementally precisely because a vault
at mixed generations stays readable. ADR 0010 records the alternatives — revoking
the old grants, chaining each key under its successor, re-sealing every item in
one request against a server that caps a push at 500 operations — and why each
was rejected.

Two things fell out of the change rather than being asked for. The grant listing
would have shown a member once per generation, so it now returns one row per
holder carrying the best key they hold, which is what makes a row below the
vault's generation mean "still owed the new key". And MarkUnreadable gives up the
write target as well as reporting: a client whose vault was rotated elsewhere
would otherwise have gone on sealing items under its superseded key — readable to
its author, unreadable to everybody else, with nothing to show for it.
2026-08-03 23:05:40 +02:00

613 lines
26 KiB
C#

using System.Security.Cryptography;
using DodoSSH.Contracts;
using DodoSSH.Domain;
using DodoSSH.Infrastructure;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
using Npgsql;
namespace DodoSSH.Api.Features.Teams;
/// <summary>
/// Team vaults and the key grants that make them readable.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Everything here stores bytes it cannot interpret. A wrapped vault key is sealed to a recipient's
/// X25519 key, and a grant signature is Ed25519 over a tuple this server never verifies — the two
/// together are what let a client detect a fabricated grant, and moving either check onto the server
/// would make it a convenience rather than the boundary. See docs/crypto.md §6 and §7.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// What the server <em>can</em> check is that a grant is not obviously useless: that the recipient is
/// enrolled, that the fingerprint names their current key, and that the generation is the vault's
/// current one. Each of those would otherwise surface at the far end as a tag failure the recipient
/// reads as data corruption, days later, with nothing pointing at the grant that caused it.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
internal sealed class VaultGrantService(
DodoDbContext database,
TimeProvider clock,
ILogger<VaultGrantService> logger)
{
/// <summary>
/// Largest wrapped vault key accepted.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// A <c>SealTo</c> envelope over a 32-byte key is 6 + 32 + 24 + 48 = 110 bytes. The cap is loose
/// enough to survive a future envelope — the reserved hybrid seal in docs/crypto.md §8 is far
/// larger — and tight enough that this column cannot be used as free storage on a server that
/// stores it without being able to read it.
/// </remarks>
private const int MaxWrappedKeyBytes = 4096;
/// <summary>Creates a vault owned by a team, with the creator's own grant.</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The vault and its first grant are written together, for the reason enrollment gives about a
/// personal vault: a vault with no grant is a container nobody can ever open, including whoever
/// created it, because only a client can wrap the key and it has already moved on.
/// </remarks>
internal async Task<VaultSummary> CreateTeamVaultAsync(
UserAccount user,
Team team,
CreateTeamVaultRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var name = RequireVaultName(request.Name);
if (request.VaultId == Guid.Empty)
{
throw new TeamInvalidException("A vault id is required. Generate a UUIDv7 on the client.");
}
RequireWrappedKey(request.WrappedVaultKey);
RequireSignature(request.GrantSignature);
var key = await RequireCurrentKeyAsync(user.Id, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
var taken = await database.Vaults
.AnyAsync(v => v.Id == request.VaultId, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
if (taken)
{
throw new TeamInvalidException(
"That vault id is already in use. Generate a new UUIDv7 and retry.");
}
AddVaultWithSelfGrant(user, team, request, name, key, clock.GetUtcNow());
try
{
await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (DbUpdateException exception) when (IsUniqueViolation(exception))
{
// The pre-check covers the ordinary case; this is the race between two creates choosing
// the same id, which must not surface as a 500 about a constraint.
