Public Access
The relay checkbox said it was not wired up, and the plan said the server half was built and shipped. It was not: there was ADR 0004, the contract records, RelayOptions and a CHECK constraint, and RelayOptions said in its own remarks that there was no endpoint and no dialler. So both halves are built here, as step 3 of docs/reaching-a-host-you-cannot-dial.md. Server, in Features/Relay: - POST /api/v1/relay/tickets makes every decision: the host, Connect on its vault, the relay switched on, and the stored name resolved once and judged by RelayAddressPolicy. Loopback, link-local, 0.0.0.0/8, multicast and the metadata endpoints are refused with no configuration escape, with IPv4-mapped and NAT64 spellings unwrapped first; then the operator's denials, allow-list and private-network switch. What passes goes into a Data Protection ticket, and nothing resolves the name again. Every target refusal is the same 403, so the endpoint cannot be used to map the operator's DNS; the real reason is logged. - GET /api/v1/relay/connect takes the ticket as a second subprotocol, checks its expiry against TimeProvider and spends it with a unique insert into relay_ticket_use before accepting the upgrade. After the upgrade a refusal is a close code: 4502 for a host the server could not reach, 4429 for a limit, 4408 idle, 4409 lifetime, 1001 after a drain. - relay_session is the audit row, written from short-lived scopes. Client: - RelayBridge is a loopback SOCKS5 listener that accepts once and pipes to the relay socket. It rides on the new SshLoopbackProxy.Lifetime, so the connection disposes it on every way a session ends and a failed connect disposes it before throwing. - ServerRelay, exposed as IVaultServer.Relay from /api/v1/meta, asks for the ticket, opens the socket, starts the bridge and turns every refusal into a sentence. - VaultViewModel and TransfersViewModel reach a relayed host through it, never fall back to dialling it directly, and replace SSH.NET's transport error with the relay's own reason when it gave one. Neither side ever cancels a WebSocket operation. Cancelling one aborts the socket, and an aborted socket sends no close frame, which is the only way the client learns the server could not reach the host. AnIdleSession_IsClosedWithTheIdleCode asserts that the code arrives. Three departures from ADR 0004, recorded in it: awaited copy loops rather than Pipelines (same backpressure, two 32 KiB buffers), no ?ticket= fallback, and no device id in the ticket. Tests: API 245, shell 582 (5 skipped), layout 170, SSH 110 including a real login through the bridge, API client 30, contracts 25. Not run: the Android build (its change is copy only) and the Alpine layout oracle.
120 lines
5.6 KiB
C#
120 lines
5.6 KiB
C#
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
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namespace DodoSSH.Api.Setup;
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/// <summary>Binds and validates strongly-typed options.</summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// Every section uses <c>ValidateOnStart</c>. A self-hosted server that boots half-configured and
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/// fails later, per-request, is far harder to diagnose than one that refuses to start and says
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/// which setting is wrong.
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/// </remarks>
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internal static class Configuration
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{
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internal static IServiceCollection AddDodoOptions(this IServiceCollection services)
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{
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services.AddOptions<ServerOptions>()
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.BindConfiguration(ServerOptions.SectionName)
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.ValidateDataAnnotations()
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.ValidateOnStart();
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services.AddOptions<DatabaseOptions>()
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.BindConfiguration(DatabaseOptions.SectionName)
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.ValidateDataAnnotations()
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.ValidateOnStart();
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services.AddOptions<OidcOptions>()
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.BindConfiguration(OidcOptions.SectionName)
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.ValidateDataAnnotations()
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.ValidateOnStart();
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services.AddOptions<SyncOptions>()
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.BindConfiguration(SyncOptions.SectionName)
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.ValidateDataAnnotations()
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.Validate(
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options => options.MaxItemPayloadBytes <= options.MaxPayloadBytes,
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"Sync:MaxItemPayloadBytes must not exceed Sync:MaxPayloadBytes.")
