Files
DodoSSH/tests/DodoSSH.Api.Tests/EndpointInventoryTests.cs
T
jaap-jan 95816de0c5 Share a vault with a team, without the server holding a key
M3's teams, sharing and ACLs. Teams with roles, a public-key directory, the
append-only key log served for clients to check it against, team-owned vaults,
and vault key grants wrapped by a client and stored opaquely by the server.
VaultAccessService resolves team membership to PermissionFlags, so a viewer may
pull and may not push; the desktop client reads and syncs every vault it holds
a key for, and a real TEAMS screen replaces the one that said it did not exist.
No migration: team, team_membership, vault.team_id and vault_key_grant have all
been there since the first one, which is what carrying two unused tables bought.

Membership is authorisation. A grant is access. The obvious model is one
concept — "access", with a role attached, handed out by the server — and this
architecture cannot implement it: a vault key is sealed to each member's X25519
key, and only a client holding the plaintext can seal it for somebody else. So
"give Bob access" decomposes into a database write and a wrap, which happen on
different machines. Adding a member makes the server serve them the vault; it
cannot make it readable. VaultSummary.WrappedVaultKey is null in the meantime
and the vault appears in their list saying it is waiting for a key, because
hiding it until a grant existed would have been tidier and would have implied
the server was the thing granting access. The screen says the same thing after
every add, in the status line. ADR 0009 records the whole decision.

Sharing verifies or refuses. A directory lookup is a claim by the server about
a third party's public key, and wrapping to an unverified claim hands the vault
to whoever made it — no amount of transport security helps, because the server
is inside the threat model. KeyLogAudit reads the whole log, recomputes every
entry's hash from its own contents, checks the chain from genesis, and refuses
unless the offered key appears in it unchanged. There is no override flag: one
that exists gets used on the day the log is briefly unreachable, and the
resulting grant is indistinguishable from a correct one afterwards. What it
still cannot promise is that the key is the right person's, so the fingerprint
comes back for an out-of-band comparison and the success message says so every
time. A test corrupts the fake server's log by one byte and watches the client
refuse rather than warn.

The roles are only the ones that are enforceable. There is no ConnectOnly,
despite the design asking for one and TeamRole having room: SSH terminates on
the client, so a session needs the credential's plaintext on that machine, and
"may connect but may not read the key" cannot be enforced here. Shipping it as
an option in a dropdown would have been a lie. Connect rides along with Read
and is documented as an interface hint. Removal is named for what it does — it
revokes grants and flags the vault for rekey, and claims nothing about what is
already on somebody's laptop.

Three things are deliberately absent, and each is a refusal rather than an
omission. The rekey itself, because re-wrapping every item's data key under a
new vault key needs a client holding the current one; the server records that a
rotation is owed and the interface reports it, which is more honest than a
button that only appears to do it. Ownership transfer, because allowing an
owner to be removed without one leaves a team nobody can administer. And
cross-vault host key trust: a pin in a team vault is listed but not consulted
at connect time, because any member with Write could otherwise pre-approve a
fingerprint another member's client then trusts silently for a host in their
own vault. Scoping trust properly needs a scope on the SSH connect path, which
IKnownHostStore has not got; until then the narrow direction is the safe one
and the cost is in the README rather than hidden.

Reading now spans vaults and writing still does not. Every list on the vault
and hosts screens covers each vault the keyring opened, rows carry the vault
they came from, and an edit goes back to that vault rather than to the active
one — writing it to the active vault would fork the item and only show up when
a colleague wondered why their change never arrived. A new item goes wherever a
picker says, defaulting to the personal vault and never moving on its own,
because an item filed into a team's vault is visible to that team and moving it
back means deleting and retyping. The sidebar heading stops naming one vault
once there are two, and each row names its own.

The server checks what it can and nothing it cannot. It will not record a grant
for a key its recipient no longer holds, for a superseded generation, or for
somebody who is not in the team — each of those would otherwise surface days
later at the far end as a tag failure indistinguishable from corruption. It
does not verify the wrap or the signature, and the grant service says so: that
would be a convenience and never the boundary, and would put an asymmetric
implementation on a machine that is supposed to hold no keys.

Two bugs the tests found. TeamsViewModel's busy gate blocked its own reload, so
a team created a moment earlier was missing from the list it had just been
added to. And syncing every vault turned a failure from an exception into a
report, which made a background pass announce an unreachable vault once a
minute — the exact behaviour AnAutomaticPassThatFails_LeavesTheStatusAlone
exists to prevent. The fact is recorded and the message swallowed, as it was
before; pressing Sync still names the vault and the reason.