throw new TeamInvalidException(
"That vault id is already in use. Generate a new UUIDv7 and retry.");
}
TeamLog.TeamVaultCreated(logger, request.VaultId, team.Id, user.Id);
return new VaultSummary(
VaultId: request.VaultId,
Name: name,
IsPersonal: false,
TeamId: team.Id,
KeyGeneration: 1,
Permissions: 0,
WrappedVaultKey: request.WrappedVaultKey,
RekeyRequired: false);
}
/// <summary>Adds the vault row and the creator's own grant, in one unit of work.</summary>
private void AddVaultWithSelfGrant(
UserAccount user,
Team team,
CreateTeamVaultRequest request,
string name,
UserKey key,
DateTimeOffset now)
{
database.Vaults.Add(new Vault
{
Id = request.VaultId,
Name = name,
OwnerKind = VaultOwnerKind.Team,
TeamId = team.Id,
KeyGeneration = 1,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
UpdatedAtUtc = now,
});
database.VaultKeyGrants.Add(new VaultKeyGrant
{
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
VaultId = request.VaultId,
KeyGeneration = 1,
Kind = GrantKind.Member,
RecipientUserId = user.Id,
RecipientKeyFingerprint = key.FingerprintSha256,
WrappedKey = request.WrappedVaultKey,
GranterUserId = user.Id,
GranterKeyFingerprint = key.FingerprintSha256,
// No key log head, exactly as a personal vault's self-grant carries none: there is no
// third party whose key could have been substituted here.
KeyLogHead = null,
Signature = request.GrantSignature,
State = GrantState.Active,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
});
}
private static string RequireVaultName(string? value)
{
var name = (value ?? string.Empty).Trim();
return name.Length is 0 or > 256
? throw new TeamInvalidException("A vault name of 1 to 256 characters is required.")
: name;
}
/// <summary>Lists who can open a vault.</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// One row per holder, not one per grant. A rotated vault holds several grants per member — one per
/// generation, which is what lets them read its history — and a listing that showed each of them
/// would answer "who can open this" with the same person three times. The row carries the best key
/// they hold: the live grant at the highest generation, or, for somebody whose access has been
/// withdrawn, the most recent grant they had, so the withdrawal is still visible.
/// </remarks>
internal async Task<VaultGrantsResponse> ListGrantsAsync(
Vault vault,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var grants = await database.VaultKeyGrants
.Where(g => g.VaultId == vault.Id && g.Kind == GrantKind.Member)
.Include(g => g.RecipientUser)
.OrderBy(g => g.CreatedAtUtc)
.ToListAsync(cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
var holders = grants
.GroupBy(g => g.RecipientUserId!.Value)
.Select(group => group
.OrderByDescending(g => g.RevokedAtUtc is null)
.ThenByDescending(g => g.KeyGeneration)
.First())
// The order the first grant of each holder was made in, so the list reads as the vault was
// shared rather than reshuffling itself every time somebody is re-wrapped.
.OrderBy(g => grants.Find(first => first.RecipientUserId == g.RecipientUserId)!.CreatedAtUtc)
.ToList();
return new VaultGrantsResponse(
VaultId: vault.Id,
KeyGeneration: (uint)vault.KeyGeneration,
RekeyRequired: vault.RekeyRequired,
Grants:
[
.. holders.Select(g => new VaultGrantSummary(
g.RecipientUserId!.Value,
g.RecipientUser?.Email,
g.RecipientUser?.DisplayName,
(uint)g.KeyGeneration,
ToContract(g.State),
g.GranterUserId,
g.CreatedAtUtc,
g.RevokedAtUtc)),
]);
}
/// <summary>Wraps a vault key to another member.</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Re-issuing to a recipient who already holds a live grant <em>for that generation</em> replaces it
/// in place rather than inserting a second row, because the unique index permits exactly one live
/// grant per recipient per generation — and because the operation somebody is actually performing
/// when they do this is "wrap it again", after a botched first attempt.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// A recipient may hold one grant per generation at once, and after a rotation they need to: an item
/// is sealed under whatever generation was current when it was written, so somebody given only the
/// newest key would find everything older unreadable. Which generations get wrapped is the sharing
/// client's decision — it is the only party that can tell which ones it holds.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
internal async Task IssueGrantAsync(
UserAccount actor,
Vault vault,
IssueVaultGrantRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
await RequireIssuableAsync(vault, request, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
var granterKey = await RequireCurrentKeyAsync(actor.Id, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
var generation = (int)request.KeyGeneration;
var existing = await database.VaultKeyGrants
.SingleOrDefaultAsync(
g => g.VaultId == vault.Id
&& g.KeyGeneration == generation
&& g.RecipientUserId == request.RecipientUserId
&& g.RevokedAtUtc == null,
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
var grant = existing ?? new VaultKeyGrant
{
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
VaultId = vault.Id,
KeyGeneration = generation,
Kind = GrantKind.Member,
RecipientUserId = request.RecipientUserId,
CreatedAtUtc = clock.GetUtcNow(),
};
grant.RecipientKeyFingerprint = request.RecipientKeyFingerprint;
grant.WrappedKey = request.WrappedVaultKey;
grant.GranterUserId = actor.Id;
// Taken from the server's own view of the caller's key rather than from the request. The
// client signed over the same value, so an honest client is unaffected; a field that could
// disagree with reality is one a reader would have to decide which copy to believe.
