Public Access
6e39807cc044469599e9da5a74da193bedbe142d
18
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jaap-jan
|
6e39807cc0 |
Reach a Spelunk-managed server through Spelunk, and open one from a Spelunk link
A server Spelunk manages runs Spelunk's agent, which keeps a connection open
to Spelunk. A host can now be marked "Connect through Spelunk": a connect
asks Spelunk for a ticket, opens a WebSocket, and the agent connects to the
SSH server on the machine's own loopback, so the server needs no open SSH
port. Shells and file transfers both go this way.
Client, in Client.Session:
- SpelunkTunnel implements Spelunk's contract: POST
{api}/api/servers/{id}/tunnel-tickets with the API key as a bearer token
and {"port":N}, then a WebSocket to the API's own origin at the path
Spelunk returns, offering spelunk.tunnel.v1 and ticket.<ticket>. After the
upgrade the relay's RelayBridge carries the bytes unchanged. Every refusal
is a sentence: 401 key, 403 role (with Spelunk's detail), 404 server, 503
agent not connected, 401/503 on the upgrade, and close codes 4502 (agent
could not reach the port, or is too old: "Unknown stream kind") and 4503
(agent disconnected). Only a path is taken from the ticket response, so it
cannot send the ticket to another host.
- IConnectionRoute is what RelayRoute and SpelunkTunnelRoute have in common,
so the connect path has one shape for both.
Host model: HostSecret.Spelunk is a SpelunkRoute (normalised API base,
server id, and the id of the credential holding the API key), at payload
schema version 8. It is written last and only when present, so every other
host keeps its bytes and its version; an older build reads a Spelunk host
as read-only rather than dropping the route. A half-written route makes the
item unreadable instead of dialled. It merges as one value and is exclusive
with RelayEnabled. The API address must be https, or http to loopback.
The API key is an ordinary keychain credential whose password is the key,
referenced by id, so it is encrypted, synced, merged and rotated like every
other secret, one credential serves every server in the organisation, and
the used-by list and deletion warning count it.
Routing: OpenRouteAsync is the one decision for both transports. A Spelunk
host is never dialled directly, never probed after a failure, and a route
that hung up with a reason replaces SSH.NET's transport error.
UI: a "Connect through Spelunk" card beside the relay card in the desktop
drawer and the phone's editor; ticking one unticks the other.
dodossh://spelunk/connect?api=&server=&name=&host= links:
- SpelunkLink parses them strictly and never reads a credential from one.
- Program reads a link from the arguments; a launch that finds DodoSSH
running passes it down the doorbell as "dodossh.open-link <link>", which
the running instance parses again, bounded, and otherwise ignores whole.
The plain come-forward ring is unchanged.
- A saved host routed to that server on that Spelunk is connected to;
otherwise the editor opens on a new, unsaved Spelunk host, with the key
pre-chosen only when another host already sends it to that Spelunk. A link
that arrives while locked waits for the unlock.
- Windows registers the scheme under HKCU from Velopack's install and update
hooks and removes it on uninstall only if it still points at this
executable; the macOS plist template declares CFBundleURLTypes and the app
takes the URL from Avalonia's activation event; the Linux desktop entry
gets %u and MimeType=x-scheme-handler/dodossh.
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  laurensandClaude Opus 5
|
b8c94ecb73 |
Put a window on screen while it starts, and refuse the second one
Two things a desktop application is expected to do and this one did not. ◆ THREE SECONDS OF NOTHING. Measured on a debug build against a cold profile: the main window arrives 3.1 seconds after the executable does. Nothing was on screen for any of it — the icon had been double-clicked and the desktop looked unchanged. The main window cannot come sooner. It needs a view model, and the view model needs composition to have opened the SQLite cache, bound the terminal's loopback socket, asked the platform about a TPM and read the install layout off disk. Its own IsStarting card already narrates what happens after it appears; this is the part before, which no arrangement of that window can cover. So SplashWindow, and it is measurably the point: 668 ms to the splash, 3.1 s to the window that replaces it. Two mechanics are load-bearing rather than incidental. The splash *is* desktop.MainWindow for a moment. The lifetime shows whatever that property holds once OnFrameworkInitializationCompleted returns; a window merely Show()n there would have no lifetime attached, and under ShutdownMode.OnLastWindowClose the first close of anything would end the process. Handing the property over is one assignment and Avalonia reads it lazily. And composition is posted at DispatcherPriority.Background rather than called. It is synchronous and slow — which is the entire argument for a splash — so running it inline would block the very dispatcher turn that has to paint the thing. The window is SizeToContent="Height", which is about the failure and not the splash: CouldNotStart carries an exception's own message, and inside a fixed height a long one would wrap and be clipped at exactly the moment that text is all the window is for. A composition that throws is caught rather than left to the dispatcher, for the same reason — before this there was nothing on screen to abandon, and now there is, so an escaping exception would leave a window saying "Starting…" over a process that had stopped. Escape closes it, and only then. ◆ AND ONE INSTANCE. Claimed in Main before Avalonia is configured, so a second launch starts nothing at all: no toolkit, no window, no splash flashing up before it thinks better of it. Exclusion is an exclusive handle on instance.lock inside the profile directory, and that location settles two questions at once. A nightly and a release build do not exclude each other — separate profiles, ADR 0013 — and two people signed in to one machine each get their own instance. A global mutex would have had to re-derive both from somewhere. A file handle rather than a named mutex because the kernel releases it however the process ends. There is no such thing as a stale lock here, which is a state a named mutex makes both platforms model differently and neither model simply. The second launch is not silent. Somebody who double-clicks an icon and sees nothing has been told the application is broken, so it rings a named pipe — named from a digest of the profile path, so it is scoped exactly as the lock is — and the running instance un-minimises and activates. Activate is a request and not a guarantee: Windows refuses the foreground to a process that did not receive the input, and the flashing taskbar button that results is still an answer. Three seconds of retrying when the lock is held by something that does not answer its pipe, and that window has one job. Velopack's apply ends this process and its updater starts the new build; the two are ordered, but a lock held a moment too long would make the successor refuse itself and vanish — an update that looked like an uninstall. The doorbell is disposed before Shutdown for the same reason, so the pipe name is free before the process is. ◆ VERIFIED BY RUNNING IT, WHICH IS THE ONLY WAY EITHER OF THESE COULD BE. Two launches of the built executable: the first stayed up with instance.lock in the profile, the second exited. Window sizes over time are where the two timings above come from — 420x160 then 1196x776. SingleInstanceTests covers what a single process can reach: the lock, its release by disposal, the doorbell answering more than once, and two profiles not excluding each other. SplashCardTests measures the one thing the splash can get wrong, which is a failure message long enough to need the height the window is willing to give it. Checks 1.12 and 16.11 are what needs a second executable and a real screen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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laurensandClaude Opus 5
|
1908189100 |
Make the terminal's right button copy and paste, and never open a menu