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.Validate(
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options => options.DefaultPullLimit <= options.MaxPullLimit,
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"Sync:DefaultPullLimit must not exceed Sync:MaxPullLimit.")
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.ValidateOnStart();
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services.AddOptions<EventsOptions>()
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.BindConfiguration(EventsOptions.SectionName)
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.ValidateDataAnnotations()
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.Validate(
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options => options.HeartbeatInterval > TimeSpan.Zero,
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"Events:HeartbeatInterval must be greater than zero.")
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.Validate(
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options => options.AccessRefreshInterval > TimeSpan.Zero,
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"Events:AccessRefreshInterval must be greater than zero.")
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.Validate(
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options => options.MaxConnectionDuration > options.AccessRefreshInterval,
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"Events:MaxConnectionDuration must exceed Events:AccessRefreshInterval; a connection "
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+ "that never lives long enough to re-read its own access has none of the bound that "
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+ "setting exists to provide.")
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.ValidateOnStart();
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services.AddRelayOptions();
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return services;
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}
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/// <summary>The relay's options, which carry more rules than any other section. See ADR 0004.</summary>
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private static void AddRelayOptions(this IServiceCollection services) =>
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services.AddOptions<RelayOptions>()
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.BindConfiguration(RelayOptions.SectionName)
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.ValidateDataAnnotations()
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.Validate(
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options => !options.Enabled || !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(options.WebSocketUrl),
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"Relay:WebSocketUrl is required when Relay:Enabled is true.")
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.Validate(
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options => options.IdleTimeout < options.MaxSessionDuration,
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"Relay:IdleTimeout must be shorter than Relay:MaxSessionDuration.")
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.Validate(
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options => options.TicketLifetime > TimeSpan.Zero
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&& options.TicketLifetime <= TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
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"Relay:TicketLifetime must be positive and at most 30 seconds. A ticket is a bearer "
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+ "credential in a header; ADR 0004 bounds how long one may be worth stealing.")
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.Validate(
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options => options.ConnectTimeout > TimeSpan.Zero && options.DrainTimeout >= TimeSpan.Zero,
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"Relay:ConnectTimeout must be positive and Relay:DrainTimeout must not be negative.")
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.Validate(
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options => Features.Relay.RelayAddressPolicy.AreNetworks(options.AllowedNetworks)
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&& Features.Relay.RelayAddressPolicy.AreNetworks(options.DeniedNetworks),
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"Relay:AllowedNetworks and Relay:DeniedNetworks must hold CIDR networks such as "
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+ "10.20.0.0/16, with no host bits set. An entry this server cannot read would be a gap "
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+ "the operator believes is closed.")
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.Validate(
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options => !options.Enabled
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|| (Uri.TryCreate(options.WebSocketUrl, UriKind.Absolute, out var url)
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&& (string.Equals(url.Scheme, Uri.UriSchemeWs, StringComparison.Ordinal)
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|| string.Equals(url.Scheme, Uri.UriSchemeWss, StringComparison.Ordinal))),
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"Relay:WebSocketUrl must be an absolute ws:// or wss:// URL.")
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.ValidateOnStart();
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/// <summary>
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/// Warns about configuration that is individually valid but dangerous in combination.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// These cannot be hard failures — each is legitimate in some deployment — but silently
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/// accepting them produces subtly broken security properties that nobody notices.
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/// </remarks>
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internal static WebApplication WarnOnRiskyConfiguration(this WebApplication app)
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{
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var logger = app.Services.GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>().CreateLogger("DodoSSH.Startup");
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var oidc = app.Services.GetRequiredService<IOptions<OidcOptions>>().Value;
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if (!oidc.RequireHttpsMetadata && !app.Environment.IsDevelopment())
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{
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StartupLog.InsecureMetadataOutsideDevelopment(logger);
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}
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if (oidc.AllowEmailLinking)
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{
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StartupLog.EmailLinkingEnabled(logger);
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}
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return app;
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}
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}
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