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DodoSSH/docs/platform-flags.md
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jaap-jan 885fb17bdc Clear the SSH gate: window-change reaches the remote, and licence as MIT
Licence is MIT, set solution-wide rather than only on the packable project:
DodoSSH.Contracts is published so clients can build against it, and a
package with no licence expression is one a corporate policy scanner
rejects outright.

The SSH.NET spike is the M1 client gate and it passes. SSH.NET 2025.1.0
exposes ShellStream.ChangeWindowSize, but a method existing is not the
remote observing it, so the tests read `stty size` back from a real sshd
after resizing rather than asserting the call did not throw. Repeated
resizes each take effect too, which matters because dragging a window edge
produces a stream of them. The IChannelSession fallback is not needed.

Also verified against a real sshd: password and public-key auth, that the
host key arrives as a raw blob we can fingerprint ourselves rather than
reading SSH.NET's MD5 property, and that refusing the key via CanTrust
actually aborts the connection -- without which the TOFU dialog would be
decoration.

Kept as a permanent suite, not deleted after the spike. An upgrade that
silently stopped sending the request would present as wrapped output only
after a resize, which is easy to misattribute to the terminal emulator.

Two bugs in the test itself, both worth naming because either would have
been read as "resize does not work":

- A PTY emits CRLF, and the anchored regex rejected the CR. The output
  visibly contained `24 80` while the match failed.
- Each read can begin with output still buffered from the previous command,
  including its size line. Taking the first match would have reported the
  pre-resize size.

platform-flags.md now records window-change as resolved rather than
unverified -- a stale flag is worse than none -- plus the three real SSH.NET
limits found on the way: ShellStream does not override ReadAsync so every
idle session parks a pool thread, one connection cannot serve both
SshClient and SftpClient, and agent forwarding needs an upstream change.
2026-07-28 16:52:09 +02:00