Selecting output and right-clicking it opened the WebView's own context menu with Copy on it, which is correct behaviour for a web page and wrong for a terminal. What a terminal's right button has meant since the Windows console got QuickEdit, and since PuTTY shipped, is this: with something selected it copies and drops the selection, with nothing selected it pastes. No menu, no second click. The gesture can only live in the page. The selection is drawn into a canvas the host never sees, and once a terminal has focus the host's window receives no input events at all — the same reason the Ctrl+plus chords are handled there. ◆ THE CLIPBOARD IS THE HOST'S IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, AND THE READING IS WHY. navigator.clipboard.readText() is gated behind the clipboard-read permission in every Chromium, and an embedded WebView with no PermissionRequested handler answers a permission request by putting a prompt on the screen. Trading a context menu for a permission dialog is not this change. So the page asks and the host answers, exactly as requestFontSizeStep does. Writing does not go the other way either, although navigator.clipboard.writeText would have worked from the page on Windows: a clipboard that is the host's in one direction and the page's in the other is two mechanisms to keep working across WebView2, WebKitGTK and Android's WebView. The host has owned a clipboard delegate since the keychain grew its COPY buttons, so each App.axaml.cs grows a ClipboardReader beside its ClipboardWriter and MainWindowViewModel takes it. Three opcodes: client ClipboardCopy and ClipboardPaste, server Clipboard. ◆ Clipboard IS NOT Paste, AND THE DIFFERENCE IS THE BRACKETING. Paste carries a snippet off the sidebar, and the page deliberately *types* a single-line one rather than bracketing it, because bash marks a bracketed paste as an active region and a snippet should read as though it had been typed. A clipboard paste is the case those markers are for — readline uses them to decide it has been pasted into — so Clipboard is always bracketed and never followed by an Enter. One opcode for both would have needed a flag meaning "which of the two kinds of paste is this", on a payload whose existing flag byte means something else. Both client frames are dispatched before the session lookup, which is what keeps the gesture working in a pane whose shell has just ended: squinting at the message a remote left behind is exactly when somebody copies the line. Dispatch was past MA0051's length once it grew a second such branch, so the frames no pump needs to see moved into Announce() and the font-size chord went with them. ◆ CAPTURED AND STOPPED, RATHER THAN MERELY PREVENTED. preventDefault alone suppresses the menu and still lets xterm's own contextmenu handler run, which moves its helper textarea under the pointer at z-index 1000 and leaves the selection sitting in it, selected. Both of those exist to serve the native menu. Taking the event in the capture phase on the pane and stopping it there is what keeps the gesture wholly the page's. rightClickSelectsWord is now false, which on macOS is a change of default rather than a restatement of it: xterm sets it true there alone, so a right-click would have selected the word under the pointer and copied that instead of pasting — wrong on one platform only, which is the worst way for it to be wrong. The renderer harness grows the pane it has been inviting since RendererReconnectionTests: a fake Terminal, the two addons, and a real UTF-8 codec, because both directions run through the page's own TextEncoder and TextDecoder and a Latin-1 stub would pass a test with an em dash in the selection. Its warning about declaring names terminal.js declares now covers the half that does not SyntaxError — a harness frame() was silently replaced by the page's frame() and failed six tests on a type error a long way from the cause. Manual checks 1.11 and 11.13 are what is left for a person: that a real contextmenu event reaches a capture listener, that no native menu is drawn once it is prevented, and that xterm's real paste() brackets. 11.13 also records what is unverified — whether Android's WebView delivers a pointer's secondary click as a contextmenu event at all. ClipboardReader is wired on that head regardless, because the alternative is a head where the paste half silently does nothing and nobody finds out; that head is not compiled here either, this machine having no android workload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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jaap-jan
|
cfc2e3ae0c |
Notice when a file session stops, and give the file browser the four things it was short of
The commit before this one taught a terminal to notice its machine going away.
The file browser had the same defect and three of the same symptoms, and it is
also the screen people leave soonest — so the disconnect work and four things it
was missing arrive together, because they are the same complaint: this screen
knows less about the host than the host does.
◆ THE DISCONNECT HALF, WHICH IS THE OTHER SURFACE OF THE LAST COMMIT.
IsConnected was set at connect and cleared only by the DISCONNECT button. A host
that went away therefore left this screen saying CONNECTED over a session that
was gone, and every action after it failing with the same server message and
nothing saying why they all did.
IRemoteFileStore now carries a latched TransportFailure and a ConnectionLost
event. The latch is the shell's own — read ISshShellSession.TransportFailure for
the argument, which is unchanged. The event is not, and it is the part this
surface needs: a file browser is idle between operations, so without something
raised at the moment the transport fails, nobody finds out until they click. A
bucket implements both and raises neither, which is honest rather than a gap:
S3 is request-per-operation with no connection to lose.
- THE LISTING STAYS ON SCREEN, and that is the half that makes the rest worth
having. SftpEntry is a record of what the server said rather than a handle,
so the pane can go on showing where the user was — which is what RECONNECT
is offering to put them back into. That needed a new ShowsRemoteContents on
both heads: every "is there anything here" binding read IsConnected, which
was right while the only way to stop being connected was to press a button
that empties the pane, and wrong the moment a session could be lost.
- RECONNECT re-dials through the ordinary connect path — same host key gate,
same refusals, same log entry — and then walks back to the directory the
pane was showing. The path is read off RemotePath rather than captured,
because the pane already keeps it up to date and a copy is a second thing to
get wrong. A host wanting a typed password is asked for one rather than
dialled with an empty box.
- SessionEndedBar is now one control on both surfaces, with the shell
resolving which it is drawn over: a terminal has two endings to tell apart
and a keychain entry to check, a file session has one ending and already
captured what it would dial. The phone's Files screen has its own copy,
bound to TransfersViewModel directly, because its DataContext is that rather
than the shell.
◆ PERMISSIONS: THE PERMS COLUMN STOPS BEING READ-ONLY.
It has been a true fact about a file with nothing to be done about it since it
arrived, and the commonest next act after using this screen was opening a
terminal — a whole second authenticated connection — to chmod what had just been
uploaded.
Nine checkboxes rather than a box to type 755 into, because the mode is already
drawn as -rwxr-xr-x in the column the form was opened from: a who-can-do-what
grid is the same representation the reader is holding, where an octal field asks
them to translate something they can see into something they cannot check. The
octal is printed underneath as it changes, so the two readings check each other.
The EXEC column is headed "enter" over a directory, which is what that bit means
there and the commonest misreading of a POSIX mode. The listing is re-read after
APPLY, because a umask, an ACL or a filesystem mounted without permissions can
all land somewhere other than what was asked for.
Beside it, mode and mtime carried across a transfer — which is what makes an
uploaded deploy.sh arrive executable instead of with the server's umask on it.
THE MODE IS ONLY SENT FROM A PLATFORM THAT HAS ONE. A file on Windows has no
POSIX mode; this screen already says so by leaving the local pane's PERMS column
empty rather than filling it with a plausible -rw-r--r--, and inventing 0644, or
0755 for anything called .sh, would be this client deciding a fact about
somebody's file that nothing on the machine it came from ever said. The
timestamp goes either way, because every platform has one. A store with neither
refuses in its own words and is never asked.
◆ MULTI-SELECT: A TICK IS NOT THE LIST'S SELECTION.
The two answer different questions and the split is the whole design. The
selection is "the row I am looking at", which rename, move and permissions act
on — each takes a form naming one path and is one-at-a-time by construction. The
tick is "the rows I have gathered up", which download, upload and delete take,
and it survives the highlight moving.
With nothing ticked the batch falls back to the selection, which is what keeps
the commonest use of this screen from growing a step — the usual way a
multi-select makes a tool worse. Ticks are released once a set is queued, or a
second press sends everything again.
Deleting several names every path rather than a count, because agreeing to "3
items" is agreeing to a number, and this is the one act on this screen that
nothing walks back. Each goes on its own and a refusal does not stop the rest:
the host turns down a directory that still has something in it, and in a set of
five that must not silently cancel the four it would have removed — nor hide
which ones it did not.
A drawn checkbox rather than ctrl-click, and not for taste: the phone shares
this view model and has neither ctrl nor shift, so a multi-selection has to be a
tap target there whatever the desktop does. One shape on both heads, and a state
somebody can see.
◆ RECURSIVE FOLDERS: THE TREE BECOMES FILES BEFORE THE QUEUE SEES IT.
A directory used to be counted and skipped. It is now walked, and the queue
still knows nothing about trees — which is what keeps every property it has:
each file resumable on its own, each written to a part file and renamed into
place, none able to overwrite anything already there.
The plan is collected whole and then queued, because directories have to exist
before the files that go in them and shortest-first is the only order that
guarantees a parent before its child. It also means a walk refused halfway has
queued nothing yet, so the sentence it produces describes one outcome rather
than an outcome and a queue that half happened.