Also fixes a build break this branch started with: QuickConnectTests was never
updated when M2 added ISftpSessionFactory to the shell's constructor, so
nothing built at all.
2026-07-31 12:18:28 +02:00

182 lines
10 KiB
C#

using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Metadata;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Routing;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace DodoSSH.Api.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Every route the server exposes, and the authorization decision behind each one.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The inventory test ADR 0002 asked for. Endpoints are registered from an explicit type list in
/// <c>Setup/EndpointRegistration.cs</c> rather than found by scanning, which trades one failure mode for
/// another: nothing can appear by accident, but a type left off the list is a route that quietly does
/// not exist, with no compile error and — without this test — no failure either. Asserting the whole set
/// rather than a subset is the point. A new endpoint cannot ship until somebody writes down, here, who
/// is allowed to call it.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// It is also the only coverage <c>/api/v1/meta</c> and <c>/.well-known/dodossh-configuration</c> have
/// in <em>this</em> assembly — <c>DodoSSH.SystemTests</c> does fetch both anonymously, but that suite
/// needs a Docker daemon and several containers, so it is not what a developer runs before pushing.
/// Both are anonymous only because they say so, and a client has nothing to authenticate with at the
/// point it reads them, so a 401 on either is unrecoverable rather than merely wrong.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// What this does <em>not</em> cover: <see cref="Describe"/> reads only <see cref="IAuthorizeData.Policy"/>,
/// so a role, claim, scope or authentication-scheme requirement could be added or removed without
/// failing here. Nothing uses those today; the day something does, this table needs a column.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Collection(ApiCollection.Name)]
public sealed class EndpointInventoryTests(ApiFixture fixture)
{
private static readonly string[] Expected =
[
// Anonymous by necessity: discovery has to work before a token exists.
"GET /api/v1/meta name=GetMeta tags= policies= anon=True",
"GET /.well-known/dodossh-configuration name=GetDodoSshConfiguration tags= policies= anon=True",
// Authenticated, not Enrolled: these three are how a caller discovers it must enroll, does so,
// and — for revocation — withdraws a lost machine even if its enrollment state is in doubt.
"GET /api/v1/me name=GetMe tags=Identity policies=Authenticated anon=False",
"POST /api/v1/me/enrollment name=Enroll tags=Identity policies=Authenticated anon=False",
"DELETE /api/v1/me/devices/{deviceId:guid} name=RevokeDevice tags=Identity policies=Authenticated anon=False",
// The one endpoint in the /me area that needs a key bundle to already exist.
"POST /api/v1/me/devices name=RegisterDevice tags=Identity policies=Authenticated,Enrolled anon=False",
// Enrolled: a caller with no identity key can neither write ciphertext anyone can read nor read
// what is there.
"POST /api/v1/vaults/{vaultId:guid}/sync/pull name=SyncPull tags=Sync policies=Enrolled anon=False",
"POST /api/v1/vaults/{vaultId:guid}/sync/push name=SyncPush tags=Sync policies=Enrolled anon=False",
// Enrolled, because the answer exists to be wrapped to and a caller with no key of their own has
// nothing to wrap and no signature to attribute it with. There is no search here — see
// DirectoryService for why an exact-match-only directory is a decision rather than a shortcut.
"GET /api/v1/directory name=LookupDirectory tags=Identity policies=Enrolled anon=False",
// The other half of the same decision: the directory says what a key is, this is how a client
// checks that claim against a chain the server cannot rewrite without every other client
// noticing. Nothing in it is secret.
"GET /api/v1/keylog name=ReadKeyLog tags=Identity policies=Enrolled anon=False",
// Authenticated, not Enrolled: reading and joining teams needs no key, and a member added before
// they have set a vault up must still be able to see the team they are now in.
"GET /api/v1/teams name=ListTeams tags=Teams policies=Authenticated anon=False",
"GET /api/v1/teams/{teamId:guid}/members name=ListTeamMembers tags=Teams policies=Authenticated anon=False",
"POST /api/v1/teams/{teamId:guid}/members name=AddTeamMember tags=Teams policies=Authenticated anon=False",
"PUT /api/v1/teams/{teamId:guid}/members/{userId:guid}/role name=ChangeTeamMemberRole tags=Teams policies=Authenticated anon=False",
"DELETE /api/v1/teams/{teamId:guid}/members/{userId:guid} name=RemoveTeamMember tags=Teams policies=Authenticated anon=False",
// Enrolled, because both end in a vault key being wrapped: creating a team means creating a vault
// in it, and neither is reachable without a key of one's own.
"POST /api/v1/teams name=CreateTeam tags=Teams policies=Enrolled anon=False",