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# Platform flags
Things known or suspected to behave differently outside Windows, plus deployment gotchas that
have already cost time once. **Development and testing are currently Windows-only**, so anything
here marked *unverified* has not run on the platform in question and must not be assumed to work.
Each entry says what the risk is, why it matters, and what to do about it. Delete an entry when it
has been verified or made moot — not when it merely stops being convenient.
## Cryptography
**`ChaCha20Poly1305.IsSupported` is false on macOS**, and on Windows builds before 10.0.20142.
This is why the client uses NSec (libsodium) rather than the BCL for content encryption; see
docs/crypto.md §1. *Already mitigated* — but if a BCL AEAD path is ever added as a fallback it
**must** gate on `IsSupported` rather than assuming availability, or the client will fail to open
any vault on macOS.
**Argon2id timings are measured on one Windows machine only.** 256 MiB with t=4 took 323 ms here.
The floor and ceiling in `EnrollmentLimits` were chosen against that number. *Unverified
elsewhere:* recalibrate on the slowest target platform before recommending a default profile,
because a cost that is comfortable on a desktop can make unlock unusable on a low-power laptop —
and the parameters are stored per user at enrollment, so a bad default is a per-user migration.
**libsodium ships native binaries per RID.** This complicates single-file and AOT publishing, and
on macOS every native library (`libsodium`, `libSkiaSharp`, `libHarfBuzzSharp`, `libe_sqlite3`)
must be signed **individually** with `--options runtime --timestamp` before the bundle is signed,
or notarization fails with an error that does not name the offending file.
## Desktop client
**The Avalonia WebView on Linux is unproven, and is the single largest risk in the plan.** The
official control uses WPE WebKit (`libwpewebkit-2.0`); the community `NativeWebView` uses WebKitGTK
(`libwebkit2gtk-4.1`), which is far more widely installed. Avalonia's own documentation
contradicts itself on whether offscreen rendering works there. *Unverified:* the spike must cover
Ubuntu on both Wayland and X11, Fedora KDE, and macOS 15. This is why the terminal sits behind
`ITerminalHost` — that abstraction is what preserves the option to swap backends, and it should
not be collapsed away for convenience.
**SSH.NET's `window-change` is verified working** as of 2025.1.0 — resolved, not a flag.
`ShellStream.ChangeWindowSize(columns, rows, width, height)` exists and the remote genuinely
observes it: `PtyAndResizeSpikeTests` reads `stty size` back from a real sshd after resizing, and
repeated resizes each take effect. The `IChannelSession` fallback is not needed. That suite stays
in place as a regression guard, because an upgrade that silently stopped sending the request would
present as wrapped output only after a resize — easy to misattribute to the terminal emulator.
**`ShellStream` does not override `ReadAsync`.** The base `Stream` implementation therefore runs
the blocking `Read` on a thread-pool thread, so every open session parks one thread for as long as
it is idle. Fine for the handful of tabs M1 targets; revisit before advertising many concurrent
sessions, since the fix is either an upstream change or driving `IChannelSession` directly.
**SSH.NET cannot share one connection between `SshClient` and `SftpClient`.** A shell plus SFTP to
the same host means two TCP connections, two authentications and — later — two relay sockets.
Connect SFTP lazily and reuse the cached decrypted credential so the user is not prompted twice.
**Agent forwarding is de-scoped from v1.** It needs an upstream SSH.NET change. A vault-backed
agent of our own plus ProxyJump covers the real use cases.
**The SSH suite pulls `linuxserver/openssh-server` from Docker Hub**, which is rate-limited for
unauthenticated pulls. If CI starts failing on image pulls rather than on tests, that is why.
**MSIX packaging is ruled out, not merely deprioritised.** A packaged app runs WebView2 in an
AppContainer where loopback connections are blocked without a `CheckNetIsolation` exemption. The
terminal data plane *is* a loopback WebSocket, so MSIX would break the product outright. Velopack
for Windows/macOS/AppImage; Flatpak and deb/rpm defer updates to the package manager.
**Linux ships AppImage and Flatpak first**, specifically so the WebKit runtime is bundled rather
than assumed present on the user's machine.
## Build and CI
**Integration tests need a Docker daemon** (Testcontainers). They run on `ubuntu-latest` in CI.
macOS runners have no Docker daemon, and the Windows CI job is deliberately build-only. So
anything proved by an integration test is proved on Linux only — which is the right place for
server code, and no coverage at all for client platform behaviour.
**`[CallerFilePath]` is rewritten to `/_/...` under `ContinuousIntegrationBuild`.** Any test that
locates a fixture by source path passes locally and fails in CI. Copy fixtures to the output
directory and read them via `AppContext.BaseDirectory` instead; `GoldenVectorTests` shows the
pattern.
**`dotnet format --verify-no-changes` is part of the CI gate** and exits non-zero on style
warnings, not just whitespace. Run it before pushing; a build with zero warnings can still fail
that step.
## Deployment
**PostgreSQL 18 moved its data directory** to `/var/lib/postgresql`, not `/var/lib/postgresql/data`
as in 17 and earlier. A compose file carried over from an older version silently gets an empty
volume — the database appears to work and loses everything on restart. Relevant to any compose
file other than `deploy/docker-compose.dev.yml`, which is already correct.
**Keycloak in the dev stack listens on host port 18080, not 8080.** On this machine an unrelated
Apache Tomcat holds `127.0.0.1:8080`, and a loopback-specific bind wins over Docker's `0.0.0.0`
publish when resolving `localhost` — so every realm request returned 404 while the container
looked healthy. If discovery fails against a locally-published container, check for another
process bound specifically to loopback before suspecting the container.
**`Sync:CursorSigningKey` generates an ephemeral per-process key when unset.** Fine for a single
node; on a multi-node deployment cursors issued by one node are rejected by another, so clients
resync from the beginning repeatedly. Must be configured explicitly before running more than one
instance. `WarnOnRiskyConfiguration` logs this at startup.
**Rate limiting is not implemented yet** (M2). `POST /api/v1/me/enrollment` and the sync endpoints
are reachable by any authenticated caller at any rate. Enrollment requires a valid access token
and is idempotent, so the exposure is resource consumption rather than a credential-guessing
surface — but it is still an unmetered write path.
**`/api/v1/me` does not update `last_seen_at_utc`.** Deliberate: a GET that writes on every call is
a smell, and nothing depends on the value yet. Revisit when device management lands, since that is
the first feature that needs it.