grant.GranterKeyFingerprint = granterKey.FingerprintSha256;
grant.KeyLogHead = request.KeyLogHead;
grant.Signature = request.GrantSignature;
grant.State = GrantState.Active;
if (existing is null)
{
database.VaultKeyGrants.Add(grant);
}
await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
TeamLog.GrantIssued(
logger, vault.Id, generation, request.RecipientUserId, actor.Id);
}
/// <summary>
/// Everything that can be checked about a grant without holding the vault key.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// None of this verifies that the wrap contains the right key — nothing on this machine can. Each
/// check exists because failing it would otherwise surface at the recipient as a tag failure they
/// read as data corruption, long after the request that caused it.
/// </remarks>
private async Task RequireIssuableAsync(
Vault vault,
IssueVaultGrantRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
// Team vaults only. A personal vault has exactly one subject who may reach it, so a grant on
// one would seal a key to somebody the access check will go on refusing — a row that looks
// like sharing and is not. Moving the items into a team vault is the operation that shares.
if (vault.OwnerKind != VaultOwnerKind.Team || vault.TeamId is not { } teamId)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
"Only a team vault can be shared. A personal vault is reachable by its owner alone, "
+ "so a grant on one would seal a key to somebody who still could not fetch it.");
}
RequireWrappedKey(request.WrappedVaultKey);
RequireSignature(request.GrantSignature);
RequireDigest(request.RecipientKeyFingerprint, "recipient key fingerprint");
RequireDigest(request.KeyLogHead, "key log head");
// Any generation the vault has actually reached, not only the current one — sharing a rotated
// vault means handing over its history as well as its present. A generation ahead of the
// current one is refused: nothing is sealed under it, so the grant would open nothing, and
// accepting it would let a client move the vault forward without the transaction that does so.
if (request.KeyGeneration is 0 || request.KeyGeneration > (uint)vault.KeyGeneration)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
$"This vault is at key generation {vault.KeyGeneration}. A grant for generation "
+ $"{request.KeyGeneration} would open nothing.");
}
var member = await database.TeamMemberships
.AnyAsync(
m => m.TeamId == teamId
&& m.UserId == request.RecipientUserId
&& m.Status == MembershipStatus.Active
&& m.DeletedAtUtc == null,
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
if (!member)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
"That account is not an active member of the team that owns this vault. Add them to "
+ "the team first — a key wrapped to somebody the server will refuse to serve is a "
+ "grant that does nothing.");
}
var recipientKey = await RequireCurrentKeyAsync(request.RecipientUserId, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
// The fingerprint the client signed over must be the key the recipient actually holds.
// Otherwise the grant is sealed to a superseded key, opens nothing, and surfaces at the far
// end as an unexplained decryption failure rather than as the mistake it is.
if (!CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals(
recipientKey.FingerprintSha256, request.RecipientKeyFingerprint))
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
"The fingerprint does not name the recipient's current identity key. Re-read the "
+ "directory and wrap the key again — theirs has been rotated since you fetched it.");
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Moves a vault to a fresh key generation, wrapped to the caller.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>The vault as the caller now sees it, at the generation this call created.</returns>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>What the server contributes is the moment, not the key.</b> It cannot generate a vault key, tell
/// that the one it is handed differs from the old one, or check that the caller held the old one at
/// all. What it can do — and what nothing else can — is advance the generation exactly once, so two
/// admins rotating the same vault at the same time do not both walk away believing they succeeded.