Links are counted, not followed, in both directions. One pointing at an ancestor
is a walk with no end, and on the remote side there is a second reason: an lstat
listing says a name is a link and not what it leads to, so descending would be a
round trip per entry to find out. Locally that is AttributesToSkip on the one
enumeration that decides what to descend into. A 5000-file ceiling is a backstop
for the accidental drag of a home directory, and it says so rather than
truncating quietly.
The status line grew four more ways to be partly what was asked for, and states
each: gone, refused, left alone, not a file.
◆ EDITING IN PLACE: FETCH, OPEN, WATCH, PUSH BACK.
The round trip this replaces is download, find it, open it, edit, come back,
delete the old one because nothing here overwrites, upload, check the mode
survived.
DELIBERATELY NOT THROUGH THE TRANSFER QUEUE, in either direction. The queue
refuses to overwrite, which is the right rule for a file somebody dragged and
exactly the wrong one for a file they are editing, where replacing the original
is the entire intent. The write-back deletes first: OpenWriteAsync at offset
zero writes over the beginning and leaves any tail that is longer — its own
contract says so — which for a config that got shorter means a file ending in
the back half of its previous version. Deleting is the only truncation this
interface offers, and the mode goes back on afterwards because deleting took it.
A stat before every save, compared against what the server said when the copy
was taken, catches somebody else writing while the file is open — which is how a
config gets silently reverted. There is no merge and no button pretending
otherwise; the three answers offered are the three that exist. Length and
timestamp rather than a digest, because a digest is a second full read of a file
there is otherwise no reason to fetch.
Both platform halves are injected: what opens a .conf is a registry
association, a desktop entry or a Launch Services binding depending on the
desktop, and watching a file is a platform object with its own thread. The
watcher watches the directory and filters the name, because a great many editors
write a temporary file and rename it over the top — which to a watcher pointed
at an inode is the file disappearing. The phone gets neither delegate, so the
button is not live there rather than there and disappointing.
◆ TWO THINGS FOUND ON THE WAY, BOTH WORTH STATING.
The shell suite's inline `post` was not serialising the way a dispatcher does.
Routing TransfersViewModel through it exposed a check-then-add in
OnTransferChanged that two threads turn into two rows for one transfer. Harmless
in production, where the UI thread serialises — the fixture was under-specifying
what it stood in for, and now posts under a lock.
And the edit session replaced its own record with `with` on each save, which
left the watcher holding an instance that was no longer the current one: every
save after the first quietly did nothing. The stamp moves in place now, and the
test saves twice.
◆ WHAT IS VERIFIED.
901 across the five suites this touches, 19 of them new. The layout suite earned
its keep three times over: the batch deletion card's path list overflowed the
204-pixel pane at 120, at 72 and at 56 before 32 held, and the edit strip
overflowed by 131 until the whole strip — rather than the log inside it — was
bounded. Each number in those files is measured and says which failure it came
from, because the next person to add a line to either card will move them again.
What no suite covers is the platform halves of editing: Process.Start with
UseShellExecute and a live FileSystemWatcher are the operating system, and a test
waiting on one would be measuring it. The shell's own half — when a save is
written back, when it is refused, what stopping releases — is covered against a
watcher that fires on demand.
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|
jaap-jan
|
4552538533 |
Let the Linux head check for updates, and seal its device key in the TPM
Two things the RPM shipped without, and the reason they arrive together is
that both are the same question — what may this platform ask of the machine,
and what must it not ask of the user.
◆ UPDATES: THIS CLIENT CHECKS AND FETCHES, AND PACKAGEKIT INSTALLS.
ADR 0013 rule 11 said there was no updater at all, and that went too far. It
conflated noticing that a newer build exists with installing it: the second is
what the trust argument is about, and the first is not — a client that checks
a fixed address and tells you what it found has taken no capability from
anybody. Written as a flat refusal, the rule bought its safety by paying a cost
that was avoidable, and the ADR now says so in its own words.
So LinuxUpdateChannel reads the rolling nightly release, compares versions the
way rpm compares them, downloads the package, verifies its digest and hands the
file to PackageKit over gdbus. Polkit asks; the user may say no; nothing is
torn down before the answer, because ApplyingEndsTheProcess is false and the
shell already knows what that means — it is the phone's shape, and declining an
update must not cost somebody their open shells.
Three details that are load-bearing rather than incidental:
- The comparison is rpmvercmp and not SemVer, because rpm is what will accept
or refuse the install. Same argument ADR 0014 makes for versionCode. The
installed side is read out of the rpm database rather than derived from the
assembly, so the SemVer-to-rpm translation exists in exactly one place. All
28 expected values in RpmVersionTests came out of rpm itself rather than out
of a reading of the algorithm.
- The digest is checked and is not a signature. Velopack verifies its own
downloads and Android checks a signature; an RPM over HTTPS has neither. The
manifest names a SHA-256 and a mismatch deletes the file rather than leaving
something installable-by-hand in the profile directory.
- ONLY_TRUSTED is cleared, which is what routes the request to polkit's
package-install-untrusted action. The package is unsigned, so requiring
trust would fail every update at the last step.
◆ THE DEVICE KEY: SEALED IN THE TPM, BEHIND A PIN THE TPM CHECKS.
ADR 0007's amendment is the bar: a gate inside the process is not a gate. The
key is sealed into a TPM 2.0 keyedhash object whose userAuth comes from a PIN,
so unsealing is a command the chip refuses; the blob is encrypted to the storage
hierarchy and is useless on any other machine; nothing here ever compares a PIN.
The sealed object deliberately carries no NoDA attribute, and that one omission
is the whole reason four digits is enough: every wrong answer advances the TPM's
dictionary-attack counter and the chip stops answering entirely once it trips.
Measured at four wrong tries against a software TPM, after which the correct PIN
gets nothing either. It is asserted by a test rather than left to a reading of
the template, because removing the attribute leaves every other assertion
passing.
This is weaker than Hello and Touch ID and the difference is invisible, so it is
written down in three places rather than smoothed over: those raise their prompt
from inside the platform and this one is a window we draw. The prompt is
deliberately plain for that reason — teaching people that a convincing DodoSSH
PIN box is a system dialog is the one thing this design must not do.
Rejected, each for failing the amendment: the Secret Service API, which has no
per-use consent and is DPAPI's shape exactly; fprintd, which answers a question
and holds nothing, so skipping the call skips the gate; and a polkit-gated root
helper, which would work and puts a privileged component in a package that
installs nothing setuid.
Availability is narrower than "has a TPM": on Fedora /dev/tpmrm0 is root:tss and
desktop users are not in tss, so the ordinary case reports unavailable and keeps
asking for the passphrase. Shipping a udev rule to widen that is refused — it is
the administrator's decision, not an application package's.
◆ WHAT IS ACTUALLY VERIFIED, SINCE THAT IS THE PART THAT USUALLY ISN'T.
This is the only device key store in the repository with real coverage, and it
is only possible because the PIN is a delegate and the TPM is a device: seal,
unseal, wrong PIN, lockout, decline and a foreign blob all run unattended
against a software TPM. Windows and macOS cannot be tested at all — their
prompts block a suite forever, which WindowsDeviceKeyStoreTests records.
TSS.Net's own TcpTpmDevice cannot reach swtpm: it opens the platform socket too
and exchanges a handshake only the Microsoft reference simulator answers, so
Connect() blocks with no error and no timeout. SoftwareTpm speaks the data
channel and nothing else.
The suite also lied once and was fixed: the lockout test trips shared state, and
without a DictionaryAttackLockReset in Dispose every later test got null from a
correct PIN — six of them assert null and passed for entirely the wrong reason.
End to end on a real Fedora 44: a genuine linux-x64 publish packages, installs,
and every DT_NEEDED in the installed tree resolves except liblttng-ust, which is
the one this spec deliberately excludes. What no runner covers is /dev/tpmrm0,
PackageKit and polkit, and Phase 19 grew five checks for exactly those.
Also fixed: the magic-bytes literal picked up raw control characters, which made
LinuxDeviceKeyStore.cs binary to git — no diffs and no line-ending normalisation.