"POST /api/v1/teams/{teamId:guid}/vaults name=CreateTeamVault tags=Teams policies=Enrolled anon=False",
// Enrolled. The listing is gated on Read rather than Share — every member can already see the
// sharing graph — and the two writes are gated on Share inside the handler, which this table
// cannot see. See VaultGrantEndpoints.
"GET /api/v1/vaults/{vaultId:guid}/grants name=ListVaultGrants tags=Vaults policies=Enrolled anon=False",
"POST /api/v1/vaults/{vaultId:guid}/grants name=IssueVaultGrant tags=Vaults policies=Enrolled anon=False",
"DELETE /api/v1/vaults/{vaultId:guid}/grants/{userId:guid} name=RevokeVaultGrant tags=Vaults policies=Enrolled anon=False",
// Anonymous on purpose, and load-bearing: DodoSSH.SystemTests waits on /healthz/ready before any
// token exists, and an orchestrator probe that needs credentials reports the wrong thing.
// MapHealthChecks constrains no verb, hence ANY.
"ANY /healthz/live name= tags= policies= anon=True",
"ANY /healthz/ready name= tags= policies= anon=True",
"ANY /healthz/startup name= tags= policies= anon=True",
// Not ours. FastEndpoints maps this one itself, in every environment, with no way to opt out; it
// answers with the server's whole endpoint-name-to-route table. It stays registered and is
// short-circuited to 404 instead — see RouteTableIsNotReachable below. Listed so that a version
// bump which adds a second hidden route, or renames this one out from under the block, fails
// here rather than in production.
"GET _test_url_cache_ name= tags= policies= anon=False",
];
[Fact]
public void TheServerExposesExactlyTheEndpointsWeMeantTo()
{
// Forces the pipeline to be built. FastEndpoints registers its routes when the application is
// built, not when its services are, so resolving the data sources from an unstarted host finds
// the health checks and nothing else.
using var client = fixture.CreateClient();
var actual = fixture.Services.GetServices<EndpointDataSource>()
.SelectMany(source => source.Endpoints)
.OfType<RouteEndpoint>()
.Select(Describe)
.Order(StringComparer.Ordinal)
.ToArray();
actual.ShouldBe([.. Expected.Order(StringComparer.Ordinal)]);
}
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Distinct from the inventory above, which only proves the route is registered. This proves it does
/// not answer.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Every spelling routing accepts is asserted, not just the canonical one. Routing matches literal
/// segments case-insensitively and tolerates a trailing slash, so a block that compares the request
/// path with <c>StringComparison.Ordinal</c> passes a canonical-spelling test while leaving the
/// listing fully readable at <c>/_TEST_URL_CACHE_</c>. That is not hypothetical — it is what the
/// first version of this guard did, and a single-spelling test is what let it look correct.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Theory]
[InlineData("/_test_url_cache_")]
[InlineData("/_TEST_URL_CACHE_")]
[InlineData("/_Test_Url_Cache_")]
[InlineData("/_test_url_cache_/")]
public async Task RouteTableIsNotReachable(string path)
{
// Authenticated on purpose: the deny-by-default policy already stops an anonymous caller, so a
// 404 for one would prove nothing about whether the listing is exposed.
var client = fixture.CreateClientFor(subject: $"route-table-{Guid.CreateVersion7()}");
var response = await client.GetAsync(
new Uri(path, UriKind.Relative),
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
response.StatusCode.ShouldBe(System.Net.HttpStatusCode.NotFound);
// A 404 with the listing in the body would satisfy the status assertion on its own.
var body = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
body.ShouldNotContain("Endpoint", Case.Insensitive);
}
private static string Describe(RouteEndpoint endpoint)
{
var methods = endpoint.Metadata.GetMetadata<HttpMethodMetadata>()?.HttpMethods;
var verbs = methods is { Count: > 0 } ? string.Join(",", methods) : "ANY";
var name = endpoint.Metadata.GetMetadata<IEndpointNameMetadata>()?.EndpointName ?? string.Empty;
var tags = string.Join(",", endpoint.Metadata.GetMetadata<ITagsMetadata>()?.Tags ?? []);
// FastEndpoints adds a synthetic "epPolicy:<full type name>" beside the named policies, and
// including it would couple this table to endpoint class names. Dropping it is not free: that
// policy is also where FastEndpoints folds Roles(), Claims() and Permissions(), so those become
// invisible here. Nothing calls them — the two named policies carry the whole authorization
// decision — and the class remarks say so, rather than this filter pretending it discards nothing.
var policies = string.Join(
",",
endpoint.Metadata.OfType<IAuthorizeData>()
.Select(data => data.Policy)
.Where(policy => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(policy))
.Where(policy => !policy!.StartsWith("epPolicy:", StringComparison.Ordinal)));
var anonymous = endpoint.Metadata.GetMetadata<IAllowAnonymous>() is not null;
return $"{verbs} {endpoint.RoutePattern.RawText} name={name} tags={tags} policies={policies} anon={anonymous}";
}
}