/// The stale one's generation is no longer one past the current, and it is refused.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Earlier grants are left standing.</b> They are what the remaining members read the vault's
/// history with: an item carries the generation it was sealed under, and nothing here re-encrypts
/// items — only a client holding both keys could. The departed member is cut off by the revocation
/// that removal already performed, which takes every generation they held.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The rekey flag is cleared here rather than when the last member is re-wrapped, because it records
/// that a membership change left the vault owing a rotation, and the rotation is this. Who still
/// needs the new key is a different question, and the grant list answers it by generation.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
internal async Task<VaultSummary> RekeyAsync(
UserAccount actor,
Vault vault,
int permissions,
RekeyVaultRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var key = await RequireRotatableAsync(actor, vault, request, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
var now = clock.GetUtcNow();
var generation = (int)request.KeyGeneration;
AddSelfGrant(actor, vault, key, generation, request, now);
vault.KeyGeneration = generation;
vault.RekeyRequired = false;
vault.RekeyReason = RekeyReason.None;
vault.UpdatedAtUtc = now;
try
{
// One SaveChanges, so the row and the grant land together. The vault's xmin concurrency
// token is what makes the generation check above binding rather than advisory: a second
// rotation that read the same generation fails here instead of overwriting this one.
await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (DbUpdateConcurrencyException)
{
// Reported as the same refusal the pre-check gives, because it is the same situation seen a
// moment later — and a 500 about a concurrency token would tell the user nothing they could
// act on. Retrying is safe: the caller generates a fresh key and reads the generation again.
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
"Somebody else rotated this vault while this rotation was being recorded. Read it again "
+ "and rotate from the generation they left behind.");
}
TeamLog.VaultRekeyed(logger, vault.Id, generation, actor.Id);
var prior = await database.VaultKeyGrants
.Where(g => g.VaultId == vault.Id
&& g.RecipientUserId == actor.Id
&& g.KeyGeneration < generation
&& g.State == GrantState.Active
&& g.RevokedAtUtc == null)
.OrderBy(g => g.KeyGeneration)
.Select(g => new VaultKeyWrap((uint)g.KeyGeneration, g.WrappedKey))
.ToListAsync(cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
return new VaultSummary(
VaultId: vault.Id,
Name: vault.Name,
IsPersonal: false,
TeamId: vault.TeamId,
KeyGeneration: request.KeyGeneration,
Permissions: permissions,
WrappedVaultKey: request.WrappedVaultKey,
RekeyRequired: false,
PriorKeyWraps: prior);
}
/// <summary>Records the rotating client's grant for the generation it has just created.</summary>
private void AddSelfGrant(
UserAccount actor,
Vault vault,
UserKey key,
int generation,
RekeyVaultRequest request,
DateTimeOffset now) =>
database.VaultKeyGrants.Add(new VaultKeyGrant
{
Id = Guid.CreateVersion7(),
VaultId = vault.Id,
KeyGeneration = generation,
Kind = GrantKind.Member,
RecipientUserId = actor.Id,
RecipientKeyFingerprint = key.FingerprintSha256,
WrappedKey = request.WrappedVaultKey,
GranterUserId = actor.Id,
GranterKeyFingerprint = key.FingerprintSha256,
// No key log head, as every self-grant carries none: there is no third party whose key
// could have been substituted when you wrap something to yourself.