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jaap-jan
|
af0e29a98b |
Give the desktop a nightly channel, the way the phone has one
ADR 0014 gave the phone a nightly and ADR 0013 rule 3 gave the desktop none, so the two heads had different answers to the same question — how does somebody try what is on main? — for no reason except the order the work happened in. This is the desktop's answer: CI publishes a build from main on every push, and it installs beside the release one rather than over it. The phone gets its separation from the platform. Android refuses an update signed by a different key, so its two channels cannot replace one another whatever anybody does. Nothing refuses anything here: Velopack applies what its feed serves and verifies no signature. So all of it is construction, and there are four separations because each closes a different door. A pack id each, so the two install in different directories and neither feed's package can be applied to the other's install. A Velopack channel each — win and win-nightly — so neither build ever reads the other's release index; the name reaches the wire as releases.win-nightly.json, which is why the constant in VelopackUpdateChannel and the argument in ci.yml have to agree or the channel answers nothing forever with no error. A prerelease flag, so the release channel cannot see the nightly even by accident. And a profile directory each, which is the one that is easy to skip and would hurt most: the cache schema is migrated on every launch, before unlock, so a shared profile means a nightly quietly upgrading a database the release build then opens. Both are installed at once by design, so that is an ordinary Tuesday rather than a corner case. The prerelease flag turns out to be load-bearing across heads as well. The phone's release channel reads releases/latest, which skips prereleases — so a desktop nightly published as a stable release would become the newest release in this repository and every phone on the release channel would start failing its check against a release carrying no Android manifest. Which build this is arrives as assembly metadata, the same mechanism and the same reasoning as the Android head: the updater needs the string rather than a branch, and a value baked into the assembly is one a crash report can be asked for. Three things read it — the feed, the prerelease flag, and the profile — and one more shows it: the titlebar says DodoSSH Nightly. Everything else that distinguishes the two is somewhere nobody is looking while typing a passphrase into one of them. The version needed a floor and it is applied to the whole build rather than to the packaging. MinVer answers 0.0.0-alpha.0.N until the first v* tag and vpk refuses anything below 0.0.1, so the job lifts the patch digit and keeps the height — through MinVerVersionOverride, so the assemblies carry the same number the installer does. Packing a version the assembly disagreed with would put one string on the preferences screen and another in the feed, which is the screen somebody reads when asked which nightly they are on. Two things found by running it rather than reading it. -t:MinVer needs a restore first, because the target arrives with the package and MSB4057 on a clean checkout reads like a typo in the workflow rather than a missing restore; the release script had the same gap and now restores before it reads. And vpk rejects an empty --packVersion loudly, which is how a broken version handoff announces itself rather than shipping a package called 1.0.0. Rule 3 is untouched. The release channel still has no job, no token and no runner, and the two channels cannot see each other. What a nightly costs is written where somebody reads it before installing one: whoever can write a release here can put a build on every nightly machine, which is fine for a build being tried and is not fine for a build holding somebody's infrastructure credentials. Verified by running the job's own steps against a clone in a Linux container: DodoSSH.Desktop.Nightly-win-nightly-Setup.exe, and an index naming pack id DodoSSH.Desktop.Nightly at 0.0.1-alpha.0.144. The upload itself is the one step not exercised — it needs a real forge and a write token, and check 16.10 is what walks the half no runner can. |
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jaap-jan
|
3ead865f01 |
Merge branch 'main' into the desktop updater, and give way on two numbers
Main landed a realtime push feature while this branch was building the updater, and the two collided in three places. Every one of them resolves the same way: main got there first, so this branch moves. **Two ADRs were both numbered 0012.** Main's is realtime push; this one is now [ADR 0013](docs/adr/0013-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md). Git did not call this a conflict — the filenames differ — so it would have merged quietly and left the directory with two 0012s and every cross-reference ambiguous. Renumbered here along with the nine places that point at it. **Two manual-check phases were both numbered 15**, and that one git did catch. Main's "Changes that arrive without a timer" keeps 15; installing and updating the desktop client becomes Phase 16, with its checks and every reference to them renumbered. The file's own rule is that a number is for life, which is exactly why the one that had not been pushed is the one that gives way. **The merge rewrote several files with CRLF**, and `.editorconfig` asks for LF on everything except `*.ps1`. That is not cosmetic here: IDE0055 is an error and `EnforceCodeStyleInBuild` is on, so it failed the build on three lines of App.axaml.cs whose only change in this branch was an ADR number in a comment. Forty-six files normalised back to LF; the release script keeps CRLF, which is what `.gitattributes` and `.editorconfig` both already say for a PowerShell file. Nothing else conflicted. The updater does not touch the sync loop or the event stream, and the one file both sides edited heavily — MainWindowViewModel — merged without a hunk in common. Verified after merging: the solution restores locked and builds clean, and 304 shell, 100 layout, 54 session, 28 client-api and 25 contracts tests pass. The first two counts are higher than before the merge because main's own tests came with it and pass alongside these. |
||
|
jaap-jan
|
6728a0a597 |
Let the desktop client replace itself, and give the repository one version
Packaging for Windows, and the updater that only exists once something is
packaged. Velopack, win-x64, fed from the project's own forge — never from the
deployment a client signs in to, which is ADR 0011 rule 2 carried over
unchanged and is why the feed address is a constant in the code rather than a
setting. See docs/adr/0012-desktop-distribution-and-updates.md.
**Nothing is ever installed while somebody is using it.** A newer build is found
on a six-hourly pass, downloaded in the background, and then waits — for a
restart the user presses, or for the next launch they were going to do anyway.
That is a policy rather than caution: this application argues at length that
locking keeps shells running, because a lock that destroyed work would stop
being used, and a restart does not keep them. Having taught that, it owes the
user the choice at the one moment it stops being true, and the sentence saying
so counts the shells it would close.
**The version is now derived from the v* tag**, by MinVer, for everything. There
was no version before this — no property anywhere, so every assembly reported
the SDK's 1.0.0 and the API served that string as its serverVersion to every
client that asked. The tag was already the version of record for the container
image; this makes it the version of record full stop. MinVer's failure mode is
answering plausibly rather than failing, and here a wrong version is a client
that never updates, so it is guarded twice: fetch-depth 0 on every checkout, and
a step that fails a tag build when the tag and the computed version disagree.
**The pack id is DodoSSH.Desktop and not DodoSSH**, which is the one decision
here that would have destroyed data. Velopack installs to %LOCALAPPDATA%\<packId>
and removes that whole directory on uninstall, and %LOCALAPPDATA%\DodoSSH is
where ClientPaths keeps the encrypted cache, the outbox of changes not yet
pushed, and the device key. The obvious id would have had the uninstaller
silently delete work the server has never seen — the thing the application
refuses to do without a counted confirmation. Velopack's own advice to move user
data to roaming %APPDATA% is declined for the reason ClientPaths already gives.
**Releases are cut by a person, and CI gains no job that could.** The tempting
argument is that a forge write token is not a signing key. It does not survive
contact with what the token does: Velopack clients trust their feed and do not
verify a package signature when they apply one, so whoever can write a release
can ship an update every install runs. That is the capability ADR 0011 rule 1
puts on a machine which is not a runner, reached through a different door. The
mechanical objection — vpk needs Windows and the runners are Linux — is the
smaller of the two and is recorded beside it, because somebody will fix one and
believe they are done.
Unsigned for now, deliberately and with the cost stated where a user reads it:
SmartScreen warns once per person, on Setup.exe, because Mark-of-the-Web is
applied by the browser that downloaded it. In-app updates are fetched by the
application and applied from a local file, and never trip it.
The banner is a fourth row of the window rather than an overlay. Anything drawn
in the terminal's rectangle is sliced by the native child window that composites
above it — the defect this window has shipped once — and a sibling row is the
arrangement TitleBar and StatusBar already prove works.
----
Three defects surfaced on the way, none of them in the feature being built.
