Public Access
ISshConnection and ISftpSession both carry Cipher now — the server-to-client algorithm off SSH.NET's own ConnectionInfo, captured once because a rekey is not an event that library raises — and TerminalWorkspace.GetSessionFacts hands that plus the host key's algorithm back per session, without ever handing over the connection itself. Nothing reads either yet; the status bar that will is the next commit.
159 lines
7.5 KiB
C#
159 lines
7.5 KiB
C#
using System.Security.Cryptography;
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using System.Text;
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using Renci.SshNet.Common;
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namespace DodoSSH.Client.Ssh.Tests;
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/// <summary>
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/// Public-key authentication through the path the vault actually uses, against a real sshd.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// <c>PtyAndResizeSpikeTests</c> also authenticates with this fixture's key, and it does so by building
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/// SSH.NET's <c>PrivateKeyAuthenticationMethod</c> itself — correct for a spike whose subject is the PTY,
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/// and it leaves the application's own path unexercised. What runs here is what a vault-held key goes
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/// through: <see cref="SshPrivateKeyCredential"/> carrying PEM bytes rather than a path, into
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/// <see cref="SshNetConnectionFactory"/>, which hands them to <c>PrivateKeyFile</c> as a
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/// <c>MemoryStream</c>. That indirection is the reason a key in this product never becomes a file on disk,
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/// and until now nothing established that it authenticates.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// The fixture's key is RSA because there is no BCL Ed25519, and the fixture has to render the public half
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/// in <c>authorized_keys</c> form to install it. Which algorithm it is does not matter to anything under
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/// test here — the client never parses the key, it forwards it.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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[Collection(SshCollection.Name)]
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public sealed class KeyAuthenticationTests(SshServerFixture fixture)
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{
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private static CancellationToken Token => TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
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[Fact]
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public async Task AKeyHeldAsBytes_AuthenticatesAndOpensAShell()
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{
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await using var connection = await ConnectTrustedAsync(
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new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs1(fixture.ClientKey), Passphrase: null));
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connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();
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// The one place this suite checks Cipher against a real handshake rather than a fake's fixed string.
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// SSH.NET negotiates whatever the container's sshd offers first from its own preference list, so the
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// exact algorithm is not pinned here — only that ConnectionInfo.CurrentServerEncryption came back as
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// something rather than the empty string a stalled or pre-handshake read would produce.
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connection.Cipher.ShouldNotBeNullOrEmpty();
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// Authenticated is not the same as usable: a channel has to open on the connection too.
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await using var shell = await connection.OpenShellAsync(TerminalSize.Default, Token);
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shell.IsOpen.ShouldBeTrue();
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task TheSameKeyInPkcs8Armour_AlsoAuthenticates()
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{
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// SshKeySecret stores whatever armour it was given, verbatim, and declines to normalise it. This is
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// the half of that claim which is about SSH.NET rather than the codec: the two commonest forms
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// ssh-keygen and openssl produce both load without the client knowing which it has.
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await using var connection = await ConnectTrustedAsync(
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new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs8(fixture.ClientKey), Passphrase: null));
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connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task AKeyTheServerDoesNotKnow_FailsAsAnAuthenticationError()
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{
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// The specific failure worth pinning is a misreport. The host key is already trusted here, so the
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// factory's gate must translate nothing and let the authentication error through — if it answered
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// with SshHostKeyUnknownException instead, the user would be shown a fingerprint to approve for a
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// problem that approving it cannot fix.
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using var stranger = RSA.Create(2048);
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var knownHosts = await TrustedStoreAsync();
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var factory = new SshNetConnectionFactory(knownHosts);
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await Should.ThrowAsync<SshAuthenticationException>(async () =>
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await factory.ConnectAsync(Request(new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs1(stranger), null)), Token));
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task APassphraseOnAnUnprotectedKey_IsIgnoredRatherThanRefused()
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{
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// Written expecting the opposite, and it records what SSH.NET measurably does: PrivateKeyFile
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// accepts a passphrase for a key that has none, and the connection authenticates as if it had not
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// been given. See docs/platform-flags.md — the consequence is that nothing downstream will catch a
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// stray passphrase, so a client that wants that caught has to notice it itself, and a client that
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// does not can stop worrying about the case.
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await using var connection = await ConnectTrustedAsync(
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new SshPrivateKeyCredential(Pkcs1(fixture.ClientKey), "a passphrase this key does not have"));
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connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();
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}
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>The test the key generator exists to pass.</b> Everything else about the hand-written
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/// <c>openssh-key-v1</c> container is checked against SSH.NET's own parser, which is the parser this
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/// application uses and therefore a fair oracle — but it is still one implementation agreeing with
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/// another. This is the one that puts the public half on a real OpenSSH server and authenticates with
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/// the private half, which is the only thing anybody actually wants to know.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// Both algorithms, because they are encoded by entirely different code: Ed25519 goes through the
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/// hand-written container, and RSA through the BCL's PKCS#1 export with only the public line
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/// hand-encoded. A failure on one says nothing about the other.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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[Theory]
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[InlineData(SshKeyAlgorithm.Ed25519)]
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[InlineData(SshKeyAlgorithm.Rsa4096)]
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public async Task AKeyThisClientGenerated_AuthenticatesAgainstARealServer(SshKeyAlgorithm algorithm)
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{
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var generated = SshKeyGenerator.Generate(algorithm, "dodossh@generated");
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await fixture.AuthorizeAsync(generated.PublicKeyLine, Token);
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await using var connection = await ConnectTrustedAsync(
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new SshPrivateKeyCredential(
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Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(generated.PrivateKeyArmour), Passphrase: null));
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connection.IsConnected.ShouldBeTrue();
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// Authenticated is not the same as usable, as above.
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await using var shell = await connection.OpenShellAsync(TerminalSize.Default, Token);
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shell.IsOpen.ShouldBeTrue();
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}
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private static byte[] Pkcs1(RSA key) => Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(key.ExportRSAPrivateKeyPem());
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private static byte[] Pkcs8(RSA key) => Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(key.ExportPkcs8PrivateKeyPem());
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private SshConnectionRequest Request(SshCredential credential) =>
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new(fixture.Host, fixture.Port, SshServerFixture.Username, credential);
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/// <summary>A store that already trusts the container's host key, so first contact is not the subject.</summary>
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private async Task<InMemoryKnownHostStore> TrustedStoreAsync()
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{
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var knownHosts = new InMemoryKnownHostStore();
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var factory = new SshNetConnectionFactory(knownHosts);
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// Learned by being refused, which is the only way this client learns a host key.
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var unknown = await Should.ThrowAsync<SshHostKeyUnknownException>(async () =>
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await factory.ConnectAsync(
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Request(new SshPasswordCredential(SshServerFixture.Password)), Token));
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await knownHosts.TrustAsync(unknown.Presentation, Token);
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return knownHosts;
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}
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private async Task<ISshConnection> ConnectTrustedAsync(SshCredential credential)
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{
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var knownHosts = await TrustedStoreAsync();
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return await new SshNetConnectionFactory(knownHosts)
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.ConnectAsync(Request(credential), Token);
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}
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}
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