KeyLogHead = null,
Signature = request.GrantSignature,
State = GrantState.Active,
CreatedAtUtc = now,
});
/// <summary>
/// Everything that can be checked about a rotation before it is recorded.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>The caller's current identity key, which the new grant is filed against.</returns>
private async Task<UserKey> RequireRotatableAsync(
UserAccount actor,
Vault vault,
RekeyVaultRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (vault.OwnerKind != VaultOwnerKind.Team || vault.TeamId is null)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
"Only a team vault can be rotated. A personal vault has one reader, so a rotation "
+ "would re-wrap a key to the same person and change nothing about who can read it.");
}
RequireWrappedKey(request.WrappedVaultKey);
RequireSignature(request.GrantSignature);
if (request.KeyGeneration != (uint)vault.KeyGeneration + 1)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
$"This vault is at key generation {vault.KeyGeneration}, so the next one is "
+ $"{vault.KeyGeneration + 1} and not {request.KeyGeneration}. Read the vault again — "
+ "somebody else has rotated it since you last looked.");
}
var key = await RequireCurrentKeyAsync(actor.Id, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
// Held now, not merely permitted. The new key has to be wrapped from the old one, and an
// account that cannot open the current generation cannot have done that — so a request from
// one is either a mistake or an attempt to strand every other member behind a key nobody has.
var holdsCurrent = await database.VaultKeyGrants
.AnyAsync(
g => g.VaultId == vault.Id
&& g.KeyGeneration == vault.KeyGeneration
&& g.RecipientUserId == actor.Id
&& g.State == GrantState.Active
&& g.RevokedAtUtc == null,
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
return holdsCurrent
? key
: throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
"You hold no key to this vault at its current generation, so you cannot rotate it. Ask "
+ "a member who does.");
}
/// <summary>
/// Withdraws a member's key grant.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>Whether there was a live grant to withdraw.</returns>
/// <remarks>
/// Blocks future reads and nothing else. Anything the recipient has already pulled is on their
/// machine and stays there, which is why the vault is flagged for rekey and why the honest
/// remediation for a departure is rotating the SSH credential itself. See ADR 0001.
/// </remarks>
internal async Task<bool> RevokeGrantAsync(
UserAccount actor,
Vault vault,
Guid recipientUserId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (recipientUserId == actor.Id)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
"You cannot withdraw your own key. It would leave you unable to read a vault you can "
+ "still write to, and nothing here can hand it back.");
}
var grants = await database.VaultKeyGrants
.Where(g => g.VaultId == vault.Id
&& g.RecipientUserId == recipientUserId
&& g.RevokedAtUtc == null)
.ToListAsync(cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
if (grants.Count == 0)
{
return false;
}
var now = clock.GetUtcNow();
foreach (var grant in grants)
{
grant.State = GrantState.Revoked;
grant.RevokedAtUtc = now;
}
vault.RekeyRequired = true;
vault.RekeyReason = RekeyReason.Requested;
vault.UpdatedAtUtc = now;
await database.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
TeamLog.GrantRevoked(logger, vault.Id, recipientUserId, actor.Id);
return true;
}
private async Task<UserKey> RequireCurrentKeyAsync(Guid userId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var key = await database.UserKeys
.SingleOrDefaultAsync(k => k.UserId == userId && k.IsCurrent, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
return key
?? throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
"That account has not published an identity key yet, so there is nothing to wrap a "
+ "vault key to. They have to sign in and set up their vault first.");
}
private static void RequireWrappedKey(byte[]? value)
{
if (value is null || value.Length == 0 || value.Length > MaxWrappedKeyBytes)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException(
$"A wrapped vault key of 1 to {MaxWrappedKeyBytes} bytes is required.");
}
}
private static void RequireSignature(byte[]? value)
{
if (value is null || value.Length != 64)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException("An Ed25519 grant signature is 64 bytes.");
}
}
private static void RequireDigest(byte[]? value, string field)
{
if (value is null || value.Length != 32)
{
throw new VaultGrantInvalidException($"A {field} is 32 bytes.");
}
}
private static VaultGrantState ToContract(GrantState state) => state switch
{
GrantState.Active => VaultGrantState.Active,
GrantState.AwaitingRewrap => VaultGrantState.AwaitingRewrap,
GrantState.Revoked => VaultGrantState.Revoked,
_ => VaultGrantState.Unspecified,
};
private static bool IsUniqueViolation(DbUpdateException exception) =>
string.Equals(
(exception.InnerException as PostgresException)?.SqlState,
PostgresErrorCodes.UniqueViolation,
StringComparison.Ordinal);
}