**A settings key absent from the file came back as the CLR default, not the
declared one.** The JSON source generator builds a record through a synthesised
parameterised constructor and assigns every property from its argument array, so
a property initializer runs and is then overwritten by a default for anything the
file did not contain. A settings.json of {} read back a font size of 0, clamped
up to the 8px floor rather than the 13px the renderer draws at. It could not bite
while there was one setting, because that setting was written on every save and
so was never absent; adding a second would have turned automatic update checks
off for every existing profile, silently, the opposite of the documented default.
Reflection-based deserialisation of the same JSON answers correctly, which is why
every way of checking it by hand agrees except the one that ships. The defaults
now live on the constructor parameters, which is the only place the generator
reads them from.
**Declaring a RuntimeIdentifier on the desktop head broke the server's image
build.** It is the obvious way to let a self-contained publish restore under
locked mode, and it writes a net10.0/win-x64 target into the lock file of every
project the head references transitively — including DodoSSH.Contracts and
DodoSSH.Crypto, which the API builds too. The Dockerfile restores those with no
RID and fails NU1004. Found by running docker build rather than by reading. The
RID stays out of the committed state; the two commands that need one ask for it
unlocked, and the release script puts the lock files back.
**A Docker ARG named VERSION silently sets MSBuild's Version.** An ARG is an
environment variable for the rest of the stage, MSBuild reads environment
variables as properties, and property names are case-insensitive. With the
workflow passing main-<short sha> on a main build the publish died with
NETSDK1018 pointing at DodoSSH.Contracts, a project nobody had touched. The build
stage's argument is ASSEMBLY_VERSION now, empty except on a tag build.
All three are in docs/platform-flags.md, which is where the next person will look.
----
Verified: the whole solution builds and restores locked; 289 shell, 93 layout and
54 session tests pass, including the regression test for the settings defect and
a measurement of the banner at the window's minimum width. vpk pack runs end to
end and reports "Verified VelopackApp.Run()" against Program.Main. The API image
builds correctly both as a main build and as a tag build, carrying 1.0.0 and
0.1.0 respectively.
Not verified, and it needs a published release to be: installing, updating and
uninstalling on a real machine. That is Phase 15 of docs/manual-checks.md, and
the pack id and the WebView2 profile fix are reasoned and commented but only
proved by walking it. Two things to watch at the first upload — the reverse
proxy's body-size limit for a 64 MB asset, and whether vpk upload gitea is happy
with Gitea 1.27.1.
|
||
|
jaap-jan
|
2caedd93ff |
Merge branch 'main' into the Android head
Main grew the screens the host-management plan called for — hosts, pins, snippets, logs, import, teams — plus the ObjectStore and Import projects behind two of them, and moved WindowsDeviceKeyStore into the desktop head's Platform folder. Five of those view models landed in a directory this branch had already moved, so they join the rest in DodoSSH.Client.Shell: git spotted the rename and put them there, and the namespaces followed. Shell picks up ObjectStore and Import as a result, which the Android head then gets transitively and will use neither of at first — scoped storage means there is no ~/.ssh/config to import, and file transfer is out of its first scope. Desktop suites green at 155 and 64. |
||
|
jaap-jan
|
fe9d7fc289 |
Give DodoSSH a phone, and a shared shell for both heads to drive
The Android head from docs/android-port.md, taken as far as its step 6. Step 3, the spike, is answered and its throwaway screen is gone: libsodium.so and libe_sqlite3.so are both in the arm64 APK, so NSec resolves its native half on Android despite shipping no Android build, and the local cache opens. Two findings the audit could not have had: Avalonia.Controls.WebView only ships net10.0-android36.0, which settles the open "which Android versions" question at targetSdk 36; and Android has blocked cleartext HTTP since API 28, so the terminal renderer needs a network security config scoped to 127.0.0.1 or the WebView loads nothing. DodoSSH.Client.Shell is new and is why the phone can exist: the view models, the terminal renderer files and the palette moved there so both heads drive one state machine and draw from one set of tokens. The desktop head is otherwise untouched and its 144 tests still pass. The platform pieces behind interfaces that already existed: the profile directory from filesDir, a device key wrapped by a StrongBox-backed key that a fingerprint releases, and a foreground service so a shell outliving a vault lock stays true on a platform that stops backgrounded processes. Sign-in is deliberately absent rather than approximated. It needs an app link, because reusing the desktop loopback listener is the attack RFC 8252 section 8.3 names. |
||
|
jaap-jan
|
d07b336868 |
Free the terminal from the Hosts screen, and fill the room it left
The WebView sat inside the Hosts grid, so navigating to Files or the keychain hid every open terminal and the strip that named them. A connection you had opened was invisible from four of the five screens. The window now has two surfaces rather than one: a nav rail that says which page you are on, and a terminal strip that is always there and switches the whole content area to a shell. Screen keeps meaning "which page" and never becomes a sixth kind of page, which is why this is two properties instead of one enum with a terminal member in it. Every screen lives inside one wrapper panel that collapses when a terminal is showing. That is not tidiness — the WebView hosts a Win32 child window that composites above everything Avalonia draws, so a screen left visible over its rectangle is a screen sliced in half, and this window has shipped that defect once already. One decision point, IsTerminalShowing, and a nested panel rather than five compound bindings nobody would remember to extend. The focus choreography is the part no test in this repo can see. Every reveal path now focuses in the same turn the WebView appeared, so all three of them post at DispatcherPriority.Loaded and let the native control re-push its bounds first. Going the other way had a real bug: the screen-changed branch called a bare Focus() where it had to release the keyboard from the native child, so switching from a terminal to Files silently ate the first keystrokes. Rare before this commit and the primary gesture after it. The tab strip grew a cross inside each tab, a plus that opens the quick-connect palette, and middle-click close. Nested buttons are correct here: Avalonia handles a left press on the cross and deliberately does not handle other buttons, which is exactly what lets middle-click bubble up from the cross as well as the tab. The test is PointerUpdateKind rather than IsMiddleButtonPressed, because the latter reports button state and is also true for a left press made while the middle button happens to be held. The handler is on the tab and not the strip, so the background closes nothing by construction. Plus opens the palette rather than a flyout, since a menu dropping into the WebView's rectangle may or may not composite above a child HWND and this repo does not make rendering claims it has not photographed. Everything a user reads now says keychain. The wire, the database and the cryptographic spec still say vault, deliberately: renaming those is a migration and a protocol change for a word. That split is written down rather than left to be rediscovered as an inconsistency. Four things that were squeezed into the keychain's category rail, or into nothing at all, now have screens. Pinned host keys get one, with fingerprints never truncated and a filter that matches them, because comparing what you have against what the operator published is the whole workflow; the approved date is read out of the item's UUIDv7 rather than added as a column, and says so, since it means first approval and not last use. Keys can be generated in the client, which needed the openssh-key-v1 container written by hand — there is no BCL or NSec helper, and the PKCS#8 route is unverified in the SSH library this uses. The armour carries no passphrase: encrypting it needs bcrypt_pbkdf, which is Blowfish with a swizzle, in a project whose crypto is otherwise entirely libsodium, for a protection the key's own remarks argue is redundant inside a vault. Generation fills the existing editor and stops, so SAVE stays the one thing that writes. ~/.ssh/config can be imported behind a preview that is ticked per row and writes nothing until the button; IdentityFile records the path and imports the key material only on an explicit opt-in, because reading somebody's private key into a vault is precisely the act this product exists to make deliberate. Match blocks and ProxyJump are reported rather than obeyed — one cannot be evaluated statically and the other has nothing behind it to route with, and a preview that implied otherwise would be worse than one that admits it. Files can be dragged in all four directions that are honestly available. Remote to Explorer does not ship and is not pretended to: the shell wants the bytes during the drop, which needs a virtual file and a native COM data object, outside what Avalonia offers. Note for the next person that Avalonia 12 replaced the drag model outright — DataObject and DataFormats are no-op stubs and IDataObject is not in the reference assembly, so every tutorial written for 11 does not compile here. Hosts can be grouped, flat and never nested. A parent id merged as a scalar lets two offline clients each re-parent A under B and B under A, producing a cycle inside an encrypted payload that no server can police and every reader would have to detect for ever. Membership lives in that payload rather than in the one plaintext concession ADR 0001 allows, whose test is that the relay cannot function without it — nothing on the server reads a group, so what plaintext would hand over is a clustering of the estate for nothing. The plaintext column reserved for it is dropped, provably always null, and the server now refuses a client that sends one; it was never populated, was copied on apply, and was not cleared on delete, so a group id would have outlived the host it described. Snippets insert through xterm rather than through the pump, because xterm is the only thing that knows whether the remote has bracketed paste on, and that is what makes a shell treat embedded newlines as text instead of as execute. The host process moves opaque bytes and never parses output, so it would have to guess, and guessing wrong runs every line. Running is off by default and the copy says the text goes into whatever is there — the terminal has no notion of being at a prompt, and may be in vi or at a password prompt with echo off, so the Enter the user presses themselves is the entire safety property. Connections and keychain changes are recorded as synced encrypted items, which is what makes them auditable by a team later and costs the server knowledge of connection rate and timing from row counts alone. ADR 0001 already concedes it cannot hide that class of metadata; the trade is now written into it rather than left implicit. A connection entry is written once, at close, which is what makes a synced log tractable: nothing to merge, one outbox row, no chance of colliding with itself. Live sessions come from memory, not from the log. The write is void by contract and posts to a bounded channel, because putting an encrypt-and-write on the teardown path of every session is how closing the application comes to take four seconds. A ticket opened before a lock still closes afterwards, since a shell outlives the vault. The activity log hooks the one generic repository every kind writes through, so it cannot miss a caller — which is also why the log kinds themselves declare they are not audited, or the first entry would write an entry about writing an entry. It records the names of the fields that changed and never their values; a log with an old password in it would be a plaintext credential store with no vault around it. Retention is 90 days or 5,000 entries, whichever bites first, pruned on the sync loop rather than on a second timer. That log traffic then broke the status line, which is worth recording because the fix is a shape and not a patch: background sync counted its own log rows as pushed items, so the quiet rule stopped being quiet and every action's message was overwritten a second later by a sync report. The report now separates log rows from user items and the rule reads the latter. S3 buckets appear as a remote in the file browser, behind the same interface an SFTP session implements, so the queue and both panes did not have to learn what they are talking to. Uploads go through a pipe, because the queue wants to write and the SDK wants to read; memory is then bounded by the part size instead of buffering a file to disk twice. Finally, the Windows device key store moved out of the session project, which was the one thing keeping it from being portable — everything else in it is platform-neutral, and a Windows CNG dependency in the middle of the vault code meant a second head could not reference it without dragging Windows along. The seam that made the move free was already there. docs/android-port.md is the audit behind that: what ports, what does not, in order of cost, the four decisions taken, and an inventory of every screen and state the interface has to carry, written so a design can be made from it directly. dotnet build, dotnet test and dotnet format --verify-no-changes are all clean: 1240 tests at zero warnings, including the end-to-end suite against real containers. The manual checks that headless Avalonia cannot make — the drag from Explorer, a generated key against a real host, twelve tabs at the minimum window width — are listed in docs/manual-checks.md and are still outstanding. |
||
|
jaap-jan
|
240aadb746 |
Merge branch 'main' into claude/vault-unlock-logout-autosync-a84c35
ci / build and test (push) Failing after 3s
Four files needed a hand, and all four were two branches adding something in the same place rather than either changing what the other did. The shell's constructor now takes both new parameters: main's SFTP session factory, which it must have because it builds the transfers view model, and this branch's optional resume handler, which stays last so every existing test that constructs a shell without one still gets a shell that can only be online because somebody signed in during this run. App.axaml.cs, ShellFlowTests and QuickConnectTests pass the pair; the layout suite keeps both of its new fields. Signing out now detaches the transfers screen exactly as locking does, and the confirmation says that an open transfer session survives it. That is the same policy both sides already argue for their own case: signing out destroys this machine's copy of the vault, not work that authenticated before it. QuickConnectTests did not compile on main — the SFTP commit added a constructor parameter and the quick-connect suite, merged from a parallel branch just before it, was still calling the old one. Fixed here rather than worked around, since the merged tree has to build. dotnet build, dotnet test and dotnet format --verify-no-changes are all clean: 980 tests, including the end-to-end suite against real containers. |
||
|
jaap-jan
|
0b261c4d39 |
Stay signed in, come back online by itself, and let a machine be given up
Three things a machine that has been set up could not do. Unlock now takes Enter, which is the gesture everybody makes after typing a password and which did nothing until they found the button. Signing in survives a relaunch. The refresh token is kept in the local cache, sealed under the vault's own cache key, so a later launch resumes the session through the refresh grant with no browser and nobody present — and because it is sealed under that key, only an unlocked vault can resume it. A locked client therefore cannot reach the server at all, which is a consequence worth stating rather than working around; docs/crypto.md §3.2 records it. Every sync pass asks the shell for a connection rather than reading one captured at unlock, so a laptop that unlocked on a train is online within a minute of finding a network, with nothing pressed. Unlocking itself still never waits on a socket. Signing out empties this machine: the profile, the cached items, the outbox and this machine's device key, with the account's row withdrawn when the server can be reached. It asks first and says what it costs — the outbox count when the vault is open, an admission that it cannot be counted when it is not, and the shells that keep running either way. The vault is on the server and is untouched, which is what makes the same button the only honest answer to a forgotten passphrase, so it is on the unlock screen as well as in preferences. It cannot end the session at the identity provider, and says so. Two defects surfaced on the way. The synchronisation pass that runs when the vault opens never ran at all: the loop is started from inside the unlock command, so the busy flag it yields to was raised by that command — the first sync was a minute late on every launch. And signing in from preferences while unlocked threw an unlock screen over an open vault whose keys were still in memory. The unlock card and the new confirmation live in their own controls because MainWindow cannot be laid out headless, so markup left inside it is markup no test can measure; both are now measured at the window's minimum size in the shapes that grow. What is still unverified is the composed window itself. |
||
|
jaap-jan
|
04faef6597 |
Move files to and from a host over SFTP
M2's file transfer, built bottom-up: an SFTP session on the SSH layer, a transfer queue in a project of its own, and the two-pane browser the design asked for replacing the screen that said it did not exist. Remote listings carry names, sizes, modification times and a real drwxr-xr-x — nothing in this repository could render a POSIX mode before — and the queue moves one file at a time with progress, throughput and resume. The design import assumed this would be an SFTP subsystem channel on ISshConnection, beside the shell on a transport that is already up. SSH.NET does not offer that: SftpClient derives from BaseClient and owns its own transport, and there is no supported way to hand it an SshClient's session. So file transfer opens a second authenticated connection, and it is named for that rather than dressed up as a channel — OpenSftpAsync is on ISftpSessionFactory, not on a connection. The difference is visible to a user: the host records a second login, and a host whose password is typed each time asks for it again on this screen. It goes through the same host key gate, the same pin and the same two refusals a shell does, so a fingerprint approved for a terminal is approved here and one approved here reaches the other machines with the next sync. docs/design-import-gaps.md is corrected, and marked as the one row where what shipped differs from what it predicted. Nothing is written at its final name until it is complete. Every transfer goes to a .dodossh-part file beside its destination and is renamed into place at the end, so an interrupted transfer can never be mistaken for a finished one — which matters most for what this screen is actually for, which is copying a build artefact onto a server and then running it. A destination that already exists is refused outright rather than overwritten: the queue has no way to ask, and silently replacing a file somebody's process is serving is the worse of the two failures. The remote pane has DELETE and MKDIR so that refusal is not a dead end. A test against the container pins the assumption underneath all of this — that SFTP's rename does not clobber. Resume works within a run of the application and not across a restart, and the limit is deliberate rather than unfinished. Nothing records which source wrote a part file, and resuming one on the strength of its name matching is how a corrupt artefact gets delivered with nothing reporting a failure; a part file found at startup is started over. Making it survive a restart needs the preferences store this client still has not got. The offset a resume starts at is the part file's own length rather than the transfer's recorded progress: a cancellation can land between a write completing and the counter moving, and only one of those two is a fact about the bytes that are there. The queue and its connection outlive a lock, as shells do. LockAsync already argues that locking must not destroy work in flight — it is what somebody does when they walk away from the machine, which is exactly when a long transfer is most likely to be running — so TransfersViewModel is created once and the vault is attached on unlock and detached on lock. What locking takes is the host list, and it has to: those rows carry decrypted secrets. DodoSSH.Client.Transfer is a new project rather than more of Client.Ssh. The two answer different questions — one is about reaching a host, the other about moving bytes and what to do when moving them stops halfway — and this is the only client project that deliberately touches the local filesystem. Three defects the tests found, none of which review would have. SftpPath.Name answered an empty string for the root. NavigateRemoteAsync wrapped itself in the busy guard, so navigating from inside another command did nothing at all and the remote pane simply stayed empty after connecting, with no failure anywhere to explain it. And opening an SFTP session per test made two handshakes per test — this client learns a host key by being refused — which pushed the SSH assembly past sshd's MaxStartups and failed a different few unrelated tests each run; the session is shared through the fixture now, with the reason written where the next person will hit it. 1004 tests green across 18 projects, 24 of them new: the SFTP subsystem against the OpenSSH container, the queue against a real temporary directory and a fake host, and three more layout measurements because a screen this window has never laid out is a screen never checked. Not verified: the screen has not been looked at running. The layout harness measures it at the window's minimum in three shapes, which is the class of defect that has shipped here before, but reaching it in the application needs the compose stack, the migrations, the API and a browser sign-in. What is still absent — the status bar's transfer count, dragging between the panes, transferring a directory, and sftp over a bastion — is in docs/design-import-gaps.md. |
||
|
jaap-jan
|
573f5d5668 |
Keep the device key in the TPM, behind a consent Windows enforces
The last of ADR 0007's three pieces, and it does not implement what that ADR originally decided — because writing it exposed a flaw in the decision. The ADR said "a Windows Hello gesture gating a protected blob". That does not deliver what the rest of the document claims for it: a gate inside the process is not a gate. A store that showed a prompt and then read a DPAPI blob would be bypassed by malware that skipped the prompt, read the file and called CryptUnprotectData itself — which is exactly the attacker the whole decision was made against, and exactly the reason DPAPI alone was rejected. The presence requirement has to be a condition of using the key, enforced below the application, or it is decoration. So the device key is encrypted to an RSA key created in the Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider — the TPM — under CngUIProtectionLevels.ProtectKey. Windows requires consent to use that key, so the prompt is not something this code can be talked out of showing. Malware can ask for the key; it cannot answer the dialog. That is strictly stronger than the ADR described, and most of what option D was being saved for: the wrapping key genuinely never leaves hardware. The X25519 device key still lands in memory to open the wrap, because DSH1 fixes that wrap at a curve the TPM cannot do — the remaining gap, and now a smaller step than it was. CngKey is in-box, so this needed no WinRT projection and no Windows target framework. Which is worth stating plainly because the opposite was planned: the piece was scoped as "where the Windows TFM lands", and it turned out a platform guard on one class was enough. Client.App and its two test projects stay on net10.0. Two things were measured on real hardware rather than assumed, and the second changed the shape of the work. The platform provider works here and holds an RSA key — confirmed by creating and deleting one before writing anything that depended on it. And ProtectKey prompts at key *creation*, not only at use. The comment in the first draft of this file said the opposite, with a confident explanation: sealing uses only the public half, so it should be silent. It is not. CngKey.Create blocks on a dialog, because the policy means "protect this key with a PIN" and Windows asks the user to set that up there and then. Found by writing tests around save and forget and watching the suite hang for ten minutes waiting for somebody to type one. That has two consequences worth knowing before touching this file. SaveAsync is user-facing code — it belongs on a UI thread, behind a button somebody pressed, never on a background pass. And almost nothing in the store can be covered automatically: two tests remain, availability and the empty-blob case, both of which provably reach no dialog. Disabling the UI policy to make the rest testable would remove the one property worth having. The interface offers two things and hides both where they cannot work. "Use Windows Hello" appears on the unlock screen only when this machine has a cached wrap and a keystore still willing to release the key; "Use Windows Hello here" appears in the account bar only when the machine can keep a key and has not already registered one, so it is spent once used. Absent rather than disabled, in both cases: a greyed-out button on a machine that never had a TPM reads as something broken, and the passphrase box beside it is not a fallback — it is the ordinary way in. Both unlock paths now share AdoptAsync rather than each opening the known-host store, building the vault and starting auto-sync. The ordering in there is load-bearing and a second copy would be a second chance to get it wrong. The shell's tests drive a fake keystore. Not for speed: the real one prompts on every save and load, so a suite using it would block forever. What the shell has to get right is which buttons appear and what happens when one is pressed, and a fake answers exactly that. It is shared from Client.Session.Tests by source link rather than reimplemented. 882 tests green, 6 of them new. Zero warnings, dotnet format clean. Not verified, and not verifiable here: the dialogs. Whether the consent prompt appears at the right moments, reads sensibly, and returns to a usable window when declined needs the application run by a person on a machine with a TPM. That is the remaining half of outstanding item #7, and it is now the only thing between this feature and being finished. |
||
|
jaap-jan
|
211eba0666 |
Keep host key trust in the vault, and make it withdrawable
A fingerprint approved once is now approved on every machine and survives a
restart, because host key trust is a vault item type rather than a dictionary
that dies with the process. InMemoryKnownHostStore was what shipped, so the user
was asked to verify a fingerprint on every single connection — which is the gap
most likely to train somebody to click through the one warning that actually
matters. A warning that appears when nothing is wrong teaches that nothing is
ever wrong.
The fourth item type, and like the third it cost no sync logic: a row, an EF
configuration, a migration, a server kind; a secret, a codec, a merge, a cipher,
a repository facade and a session property. One row in the client registry. The
reconciler, the mirror, the repository, the outbox and the pull filter were not
touched. SyncEntityType.KnownHostKey and AadResourceType.KnownHostKey were
already reserved, so neither the contract nor docs/crypto.md changed.
One item per (host, port, algorithm), because a server legitimately offers
several host keys and which one gets negotiated is not ours to predict. Pinning
per endpoint would make an algorithm change indistinguishable from an attack.
The label is derived rather than stored, which is the one place this type
departs from the other three. A user never names a pin — there is nothing to
name it after but the three fields it already has — and a stored label is a
second copy of data that can disagree with the first after a merge. Relabel
returns the secret unchanged, and says why.
The store answers the handshake without touching the disk. SshNetConnectionFactory
calls FindAsync from inside SSH.NET's synchronous HostKeyReceived event, over
.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), which cannot be avoided; doing SQLite I/O plus an AEAD
open per lookup there would put the handshake behind the cache. So decryption
happens in OpenAsync and RefreshAsync — on unlock and after each sync pass,
exactly where the host and key lists already reload — and FindAsync is a
dictionary read under a lock with no await inside it.
That snapshot is where the one real bug in this change lived. Install originally
merged the live pins over the freshly loaded snapshot, to protect a TrustAsync
that had landed while the read was in flight. It would also have resurrected
every pin the user had just forgotten, and stopped a withdrawal made on another
machine from ever taking effect — the store would have healed the deletion back
into existence on every refresh. Replacing wholesale and discarding the read
instead is correct because writes are the rare case: every write bumps a
generation counter, and a refresh whose stamp is stale throws itself away rather
than winning. Nothing found this but reading the method again; it is the kind of
mistake that passes every test written before it, because the test that catches
it is the one the bug tells you to write.
Forgetting is new, and persistence is what made it mandatory rather than
convenient. A mismatch is a hard refusal with no way to continue — deliberately,
and that stays — so pinning a key permanently is also a way to make a
legitimately rebuilt server permanently unreachable. Before this change the pin
died at exit and the problem solved itself; now it does not.
ForgetAsync drops every algorithm for an endpoint, and it is reachable from the
host editor rather than from the warning. Putting it on the mismatch banner would
have made it two clicks from "this may be an attack" to "connect anyway", which
is the affordance the hard refusal exists to deny. The banner already promised
the key could be removed in the host's settings; that promise is now true and
points at the button.
Trust recorded on another machine becomes visible at the next sync pass, not
immediately, and that is a decision rather than an oversight. The failure it
produces is a first-contact prompt for a host a colleague approved a minute ago:
answerable, and self-correcting on the next pass. The opposite trade — polling
the vault on the handshake thread to close a one-minute window — buys nothing
and costs the property above. The dangerous direction is not reachable at all: a
pin recorded here enters the snapshot as part of recording it, so a refresh can
never discard a local trust decision.
The server learns nothing, and this is the item type where the temptation was
real. A plaintext host column would let a known-hosts screen sort and page
without decrypting anything, and it would hand the operator the map of every
user's estate — assembled, as these things are, out of facts that are each
individually harmless. A host row concedes an address only when relay is
switched on and the database refuses to store one otherwise (ADR 0004); there is
no equivalent excuse here. The table has no column to put one in, and the EF
configuration says so where somebody adding it would be standing.
Two things about the migration in this commit are worth knowing, because both
came out of getting it wrong.
It was hand-written first, including its .Designer.cs, and that version is not
what is here. Verifying it turned up something that had been quietly assumed:
Migration_AppliedCleanly_WithNoPendingModelChanges does not check the model
snapshot. It asserts that migrations applied and that none are pending, which a
wrong snapshot satisfies perfectly — the snapshot only matters as the diff base
for the *next* migrations add, so an incorrect one passes the whole suite and
corrupts the following migration instead. The real check is to generate a
throwaway migration and confirm its Up and Down come out empty. They did, and
the generated designer was byte-identical to the transcribed one across all 1255
lines, so the hand-written work was in fact correct.
Then dotnet ef migrations remove --no-build deleted the wrong migration. With
--no-build the tool reads the previously compiled assembly rather than the files
on disk, and the probe had just changed which migration was last, so it removed
AddKnownHostKeyItem and reverted the snapshot. That turned out to leave exactly
the right diff base, so the migration here is EF's own output rather than a
transcription — a better outcome than the one that was interrupted, arrived at
by accident. Never pass --no-build to migrations remove.
Mutation tested, all three sabotages detected: dropping the algorithm from
KnownHostIdentity.For, merging instead of replacing in Install, and pointing
KnownHostKeyCipher at PortForward — which is what a cast from the wire enum's 10
would silently produce. Each is caught both by an assertion about the mechanism
and by a behavioural test that never mentions it; the resource-type sabotage is
caught by the table from
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jaap-jan
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49f617b450 |
Wire the Avalonia shell to the vault
The host list now comes from the vault instead of from a form. A fresh machine takes a server URL, signs in through the browser, enrolls, and from then on opens with the passphrase alone. DodoSSH.Client.Session is the composition layer: where a profile lives, how it unlocks, and how a machine gets one. ClientPaths picks a non-roaming per-OS directory — %LOCALAPPDATA% and never %APPDATA%, because a SQLite cache that roams between two machines is a corrupt one, and each machine's outbox is its own. SessionOpener needs no transport at all and could not reach one if it wanted to; that is the offline unlock, asserted rather than asserted about. A wrong passphrase, a stale KDF and a grant revoked by a rekey are three different answers, because the remedies are three different things and telling someone to retype a passphrase that was never the problem is worse than saying nothing. The shell's states are the onboarding story. The recovery code gets its own state that cannot be clicked past: it exists for one moment, losing it with the passphrase loses the vault, and there is no server-side reset by design. It is dropped from memory on confirmation rather than merely hidden. Sign-in is a delegate over IVaultServer, so the whole state machine runs in a test against an in-memory server — no browser, no identity provider, no toolkit. The view models are plain observable objects, which is what makes that possible. What it does not cover is whether the XAML binds to the right names; that needs a rendered tree and Avalonia.Headless, and is its own piece of work. Three things found by doing it rather than by reading it: - Pooled SQLite connections keep the database file open after the last context is disposed. On Windows that means locked, so the application could never replace its own cache — and a test could not clean up after itself, which is how it surfaced. Dispose now clears the pool. - EF's SQLite provider puts the database in WAL mode, so the cache is three files. A comment in ClientCacheFactory claimed the opposite; reading PRAGMA journal_mode off a real launch settled it. WAL is the right mode here — a sync pass writes while the interface reads — so the comment was wrong on the merits as well as on the fact. - Enrolling a device key with nowhere to keep the private half would put a wrap on the server nobody can open and make the device list claim this machine can unlock without a passphrase. Device binding is now optional and the shell declines it until the OS keystore is wired. Verified on Windows: the client created %LOCALAPPDATA%\DodoSSH\cache.db and migrated it on first launch, and msedgewebview2 held an established connection to the data plane while the unlock overlay covered it — which is the point of covering the WebView rather than collapsing it, since a NativeWebView that is never laid out is never realised. 630 tests, up from 593. The recovery-code gate and the offline unlock were each verified by breaking them and watching the right test fail. Still to do for M1's actual definition of done: the manual run against the real API and a real Keycloak. Credentials are not a synced entity type yet, so a connection still asks for a password, and the interface says so rather than implying otherwise. |
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jaap-jan
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5fccd53824 |
Add the Avalonia app and the xterm renderer, and fix two real bugs
The terminal works end to end. A new integration test drives a real sshd in a container through a real PTY, the real pump, the real loopback WebSocket with its token and origin checks, and a ClientWebSocket standing in for the page: the login banner arrives, typed input round-trips, and `stty size` reports the 100x30 the session asked for. The only untested link left is xterm drawing bytes it was handed. The WebView is de-risked on Windows, which was the plan's largest risk. Not by assertion: with the app running there is an established TCP connection from msedgewebview2 to the data plane port, so WebView2 launched, navigated to the loopback page, executed terminal.js, and completed the WebSocket handshake against the real token and origin checks. Linux remains unproven and the package's own release notes now corroborate the concern -- Linux uses a WPE backend, and it ships a NativeWebDialog described as useful where embedded WebViews may be unavailable. Two bugs found by building it, both of which would have shipped: - ShellStream.Write buffers and needs an explicit Flush. Without one a keystroke is accepted, reported as written, and never reaches the remote: the terminal displays output perfectly and simply stops responding to input. SSH.NET's own WriteLine flushes, which is why the earlier spike never hit it. Found by isolating the pump against real SSH and reading BytesRead=51 -- banner and prompt through, nothing after. - The Windows app manifest needs a supportedOS list, or Avalonia's native control host fails outright and the terminal never starts. Also fixed a genuinely flaky test I happened to catch: SyncCursorTests tampered with the *last* base64url character, whose low bits the decoder ignores when the input length is not a multiple of three -- so a tampered cursor sometimes decoded to identical bytes and verified. It failed roughly one run in thirty, depending on a random key. Now tampers the penultimate character, which is fully significant at every length; 40 consecutive runs are clean. xterm 6.0.0 plus the fit and webgl addons are vendored as UMD bundles rather than built with npm, so a clean clone needs only the .NET SDK. Provenance and licences are recorded next to them, along with the UMD global names terminal.js depends on -- a bundle that switched to ES modules would load without error and leave Terminal undefined. The renderer acknowledges output from term.write's completion callback, not on receipt. Acknowledging early would return flow-control credit for bytes the screen has not caught up with, which is the one thing the credit window exists to measure. TerminalWorkspace moved into DodoSSH.Client.Terminal: it has no Avalonia dependency, and having it there is what let the end-to-end test exist at all. 404 tests pass, zero warnings on a clean rebuild, format clean. |